“The caller insisted on being put straight through to the victim so the receptionist did so. The caller then said words very like the following: Drop the charges, we know where you live and where your parents live and where your business is. You’ll be in trouble (might have said danger) if you don’t. The victim asked who was calling and the caller did not answer but rang off. The voice sounded to the victim like a former thieving employee Lee Daniel Jordan, also known as Daniel Brougham and various other aliases, who is currently under investigation by Dave Ridley of CID at Hitchin in connection with various acts of dishonesty but as far as the victim knows no charges have been made as yet.”
“Mr Van Colle – know where you live, businesses are – parents live if you don’t drop the charges you’ll be in danger – aggressively said … Sounded like Lee Jordan – employee – spoke - quietly - malice – intent – foreign accent like Lee J’s.”
“It is accepted by the Defendant both that DC Ridley took no further steps at this time in response to the threat to Giles made by Brougham, and that he should have done more by contacting or arresting Brougham. His explanation for failing to arrest Brougham, namely that he felt Giles had not made a sufficiently clear and positive identification of Brougham is, as he now accepts, unsatisfactory in the circumstances. In his evidence at trial he accepted in cross-examination that this had been a serious threat, that it involved the threat of physical danger, that it disclosed an offence of witness intimidation, and that it indicated a risk to Giles’ life. He also conceded that he should have appreciated this at the time. In allowing himself to be dissuaded from a more positive response to this threat by what he regarded as a doubtful identification Mr Faulks submits, as DC Ridley himself accepted in evidence, that DC Ridley made an error of judgment. The judgment he exercised, however, related only to whether he had reasonable grounds to arrest Brougham, to charge him with criminal offences relating to his interference with witnesses, and to prosecute him successfully in connection with such charges. It is clear on the evidence, and DC Ridley himself accepted it, that he did not give any thought at all to Giles’ safety and to the need for steps to be taken to protect him in the light of the threat which had been made.”
“Q. What about providing protection for Giles as a witness who had had a threat, as you have accepted, potentially to his life, what about protecting him? Did you think about that? A. No, my Lord, no. Q. You did not think about that. As a very experienced officer – I know you have said that you have not seen the Hertfordshire guidelines on witness protection – but as an experienced officer do you mean to say with a threat like that being made it did not cross your mind that you needed to protect the witness? A. No, my Lord. … Q. Did you consider speaking to Brougham, approaching Brougham, about this, investigating it with him further, even if not arresting him? A. No, my Lord. Q. You did not. Did you consider attempting to trace the telephone call to Giles, to link it to Brougham? A. Not at that stage, my Lord, no. Q. So at that time you simply take the statement, with evidence of the serious threat made, and you decide to do nothing – absolutely nothing? A. My decision making process was to make sure that those statements which I obtained on that day were delivered to the Crown Prosecution Service. … Q. … your decision was governed – and these decisions, you say, were governed by the tactical process of the prosecution for the theft charge. The question of protection of Giles really never came into your mind? A. It did not, my Lord, yes.”
“1. failed to investigate thoroughly whether offences of intimidation of witnesses and doing acts tending and intended to pervert the course of public justice had been committed; 2. failed to analyse the available evidence carefully, both individually and with others through proper channels of line management; 3. failed to take proper account of the guidance set out in the Hertfordshire Constabulary’s document “Procedures and Guidelines Regarding the Intimidation of Witnesses”; and 4. failed to consider carefully the power to arrest the said Daniel Brougham.”
“Having considered the facts of this case the panel are of the view that the events outlined in the evidence between30 August 2000 and22 November 2000 amounted to an escalating situation of intimidation in respect of the witnesses Panayiotou and Van Colle. DC Ridley was in a unique position during this time with the fullest picture of the developing situation. The panel finds that during this period the officer failed to perform his duties conscientiously and diligently in connection with the improper contacts made with these witnesses. Considering the three specific elements set out in the charge: 1. The panel accept that DC Ridley did obtain statements when the inappropriate approaches to witnesses were reported to him by witnesses, however, the panel’s view is that an investigation includes seeing this through to a satisfactory conclusion. On the basis of the evidence presented to the hearing, it was apparent that the 2 phone calls to Panayiotou and Van Colle on 13 October subject of statements taken on the 19 October did amount to substantive offences of witness intimidation and attempting to pervert the course of justice. In a full and proper investigation, the public would at least have expected contact with Brougham in an attempt to prevent recurrences, but more probably he should have been arrested. Further more on the 29 October when Mr Panayiotou reported the 2 fires in relation to his business premises and his wife’s car a thorough investigation would have taken account of previous incidents and initiated a more detailed examination of the circumstances. 2. The panel felt that on the evidence presented, the officer failed to adequately analyse and properly identify possible links between events, that would have resulted in a different course of action, had he done so. In particular, he failed to identify on 13 October that the calls to Mr Panayiotou and Mr Van Colle were probably both made by Brougham. Further on29 October 2000 he failed to analyse and assess the information regarding the two fires in the context of the previous threats and intimidation. In respect of the final call from Van Colle the officer stated he was happy to wait to make his statement. However, DC Ridley was in possession of additional facts i.e. the fires, which may have affected Van Colle’s level of concern. This issue merited greater urgency. The panel acknowledged the informality of the line management arrangements presented in the evidence and that none of his immediate line managers contradicted the actions the officer was undertaking and that he drew comfort from this together with discussions he had with counsel at court in respect of this case. 3. Discharged in the course of the hearing. 4. On the basis of the 2nd statement taken from Mr Panayiotou on 19 October the panel are of the view that there was sufficient evidence to arrest for attempting to pervert the course of justice. The panel is also of the view that in the case of Van Colle there was evidence sufficient to justify grounds for arrest. It is the view of the panel that an arrest under these circumstances was both necessary and proportionate and was likely to have been beneficial to the ultimate outcome of the case. It is acknowledged that the officer through his counsel accepted that he did make a wrong decision about not arresting Brougham and the panel accepts that there would have been no guarantee that this would have averted the ultimate tragedy.”
“26. Given the seriousness of these incidents, Mr. Panayiotou’s distress and his suspicions that Brougham was behind the fires, further and prompt investigation and action by DC Ridley was called for. In this I find myself in agreement with the Disciplinary Panel’s conclusions that DC Ridley failed to respond to an escalating picture of intimidation involving two prosecution witnesses in the same case, and in particular that he failed to analyse carefully the available evidence, both individually and with others through proper channels of line management. These conclusions are accepted in this trial as correct and DC Ridley acknowledges that the report to him of these fires should have prompted an immediate response, but that he failed to act and failed to consider protection. These events in my view called for a pro-active approach; an investigation and analysis of the possible links between the various incidents which had, by early November, been reported to him by the witnesses. Questions should have been asked of the other prosecution witnesses (Lee Atkinson and John Heward), and information re the fires on 28 and 29 October shared with the Van Colles, all of which would have elicited important information about the nature and extent of Brougham’s activities and would then have required an assessment of the need for witness protection for both Mr. Panayiotou and Giles and the appropriate steps to be taken. If that had been done it is likely in particular, in my view, that Giles would have reported the fire to his own car on 24th September, especially after his insurers reported their findings that it had been started deliberately. Instead, the matter was understandably regarded by Giles and his parents as wholly unconnected with Brougham. Even when Giles raised with his mother whether the deliberate fire to his car, as found by the insurers, could be linked to Brougham’s threats, she stated in her evidence that she had merely observed to him that they had been watching too much television (Transcript 9/6 at page 19). That it was for the officer in the case, and not the witnesses themselves, to evaluate all the material information and make an informed assessment of the risk and the need for protection is clear from the evidence, not least from DC Ridley himself in accepting that it was to him that any witness who had suffered intimidation would primarily look for support ... 27. In these circumstances I do not accept Mr. Faulks’ submission that, whilst DC Ridley was not as curious as he should have been, it was understandable that he did not connect the fires with Brougham’s previous approaches to Mr. Panayiotou and his threats to Giles. Viewed objectively, at the time these events were unfolding, by late October or early November a disturbing pattern of behaviour was emerging, which was capable of being identified with appropriate and reasonable enquiries by the officer in the case. It called for immediate action. There was none. Meanwhile, it appears that on 5th November DC Ridley was seconded to an urgent murder inquiry, wholly unconnected with this case, which meant that he was based at Letchworth and was no longer working at Royston Police Station. He left a message on his answer phone to that effect.”
“Q. Why were you going to arrest him? A. Because of the next step in relation to that call. I discussed the matter with my Detective Sergeant and we decided that following taking the statement we would then arrest him. Q. With a view to? A. With a view to processing him through the criminal justice system. Q. For? A. For witness intimidation. Q. So what was in your mind was due process again and charging him with a criminal offence? A. Yes, my Lord. Q. It is a question of whether you needed to act to protect, avoid a risk to the safety, or life, of Giles, you did not think of that? A. No, not at that stage, no………. Q … that aspect of protecting Mr. Van Colle was really not in your mind? Q. With a view to? Q. For? Q … that aspect of protecting Mr. Van Colle was really not in your mind? A. No, my Lord.”
“In respect of the final call from Van Colle the officer stated he was happy to wait to make his statement. However, DC Ridley was in possession of additional facts i.e. the fires, which may have affected Van Colle’s level of concern. This issue merited greater urgency.”
“The threats must have been made although not life threatening. Judgement is needed in such cases in order to assess the actual risk presented by the threat made. Action which can be taken includes the temporary removal of the witness from his or her home or a number of other measures which are listed in this policy.”
“a) … b) Measures to deal with the perpetrator which include initiating proceedings against the perpetrator, where possible, and supplying courts with “full information about actual or potential witness intimidation” to enable courts when considering the question of bail to “consider imposing conditions which restrict the defendant’s contact with the witnesses”. c) Measures to protect and support witnesses including, for example, the provision of information about intimidation or about any relevant bail conditions and about what action they should take, “as detailed on a Witness and Victim Information Sheet”; establishing one contact point for witnesses; the supply of panic alarms to be worn by the witness to avoid the need to dial 999; and considering an offer to transfer the witness to alternative temporary accommodation.”
“37. Whilst particular measures are clearly a matter of judgment for the individual officer in any given situation the essential requirement, reading this policy as a whole, is for police officers to consider and assess all the circumstances and the risk in any particular case, in order to reach an informed decision as to the need for protection and the level of protection required for the witness or witnesses affected. The very existence of this policy indicates that the Defendant recognised that the police had a duty to protect witnesses who are the victims of intimidation. It is therefore a matter of regret, as is clear from DC Ridley’s evidence at this trial, that he had throughout been wholly unaware of the policy and the guidance contained within it. In reply to questions from the judge he also agreed that he had had no training in relation to the contents of the policy or about witness protection generally. It appears that the policy was placed on the Hertfordshire Constabulary intranet but DC Ridley had received no instructions about it or about following the guidance it contained. He therefore accepted that he had not had regard to its contents when dealing with this case. The fact that he was unaware of it also explains why the disciplinary charge relating to his failure to take proper account of the guidance in this policy was withdrawn at the Misconduct Hearing.”
“The absence of clear findings of fact at the domestic level, in a case where there was considerable dispute on the material facts and which is, on its facts, very different from the present case, in which there is very little factual dispute between the parties, means that little assistance is to be derived in my judgment from the Court’s conclusions on the particular complaints raised.”
“115. The Court notes that the first sentence of Article 2(1) enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. It is common ground that the State’s obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. It is thus accepted by those appearing before the Court thatArticle 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. The scope of this obligation is a matter of dispute between the parties.”
“116. For the Court, and bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention. In the opinion of the Court where there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their above-mentioned duty to prevent and suppress offences against the person, it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. The Court does not accept the Government’s view that the failure to perceive the risk to life in the circumstances known at the time or to take preventive measures to avoid that risk must be tantamount to gross negligence or wilful disregard of the duty to protect life. Such a rigid standard must be considered to be incompatible with the requirements ofArticle 1 of the Convention and the obligations of Contracting States under that Article to secure the practical and effective protection of the rights and freedoms laid down therein, including Article 2. For the Court, and having regard to the nature of the right protected by Article 2, a right fundamental in the scheme of the Convention, it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge. This is a question which can only be answered in the light of all the circumstances of any particular case.”
“13. We consider that the Osman duty is directly engaged in the present case. The majority in Londonderry, and that majority includes the families of those who were killed or injured on Bloody Sunday, wish the inquiry well and are anxious that it should continue to be peacefully held in Londonderry. It is, however, common ground that there are, in Londonderry in particular but also elsewhere, dissident republican elements who are not prepared to observe the ceasefire, but are anxious to disrupt the peace process. In particular, the republican group that describes itself as the Continuity IRA is not observing the ceasefire. These elements pose a threat to the inquiry and those who are or will be taking part in it, and in particular the soldier witnesses. The security agencies consider that this threat is, and will be, sufficiently real and imminent to call for precautionary measures to safeguard those taking part in the inquiry. We consider that they are plainly right to do so.”
“The soldier witnesses’ application raises the issue of whether, and in what circumstances, article 2 can require a public authority to desist from a lawful and peaceful activity because of a terrorist threat. We are not aware of any Strasbourg jurisprudence which bears directly on this question, but we think that its answer must turn on matters of fact and degree.”
“28. In R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex p Fernandez[1971] 1 WLR 987 , after adumbrating the various phrases which he considered expressed the same degree of likelihood of risk, Lord Diplock referred, at p 994, to the alternative of “applying, untrammelled by semantics, principles of common sense and common humanity”
“However, the word “immediate” should not be understood, in the context of decisions on admission to a protective regime, to mean that the threat will necessarily materialise in the very near future. That would be appropriate if a particular threat required urgent measures. However, the kind of risk to be assessed in this context is of harm to the prisoner as and when those wishing him harm find an opportunity. This case concerns a decision whether the risk is sufficient to justify entry to an available protective regime. That implies an assessment of the risk of harm within a period until the decision is reviewed. In my view the question to be asked is whether there is a real risk to the life of the prisoner if he is not admitted to a PWU, rather than some alternative regime, for whatever period is being considered. However, immediacy requires that the risk must be present and continuing. A real risk is one that is not simply a fear felt by the prisoner, but is disclosed by all the information available.”
“… the question to be asked before entry to a protected witness unit is whether there is a real and immediate risk to the life of the claimant if he is not admitted to a protected witness unit, rather than some alternative regime, for whatever period is being considered. Since a year is the normal period between reviews, that is the relevant period. Immediacy must be considered in that context. Where a prisoner has previously been properly admitted to a protected witness unit, it is in my judgment incumbent on the Prison Service to satisfy itself that the risk is no longer such as to require admission.”
“54. …. there is no single or all-purpose formulation of the test to be applied when considering what steps a public body should take in order to protect a person from a threat to his life from a third party or parties. It all depends on the facts of the case. As to general guidance on how to approach each case on its own particular facts, the starting point is the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Osman ... There, the court held, at paragraphs 115 and 116, that article 2(1) may, depending on the facts, impose a duty on a public authority to take all reasonable steps to protect a person from a real and immediate risk to his life.”
“55. The critical words in that passage, “a real and immediate risk” to life were considered by the Court of Appeal in R (A) v Lord Saville … The court upheld the Divisional Court’s grant of judicial review quashing the tribunal’s decision requiring the soldiers to give their evidence to it in Londonderry. In doing so, the court sought, at pp 1261-1262, paras 28-31, to avoid any all-purpose formula of the threshold of risk required to engage the article 2 duty, preferring a common sense and humane approach tailored to the circumstance of each individual case. Thus, it considered, at paragraph 28, that the test applied in Osman …, of a real and immediate risk, while apt for a case where there was a known and very high degree of risk to life from criminal acts of a third party, was “well above the threshold” that would engage article 2 where the risk attended an action that the authority itself was contemplating, as in the case before it. The court applied what it regarded as a lower threshold of risk, taking into account both the soldier applicants’ subjective fears and their objective justification.”
“60. Whatever the risk to a person’s life and whatever the mechanism that may give rise to it, the approach of Lord Diplock in R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex p Fernandez[1971] 1 WLR 987 , adopted by the court in R (A) v Lord Saville of Newdigate[2002] 1WLR 1249 seems to me, with respect, to be entirely logical and of general application. If a risk to life is not “real”, it is not a risk to life. If a risk to life is not “immediate” in the sense that it is not present at the time or during the period when it is claimed that a protective duty is owned by a public body, it is not a risk that can engage article 2. It is a future risk that may, at some later date, do so. To be a candidate for engaging article 2, all that is needed is “a risk to life”
“121. In the view of the Court the applicants have failed to point to any decisive stage in the sequence of the events leading up to the tragic shooting when it could be said that the police knew or ought to have known that the lives of the Osman family were at real and immediate risk from Paget-Lewis. While the applicants have pointed to a series of missed opportunities which would have enabled the police to neutralise the threat posed by Paget-Lewis, for example by searching his home for evidence to link him with the graffiti incident or by having him detained under theMental Health Act 1983 or by taking more active investigative steps following his disappearance, it cannot be said that these measures, judged reasonably, would in fact have produced that result or that a domestic court would have convicted him or ordered his detention in a psychiatric hospital on the basis of the evidence adduced before it.”
“… the Court cannot speculate as to the outcome of the domestic proceedings had the applicants’ statement of claim not been struck out. It considers nevertheless that the applicants were denied the opportunity to obtain a ruling on the merits of their claim for damages against the police. Deciding on an equitable basis it awards each of the applicants the sum of£10,000 .”
“99. The Court recalls that the Government argued that notwithstanding any acknowledged shortcomings it has not been shown that matters would have turned out any differently, in other words, that fuller co-operation and communication between the authorities under the duty to protect the applicants and closer monitoring and supervision of the family would not necessarily have either uncovered the abuse or prevented it. The test under Article 3 however does not require it to be shown that “but for” the failing or omission of the public authority ill-treatment would not have happened. A failure to take reasonably available measures which could have a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm is sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State. 100. The Court is satisfied that the pattern of lack of investigation, communication and co-operation by the relevant authorities disclosed in this case must be regarded as having had a significant influence on the course of events and that proper and effective management of their responsibilities, might, judged reasonably, have been expected to avoid, or at least, minimise the risk or the damage suffered.”
“Wisely, in my opinion, the Court has not sought to lay down hard and fast rules in a field which pre-eminently calls for a case by case judgment and the Court’s language may be taken to reflect its assessment of the differing levels of probability held to attach to the causal connection found in individual cases.”
“106. I do not accept Mr. Faulks’ submissions that it is unlikely that Brougham’s bail would have been revoked if he had been returned to court; or that, if conditions had been attached to his bail, they would not have prevented the murder; or that even if Brougham had been remanded in custody, he was capable of getting others to act on his behalf and the murder might well still have taken place. This latter suggestion is, in my judgment, fanciful on the evidence in this case, notwithstanding that others may well have been involved with Brougham in the arson attacks or in the murder itself. If Brougham had been arrested and if DC Ridley had taken steps to discover the extent of his activities and the Court was informed of the approaches and threats which had been made to both Giles and Mr. Panayiotou, and indeed the other witnesses Lee Atkinson and John Heward, I consider it is highly likely that his bail would have been revoked and Brougham remanded into custody. Even if bail was continued but made conditional, upon Brougham’s not interfering with Prosecution witnesses and/or not entering within specified areas where Giles’ lived and worked, the very fact of his arrest, his court appearance and the risk of custody upon breach of the conditions would be likely in my judgment to have resulted in a cessation of the intimidation and Giles’ death would not have occurred. Clearly, if Giles had been placed in temporary safe accommodation pending the trial, as was considered in the case of the witness Lee Atkinson after Giles’ death, it is very unlikely that the murder would have taken place. There was, for all these reasons, at the very least a real prospect of avoiding this tragedy.”
“8(1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate. (2) But damages may be awarded only by a court which has power to award damages, or to order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings. (3) No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, including- (a) any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in question (by that or any other court), and (b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in respect of that act, the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made. (4) In determining- (a) whether to award damages, or (b) the amount of an award, the court must take into account the principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the award of compensation underArticle 41 of the Convention . … (6) In this section- “court” includes a tribunal; “damages” means damages for an unlawful act of a public authority; and “unlawful” means unlawful under section 6(1).”
“In determining whether damages should be awarded, in the absence of any clear guidance from Strasbourg, principles clearly laid down by the HRA may give the greatest assistance. The critical message is that the remedy has to be “just and appropriate” and “necessary” to afford “just satisfaction”
“It would seem to be clear that a domestic court may not award damages unless satisfied that it is necessary to do so, but if satisfied that it is necessary to do so it is hard to see how the court could consider it other than just and appropriate to do so. In deciding whether to award damages, and if so how much, the court is not strictly bound by the principles applied by the European Court in awarding compensation underarticle 41 of the Convention , but it must take those principles into account. It is, therefore, to Strasbourg that British courts must look for guidance on the award of damages.”
“None of the three English cases cited involved a violation of article 6, and to that extent they have only a limited bearing on the present problem. But there are in my opinion broader reasons why this approach should not be followed. First, the 1998 Act is not a tort statute. Its objects are different and broader. Even in a case where a finding of violation is not judged to afford the applicant just satisfaction, such a finding will be an important part of his remedy and an important vindication of the right he has asserted. Damages need not ordinarily be awarded to encourage high standards of compliance by member states, since they are already bound in international law to perform their duties under the Convention in good faith, although it may be different if there is felt to be a need to encourage compliance by individual officials or classes of official. Secondly, the purpose of incorporating the Convention in domestic law through the 1998 Act was not to give victims better remedies at home than they could recover in Strasbourg but to give them the same remedies without the delay and expense of resort to Strasbourg. This intention was clearly expressed in the White Paper “Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill” (Cm 3782,1 October 1997 ), para 2.6: “The Bill provides that, in considering an award of damages on Convention grounds, the courts are to take into account the principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights in awarding compensation, so that people will be able to receive compensation from a domestic court equivalent to what they would have received in Strasbourg.”
“An apology, an offer of treatment or other redress, shall not of itself amount to an admission of negligence or breach of statutory duty.”