“On4 September 2017 , the BBC broadcast a Panorama programme called ‘Undercover: Britain’s Immigration Secrets’ (referred to in this Report as ‘the Panorama programme’). This had been filmed covertly over five months at Brook House, an immigration removal centre (IRC) near Gatwick Airport in Sussex. Containing disturbing footage, the documentary portrayed Brook House as violent, dysfunctional and unsafe. It showed the use of abusive, racist and derogatory language by some staff towards those in their care, the effects of illicit drugs, and the use of force by staff on mentally and physically unwell detained people. Following the broadcast of the Panorama programme, a series of investigations were conducted, including a special investigation by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) in 2019, …. On5 November 2019 , the Home Secretary announced that the PPO’s special investigation would be converted to a statutory inquiry undersection 15 of the Inquiries Act 2005 .”
“…. The evidence supplied is not sufficient to demonstrate to me that the applicant has an automatic right of residence and therefore the case was progressed to tasking in my absence on the instruction of my T/L on 23/03/17.”
“Not to be disclosed: Charlotte Hewitt, SEO Detention & Performance Manager provided me with the following update: “Just to update you following discussions with our barrier team. They are satisfied that as the legal reps still have not provided any original documents as evidence, they have not demonstrated that this person has a right of residence as the spouse of an EEA national. They are therefore proceeding to consider the HR application and have advised that this is likely to be refused and certified. The only matter remaining is whether removal action should have been conducted under the EEA regs rather than a Section 10 removal”
“With regard to the Claimant’s ID, it is questionable as to whether the Defendant was entitled to demand an original copy of the ID card given that she had previously accepted his ID, but in any event that is not what she said. She asked for a copy of his ID card, and that was provided. She did not ever say that the application was being refused because only a copy of the ID card had been provided. Given that she had asked for a copy, if she were dissatisfied with that one might expect her to go back to the claimant and ask for an original.”
“The applicant has amended his grounds and Counsel no longer thinks we can defend this matter. Would you be able to review your decision (EEA refusal and decision to detain) and advise if you think this can be defended - Counsel consider we have handled this case inconsistently and considers there is too much risk to proceed: The main issue for me is the letter of28th October 2016 , which asked the Claimant to send over various further documents in support of his application so that his case could be “considered further”. …. The Defendant never told the Claimant that he would have to make a further formal application - and indeed even the letter of12th May 2017 which said that the October letter was not promising a reconsideration (and which in any event post dated the decision to detain) did as a matter of fact consider the further documents but refused to grant an EEA card. The Defendant therefore should have considered the documents that had been sent over before detaining the Claimant. For the reasons set out in my previous advice, I do not think that there were any good reasons for rejecting those documents. No reasons were in fact given in the12th May 2017 letter. It is not possible to identify what they might have been. There was evidence that the spouse was working. There was no evidence that the marriage had been dissolved or a divorce obtained. With regard to the Claimant’s ID, it is questionable as to whether the Defendant was entitled to demand an original copy of the ID card given that she had previously accepted his ID, but in any event that is not what she said. She asked for a copy of his ID card, and that was provided. She did not ever say that the application was being refused because only a copy of the ID card had been provided. Given that she had asked for a copy, if she were dissatisfied with that one might expect her to go back to the claimant and ask for an original.”
“In this circumstance, if the applicant can provide original ID for the sponsor and a marriage certificate, then I believe that should be sufficient to qualify the applicant for a long COA [Certificate of Application] at least.”
“4. Considerations relevant to weighing of hearsay evidence. (1) In estimating the weight (if any) to be given to hearsay evidence in civil proceedings the court shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence. (2) Regard may be had, in particular, to the following— (a) whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a witness; (b) whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated; (c) whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay; (d) whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters; (e) whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with another or for a particular purpose; (f) whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight.”
“70. Lord Devlin's phrase "oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional" must be read, as was made clear by Lord Hutton in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire[2002] AC 122 at paragraph 89, in the light of Lord Devlin's further view at page 1128: ‘In a case in which exemplary damages are appropriate, a jury should be directed that if, but only if, the sum which they have in mind to award as compensation (which may, of course, be a sum aggravated by the way in which the defendant has behaved to the plaintiff) is inadequate to punish him for his outrageous conduct, to mark their disapproval of such conduct and to deter him from repeating it, then it can award some larger sum.’ As Lord Hutton observed, the conduct had to be ‘outrageous’ and to be such that it called for exemplary damages to mark disapproval, to deter and to vindicate the strength of the law. 71. In my view, the guidance given by Sir Thomas Bingham MR and Lord Hutton is sufficient. There is no need for this to be qualified by further looking for malice, fraud, insolence cruelty or similar specific conduct. There is no authority that supports Dr McGregor's view to this effect. (iv) The unlawful imprisonment of Mr Muuse was an outrageous exercise of arbitrary executive power. 72. There are a number of factors that show that the unlawful imprisonment of Mr Muuse in this case was not merely unconstitutional but an arbitrary exercise of executive power which was outrageous. It called for the award of exemplary damages by way of punishment, to deter and to vindicate the strength of the law. 73. The junior officials acted in an unconstitutional and arbitrary manner that resulted in the imprisonment of Mr Muuse for over three months. The outrageous nature of the conduct is exhibited partly by the way in which they treated Mr Muuse and ignored his protests that he was Dutch, partly by the manifest incompetence in which they acted throughout and partly by their failure to take the most elementary steps to check his documents which they held: i) The actions of the junior officials who exercised the power to imprison Mr Muuse and keep him imprisoned cannot be explained on any basis other than that the officials were incompetent to exercise such powers on the assumption favourable to them (which I have made for the reasons already given) that they were not recklessly indifferent to the legality of their actions. ii) They disobeyed the order of the court to release Mr Muuse for no reason. iii) They did not consider the conclusive evidence they held as to his nationality – his ID card and passport – and their other records.”
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
“The court recalls that it is not its role under article 41 to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. Its non-pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage.” … 40. The court has also identified, as relevant to the “overall context” of a case the need to take account of the state's overall conduct. The sorts of factors of potential relevance here would be: whether the violation was deliberate and/or in bad faith; whether the state has drawn the necessary lessons and whether there is a need to include a deterrent element in an award; whether there is a need to encourage others to bring claims against the state by increasing the award; whether the violation was systemic or operational. For instance, in Assenov v Bulgaria(1998) 28 EHRR 652 , para 175 the only factors which the court identified as relevant to quantum were “the gravity and number of violations”
“67. It is uncontroversial that conditions of detention … may result in a detainee suffering inhuman or degrading treatment. … 69. As Singh J suggests, not only must the suffering and humiliation be over and above that inevitable in legitimate detention, a high level of suffering is usually required, variously put in terms of (e.g.) "…intense suffering …" (Iovchev v Bulgaria (2006) (ECtHR Application No 41211/98)[2006] ECHR 97 at [133]); "… serious suffering…" (R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2005] UKHL 66 at [8] per Lord Bingham), or "… intense physical or mental suffering" (Pretty at [52]). … 71. However, in this respect, although subjective suffering will often be crucial evidence, the threshold test is objective,”
“ill-treatment that attains the appropriate minimum level of severity usually involves the relevant individual suffering evidenced actual bodily harm or intense physical or mental suffering.” (§70). He continued that while “subjective suffering will often be crucial evidence”, the test remained objective (§71). That usually means there must be serious suffering: this important point is emphasised when one considers Hilton v United Kingdom(1981) 3 EHRR 204 , where the Court said that for conditions to amount to degrading treatment, they must be shown to be more than merely “depressing or discouraging”. (i) Hickinbottom J did not define “inhuman treatment” in Grant. The learned judge did so in ASK observing that the ECtHR has considered “treatment to be inhuman because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch, and caused either bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering” (68(3)).”
“Q. What about the toilet itself? Was it clean or dirty? A. No, it's not clean. It's like an old WC toilet with plaques on it, brown and things like that. Q. So it was stained? A. Proper stained.”
“You’re reminded and being told, ‘You should know your place’.”
“no-one will listen to you, because, in reality, no-one cares about what is happening to you”
“Problem Stress related problem (new) History really struggling-flashbacks, hypervigilant, on guard, insomnia, nightmares, avoids going out. Cannot even bring himself to go to the gym. Cries when talks about the centre. Trained as a computer engineer but not working since release. Not suicidal. Examination anxious but settled with conversation Medication Citalopram 20mg tablets One To Be Taken each day 28 tablet Comment signs of PTSD Refer to HiM [Health in Mind] start SSRI -given pros and cons = agreed to try”
‘...Got stopped by police for suspected drink driving. Too many triggers, flashbacks. Felt like I was back at the detention centre. In the following two weeks depression but improved. Spending more time going out with friends. What if it happens again?’
“I broke down. I started crying”
“Current presenting difficulties (and coping strategies) What: PTSD - recent event that 1 month ago- got stopped by police for suspected drink driving - too many triggers - not feeling safe – flashbacks: felt like I was back at the detention centre when being frisked - when being taken to the cell same colour of bed.”
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”