“Travelling south I particularly recall wanker signs made with two hands. The one doing it had a black coat, black spiky hair and Arab appearance. We then did a circuit of the usual haunts. We would drive north, turn left and left and then back north onto Edgware Road.”
“I asked him if he would help, and I said it was police brutality. He did not look back at me he said “I know. I can’t do anything about it. I am sorry mate.””
“As we were about to leave (and) the wheels had started to roll Police Sergeant Wilson who was sat on the seat by the rear door (G) immediately shouted out “stop the carrier he’s said something” indicating that another male in the crowd had said something. Once the carrier had stopped Police Sergeant Wilson and PC Kitchener jumped out and grabbed another male in the carrier. This male was placed on the single seat at the rear of the carrier. I was sat in the single seat in the middle at the time, and I was facing the rear door. Police Sergeant Wilson went over to this male who later gave his name as Basil Khan……..and began to lecture him saying words to the effect of “you fucking little cunt, you ever say one more thing and I will fucking kill you, you little shit”
“PC Jones then went to the back of the carrier behind where Basil was sitting and moved a couple of public order bags which were on the floor in the centre aisle towards the rear door. I saw him approach Basil from behind taking him by surprise, grabbing him around his neck in a headlock. Basil was shouting “I can’t breathe, I can’t breathe.”
“As Basil Khan was forced up into the carrier, I motioned him to sit at the rear of the carrier. He then spun and hit me with his right elbow in my right cheek.”
“I tried to take hold of his upper arm. As the handcuffs were applied he was struggling. He was not going to be ‘coming quietly’ ”
“As we were pulling away, another of the youths, who I now know to be Basil Khan, then came up to the side of the carrier. He was acting in a threatening manner and I told Steve (White) to stop and Mark (Jones) and I got out. I said to Basil Khan “you have been told to go and you chose to come back and threaten us.”
“I was looking out of the window at the group still loitering at the window and as I looked back I saw PC Jones recoil as if he had been struck and wince in momentary pain. His head rocked back and at that time he was following Basil Khan through the carrier. PC Jones said “he’s just fucking hit me!””
“As I turned in the seat I saw he was detaining a …youth whom I now know as Basil Khan. He was placed on the carrier and moved to a seat at the rear; I became aware that he had been arrested for a public order offence. I then continued to (illegible) my radio and to contact the local custody. As I did so I heard struggling from the rear of the carrier and heard PC Jones saying “stop struggling, sit still!”
“We stopped at the back gate for a few minutes whilst waiting for cell space and PC Jones was still punching and driving his knees into Basil, shouting swearing and basically abusing him. I looked at Sergeant Wilson using hand signals asking him to stop this but he ignored my request. There was cell space at Paddington and we drove into the yard. PC Brown and PC White took Ahmed into custody whilst we remained on the carrier with Basil and PC Jones carried on again punching and punching and punching Basil several times. I was then approached by Sergeant Wilson in the yard. He’d been informed that I was not happy with what went on and I told him “I’m not impressed with what went on, that was way out of line”
“If I had treated him differently, things may not have escalated. I was quite dismissive. He said something like “If you are not going to do anything about it, I will take it somewhere else.”
“Basil, still awake? …………..The sergeant is just here to be a witness to this, did anything happen to you in the back of that police van tonight? Inspector Cruickshank: “What?”
“(1) In estimating the weight (if any) to be given to hearsay evidence in civil proceedings the court shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence. (2) Regard may be had, in particular, to the following— (a) whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a witness; (b) whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated; (c) whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay; (d) whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters; (e) whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with another or for a particular purpose; (f) whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight.”
“9 It is therefore clear from the statute that it is the duty of the constable, if he is not in uniform, before he commences the search to take reasonable steps to bring to the attention of the appropriate person documentary evidence that he is a constable. A search conducted in breach of this duty cannot be a lawful search, and therefore resistance to such a search would be lawful and cannot constitute the offence of obstruction of a constable in the execution of his duty. 10 The justices found in their case that the search was lawful, but in their recitation of the evidence, they did not record any evidence of an attempt to produce evidence that was frustrated by the appellant's actions. 11 Miss Stevens, who appears for the respondent……., submitted that Parliament has not required that the warrant card, or indeed any other documentary evidence, be produced in every case, and it is sufficient if the officer has taken reasonable steps to produce it. I accept that submission. There may be cases when physical resistance from the appellant prevents the process of production of documentation being complete before there is a physical taking hold of a person in order to search them. 12 However, I reject (1) any submission that it can be inferred on the present facts that the officer was about to produce the warrant card but had been prevented from so doing, and (2) generally that performance of the duty for uniformed officers, namely informing a person to be searched of the name of the officer and police station concerned, was a sufficient part-performance of the separate and additional duty for plain clothed officers. In my judgment, that distinct duty is the more important duty when an officer is in plain clothes. The uniformed officer has his uniform to speak for him or her as the source of his or her authority and status as a constable. The plain clothed officer needs to produce the warrant card to start in the same position as the uniformed officer. 13 Although there is no reference in the statute to which order the duties are to be performed in, this consideration would lead me to believe that, in the normal case, the card should be produced before or at least at the same time as the verbal introduction in order to found a legitimate search. It is notable that the authors of the Codes of Practice, who are well experienced in the practical realities of policing, provide as follows: "Code of Practice A 3.9. 3. 9 Officers not in uniform must show their warrant cards ..." 14 It is also notable that in the case of Mustapha Osman v Southwark Crown Court[1999] 163 JP 735 (1 July 1999 ) in the judgment of Sedley LJ there has been the suggestion that a convoluted oral explanation might take longer and might be more likely to interfere with the duties of preventing crime and searching, and that a convenient alternative would be the production of a piece of paper with the requisite information contained on it. 15 In the present case, there was no evidence, or certainly no evidence recited in the justices' case, as to the following matters: (1) why the card was never produced or attempted to be produced; (2) that PC Townsend ever intended to produce the card but was prevented from doing so; (3) that he explained at any time that he was intending to do so when his hands were free; (4) that he did so when the appellant had been restrained and handcuffed with the assistance of other officers. It was equally plain from the facts found that before and during the search the officer was able to give a lot of oral information about who he was and what he was intending to do. 16 It is clear from the line of authorities, beginning with the case of Osman and continuing through to the case of R v Christopher Bristol[2007] EWCA Crim 3214 (4 December 2007 ), as well as the plain words of the statute, that compliance with the statutory requirements is a precondition of a lawful search. It makes no difference that the constable is said to have been known to the person being searched. The earlier decision in the case of Forde [1985] 81 Crim App R 19, to which reference was made by Miss Stevens, preceded the statutory language with which we are concerned. It cannot assist in the kind of case that is concerned with whether those preconditions have been complied with. Of course, as already acknowledged, where the evidence demonstrates that the constable did take reasonable steps to produce the documentary evidence but was prevented from doing so, the duty may have been complied with, but there is no evidence to that effect in this case. 17 In my judgment, the justices have misunderstood the mandatory requirements for a lawful exercise of the power of search, and on the facts found by them, could not have concluded that the power had been lawfully exercised. The consequence is that the search was unlawful, the officer was not acting in the execution of his duty when conducting it, and the appellant was entitled to use reasonable force to resist the search. 18 The justices posed three questions for the opinion of the High Court: "(1) Was the court entitled to find that notwithstanding the failure of PC Townsend to produce documentary evidence to the appellant, that he had taken all reasonable steps to comply with his duty as provided by section 2(2)(b)(i) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Code of Conduct?" The answer is "no", in my judgment. "(2) If not, did that failure render the search unlawful?" In my judgment, the answer is "yes". "(3) If the search and use of force on the appellant were unlawful, can the appellant properly be convicted of an offence pursuant tosection 4(1) (a) of the Public Order Act 1986 ?" In my judgment, the answer is "yes", but only if the conduct used in resisting any unlawful force was excessive. (My italics) 19 Applying those answers to the facts of this case, it must follow that the conviction for obstruction of the police must be quashed and an acquittal substituted. The appellant was entitled to use reasonable force to resist the search, and conviction for threatening words or behaviour could be founded on reasonable force or threat of force to resist such a search. Since the justices appear to have included the appellant's resistance to the search as at least part of the basis of the conviction for threatening words, the conviction cannot stand. However, the case stated also recites that the justices found that the appellant threatened to stab the officer with a knife. It is strongly arguable that use of such words could be excessive force and constitute the offence of threatening words and behaviour, irrespective of whether the officer was acting in the execution of his duty or not. It is therefore common ground that we should quash the conviction of the public order offence as well, but in the case of that offence, and that offence only, remit the charge to the justices for further consideration of this issue. Of course, it will be open to the CPS to review whether this is a prosecution they would wish to pursue in all the circumstances of the case. But to this extent, this appeal is allowed.”
“(8) If the case is one in which aggravated damages are claimed and could be appropriately awarded, the nature of aggravated damages should be explained to the jury. Such damages can be awarded where there are aggravating features about the case which would result in the plaintiff not receiving sufficient compensation for the injury suffered if the award were restricted to a basic award. Aggravating features can include humiliating circumstances at the time of arrest or any conduct of those responsible for the arrest or the prosecution which shows that they had behaved in a high handed, insulting, malicious or oppressive manner either in relation to the arrest or imprisonment or in conducting the prosecution. Aggravating features can also include the way the litigation and trial are conducted. [The aggravating features listed take account of the passages in the speech of Lord Reid in the case of Broome at 1085 and Pearson LJ in McCarey v Associated Newspapers Limited[1965] 1 QB 86 at 104. (9) The jury should then be told that if they consider the case is one for the award of damages other than basic damages then they should usually make a separate award for each category. [This is contrary to the present practice but in our view will result in greater transparency as to the make up of the award]. (10) We consider that where it is appropriate to award aggravated damages the figure is unlikely to be less than a£1,000 . We do not think it is possible to indicate a precise arithmetical relationship between basic damages and aggravated damages because the circumstances will vary from case to case. In the ordinary way, however, we would not expect the aggravated damages to be as much as twice the basic damages except perhaps where, on the particular facts, the basic damages are modest. (11) It should be strongly emphasised to the jury that the total figure for basic and aggravated damages should not exceed what they consider is fair compensation for the injury which the plaintiff has suffered. It should also be explained that if aggravated damages are awarded such damages, though compensatory are not intended as a punishment, will in fact contain a penal element as far as the defendant is concerned. (12) Finally the jury should be told in a case where exemplary damages are claimed and the Judge considers that there is evidence to support such a claim, that though it is not normally possible to award damages with the object of punishing the defendant, exceptionally this is possible where there has been conduct, including oppressive or arbitrary behaviour, by police officers which deserves the exceptional remedy of exemplary damages. it should be explained to the jury: (a) that if the jury are awarding aggravated damages these damages will have already provided compensation for the injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the oppressive and insulting behaviour of the police officer and, inevitably, a measure of punishment from the defendant's point of view; (b) that exemplary damages should be awarded if, but only if, they consider that the compensation awarded by way of basic and aggravated damages is in the circumstances an inadequate punishment for the defendants. (c) that an award of exemplary damages is in effect a windfall for the plaintiff and, where damages will be payable out of police funds, the sum awarded may not be available to be expended by the police in a way which would benefit the public. [This guidance would not be appropriate if the claim were to be met by insurers]. (d) that the sum awarded by way of exemplary damages should be sufficient to mark the jury's disapproval of the oppressive or arbitrary behaviour but should be no more than is required for this purpose. (13) Where exemplary damages are appropriate they are unlikely to be less than£5,000 . Otherwise the case is probably not one which justifies an award of exemplary damages at all. In this class of action the conduct must be particularly deserving of condemnation for an award of as much as£25,000 to be justified and the figure of£50,000 should be regarded as the absolute maximum, involving directly officers of at least the rank of superintendent. (14) In an appropriate case the jury should also be told that even though the plaintiff succeeds on liability any improper conduct of which they find him guilty can reduce or even eliminate any award of aggravated or exemplary damages if the jury consider that this conduct caused or contributed to the behaviour complained of.”
“Outline Facts 7. Ms Vento was born on15 February 1967 . She had a long held ambition to join the police force, but she was unable to do so before the height requirements were relaxed in 1995. On11 December 1995 , at the age of 28, she joined the police force as a probationary constable and began training to be an ordinary police constable. At that time she was married with 3 children. Initially she had the support of her husband, though he did not expect her to succeed in combining her responsibilities as a mother with those of a trainee police officer. The couple separated in 1996 and they were divorced in 1999. 8. In general, Ms Vento made good progress during her first year in her paperwork and in her work relationships. But in the first half of 1997 a series of incidents occurred when fellow police officers criticised her conduct, her personal life and her character in an unwarranted, aggressive and demoralising manner. The treatment was found to be less favourable than a hypothetical male officer would have received in the same circumstances. The tribunal inferred that the less favourable treatment was on the ground of her sex. 9. At first she coped well with the situation and with the effects of the recent breakdown of her marriage. On12 May 1997 , however, she was diagnosed as clinically depressed. She was given medication. She continued working until July 1997. She then went off work sick and was absent for 3 months. Although still on medication, she returned to work in October 1997. Further incidents of discrimination occurred following which she suffered suicidal impulses. The discriminatory treatment of her contributed to her depression and affected her ability to form relationships. On8 December 1997 she was dismissed on the ground of alleged lack of honesty and lack of performance. 10. The Employment Tribunal found that Ms Vento did not have a vulnerable personality, which would increase the risk of failing to complete a full career in the police force to the retirement age of 55. It found that she would have successfully completed her probation and qualified as a police constable. It also found that she had limited career prospects. She was only likely to engage in clerical work in the future.”
“………We do not think it is possible to indicate a precise arithmetical relationship between basic damages and aggravated damages because the circumstances will vary from case to case. In the ordinary way, however, we would not expect the aggravated damages to be as much as twice the basic damages except perhaps where, on the particular facts, the basic damages are modest.”
“8 Judicial remedies. (1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate. (2) But damages may be awarded only by a court which has power to award damages, or to order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings. (3) No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, including— (a)any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in question (by that or any other court), and (b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in respect of that act, the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made.”