Franklin William Rzucek v Alan Vinnicombe [2026] EWHC 946 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 946 (KB)Case No KB-2022-004547
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 23/04/2026
Before
Dan Squires KC
Between
Franklin William RzucekClaimantAlan VinnicombeDefendant
Gervase de Wilde (instructed by Cohen Davis Solicitors) for ClaimantAlan Vinnicombe (representing himself)Hearing Hearing date: 25 March 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 12:00pm on Thursday 23 April 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Dan Squires KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge:

[1]In August 2018 Shanann Watts, the sister of Franklin Rzucek (“the Claimant”), was brutally murdered along with her two young daughters in Colorado, USA. The murder was perpetrated by Christopher Watts, who was Shanann’s husband and the girls’ father. The killings attracted widespread interest in the media and online around the world, including in the UK, and spawned theories speculating on the details of the murder, Mr Watts’ possible motives and whether he acted alone.[2]Alan Vinnicombe (“the Defendant”) is a UK citizen living in the UK. Until 2023 he operated a YouTube channel, named “Armchair Detective Blue”, in which he discussed what he described as “True Crime & other Case Mysteries”. The channel had more than 79,000 subscribers. On the channel the Defendant, who had no previous connection to the Claimant or his family, repeatedly posted videos discussing the murder of the Claimant’s sister and the activities of his family. The Claimant considered the videos to be defamatory and to constitute harassment. On 26 January 2023 he issued a claim pursuant to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (“PHA 1997”) and for defamation against the Defendant. On 26 February 2025, Susie Alegre, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, struck out the Defendant’s defence pursuant to CPR 3.4(2), and entered judgment for the Claimant. The case came before me to determine what, if any, remedies the Claimant was entitled to, as well as to determine an application for relief from sanction in relation to the late admission of a witness statement from the Claimant which I explain below.[3]I am grateful for the measured, clear and helpful way in which Mr de Wilde put his submissions on behalf of the Claimant, and for acting pro bono in these proceedings. I am also grateful to Mr Vinnicombe who, despite representing himself, was able to clearly and concisely explain his case. The following is my judgment.

Factual background

[4]The background to this case is the tragic murder of the Claimant’s sister, Shanann Watts, on 13 August 2018. Shanann was killed, along with her two daughters and her unborn child, by her husband Christopher Watts. After at first attempting to conceal the murders and mislead the police, Mr Watts confessed to the killings and pled guilty on 6 November 2018. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole.[5]There was extensive media interest in the Watts case. It spawned a TV dramatization and TV documentary, as well as commentary online, discussing, and speculating about, details of the murder. That included by the Defendant on his YouTube channel where he published at least 180 videos on the Watts case between 2018 and 2023.[6]The Claimant lived in North Carolina. His case on harassment concerns the Defendant’s alleged conduct from September 2020 to March 2023, and relates to videos he published to his subscribers about the Watts case. As set out further below, in the videos the Defendant speculated about the causes of the Claimant’s nieces’ death, suggested that Mr Watts had not acted alone and that the Claimant and his family did not wish the truth about Shanann and the children’s murders to come out. It is the Claimant’s case that the publication of those videos constitutes unlawful harassment pursuant to PHA 1997.[7]In August 2021 the Claimant set up a fund-raising page on CrowdJustice (an online fundraising platform designed for legal action) in order to pursue a legal complaint around the online publications concerning his sister’s murder. The Defendant, who believed the legal complaint was directed at him, responded to the fundraising and other matters in a series of videos. The Claimant’s defamation claim focused upon five of those videos posted between November 2021 and August 2022 on the Defendant’s YouTube channel. They were, according to the Claimant, viewed by tens of thousands of the Defendant’s subscribers. I will say more about the videos below, but essentially the Claimant’s case is that the videos suggested he was dishonestly raising funds from the public for legal proceedings, and that he was engaged in harassing and other unlawful conduct against the Defendant. It is the Claimant’s case that the videos contained defamatory statements which caused, or were likely to cause, serious harm to his reputation.[8]In September 2023, following complaints to Google and YouTube by the Claimant’s solicitors, the Defendant’s YouTube channel was taken down.

Procedural history

[9]On 26 January 2023 the Claimant issued the present proceedings and on 10 March 2023 served Particulars of Claim.[10]The Defendant sought on a number of occasions to file a defence. His first defence was dated 3 April 2023, and an amended defence was served dated 8 August 2023. Pursuant to CPR r 16.5 a defence must deal with “every allegation in the Particulars of Claim” stating whether they are denied, admitted or are matters which the claimant is required to prove. CPR r 16.5 also requires a defendant who denies an allegation to provide their reasons for doing so, and, if they intend to put forward a different version of events, to state their own version. Practice Direction 53B applies to media and communication claims and covers the present proceedings. It provides that if a defendant to a defamation claim wishes to argue a statement is substantially true, they must specify the imputation they contend is substantially true and the matters on which they will rely in support of that contention.[11]The Claimant considered that the defences submitted by the Defendant were defective and did not comply with the requirements of CPR r 16.5 and Practice Direction 53B. This was raised with the Defendant in correspondence. When the matter was not resolved, the Claimant applied for an Unless Order. Master Gidden accepted the defence was defective, and on 13 December 2023 made an Order providing that unless the Defendant filed and served a defence which complied with the relevant CPR provisions and Practice Direction by 29 January 2024 his defence would be struck out. The Defendant filed a further defence on 26 January 2024. The Court, of its own motion, listed a hearing on 19 April 2024. At the hearing, Master Gidden found that the defence remained defective and the Defendant had thus failed to comply with the terms of the Unless Order. He gave the Defendant what he described as “one final opportunity to comply”. A further Unless Order was made, dated 8 May 2024, providing that the Defendant had until 17 May 2024 to file a compliant defence. On 15 May 2024 the Defendant provided a re-re-amended defence and a counterclaim alleging that it had been he that was a victim of the Claimant’s harassment and not the other way round. The Claimant considered that the defence still did not comply with CPR r 16.5 and Practice Direction 53B, and on 31 May 2024 applied to strike out the defence as well as the counterclaim.[12]The strike-out application was heard before Susie Alegre, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 13 February 2025. On 26 February 2025 she struck out the Defendant’s defence and counter-claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2) and entered judgment for the Claimant. She also refused an application for security for costs the Defendant had made. By an order sealed on 1 May 2025, Ms Alegre directed the parties to contact the Court to fix a remedies hearing. She ordered the parties to serve signed statements of any witnesses on which they intended to rely by 27 May 2025 and stated that oral evidence would not be permitted from any witness whose statement was not served in accordance with the order except with the permission of the court.[13]The remedies hearing was fixed for 24 July 2025. On 28 March 2025, the Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against Ms Alegre’s order. On 17 July 2025 Nicklin J adjourned the remedies hearing, with the agreement of the parties, given the then pending application for permission to appeal. In his order Nicklin J also noted that the Claimant had indicated he wished to rely on witness evidence at the remedies hearing. He noted that that was required to be served by 27 May 2025, and that the Claimant would require relief from sanction to be able to rely on any witness evidence.[14]On 6 August 2025 the Claimant’s solicitors served a witness statement from the Claimant in relation to remedy. They also applied for relief from sanction in relation to the late service of the statement.[15]On 10 March 2026 Warby LJ refused the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. There was therefore no basis for further delay of the remedies hearing and on 25 March 2026 it came before me along with the Claimant’s application for relief from sanction. The Claimant was represented by Mr de Wilde who made submissions on his behalf. The Defendant represented himself. Both the Claimant and Defendant gave oral evidence, and the Defendant cross-examined the Claimant.[16]During the course of the hearing, it became apparent that the Defendant does not accept the Claimant’s underlying case against him, and that he considers a number of his statements that formed the basis of the Claimant’s defamation claim to be substantially true. He also maintained that he has been the victim of harassment by the Claimant, and not the other way round. On 30 March 2026, after the hearing before me, the Defendant submitted further submissions and evidence. That too sought, in part, to challenge the merits of the Claimant’s claim for harassment and defamation. As set out below, that is not open to the Defendant. His defence and counter claim have been struck out and judgment entered against him. It is not open to the Defendant to now seek to litigate matters that go to his liability for harassment and defamation. I did, however, accept the late evidence and submission. The Claimant indicated that he did not object to the material being placed before me, and I do not consider that its admission prejudices the Claimant.

Relief from sanction application

[17]I heard submissions on the Claimant’s application for relief from sanction at the outset of the hearing. Following argument, I indicated that I would grant the application and gave brief reasons. I indicated I would expand upon the reasons in my written judgment.

Legal principles

[18]CPR 32.10 provides:
“If a witness statement or a witness summary for use at trial is not served in respect of an intended witness within the time specified by the court, then the witness may not be called to give oral evidence unless the court gives permission.”
[19]CPR 3.9 provides in relation to relief from sanction:
“(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need – (a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.”
[20]There was no dispute before me as to the principles governing an application for relief from sanction. They were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906; [2014] 1 WLR 3296 at paragraph 24:
“A judge should address an application for relief from sanctions in three stages. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order which engages rule 3.9(1). If the breach is neither serious nor significant, the court is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages. The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. The third stage is to evaluate “all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable [the court] to deal justly with the application including [the factors set out in CPR 3.9 (a) and (b)].”
[21]In relation to the first stage, namely determining the “seriousness and significance” of a failure to comply with a court order, the White Book (2026) summarises the applicable principles at paragraph 3.9.4:
“The court [in Denton] stated that in many circumstances whether or not a breach imperilled future hearing dates or otherwise disrupts the conduct of litigation (including litigation generally) would be the most useful measure of whether a breach has been serious or significant. However, the court added that there were breaches which are serious although they are incapable of affecting the efficient progress of the litigation: e.g. the failure to pay court fees. The court stated that the concepts of seriousness and significance are not hard-edged and that there are degrees of seriousness and significance. At the first stage, the assessment of the seriousness or significance of the breach should concentrate on the very breach in respect of which relief from sanction is sought. … If a judge concludes that a breach is not serious or significant, then relief from sanctions will usually be granted and it will usually be unnecessary to spend much time on the second or third stages. If, however, the court decides that the breach is serious or significant, then the second and third stages assume greater importance.”
[22]As to the second stage, the court considers the reasons for the default. The Court of Appeal in Denton at paragraph 30 stated that “[i]t would be inappropriate to produce an encyclopaedia of good and bad reasons for a failure to comply with rules, practice directions or court orders.” It noted, however, that in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers [2013] EWCA Civ 1537; [2014] 1 WLR 795 paragraph 41 some examples were given. They included the observation that “mere overlooking a deadline, whether on account of overwork or otherwise, is unlikely to be a good reason.”[23]As to the third stage, the Court of Appeal in Denton observed at paragraph 31 that “in every case”, as per CPR 3.9, the court will be required to “consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application.” At paragraph 35 the Court of Appeal gave the following guidance:
“[T]he court must, in considering all the circumstances of the case so as to enable it to deal with the application justly, give particular weight to [the] two important factors [referred to in CPR 3.9, namely the ‘need … for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and … to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders’]. In doing so, it will take account of the seriousness and significance of the breach (which has been assessed at the first stage) and any explanation (which has been considered at the second stage). The more serious or significant the breach the less likely it is that relief will be granted unless there is a good reason for it. Where there is a good reason for a serious or significant breach, relief is likely to be granted. Where the breach is not serious or significant, relief is also likely to be granted.”

The parties’ positions

[24]The Claimant accepted that any breach of a court order is serious, but submitted that the breach in the present case was not significant in practical terms and had no impact on the timing or conduct of the remedies hearing. The Defendant received the Claimant’s witness statement by 6 August 2025 when his application for permission to appeal was still pending and the remedies hearing was stayed. The Claimant submitted that there was a good reason for the default as the failure arose from a combination of the delay in the sealing of Ms Alegre’s order, and an oversight during the period by the Claimant’s legal team when they were actively progressing listing of the hearing, managing correspondence with the Defendant and responding to his application for permission to appeal. It was also said that in all of the circumstances it would be just to grant relief from sanction as the consequences of not permitting the Claimant to rely on his witness statement would be disproportionate to an error which had no adverse effects on the litigation.[25]The Defendant submitted that relief from sanction should not be granted. He submitted that the breach was serious and significant, the explanation provided for it was inadequate, and that the Claimant “was seeking to gain unfair advantage from their own default”.

Discussion

[26]Applying the three-stage test in Denton, I do not consider that the breach of Ms Alegre’s order was a serious or significant one. As the Claimant noted, all breaches of court orders are, on one level, serious. That will, however, arise in every case in which a court is considering relief from sanction pursuant to CPR 3.9, and the question is whether there is something beyond the mere fact of the breach that means it should be considered “serious and significant”. As noted in Denton, while there are some breaches that will be regarded as serious even if they do not affect the efficient progress of the proceedings, generally speaking the key consideration will be whether or not a breach imperils hearing dates or otherwise disrupts the conduct of litigation or prejudice the other party. In this case, the Claimant’s default did not imperil the hearing date or the progress of the litigation or prejudice the Defendant. As the Claimant noted, the remedies hearing initially listed for July 2025 was adjourned, at the Defendant’s request, while his permission to appeal application was determined. That application was not determined until March 2026. It therefore made no difference that the Claimant’s witness statement was submitted on 6 August 2025 rather than 27 May 2025 and the Defendant was unable to identify any prejudice to him occasioned by the delay. Nor is this a case (such as a failure to pay a court fee) which is regarded as serious even if it is not capable of affecting the efficient progress of the litigation.[27]As noted in Denton, if a breach is neither serious nor significant, the court is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third Denton stages. The lack of seriousness or significance is usually sufficient to grant relief from sanction. I therefore deal with the second and third stages only briefly. I do not consider the reason for the delay is a particularly good one. I accept that during the period when the witness statement should have been served the Claimant’s solicitors were focusing on other matters in the litigation, but ultimately the deadline for serving the witness statement was missed because of an oversight. That is not a good basis for a breach of a court order. That said, and turning to the third stage identified in Denton, while the need to enforce compliance with court orders is an important consideration, in all the circumstances I consider it just and proportionate to grant relief from sanction. It would be an obvious prejudice to the Claimant not to admit his evidence, and the six week delay in serving the witness statement did not prejudice the Defendant or in any way affect the efficient conduct of this litigation. I also note that the Defendant’s own statement on remedy was not served until 4 March 2026, and thus more than 10 months late. The Claimant did not insist that the Defendant apply for relief from sanction, but it does seem to me relevant in terms of what is just and proportionate that the Defendant sought to admit his own evidence long after the date required, as well as seeking to admit evidence after the hearing before me was complete.[28]On that basis I permitted the Claimant (as well as the Defendant) to rely on their witness statements and to give oral evidence notwithstanding that they were submitted after the date set out in Ms Alegre’s order. Claim under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 Relevant statutory provision

Claim under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997

[29]PHA 1997 section 1(1) provides:
“A person must not pursue a course of conduct — (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.”
PHA 1997 section 3 provides:
“(1) An actual or apprehended breach of section 1(1) may be the subject of a claim in civil proceedings by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question. (2) On such a claim, damages may be awarded for (among other things) any anxiety caused by the harassment and any financial loss resulting from the harassment.”
PHA 1997 section 14 provides that “Sections 1 to 7 [of the Act] extend to England and Wales only”.

The allegations of harassment

[30]The Claimant’s pleaded case on harassment is that the Defendant was involved in “[p]ersistently publishing, to his 78,500 subscribers, and more widely to the world at large, videos on [his YouTube] Channel promoting wholly unfounded conspiracy theories which directly and indirectly implicate the Claimant and his parents in a sinister, ongoing cover-up around the deaths of Shanann and [her] children.” According to the Claimant, the Defendant published at least 184 videos about the Watts case between late 2018 and March 2023. The Claimant’s pleaded case is that in those videos the Defendant, inter alia, “cruelly speculates, in ghoulish terms, as to the manner of the Claimant’s nieces’ death, by suggesting that they were drowned in an oil storage drum by Mr Watts, rather than killed first and then placed in the drum so as to conceal their corpses”; that the Defendant stated that the Claimant was “ignoring those who [along with Mr Watts] are properly to be suspected of the murder of Shanann and [her] children” and “likes money going to him” and that “had Shanann herself seen the evidence, she would not be in the same ‘corner’ as her family”. It is said that the Defendant was involved in “Persistently publishing posts on [his YouTube channel] attacking, vilifying, and mocking the Claimant for his attempts to seek redress in respect of the Defendant's publications”. It was also said that the Defendant had threatened to disseminate a nude photograph of the Claimant by a former partner and published a video of an interview conducted by the Claimant with the Federal Bureau of Investigation which contained the Claimant’s telephone number and led to him receiving an influx of calls and messages.[31]Mr de Wilde suggested that the Claimant’s case had echoes of Hibbert v Hall [2024] EWHC 2677 (KB). Hibbert involved a victim of the Manchester Arena terror attacks who brought a claim against a defendant who had published false assertions about the attack, claiming it was an elaborate hoax and that individuals, including the claimant, had faked their injuries. Steyn J found that harassment was established and awarded substantial damages. The Claimant suggests that the Defendant in the present case had similarly harassed him by propagating online conspiracy theories about the murder of his sister and suggesting the Claimant and his family were involved in a cover-up.[32]At the hearing before me, as well as in his post-hearing submissions, the Defendant sought to dispute the allegations of harassment contained in the Claimant’s pleaded case. He denied he had harassed the Claimant, asserting that it was he that was a victim of harassment by the Claimant and his supporters and that he suffered losses because of the Claimant’s conduct including his YouTube channel being taken down. The Defendant disputed the allegations about the dissemination of the nude photograph as well as asserting that the Claimant’s telephone number was already in the public domain.[33]The Defendant may or may not be right about these assertions. The difficulty for the Defendant is that his defence and counter claim have been struck out and judgment entered in the Claimant’s favour, and he was denied permission to appeal. In those circumstances it is not open to the Defendant to dispute liability on the basis that the allegations in the harassment claim brought against him are not made out or that it was he that was the victim of harassment. I therefore proceed on the basis that the Defendant committed the harassment as alleged in the Claimant’s statement of case.

Jurisdiction

[34]There is, however, a fundamental difficulty with the Claimant’s PHA 1997 claim. It does not appear that the alleged harassment occurred within the jurisdiction of the Court. It is true that judgment for breach of the PHA 1997 has been entered in the Claimant’s favour. I understand that the issue of jurisdiction was not, however, canvassed before Ms Alegre, and the Claimant very fairly accepted that the matter would need to be determined before any remedy was granted under the PHA 1997, and he helpfully drew my attention to a number of relevant authorities on the issue.[35]The difficulty for the Claimant is that the prohibition on harassment contained in section 1 of the PHA 1997 extends “to England and Wales only” (see section 14(1)). As the Claimant notes, there are a number of authorities (considered further below) which suggest that a claim cannot be brought pursuant to the PHA 1997 unless the alleged act of harassment occurs within the jurisdiction and the impact on the victim is felt within the jurisdiction. In the present case the Defendant is located in the UK, but the Claimant was in the US during the course of conduct said to constitute harassment, and he has not indicated any intention to travel to the UK in the foreseeable future. The Claimant suggests that arguments could be made for a more expansive approach to territorial jurisdiction, but submitted that, where the Defendant was unrepresented, this is not a suitable case in which to determine what he described as the “difficult [jurisdictional] issue.” On that basis the Claimant invited me not to determine relief in relation to the PHA 1997, but instead to stay the harassment claim. He said that would enable the court to provide a remedy if the impugned conduct continued and there were an apprehended breach because the Claimant were to come, or was planning to come, to the jurisdiction. He submitted that the stay could then be lifted and the court could determine the question of jurisdiction for the purpose of the past acts of harassment, and, if the Claimant succeeded, the court could go on to consider remedy including injunctive relief.[36]Whether or not to grant a stay is a question of case management to be determined pursuant to the overriding objective set out in CPR 1.1. That means dealing with cases justly and at proportionate costs, which includes allotting to a case an appropriate share of the court’s resources while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases. Taking those matters into account, I do not consider that staying the PHA 1997 claim to be an appropriate course. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons: i) It seems to me to be inherently undesirable to have a case within the court system stayed, potentially indefinitely, with key issues left undetermined. It would not be satisfactory, in my view, for the case to return to court, at a date that could be far in the future, to assess damages for events that may, at that stage, have occurred many years previously. ii) As set out below, the Claimant is entitled to damages and injunctive relief in relation to his defamation claim. I appreciate that some of the conduct that grounds the harassment claim is different to the defamation claim, as would be the terms of any injunction, but there is also clearly a significant overlap between the two causes of action, and it is not clear the extent to which the Claimant would obtain significant additional relief in relation to harassment. Furthermore, it would, in my view, be undesirable for a judge in some years’ time (assuming the Claimant succeeds on jurisdiction) to have to determine what damage to attribute to defamation and what to attribute to harassment to prevent double-recovery. iii) Insofar as the Claimant is concerned about the position should the Defendant’s conduct continue and there was an apprehended breach of the PHA 1997 because the Claimant was to travel to the jurisdiction, or planned to do so, as set out further below he could apply for an injunction at that stage. That would not, however, require the present proceedings to be re-activated and pursued or for the court to determine a claim about past harassment. If the Claimant has a good basis for asserting that there is an “apprehended” breach of the PHA 1997, he could issue proceedings and seek an injunction. He could no doubt rely on the judgment entered in his favour by Ms Alegre, as well as evidence of the Defendant’s continuing conduct and his own presence or intended presence in the UK. That would be a far preferable way of dealing with the matter, in my view, if it arises, as opposed to staying the case and it remaining in the court system for an indefinite time in order, potentially, to determine remedies for past harassment at some unidentified future date.[37]For these reasons I reject the request for a stay. The Claimant did not make submission on what should occur if I was against him on the stay. He did not, however, withdraw his harassment claim, and it therefore remains before me on the question of remedy. On that basis, as the Claimant recognises, it is necessary for me to determine the issue of jurisdiction.[38]Jurisdiction pursuant to the PHA 1997 has been considered in a number of cases. It was considered by Sir David Eady, sitting as a High Court Judge, in Shakil-Ur-Rahman v ARY Network Ltd [2016] EWHC 3110 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 22. The claim in Shakil-Ur-Rahman was brought for harassment and defamation. The focus of both claims was a series of television programmes over a 12-month period that were broadcast in the UK and were said to be abusive and defamatory of the claimant. The claimant was, however, at the material time outside the jurisdiction. Sir David Eady indicated that was no bar to the defamation claim, but that “[w]here harassment is alleged … the tort is not complete unless and until it impacts upon the person concerned” (paragraph 117). He continued at paragraph 119 (emphasis in original):
“[M]odern technology and instantaneous communication have made it easier to reach … ‘victims’ wherever they may be, but that does not mean that jurisdictional reach [of the PHA 1997] has been correspondingly extended. … [I]t is … necessary to demonstrate acts committed within the jurisdiction, but [the claimant] makes insufficient allowance for the nature of this particular wrong. It is an essential element of it that the person concerned should be harassed. It will not suffice for the defendant to complete his act or acts within the jurisdiction unless there is also an impact there upon the ‘victim’”
. On that basis Sir David Eady dismissed the harassment claim. As he noted, however, it is not clear how much the harassment claim added to the defamation claim, given that the same publications were being relied on for both torts and that the claimant could rely on the “hostile activity” that constituted harassment for the purpose of aggravation of damages in the defamation claim (paragraphs 109 and 120, and see below in relation to the same applying to the present case).[39]In Lawal v Adeyinka [2021] EWHC 2486 (QB) Richard Spearman QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, reached a similar conclusion on jurisdiction. He refused an application for an interim injunction pursuant to the PHA 1997 in relation to broadcasts said to have been disseminated from the UK, but where the claimant was based at all material times in Nigeria. Mr Spearman QC held that the PHA 1997 “relates to matters which occur within this jurisdiction” (paragraph 18), and that “the civil remedies which arise on the basis of the pursuit of the relevant course of conduct, are all concerned with matters occurring within this jurisdiction” (paragraph 20). He held that “whether the course of conduct complained of is actionable has to take account of where it had an effect upon the claimant” (paragraph 20), and continued at paragraph 21:
“[T]he relevant knowledge of the claimant [of the harassment] and the relevant effect upon her is all something which has occurred and, on the materials before me, is going to continue to occur, in Nigeria and, in my judgment, that does not and will not give rise to a criminal offence in this jurisdiction, and nor does it or will it give rise to a civil cause of action in this jurisdiction. This is because the concept of harassment is all to do with the effect upon the victim and the course of the conduct complained of being one which causes alarm or distress or the like to the victim. In this case, the claimant is not affected by the acts or Broadcasts complained of until they come to her attention, and all that has occurred and on the materials before me seems likely to occur, in my judgment, outside this jurisdiction in Nigeria.”
[40]Mr de Wilde referred me to authorities cited in Moreham and Speker (ed), The Law of Privacy and the Media (OUP, 4th edn, 2024) paragraphs 6.55-6.58 which, he said, showed the courts taking a broader approach to the questions of the impact of harassment and the location of the claimant. I am not convinced those authorities assist. None consider the issue of jurisdiction directly, and they either concern cases where the claimant was present in the jurisdiction during at least some of the conduct constituting harassment (see for example Maisto v Kyrgiannakis [2012] EWHC 4084 (QB)), or where the claimant would be in the jurisdiction in the near future (see Potter v Price [2004] EWHC 781 (QB)).[41]While the High Court is not formally bound by a previous High Court authority, it should “generally follow a decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction unless there is a powerful reason for not doing so” (see Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 44, [2018] AC 843 paragraph 9). The ratio of Shakil-Ur-Rahman and Lawal is clear: for the tort of harassment under the PHA 1997 to be committed it requires not only that acts of harassment were committed by the perpetrator in the jurisdiction, but that the acts were experienced as harassment in the jurisdiction by the victim. I see no “powerful reason” not to follow Shakil-Ur-Rahman and Lawal and none was identified by the Claimant.[42]There are, indeed, strong arguments supporting the analysis in Shakil-Ur-Rahman and Lawal. PHA 1997 section 1(1) prohibits a person from pursuing a course of conduct he “knows or ought to know amounts to harassment” and section 14(1) provides that section 1 extends to “England and Wales only”. “Harassment” denotes a “persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that person alarm, fear or distress” (Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17, [2013] 1 WLR 935 paragraph 1, emphasis added). There is therefore no “harassment” unless and until the victim is, in fact, harassed. There will therefore not be “harassment” in “England and Wales” where the victim is at all material times outside the jurisdiction.[43]That said, such an interpretation of the Act may produce undesirable results. Given the nature of modern communication, conduct causing another person alarm, fear or distress can clearly be perpetrated where the perpetrator is in one country, and the victim in another. If a narrow view is taken of jurisdiction, a victim of acts perpetrated in the UK, that on any ordinary understanding constitute ongoing, serious and harmful harassment, would have no remedy either in the UK or in the country in which they reside because the person perpetrating the course of conduct and the victim are in different jurisdictions. The criminal law, albeit in other contexts, has exerted jurisdiction where conduct was committed in the jurisdiction, but its effects felt outside. For example, where a person obtained property by deception with the deception occurring in London and the obtaining occurring in New York, the Court of Appeal concluded that the crime fell within the court’s jurisdiction (see R v Smith) (No. 4) [2004] EWCA Crim 631, [2004] QB 1418). Part of the rationale was a recognition that the nature of modern financial transactions meant that failing to recognise jurisdiction in such circumstances would leave a significant lacuna in protection from fraud. The same could be said of harassment perpetrated in one jurisdiction but experienced in another. In circumstances in which I have not heard full argument on the issue, however, and in which I consider that, if the issue were to be determined, it would need to be in a higher court able, if necessary, to overturn Shakil-Ur-Rahman and Lawal,I say no more about it.[44]In any event, the above does not mean a person who is outside the jurisdiction can never obtain a remedy under the PHA 1997. In particular, the Claimant will not be without a remedy if, as he suggests, he may wish to come to the UK in the future. In Lawal Mr Spearman QC observed at paragraph 22:
“[T]here may be circumstances in which somebody who has been subject in a foreign jurisdiction to acts which would be treated as acts of harassment in this jurisdiction and who then is or is going to be in this jurisdiction and is concerned that a continuation of similar acts will occur in this jurisdiction may be able to obtain an injunction to restrain that. That, I think, would not be based upon there having been an antecedent criminal offence or upon an antecedent civil tort of harassment having occurred. It would be based on some other principle, such as an apprehended breach of section 1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 regardless of whether any actual breach had occurred.”
[45]PHA 1997 section 3(3) provides that “[a]n … apprehended breach of section 1(1) may be the subject of a claim in civil proceedings by the person who … may be the victim of the course of conduct in question” (emphasis added). An injunction can therefore be obtained by someone who has not yet been harassed, but may be a victim of harassment in the future. There is no reason in principle why a person who is outside the jurisdiction, but provides evidence that they intend to travel to the UK in the near future, could not seek an injunction for an “apprehended” breach of section 1(1). Clearly evidence of acts perpetrated while the person was outside the jurisdiction would support a claim for an apprehended breach, and an interim injunction was granted on that basis in HXZ v NMX [2025] EWHC 697 (KB). Indeed, if an injunction could not be obtained in such circumstances, it would mean a person might be unwilling to return to England because of a campaign of harassment against them (as was the case in HXZ) but could not obtain an injunction to stop it because they were not within the jurisdiction. That would be obviously undesirable.[46]Applied to the present case, insofar as the Claimant seeks damages or other relief in relation to any past conduct of the Defendant pursuant to the PHA 1997, I consider that I am bound to follow Shakil-Ur-Rahman and Lawal. That means the Claimant cannot obtain a remedy in relation to those past acts of harassment because he was outside of the jurisdiction at all material times. If, however, the Claimant wishes to enter the jurisdiction at some future date, and can show that the Defendant’s conduct has continued and that he has a proper basis for apprehending that the PHA 1997 will be breached when he is in England and Wales, he may be entitled to an injunction of the kind granted in HXZ. I say nothing about whether such an injunction would be granted, but it does seem to me that the Claimant would not be without a remedy to protect him from such future harassment, which was said to be his primary basis for seeking to have the harassment claim stayed.

Defamation

[47]Unlike in relation to harassment, there is no reason in principle why a person who is defamed in England and Wales cannot obtain a remedy even if they were not in the jurisdiction at the time of the defamatory publications. That is because the tort is complete when the defamatory material is published irrespective of the location of the claimant. Sir David Eady in Shakil-Ur-Rahman thus granted the claimant a remedy in defamation in relation to the same acts that he considered would not be actionable under the PHA 1997 because of the latter’s jurisdictional limitation. I therefore turn to what, if any, remedy the Claimant is entitled to in the present case for defamation. The Claimant does not seek special or exemplary damages and limits his claim to general and aggravated damages and an injunction. I will deal with each in turn.

Legal principles for assessing general and aggravated damages

[48]General damages in defamation cases are compensatory in nature. Warby J (as he then was) summarised the principles for assessing damages in Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 at paragraphs 20-21:
“20. The general principles were reviewed and re-stated by the Court of Appeal in John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586… Sir Thomas Bingham MR summarised the key principles at pages 607 – 608 in the following words: “The successful plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to recover, as general compensatory damages, such sum as will compensate him for the wrong he has suffered. That sum must [1] compensate him for the damage to his reputation; [2] vindicate his good name; and [3] take account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused. In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation the most important factor is [a] the gravity of the libel; the more closely it touches the plaintiff's personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be. [b] The extent of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a handful of people. [c] A successful plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to vindicate his reputation: but the significance of this is much greater in a case where the defendant asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology than in a case where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of what was published and publicly expresses regret that the libellous publication took place. It is well established that [d] compensatory damages may and should compensate for additional injury caused to the plaintiff's feelings by the defendant's conduct of the action, as when he persists in an unfounded assertion that the publication was true, or refuses to apologise, or cross-examines the plaintiff in a wounding or insulting way. Although the plaintiff has been referred to as “he” all this of course applies to women just as much as men.” 21. I have added the numbering in this passage, which identifies the three distinct functions performed by an award of damages for libel. I have added the lettering also to identify, for ease of reference, the factors listed by Sir Thomas Bingham. Some additional points may be made which are relevant in this case: (1) The initial measure of damages is the amount that would restore the claimant to the position he would have enjoyed had he not been defamed: Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2004) 41 EHRR [37], [45]. (2) The existence and scale of any harm to reputation may be established by evidence or inferred. Often, the process is one of inference, but evidence that tends to show that as a matter of fact a person was shunned, avoided, or taunted will be relevant. So may evidence that a person was treated as well or better by others after the libel than before it. (3) The impact of a libel on a person's reputation can be affected by: a) Their role in society. The libel of Esther Rantzen was more damaging because she was a prominent child protection campaigner. b) The extent to which the publisher(s) of the defamatory imputation are authoritative and credible. The person making the allegations may be someone apparently well-placed to know the facts, or they may appear to be an unreliable source. c) The identities of the publishees. Publication of a libel to family, friends or work colleagues may be more harmful and hurtful than if it is circulated amongst strangers. On the other hand, those close to a claimant may have knowledge or viewpoints that make them less likely to believe what is alleged. d) The propensity of defamatory statements to percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs, a problem made worse by the internet and social networking sites, particularly for claimants in the public eye: C v MGN Ltd (reported with Cairns v Modi at [2013] 1 WLR 1051) [27]. (4) It is often said that damages may be aggravated if the defendant acts maliciously. The harm for which compensation would be due in that event is injury to feelings. (5) A person who has been libelled is compensated only for injury to the reputation they actually had at the time of publication. If it is shown that the person already had a bad reputation in the relevant sector of their life, that will reduce the harm, and therefore moderate any damages. But it is not permissible to seek, in mitigation of damages, to prove specific acts of misconduct by the claimant, or rumours or reports to the effect that he has done the things alleged in the libel complained of: Scott v Sampson (1882) QBD 491… Attempts to achieve this may aggravate damages, in line with factor (d) in Sir Thomas Bingham's list. (6) Factors other than bad reputation that may moderate or mitigate damages, on some of which I will also elaborate below, include the following: a) “Directly relevant background context” within the meaning of Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579 and subsequent authorities. This may qualify the rules at (5) above. b) Publications by others to the same effect as the libel complained of if (but only if) the claimants have sued over these in another defamation claim, or if it is necessary to consider them in order to isolate the damage caused by the publication complained of. c) An offer of amends pursuant to the Defamation Act 1996. d) A reasoned judgment, though the impact of this will vary according to the facts and nature of the case. (7) In arriving at a figure it is proper to have regard to (a) Jury awards approved by the Court of Appeal … (b) the scale of damages awarded in personal injury actions: …; (c) previous awards by a judge sitting without a jury: … . (8) Any award needs to be no more than is justified by the legitimate aim of protecting reputation, necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of that aim, and proportionate to that need: Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers (1986) Ltd [1994] QB 670. This limit is nowadays statutory, via the Human Rights Act 1998.”
[49]As Warby J noted, aggravated damages can be claimed in defamation cases. Lord Judge CJ explained in Cairns v Modi [2012] EWCA Civ 1382, [2013] 1 WLR 1015 paragraph 28 the relevant principle: “[Aggravated damages are intended] to compensate the victim rather than punish the perpetrator. Where the court wishes to take account of aggravation on the defendant's part in arriving at the appropriate sum… it is compensating the claimant for additional hurt to his feelings, or in the context of vindication, injury to his reputation, brought about by the defendant's conduct over and above that caused by the publication itself”.[50]The factors that could be regarded as aggravating a claimant’s damage were summarised by Nourse LJ in Sutcliffe v Pressdram Ltd [1991] 1 QB 153 at pages 183-184:
“In Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, Lord Reid, speaking of the wide bracket within which an amount of compensation might reasonably fall and echoing the words of Pearson L.J. in McCarey v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1965] 2 Q.B. 86, 104, said, at p. 1085: "It has long been recognised that in determining what sum within that bracket should be awarded, a jury, or other tribunal, is entitled to have regard to the conduct of the defendant. He may have behaved in a high-handed, malicious, insulting or oppressive manner in committing the tort or he or his counsel may at the trial have aggravated the injury by what they there said. That would justify going to the top of the bracket and awarding as damages the largest sum that could fairly be regarded as compensation." There are statements to the same effect in the speeches of Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1221, and of Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. in Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, 1073, and of Lord Diplock, at p. 1124. In a case where compensation for injury to the plaintiff's feelings, original or aggravated, is claimed, the attention of the jury may thus be directed towards the reprehensible conduct of the defendant. and however carefully the judge might seek to protect them against it, it would not be surprising if an element, even a large one, in their award exceeding a due consideration for the plaintiff's feelings and trespassed into punishment of the defendant's conduct. The conduct of a defendant which may often be regarded as aggravating the injury to the plaintiff's feelings, so as to support a claim for "aggravated" damages, includes a failure to make any or any sufficient apology and withdrawal; a repetition of the libel; conduct calculated to deter the plaintiff from proceeding; persistence, by way of a prolonged or hostile cross-examination of the plaintiff or in turgid speeches to the jury, in a plea of justification which is bound to fail; the general conduct either of the preliminaries or of the trial itself in a manner calculated to attract further wide publicity; and persecution of the plaintiff by other means…”

The defamation in the present case

[51]The Claimant’s defamation claim in this case relates to five videos published in 2021 and 2022 on the Defendant’s YouTube channel.[52]The first video relied on was published on 13 November 2021 under the headline "Frank,Sandra [the Claimant’s mother and father], and Frankie Rzucek ~ Please Pay Attention” (“Video 1”). In the video the Defendant discussed money being raised by the Claimant to pursue legal action. The words relied on by the Claimant as defamatory (with the video timings) are as follows:
“7:31 It's all a trick all you've done is taken money off all these people and give it to this solicitor who's already spent it and then he said we need more. Oh you've been out done haven't you Frankie they want more more money so you have to go back and ask for more money and where will that take you they said it themselves. This is what they want this is what they and you want money, money, money… 8:31 Because the case is funded through donations, mugs, they got your money so they don't mind that going as long as Frankie gets a settlement, never was about justice it’s about money, money, money… 15:35 Let me tell you it’s all about money for them they will fleece every penny you can raise but you're gonna need that because I'm bringing a lawsuit against you and your family for closing down my channel fraudulently, perjury, closing down my book and loss of earnings that's real that’s not allegations, that’s facts… 21:44 I don't like what Frankie said it's total defamation it's total loss of earnings oh dear what did your mum do phoning my phone my publisher and told him not to publish my book. 26:35 If I had a penny for every time his parents say this is Frankie's this is Frankie's nothing to do with us because they don't want to get taken to court because they've got a house it's all on Frankie well it's not it's all three of you. 29:20 I'm sat in there with no money because my channel has been down for six weeks I've got medical bills to pay I've got Christmas coming, I've got all sorts of problems in my life and I was shut down by lies, lies they don't own any copyrights. 1:14:01 Frankie Rzucek who has a fund to come and get me and clap me in irons. This is my rebuttal I believe it's a fraudulent fund and I've done nothing wrong.”
[53]The second video relied on was published on 14 November 2021 under the headline “FrankieRzucek's UK solicitor Cohen Davis~ Let's take a good look” (“Video 2”). The words relied on by the Claimant as defamatory are as follows:
“5:19 Someone thinks that Frankie's getting scammed by the law firm. I don't know about that, as most of you know he's begging towards 25k which is now 75k on crowd justice. This is a while ago, so people are on to him. People want their money back, people 51:30 And those people that have given money to this fundraiser, best of luck getting your money back if you if you've asked for it we know that. I'm just a word here from Lisa, he's solicited for money for four years now people are getting fed up with it. I'm sick of it, I'm sick of being chased down by him and his family, I really am. I'm the one that lost money because of this not them. They, those people that gave money have a right to know a audited account of where the money went. I've an open-source code anyone who requests for a refund gets it. Anyone wants to know where the money was, Bubbles will tell you, we even got IVA working for us. We show either what we spend our money on what has he ever showed you for the ten thousand what has he showed you for the, thirty thousand? Zero, zero Frankie. it's not right those people have asked for their money back and you won't even answer them. 57:27 ... I'm getting hate because of what solicitor said on a case that doesn't exist. One of two things, either Frankie is working with them and they're in on it together, or he panicked and went to them in desperation and was like you've got to put something out these people are driving me crazy.”
[54]The third video relied on was published on 1 January 2022 under the headline "I’M DONE! Here is my opinion on the whole damn thing!" (“Video 3”). The words relied on by the Claimant as defamatory are as follows:
“52.18 All I’ve said is Chris Watts did not act alone you on the other hand have got my book closed down tried to get my channel closed down and lied about me non-stop, there's a slight difference don't you think, how many more go fund me people how many more people are gonna get 53:10 They're not getting the sympathy they used to get, they're not saints Shanann's not a saint and Frankie Junior has never been a saint it's disgusting what they're doing to me tormenting me year after year for what? Proving that Shanann didn't kill the children. They don't like it because I earned money, people told them to make a fortune but I don't, my books made minus money. 2:08:31 I know that he was in trouble because everybody complained that they gave him ten thousand dollars to do whatever he said he's gonna do, he didn't do it, and he never gives receipts on what happened to the money so I've no doubt that he's in trouble ... I think I think that I don't know to be honest with you that's the rumour but again he never tells us nothing does he where's the ten thousand dollars he was given does that tell you where's the 35,000 he's raised where is that, don’t tell you.”
[55]The fourth video relied on was published on 30 January 2022 under the headline "CHRIS WATTS – AD tells you all of his private personal Connections to the family & CW contacts” (“Video 4”). The words relied on by the Claimant as defamatory are as follows: “1:40:52 Young Frankie said things that if I was in America you'd be arrested for harassment, swearing at me, telling me I'm going to prison, mentally torture me, I could easily do something about it but I don't they stopped my book destroyed my book, made her spend ten thousand pound on my book trying to save it, tried to shut my channel down with perjury and lies, and almost succeeded. How did it come from Frank saying how's the poker game going and Frankie's saying who said the case is closed maybe it's not how does it come from that to this, I cant tell you ... “[56]The fifth video relied on was published on 17 August 2022 under the headline "Right toreply to FRANKIE wanting to sue AD and put him in prison” (“Video 5”). The words relied on as defamatory by the Claimant are as follows:
“7:09 It's a vendetta. Any judge in my country can see you're victimizing me and me alone. On this crusade, and you've gathered these gang and this network of like pitchfork crusaders all around you to get me, and all they do is make films about me. It's all been logged. This is frank Rzucek jr who's been inciting hatred against me for four years. He has incited hatred of me that I've never seen. He's changed my life, I've had to move house, I no longer feel safe in my own country. And it’s endless. He's under the trolls' videos every day, praising them and getting them to attack me more ... 14:20 I have been sent death threats over my phone, over the years. I don't tell you, I don't play them to you. But he's taking me to court and in my right to reply, I'm going to play you just one of the incitement that he created by telling people to call me. This is one call I got because Junior told people to call me. 23:07 Frankie Rzucek, with a friend like this, you don't need any enemies. This man has single-handedly ruined your case because you've worked as a gang stalking team and you back him and you talk to him and you encourage him and he's the one that stalked me to hotel rooms and you encourage him. 26:32 This vendetta has to stop because you've employed a whole bunch of crazies that have threatened to kill me. You Frankie Rzucek, I'm accusing you of putting my life in danger. 33:16 Well I mention it again Frank. I was threatened to be murdered thanks to you. That is violence believe it or not. Those phone calls of violence – you fanned the flames. 52:02 I will fight this to the end because you are stalking me. You and your gangs are stalking me and putting me in danger. I've had death threats. I've got loads of phone calls. You've broken the UK Data Protection Act of 2018, the General Data Protection Regulations of Europe as well, and the electronic communications device, all broken.”
[57]The Claimant, in his Particulars of Claim at paragraphs 24-28 relies on what he says to be the following defamatory meaning of the five videos “24. The words complained of in Video 1 meant and would be understood to mean that Frankie Rzucek is guilty of having raised money to make a complaint about Alan Vinnicombe on a fraudulent basis, in that his real interest is not in complaining about misinformation but in enriching himself and he is guilty of dishonesty, and lying to the Court in relation to copyright complaints about Alan Vinnicombe's channel.25. The words complained of in Video 2 meant and would be understood to mean that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that Frankie Rzucek has failed to be honest or transparent about fund-raising, has deceived his supporters to raise money on a dishonest basis, and that he has colluded with his solicitors to deceive and defraud the public via fund-raising.26. The words complained of in Video 3 meant and would be understood to mean that Frankie Rzucek has harassed and persecuted Alan Vinnicombe for years in a malicious response to Alan Vinnicombe raising questions about the deaths of his family members, and that Frankie Rzucek has defrauded the public by failing to be honest or transparent about the money he has raised to make a legal complaint and is facing serious consequences as a result.27. The words complained of in Video 4 meant and would be understood to mean that Frankie Rzucek is guilty of harassment of Alan Vinnicombe which is so serious that it gives rise to criminal liability, and that Frankie Rzucek has made complaints about Alan Vinnicombe’s channel which are dishonest and in which he lied to the Court.28. The words complained of in Video 5 meant and would be understood to mean that Frankie Rzucek is guilty of harassment of, and persistently causing and inciting hatred and serious threats of violence, including death threats, to be made against, Alan Vinnicombe, that he has endangered Alan Vinnicombe's life, and that he has acted unlawfully by infringing Alan Vinnicombe’s data protection rights.”[58]According to the Claimant, at the date of the Particulars of Claim, Video 1 had received approximately 26,000 views, Video 2 had received approximately 5,700 views, Video 3 had received approximately 22,900 views, Video 4 had received approximately 10,600 views and Video 5 had received approximately 8,900 views.

The parties’ positions on damages

[59]The Claimant invites me to accept the meaning of the videos set out in his pleadings. He contends that the impugned videos contained serious allegation of dishonesty, including dishonesty by fund-raising for legal proceedings and of raising money to that end from the public on a false and dishonest basis. He also contends that the videos allege that he had engaged in harassing and unlawful conduct towards the Defendant of a criminal or quasi criminal nature. He contends that the videos were widely published, with viewers numbering in five figures. The Claimant recognises that the viewing figures he relies on were not restricted to England and Wales but contends that a majority (perhaps three-quarters) will have been within the jurisdiction, noting that the Defendant’s YouTube channel attracts a significant number of viewers for content with a specific UK focus and that the Defendant’s fundraising activities, related to the channel, were focused on the UK. The Claimant also notes that the viewing figures he obtained are for those who watched the videos after they were created and will not have included those who watched them live. He relies on the fact that the publications were made on a number of linked occasions, and were targeted to those who were already interested in the Watts case.[60]In addition to the nature of the defamatory publication and its extent, the Claimant relies on the evidence contained in his witness statement that speaks of the “deep and lasting distress” caused by the publications, particularly given the context, namely the murders of his sister and nieces and the speculation about them and his family. He contends that the publications, and the Defendant’s wider speculation about the murder of his sister and nieces, have “destroyed [his] peace of mind” and his “reputation”. The Claimant further seeks aggravated damages. He contends that the defamation occurred in the most painful and upsetting circumstances given its connection to his sister’s murder. He also contends that the manner in which the Defendant responded to the claim has been obstructive and has caused delay, and that that should sound in aggravated damages as should the allegations that formed the basis of the harassment claim. As Sir David Eady recognised in Shakil-Ur-Rahman, even if a claimant is outside the jurisdiction for the purpose of the PHA 1997 claim, they can rely on acts of harassment that accompanied the defamatory statements for the purpose of aggravation of damages for their defamation claim. That is what the Claimant seeks in this case. The Claimant also notes that the Defendant has not apologised or sought to retract the allegations and had continued to repeat them in these proceedings.[61]On the basis of the above, and by reference to a number of comparator cases I discuss below, the Claimant invited me to award him £60,000 for defamation to encompass both general and aggravated damages.[62]The Defendant’s position is that the publications consisted of a limited number of videos over a defined period. In his oral submissions he denied that the videos were watched the number of times claimed by the Claimant, and suggested they were watched approximately 6,000 times and noted that they were no longer available. He contended that the videos had been inaccurately transcribed using AI and had been quoted out of context. He argued that there was no reliable evidence of reputational harm and that the Claimant’s evidence of distress had no medical or independent support. The Defendant also noted that when he had cross-examined the Claimant, the Claimant at first denied he had a criminal record beyond traffic violations, before confirming that was not the case and that he had at least one non-traffic conviction. The Defendant invited me, on that basis, to place no reliance upon the Claimant’s evidence. The Defendant also stated his aim in discussing the Watts case had been to prove that Shanann had not killed her children, and to show that Chris Watts had not acted alone. He stated that he had never suggested the Claimant had any involvement in the murders or ever sought to contact him. He repeated the claim that the Claimant had been raising money on “false pretences” by suggesting he did not have a criminal record. He stated that it was he that was the victim of the Claimant’s harassment, not the other way round, and that he had been targeted by the Claimant and harassed by his supporters.[63]The Defendant noted that he had adopted a restrained approach when he cross-examined the Claimant, which, he submitted, was relevant to aggravated damages. He stated that he had no fixed employment income, nor savings or property. He invited me to act “proportionately” in assessing damages and argued that any damages should be modest “at the lower end or nominal”. Discussion (i). Position on factual allegations where a defence is struck out and judgment entered[64]In this case the Defendant’s defence has been struck out and judgment entered in the Claimant’s favour. In these circumstances, what approach should I take to any factual disputes in the pleaded cases when determining remedy?[65]In Brett Wilson v Persons Unknown [2015] EWHC 2628 (QB); [2016] 4 WLR 69 Warby J considered the approach the court should take to meaning in a defamation case where a default judgment was entered because a defendant had failed to file an acknowledgement of service or a defence. Warby J held at paragraph 18 that the correct approach in such cases (as he had indicated in Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 2053 (QB)) is to “proceed on the basis of the claimant's unchallenged particulars of claim”. He continued at paragraph 19 “[that] general approach … could need modification in an appropriate case, for instance if the court concluded that the claimant's interpretation of the words complained of was wildly extravagant and impossible, or that the words were clearly not defamatory in their tendency.”[66]The Claimant submitted that an analogous approach is appropriate where, as here, a defence has been submitted but has been struck out and judgment entered for a claimant. I agree. In those circumstances the general approach in considering remedy is to proceed on the basis of the claimant’s particulars of claim. It would not be appropriate to conduct a detailed trial of fact or permit a defendant to embark on a wholesale challenge to the claimant’s case on liability. That would be to undo the striking out of the defence, and, in effect, to permit a defence to be resurrected. That is save for the potential for “modification”, identified by Warby J, in cases where the meaning pleaded by the claimant of the defamatory words was “wildly extravagant and impossible” or if the words “were clearly not defamatory in their tendency”. The same will apply if some other significant aspect of the case was so obviously and conspicuously incorrect that it should not be accepted by a court. In such cases the court should not simply proceed on the basis of the pleaded case, but instead reach its own view on meaning, or not accept the words used were defamatory, or not accept some plainly incorrect factual assertion.[67]In the present case I do not consider that the meanings pleaded by the Claimant of the five videos, set out above at paragraph 57, is “wildly extravagant and impossible” or that the words were so “clearly not defamatory in their tendency” that I should not accept defamation has been established. Nor do I consider that some other significant aspect of the pleaded case is so obviously and conspicuously wrong that I should not accept it. It may be that had the Defendant submitted a defence compliant with the CPR he would have been able to respond to one or more aspect of the Claimant’s pleaded case, whether on defamatory meaning or in establishing the truth of some aspect of the videos. It is, however, not open to the Defendant to embark on that exercise now. I therefore proceed, as Warby J did in BrettWilson,on the basis that the defamatory meaning pleaded by the Claimant is correct, the words are defamatory and that the factual basis of the Claimant’s defamation claim is established.[68]The Defendant is, however, entitled to question the Claimant’s evidence on the impact the videos had upon him. I did have some concerns that, as the Defendant noted, the Claimant initially denied having any non-traffic criminal convictions before it was pointed out to him by the Defendant that was not correct. I do not consider, however, that that would justify my disregarding the Claimant’s evidence on the impact of the publications in its entirety as the Defendant invited me to do. I also accept Mr de Wilde’s submission that the Claimant was understandably guarded in circumstances in which he was being directly questioned by the person he considered had been responsible for harassing him. The Defendant did not question the Claimant’s general evidence that he was distressed by the publication of the videos, and I see no reason to doubt that he was distressed by allegations that he was dishonestly seeking to raise funds and that he had harassed the Defendant. (ii). Damage to the Claimant’s reputation and vindication of good name[69]Turning to the factors set out in John v MGN Ltd, as considered in Barron v Vines, I, first, consider the damage to the Claimant’s reputation caused by the defamatory videos. Any sum in damages should compensate him for that damage and should be such as to “vindicate his good name”. Determining damage to reputation involves, as Sir Thomas Bingham MR held in John v MGN Ltd, consideration of the “gravity of the libel” and the “extent of publication”. In that regard, the allegations contained in the videos, given the meaning ascribed to them, are serious. They suggest that the Claimant was raising money from the public on a fraudulent basis not to complain about misinformation by the Defendant but to enrich himself; and that the Claimant had harassed the Defendant and caused serious threats of violence to be made against him. They are serious allegations made in a significant number of linked videos. While the Defendant asserted before me that the videos were watched by less people than the Claimant claimed, he provided no evidence to that effect, and I have no reason to doubt the figures in the Claimant’s pleadings. That means the videos were published to between, at least, 5,700 and over 20,000 viewers, and with two of the videos being watched by 22,900 and 26,000 viewers respectively. As the Claimant submitted, more would have watched live. As the Claimant recognises, not all of those individuals will have viewed the videos in the jurisdiction, but I accept the Claimant’s submission that a majority, and perhaps three-quarters, will have done so. That means that the defamatory publications are likely to have been watched by more than 20,000 people in this jurisdiction. That is a significant number.[70]As set out above, the fact that the Claimant was outside of England and Wales does not prevent him obtaining damages in defamation. Nor does it matter whether the Claimant was known within the jurisdiction prior to and separate from the defamatory publications by the Defendant. As the Court of Appeal observed in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co [2005] EWCA Civ 75; [2005] QB 946 at paragraph 28:
“There seems no reason in principle why a newspaper should not simultaneously create and besmirch an individual's reputation. To take an extreme example, imagine that an unknown American who was about to visit an English town was erroneously described in the town's local paper as a paedophile. Manifestly the law ought to afford him a cause of action in libel.”
[71]It is, however, the impact on the Claimant’s reputation caused by publication of the defamatory videos in this jurisdiction that is the subject of the claim, and the fact that he lives outside the UK may be relevant to quantum. As Warby J noted in Barron v Vines at paragraph 21(3)(c), the “identities of the publishees” affects quantum, so, for example, “[p]ublication of a libel to family, friends or work colleagues may be more harmful and hurtful than if it is circulated amongst strangers.” Similarly, the publication of a libel to individuals who a claimant sees on a daily basis may be more harmful and hurtful than publication to those with whom he or she has no connection and is unlikely to interact with in the future. It is also relevant if a person previously had a well-known and positive reputation in the jurisdiction (see Barron v Vines paragraph 21(3)(A)). Thus while an “unknown American erroneously described in the town's local paper as a paedophile” will be entitled to pursue an action in libel, it may be relevant to the damages he receives if, unlike a well-known local man similarly described, the libel was not published to those who knew him or with whom he was likely to interact in the future.[72]The impact on damages of a claimant being located outside the jurisdiction has been recognised in a number of cases. Sir David Eady observed in Shakil-Ur-Rahman at paragraph 103 (emphasis added):
“…I must focus upon injury to the Claimant's reputation in this jurisdiction and only that attributable to these broadcasts. I must put to one side, in so far as it is possible to do so, any damage caused to the esteem in which he was held elsewhere, and also any elements of distress brought about by other allegations or publications for which these Defendants are not responsible. The principle is clear. It is a matter of judgment and common sense, however, how it is put into effect, since obviously no precise calculation is possible.”
In Hussein v Hamilton Franks & Co Ltd [2013] EWHC 462 (QB) HHJ Moloney QC (sitting as a High Court Judge) held at paragraphs 33-34 (emphasis added):
“33. […] Counsel has cited to me various authorities showing how, for allegations of this degree of gravity against persons resident in this country, sums of the order of £80,000 to £100,000 have from time to time been awarded. I accept that; but … in this case the sum that is awarded should be lower than that. Not because the allegations are not of equal gravity but because this jurisdiction though significant to the Claimants is not the main locus of their reputations or of those with whom they mostly deal. It would not be right for me to take into account the complaints which they make in their witness statements about some of the problems they have had in the United States in this regard. They may well be justified complaints: but I am afraid that is a matter for the laws of the United States and not for me. 34. It appears to me however that these allegations are of such severity and the ambit of publication in this country is sufficiently large that on the solatium principle I should make an award which in each case is enough to stand as a clear declaration of vindication in relation to each of them. It appears to me that in modern conditions that sum is as follows: for Dilber Hussein and for Amtul Hussein £10,000 each and for Mr Omar Hussein, who is younger and has more active connections with this country. £20,000.”
[73]Like the claimants in Hussain, the Claimant in the present case lives abroad and this jurisdiction “is not the main locus of [his] reputations or of those with whom [he] mostly deal[s]”. Mr de Wilde accepted the libel was not published to the person from whom, as he put it, the Claimant “bought his milk in the morning”, and he accepted this would affect quantum. I consider that to be correct and will be relevant where comparisons are made to damages awarded to claimants in other cases for whom this jurisdiction is the main locus of their reputation. That said, the reduction in damages may not be as marked as in Hussain, where the claimants were awarded damages of £10,000 and £20,000 in circumstances in which, as HHJ Moloney QC noted, residents of this jurisdiction might have been awarded £80,000 to £100,000 for allegations of similar gravity. The publications in this case were in the UK, but they occurred online and to a “community” of those interested in the Watts case. Many would know of the Claimant, and some at least were likely to interact with him, even if he was resident abroad and they were in the UK. (iii). Distress[74]In terms of the other factors set out in John v MGN Ltd, the compensatory sum should “take account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused”. As set out above, I accept the Claimant’s evidence that he was caused distress by the allegations published in the videos. That is so, in particular, given the context of the publication, namely the traumatic circumstances of his sister and nieces’ murder, and the repeated suggestion by the Defendant that the Claimant and his family were involved in a cover-up around its circumstances. (iv). Aggravated damages[75]The Claimant also seeks aggravated damages. He relies on the context of the publication. That could be regarded as going to general damages as an element of the distress he suffered, as set out above. Or it could be regarded as an element of aggravated damages, on the basis that the defamatory videos were connected to the murder of the Claimant’s sister and nieces and made in response to the Claimant seeking to prevent the Defendant discussing them in a way that constituted harassment of his family. Ultimately it may not matter whether this aspect of the case is considered as an element of the distress for the purposes of general damages, or as an element of aggravated damages.[76]The Claimant also relies on the manner in which the Defendant has conducted the present litigation, and his failure to retract or apologise for the allegations contained in the defamatory videos. I consider that the lack of any retraction or apology is relevant to aggravated damages. Indeed, not only has the Defendant not sought to retract the allegations or apologise at any stage, but during the course of the proceedings he repeated the defamatory allegation that the Claimant had sought to raise money on “false pretences”.[77]As to the more general conduct of the litigation, the Claimant noted that in September 2021, when the Claimant’s solicitors wrote to the Defendant asking him to stop his publications about the family, the Defendant had stated in a video that “I will drag this all through the land and make sure they spend £100,000 before I even get in a courthouse, because I’ll draw it out.” Mr de Wilde invited me to infer that the Defendant’s subsequent conduct of the litigation reflected that intention, with the repeated failures to provide a proper defence and the late and unmeritorious application for permission to appeal stretching out the proceedings. I accept that the failure to retract the defamatory allegations, insisting that the claim was litigated and repeating the allegations as part of the litigation sound in aggravated damages. I am not, however, satisfied that the failure to provide a proper defence or the application for permission to appeal were deliberate tactics seeking to drag out the proceedings. The Claimant’s statement of September 2021 to which Mr de Wilde drew my attention was made some time before proceedings were commenced and indeed before the first of the defamatory videos were published, and Mr de Wilde was unable to point to similar statements at a later date. It seems to me that the Defendant’s failure to provide a proper defence, and his unsuccessful application for permission to appeal, reflected the fact he was a litigant in person doing his best to navigate an unfamiliar process, rather than a deliberate attempt to drag out the litigation in order to increase the Claimant’s costs. I do not therefore consider that should be reflected in aggravated damages.[78]I also consider that the Defendant conducted the litigation before me in a measured way despite the difficulty of appearing as a litigant in person. There was an obvious risk of aggravating the situation where the Defendant was cross-examining the Claimant in person, but I consider he conducted the cross-examination in a restrained manner, and I also note that the Defendant directly expressed his sympathy to the Claimant and his family for their loss. As set out above, the Defendant did repeat some of the defamatory statements and did not offer an apology. I do not, however, consider that otherwise the manner in which the Defendant conducted the litigation should aggravate damages.

(v) Assessment of quantum in comparator cases

[79]The Claimant relied on a number of what he described as comparator or analogous cases: i) In Turley v Unite the Union [2019] EWHC 3547 (QB) Nicklin J awarded the claimant, an MP, £75,000 in general and aggravated damages in respect of an allegation published on a blog that she had dishonestly submitted a false application to join a trade union at a concessionary rate, knowing that such membership was restricted to unwaged persons. The article was read by 3,672 people, though it was posted and discussed elsewhere. Nicklin J found that the defendants’ conduct at trial had seriously aggravated the harm to the claimant’s reputation and distress, with the case opened on the basis that the evidence would show the claimant was “not fit to be an MP” (paragraph 182). ii) In Packham v Wightman [2023] EWHC 1256 (KB); [2023] EMLR 18 Saini J awarded the claimant, a well-known naturalist, television presenter and campaigner, £90,000 in general and aggravated damages in respect of allegations contained in a series of articles and tweets some of which had reached over half a million people. Of the £90,000, the claimant was awarded £75,000 specifically in respect of an allegation that he had made fraudulent statements when raising funds. There was again serious aggravating features with the defendants being found to have used the litigation as a device to introduce offensive material specifically to smear the claimant. iii) In Gooderson v Qureshi [2022] EWHC 2977 (KB) Heather Williams J awarded £42,500 to the claimant, an estates and letting agent, in respect of some 20 posts on various review websites alleging that he was dishonest, untrustworthy, unprofessional, exploited customers, lacked scruples, and provided poor services. While the reviews may only have been read by several hundred readers, Heather Williams J found they would have been individuals specifically looking for information about estate agents such as the claimant. iv) In Wilson v Mendelsohn [2024] EWHC 821 (KB) HHJ Parkes KC awarded the claimant £22,500 for the publication of an allegation that he had harassed a mother who was dropping her daughter off at school (as well for misuse of private information). He was also awarded £7,500 from another defendant for the republication of the allegation. The allegations were seen by thousands of individuals.[80]Based on the above comparators, the Claimant notes that his case, like that of Turley and Packham, involved allegations of dishonesty, including in the latter specifically in relation to fundraising. He also notes that, like Wilson,his case involved allegations of harassment. He also noted that in all the cases except Packham the publication numbers were significantly lower than in his case. On the basis of the comparators, and taking account of any inflation since they were determined, the Claimant submits that an award of £60,000 for general and aggravating damages is appropriate. (vi). Conclusion on quantum[81]Ultimately, while general principles and comparator cases will be helpful, each case turns on its own facts. As set out above, I accept that the allegations of dishonesty and harassment, repeated over a number of linked broadcasts and published (at least for some of the videos) to at least twenty thousand people with a particular interest in the Watts case, did significantly damage the Claimant’s reputation, and have caused him distress. That is exacerbated by the context, namely the murder of the Claimant’s sister and nieces and the speculation of a cover up by the Claimant and his family made by the Defendant and others. That said, the context in Turley and Packham was of public figures with much wider reputations and the defamatory claims specifically focused on matters relevant to their public role. I also bear in mind that I am concerned with the impact of publication within this jurisdiction. The Claimant resides in the US and has not been in the jurisdiction at any material time and does not plan to be. The main locus of his reputation is the US and that is where he primarily interacts with people (other than online). While that does not prevent him being awarded damages, it means, as the Claimant accepted, damages would not be as high as if his reputation and daily interactions were all in the UK. I also note that the Claimant is entitled to aggravated damages in particular because of the Defendant’s failure to offer any retraction and apology and having repeated the defamatory statements during the course of litigation. His case does not, however, have the seriously aggravating features of Turley and Packham. In particular I do not consider that, other than the above, the Defendant conducted the litigation in a way thatsignificantly aggravated damages. Overall, and taking all of the above circumstances into account, I consider that a figure of £40,000 is an appropriate award for general and aggravated damages. (vii). Injunction[82]The Claimant also sought an injunction in the following terms:
“An injunction to restrain the Defendant whether by himself, his servants, agents, or otherwise howsoever from publishing or causing or permitting to be published the words complained of or any words to the same or similar defamatory effect in respect of the Claimant.”
At the hearing before me, the Defendant did not oppose an injunction along those lines. In his post-hearing submissions, however, he resiled from that position. He stated that “In circumstances where real-world consequences have already arisen, including damage to my home, and where the Claimant’s own conduct continues to give rise to further risk and escalation, it would be neither just nor proportionate to impose an injunction operating only against me.”[83]I consider an injunction is appropriate. The injunction the Claimant seeks is narrowly tailored to the specific allegations found to be defamatory. It is difficult to see on what basis it would be justified for the Defendant to repeat them. I consider it is proportionate and appropriate to grant an injunction notwithstanding any impact on the Defendant’s right to freedom of expression. (viii). Sum claimed in the Claim Form[84]Finally, the Defendant noted that in his Claim Form the Claimant had indicated that his claim was for £30,000 and at the hearing sought a considerably higher amount. The Claimant noted that CPR 16.3(7) provides that “[t]he statement of value in the claim form does not limit the power of the court to give judgment for an amount which it finds the claimant is entitled to”. He invited me not to limit damages to the amount specified in the Claim Form.[85]It is clear there are cases in which significantly more than the figure set out in the Claim Form has been awarded. For example, in Harrath v Stand for Peace Ltd [2017] EWHC 653 (QB), one of the cases to which the Claimant referred me, the Claim Form indicated the claimant expected to recover no more than £10,000. He was awarded £140,000. Care, however, does need to be taken where a claimant at trial seeks significantly more in damages than was claimed. The sum claimed in a Claim Form determines the court fee that a claimant pays, and it was recognised in Lewis v Ward Hadaway [2015] EWHC 3503 (Ch); [2016] 4 WLR 6 that it may be an abuse of process to undervalue a claim in order to pay a lower fee, and that, in the appropriate case, that could lead to a claim being struck out. I do not have any evidence that the claim in the present case was deliberately undervalued and cannot see that it would be proportionate to strike out the claim on that basis, and I consider the sum I am awarding is one to which the Claimant is entitled.

Conclusion

[86]For the reasons set out above, I grant relief from sanction in relation to the late admission of the Claimant’s witness statement. I am not prepared to stay the Claimant’s Protection from Harassment Act 1997 claim and do not grant any separate remedy in relation to it. I award the Claimant £40,000 in general and aggravated damages in relation to the defamatory publications and grant an injunction in the terms set out above.

Cited in 1 later judgment