“Pursuant to Clause 22.3 of Marketing Company Trading Agreement signed by you please be advised that as of1st January 2016 all interests and rights under the Marketing Company Trading Agreement entered into between PerDM Trading Limited…. and your company will be permanently assigned to Credico Marketing Limited… Please be advised that because of the proposed assignment all of the obligations and rights of the former party to this contract are now the responsibility of the new party to this contract.”
“The Independent Sales Advisor understands that the Company’s clients may restrict the Company from selling their products and services to consumers outside a geographical area. The Company shall notify the Independent Sales Advisor when a restriction on a geographical area applies, and the Independent Sales Advisor agrees that he/she, or their substitutes, will not sell outside the designated geographical area to preserve the integrity of the chain of supply.”
“all information provided by the Company to the Independent Sales Advisor relating to the Company, any Client, PerDM, any Customer, any Client Service or Group Product, the Network, or any Campaign Materials except information which the Company can prove: (a) is in the public domain otherwise than by breach of this Agreement; (b) was in the lawful possession of the Independent Sales Advisor prior to the date of this Agreement, otherwise than through liaison between the parties prior to this Agreement; (c) was obtained by the Independent Sales Advisor from an independent third party free to divulge it; (d) is required to be disclosed by a court or other competent authority; (e) is properly disclosed on a confidential basis to professional advisers of the Independent Sales Advisor for the purposes of this Agreement.”
“PerDM shall provide Campaign Instructions, Campaign Materials and support to enable the Company to provide Campaign Services (provided that, where applicable, the client has provided required Campaign Instructions and Campaign Materials to PerDM).”
“The Guarantor [Mr Lambert], in consideration of the benefits provided to the Company under this Agreement, hereby… personally guarantees to PerDM the obligations of the Company under this Agreement on the terms of the Guarantee.”
“This agreement may be terminated at any time by either party giving 14 (fourteen) days written notice of such termination to the other.”
“Upon ….. termination of this Agreement the Company shall …. 20.1.3 return all Campaign Materials [at] the date of suspension or termination. 20.1.4 deliver, or destroy, as PerDM shall require, any documents or other materials provided to it by PerDM under this Agreement.”
“In default of the Company fulfilling its obligations under clause 20.1 any authorised representative of PerDM may take reasonable steps to procure such delivery or destruction, including entering any premises owned or occupied by the Company to secure any items or materials required to be delivered to PerDM or destroyed.”
“The Company shall not, without prior express agreement from PerDM: 21.1 at any time while this Agreement is in force directly or indirectly carry on, or be involved in, any similar type of business as outlined under this Agreement. 21.2 during the period of 6 (six) months after termination of this Agreement, for any reason directly or indirectly, carry on, or be involved in any similar business conducted in a similar manner to that contemplated in this Agreement, within a radius of 10 (ten) miles of the principal place of business of the Company at any time during the final 6 (six) months (or lesser duration) of this Agreement.”
“12.1 To ensure the financial integrity of the Network, it shall be a condition of this Agreement that the [MC] shall use special banking arrangements arranged for Network companies by PerDM with the Bank.” “12.4.3 The Company shall operate each of its bank accounts only in accordance with applicable instructions issued by PerDM” “12.4.8 To enable the sound management of the Company bank accounts PerDM shall hold any and all cheque books relating to Company’s bank accounts and shall have unilateral control of any Internet Banking facility.”
“I accept that I did offer some services to clients other than Credico when Credico had no work for me during the pandemic….”
“For the purposes of this undertaking, save where otherwise indicated, the defined terms shall be interpreted by reference to their respective meaning in the [letter of3 December 2020 ] and the Trading Agreement. Whilst the Trading Agreement is in force: Neither I or S5 will, whether directly or indirectly, carry on, or be involved in any direct marketing business. Following the termination of the Trading Agreement: Neither I or S5 will during the period of 6 (six) months after termination of the Trading Agreement, whether directly or indirectly, carry on or be involved in any direct marketing business within a radius of 10 (ten) miles of the postcode M1 2PW [the postcode of S5’s office in Manchester]”
“In consideration of Credico refraining from applying for interim injunctive relief against me and/S5 Marketing Limited (S5) at this time as referred to in the letter, but without prejudice to Credico’s rights against me and/or S5 in respect of any other act by me and/or S5, I and S5 each hereby undertake to Credico, whether acting by ourselves, our directors, officers, employees, agents and/or otherwise howsoever, as follows:”
“Q. As far as you’re concerned Mr Lambert was still sort of involved because he was your point of contact. Yes, so he had obvious responsibility because he’d brung his ISAs over to ESM, so he felt it was his responsibility.”
“Until further order, or, if earlier, the termination of the Trading Agreement on25 December 2020 , the Defendants must not directly or indirectly, carry on, or be involved in any similar type of business to that outlined in the Trading Agreement and in particular (but without limitation) the Defendants must not carry on or be involved in the business of face to face selling and/or marketing through Immabee Limited. During the period from25 December 2020 until judgment after trial or further order, or, if earlier,25 June 2021 , the Defendants must not directly or indirectly carry on, or be involved in any similar busines conducted in a similar manner to that outlined under the Trading Agreement within a 10 mile radius of the postcode M1 2PW and in particular (but without limitation) the Defendants must not carry on or be involved in the business of face to face selling and/or marketing within that area through Immabee Limited.”
“The proper approach to deciding whether a novation should be inferred is to decide whether that inference is necessary to give business efficacy to what actually happened (compare Miles v Clarke[1953] 1 WLR 537 at 540). The inference is necessary for this purpose if the implication is required to provide a lawful explanation or basis for the parties’ conduct.”
“Noe Action shall be brought . . . whereby to charge the Defendant upon any speciall promise to answere for the debt default or miscarriages of another person . . . unlesse the Agreement upon which such Action shall be brought or some Memorandum or Note thereof shall be in Writeing and signed by the partie to be charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.”
“(1) The court must determine what the covenant means, properly construed. (2) The court must then consider whether the former employer has shown on the evidence that it has legitimate interests requiring protection in relation to the employer’s employment. (3) Once legitimate protectable interests are shown, the covenant must be shown by the former employer to be no wider than reasonably necessary. (4) Even if the covenant is held to be reasonable, the court will decide whether, as a matter of discretion, the injunctive relief sought should in all the circumstances be granted having regard, amongst other things, to its reasonableness at the time of trial. (5) The burden is on the covenantee to establish that the restraint is no greater than reasonably necessary for the proper protection of protectable interests. (6) Reasonable necessity is to be assessed from the perspective of reasonable persons in the position of the parties at the time that the contract was entered into or varied and having regard to the contractual provisions as a whole and to the factual matrix to which the contract would then realistically have been expected to apply.”
“Reasonableness 62. On the question of reasonableness, it is common ground that the test identified by Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt (at 565) is to be applied: “reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is no way injurious to the public.” 63. Whilst in some of the authorities the courts have conflated the two (private and public interest) aspects of the test (see for example Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide SS Co[1913] AC 781 (at 795 per Lord Parker) and Esso (at 324D per Lord Pearce)), the broad view appears to be that Lord Macnaghten’s dichotomy is to be preferred. Where businesses have dealt at arm’s length with each other, they can usually be regarded as adequate guardians of their own interests. However, the possible impact of the bargain upon third parties, or the public more generally, may call for careful judicial scrutiny. Clarity of analysis is more likely to be facilitated by preservation of both limbs of the exposition. 64. A court will be slow to substitute its (objective) view as to the interests of the contracting parties for the (subjective) views of the contracting parties themselves. The law recognises that if business contracts are fairly made by parties who are on equal terms such parties should know their business best (see in particular Esso (at 300C-D per Lord Reid; at 305B-D per Lord Morris and at 323B-E per Lord Pearce)). That consideration will carry less or no weight if the parties were negotiating on other than equal terms (see Panayiotou (at 332 per Jonathan Parker J)). The absence of independent legal advice for the weaker party may also be relevant (see PSM (at [100] per Arden LJ)). 65. Beyond this, and again drawing the relevant threads together by way of summary: i) The onus of establishing that a covenant is no more than is reasonable in the interests of the parties is on the person who seeks to rely on it (see in particular Attwood v Lamont[1920] 3 KB 571 (at 587-588 per Younger LJ). If he/she establishes that it is no more than reasonable in the interests of the parties, the onus of proving that it is contrary to the public interest lies on the party attacking it (see in particular Saxelby (at 716 per Lord Shaw)); ii) The time for considering reasonableness is again the time of the making of the contract (see in particular Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney[1965] 1 WLR 1366 (at 1377 per Diplock LJ); Shell v Lostock Garage Ltd[1976] 1 WLR 1187 (at 1197-1198 per Lord Denning MR) and Schroeder (at 1309H per Lord Reid)); iii) It is no answer on the question of reasonableness to say that there have been substantial financial rewards on all sides. The question of reasonableness has to be considered by reference to the terms of the contract (see in particular PSM (at [104] per Arden LJ)); iv) For a restraint to be reasonable between the parties it must be no more than what was reasonably required by the party in whose favour it was imposed to protect his legitimate interests (see in particular Saxelby (at 701 per Lord Atkinson) and Schroeder (at 1310B per Lord Reid and 1315H per Lord Diplock)); v) The court is entitled to consider whether or not a covenant of a narrower nature would have sufficed for the covenantee’s protection (see in particular Office Angels Ltd v Rainer Thomas and O’Connor[1991] IRLR 214 (at 220 per Sir Christopher Slade)); vi) What is reasonable may alter with the changing nature of commerce and society (see in particular Nordenfelt (at 547 per Lord Herschell)); vii) Factors to be considered when assessing reasonableness between the parties include the character of the business (see in particular Nordenfelt (at 550 per Lord Herschell)) and also: a) The relevance of the consideration for the restraint; b) Inequality of bargaining power; c) Standard forms of contract; d) Whether the restraints operate during or post-contract; e) The surrounding circumstances, including the factual and contractual background; (see in particular Panayiotou (at 329-336 per Jonathan Parker J)); viii) The duration of an agreement in restraint of trade is a factor of great importance in determining whether the restrictions in an agreement can be justified (see in particular Schroeder (at 1312F-G per Lord Reid)); ix) The level of compensation may be relevant to the question of reasonableness (see Esso (at 300B-C per Lord Reid) and (at 329-330 per Jonathan Parker J)); x) The motives of the party challenging the contract are immaterial to the question of whether the terms of the contract are reasonable as between the parties (see in particular Schroeder (at 1309H per Lord Reid) and Panayiotou (at 336 per Jonathan Parker J)).”
“54. The definition of a covenant in restraint of trade presents “peculiar conceptual difficulty”: Chitty comments that all contracts are to some extent in restraint of trade by at least preventing the parties to the contract from trading with others. However, there has been no suggestion that all contracts are or should be subject to the doctrine, which is rather “to be applied to factual situations with a broad and flexible rule of reason” (see Esso (at 331G per Lord Wilberforce)). The courts have made no apologies for refraining from any attempt to identify the dividing line between contracts which are and are not in restraint of trade. It has been described as “uncertain and porous” (see Proactive Sports Management Ltd v Rooney[2012] FSR 16 ("PSM") (at [55] per Arden LJ). The courts have emphasised repeatedly that the categories of restraint of trade are not closed (see for example Petrofina (Great Britain) Ltd v Martin[1966] Ch 146 (at 169 per Lord Denning MR)) (“Petrofina”). …. 60. I draw together the relevant legal principles from the authorities (including most recently Peninsula) as follows: (i)The doctrine is not confined to immutable boundaries or rigid categorisation, but there are certain categories of covenants to which the doctrine traditionally applies, in particular those by which an employee undertakes not to compete with his employer after leaving the employer's service and those by which a trader who has sold his business agrees not thereafter to compete with the purchaser of the business. The doctrine has been held to apply to franchise agreements, share-purchase agreements and the assignment of a patent; (ii)There are no clear limits on the scope of the doctrine and no precise or exhaustive test can be stated. The doctrine is to be applied to factual situations with a broad and flexible rule of reason (see Esso (at 331G per Lord Wilberforce)). The question is whether or not in all the circumstances the contract should be excluded from the application of the doctrine or, as Lord Wilberforce put it in Esso (at 332G), whether it is appropriate to dispense the contract “from the necessity of justification under a public policy test of reasonableness”; (iii)Contractual restraining provisions which are of a sort which have become part of the accepted machinery of a type of transaction which have generally been found acceptable and necessary – reflecting the accepted and normal currency of commercial or contractual conveyancing relations - will generally fall outside the scope of the doctrine (following the “trading society” test discussed above and approved in Peninsula Securities); (v)Determining whether contractual restraints fall outside the range of a normal commercial contract imposing restrictions on a contracting party’s ability to carry on a business activity is a question of evaluating all the relevant factors to be assessed cumulatively...; (vi)The assessment of application of the doctrine is to be carried out by reference to the position as at the time that the contract is made (not by reference to subsequent performance and events). How the contract turns out may be relevant only in so far as it furnishes evidence of the nature of the contract in question when made…; (vii)The application depends less on legal niceties or theoretical possibilities than on the practical effect of the restraint in hampering the freedom to trade…. It is a question of substance not form…; (viii)The doctrine can apply to restraints operating during the currency of the contract, as well as post-contractually. However, the distinction between pre-and post-termination restraints is not without relevance. The fact that a restraint is limited to the period of the contract may be a factor in favour of excluding the doctrine (or a factor to be brought into account on the side of justification)… (ix)As already set out above, where the doctrine applies, the contractual restraints are prima facie unenforceable but all, whether partial or total, are enforceable if reasonable. 61. The approach of the courts to analogous factual situations may be of assistance in determining the correct approach to be taken but is unlikely to be determinative because of the fact-sensitive nature of the exercise to be carried out.”
“The question is whether or not (as a matter of public policy) it is appropriate to dispense the contract from the necessity of justification under a public policy test of reasonableness”
“79…..Public policy, which sets a high threshold, remains the foundation of the doctrine. As the authorities make clear, there is no bright line to be drawn (and it would be wrong to attempt to define one). But what does have to be decided is on which side of the line the facts of any given case fall. This involves an assessment of public policy to be carried out by reference to the facts as they stood at the time that the contract was entered into, balancing the competing considerations of holding parties to freely negotiated contracts whilst not permitting them to be restricted unduly in their ability to trade. The freedom to contract is itself in the public interest (see Esso (at 304F306C per Lord Morris)). The doctrine is not there to rescue business men and women from having entered into agreements which they may later regret. 80. The search is for one or more features of the Services Agreement which, in all the circumstances, can be said to be such a cause for concern (or apparently oppressive) as to justify (as a matter of public policy) requiring the covenantee to prove reasonableness. As indicated, LLP contends that there are, including the duration of the Covenants and the one-sided nature of the termination provisions.”
“common in ordinary commerce and there would, therefore, have to be something specially restrictive before the restraint of trade principle will be effective”
“In my judgment, far from confining the circumstances in which covenants in restraint of trade may be enforced to certain categories of case, and defining those categories strictly, the courts have moved in the opposite direction. The established categories are not rigid, and they are not exclusive. Rather, the covenant may be enforced when the covenantee has a legitimate interest, of whatever kind, to protect, and when the covenant is no wider than is necessary to protect that interest.”
“OMM provided its agents with training, transactional systems, software, marketing materials, regular visits from sales staff and a helpdesk dedicated to agents giving them operational and technical assistance. It is clear from this that OMM dedicate both time and money to training and supporting their agents.” (Court of Appeal judgment, paragraph 16).”
“The primary facts as found by the judge and set out above all point to the right inference being that OMM did have a legitimate interest to protect and the only question should therefore be whether the duration the restriction or the area were unreasonable restraints.”