Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Ltd v Julia McGeoch [2026] EWHC 1575 (Ch)

“This Licence may be ended by the Licensor or the Licensee giving six month’s [sic] notice in writing to the other to expire at any time.”

“40. The Number 3 Trust needs to sell Stapleford Farm even to contain the WTDL loss at that level. Accordingly, if Julia does not proceed to buy it, the Trustees will need to evict her (and her mother) and sell the property on the open market to a third party. The Trustees have been requesting Julia since February 2022 to provide proof of funds, and they now take the view that an urgent decision is needed. As a result of the delay, Julia was served with a notice to quit on 1 February 2022 and a second notice was served on 16 January 2023, without prejudice to the first, but no eviction proceedings have yet been taken. Julia has claimed that the sale of Stapleford Farm will leave her homeless; although it is hard to see how that could possibly be, given that she owns a property in Ireland outright, having purchased that using monies gifted to her by her father to enable her to purchase Stapleford Farm from the Trustee in or about 2018. [ … ] 43. It is against that background that we have to consider the Trustees’ decision either to sell Stapleford Farm to Julia for £2 million if she comes up with proof of funds by 30 November 2023 (in argument that date was extended by three months) or commence eviction proceedings. 44. Pamela’s position in relation to Stapleford Farm has been that the Trustees should give Julia sufficient time to provide proof of funds for her purchase of that property. Pamela’s understanding is that Julia needs to sell the Irish property in order to do so and has received an offer from a prospective buyer for it. She objects to the Trustees being given blessing by this Court to commence eviction proceedings against Julia upon the basis that her father would have been very much opposed to the idea of Julia being evicted from her home 45. The skeleton arguments filed by Laura and Angus for the November hearing were silent as to what should take place with Stapleford Farm … 46. The sale of Stapleford Farm is an essential step in the winding up of the Trusts and distribution of assets to the four siblings following the equalisation programme. The reality is that Julia’s procrastination in making arrangements to complete the acquisition of Stapleford Farm acts as a block on any timely distribution. In our judgment, it would be unreasonable for the Trustees not to recognise this and indeed their steps plan and their decisions which they seek to have blessed do recognise that principle. Our difficulty is that it does not seem to us that the mere provision by Julia of proof of funds will provide any certainty that the sale of Stapleford Farm to her will go ahead. If the Court were in the position of the Trustees, it would take the approach that if Julia was not able to complete the purchase of Stapleford Farm by the end of February 2024, the eviction proceedings would be taken and the property placed on the market forthwith. Julia has in our judgment had more than enough time to take the necessary action, and her failure to do so gives one no confidence that she will make any effort in this regard in the future unless put under pressure to do so. 47. However, the principle of non-intervention suggests that the Court should not give this direction to the Trustees. Accordingly, we bless the decision of the Trustees to give Julia until the end of February to come up with proof of funds for her purchase of Stapleford Farm, failing which eviction proceedings should be taken. We add however that it does not seem to us at all unreasonable, even if Julia does come up with proof of funds by the end of February, for the Trustees to insist upon a completion of the sale of Stapleford Farm to her within the following six weeks. 48. We also take the view that if Julia does not come up with proof of funds by 28 February 2024, with eviction proceedings then to be taken, the Trustees should also forthwith place Stapleford Farm on the open market for sale. Julia’s activity or lack of it is holding up the process for each of her siblings. The fact that the Trustees have placed the property on the open market does not mean of course that the Trustees cannot still sell the property to Julia if, after that date, she is in a position to buy it. We add that, on the face of it, if Julia’s offer at £2 million is less than any offer received from a third party on the open market, the Trustees would be expected either to take the better offer unless all the adult beneficiaries agree and would be prepared to back that agreement with an appropriate indemnity or to proceed with the sale to Julia and make a further adjustment to the amount of her benefit to reflect the difference between the sale price to her and the sale price foregone by not proceeding with the better offer. 49. For the avoidance of doubt, the fact that Julia lives in Stapleford Farm with her mother does not in our judgment affect the position. If Julia has to be evicted, and naturally her mother too would have to be evicted, there is nothing preventing the two of them from living in other accommodation. We do not see the mother’s position as material to the issues involved unless all the adult beneficiaries agree that it should be.”

“55. The Trustees have recognised that it has always been the intention for Julia to own Stapleford Farm. It was decided that the best option was for her to purchase Stapleford Farm from the No. 3 Trust at market value. Stapleford Farm is Julia’s residential home … 56. In order to fund the purchase of Stapleford Farm, Julia has sold her property in Ireland, known as Landscape Stud, and on the assurances that she would not be left homeless, Landscape Stud was sold for €2,300,000, the estimated net proceed of sale amounting to €2,094,496.16 (£1,773,043.39 as at 4 July 2024). [ … ] 61. … there is a major issue with the valuation of Stapleford Farm, which has since these proceedings commenced been £2 million. Julia commissioned a report from Eddison … (Nb. The final Report has been circulated to the parties), who provided the final report during the last week of June 2024. The valuation given for Stapleford Farm, was £1,200,000 and there is significant work to be carried out if the value is to be increased. 62. It is submitted that the Trustees cannot make a decision regards the sale of Stapleford Farm until this issue of the valuation has been determined, and if the Trustees are still considering going after Julia for the difference in the purchase and sale price, then the loss and who fault the losses are will need to be determined, as after all Stapleford Farm is a Trust asset. [ … ] 64. The Trustees had blessed their decision to commence eviction proceedings in England against Julia, which has now commenced, however, there is a defence and counterclaim that will be raised, which includes an equitable interest/estopple [sic], which will need to be determined in England, as it will have an impact on the Trustees’ title of Stapleford Farm … ”

“29. Notwithstanding the comments made by the Court in the January 2024 Judgment, Stapleford Farm remains unsold. In the absence of Julia providing the required proof of funds, eviction proceedings have been commenced in England (‘the Eviction Proceedings’). The Trustees advised us that Stapleford Farm has to be sold in order to enable them to repay some of the WTDL Loan and write off the remainder and to contain the loss in the No.3 Trust. The lack of sale was a block to the implementation of the Distribution Plan and the Amended Distribution Plan. However, Julia is now defending the Eviction Proceedings (at increased cost to the Family Trusts) and the Trustees find themselves unable to sell to a third party whilst those proceedings are ongoing, particularly as Julia appears to be claiming estoppel (although the Trustees are apparently advised that her claim is not properly pleaded and is without merit). 30. At the beginning of the hearing before us on 16 July 2024, Advocate Mistry, on behalf of Julia, sought an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that the Court should not bless the Trustees’ decision without final figures being available, the final figures being dependent on the result of an enquiry as to the quantum of the Trustees’ legal and administration costs ordered by the Court in the January 2024 Judgment. He argued that the provision of final figures was essential for Julia to be able to assess whether or not she could afford to purchase Stapleford Farm and further suggested that the Court had indicated in the January 2024 Judgment that a blessing of the Trustees’ decisions could not take place until the quantum of costs was determined.”

“43. As we have already noted, the Trustees did not [in the latest application] seek any order from the Court in relation to Stapleford Farm, the Court having already provided its blessing to the Trustees’ decision as to how to proceed in its January 2024 Judgment. However, Julia, in her skeleton argument, sought an order that the Court refuse its blessing of the Trustees’ decision that it be sold for £2 million either to Julia or a third party and sought further orders relating to its value and the apportionment of any difference between its sale price and its ‘current value’. 44. It is clear that the continued delay in the sale of Stapleford Farm is a block to the implementation of the 2022 Equalisation. The delay appears to be largely attributable to Julia’s failure to engage with the Trustees in relation to her desire to purchase it. In relation to her ability to purchase the property, it would appear that she has now sold her property in Ireland, and we note that at the hearing before us Pamela indicated that she had offered Julia financial assistance to purchase it given her concern for her mother, who also lives in the property. Julia’s defence of the Eviction Proceedings appears to be yet a further attempt on her part to delay a decision as to whether or not to purchase it. Further delay is likely to have a financial impact on her siblings. As the Trustees have pointed out, Julia is not being forced to purchase the property: if she does not wish, or is unable, to purchase it she clearly has sufficient funds from the sale of her Irish property to purchase an alternative. 45. For the above reasons we blessed the Trustees' decision to allocate the WTDL French Loans 50/50 between Laura and Julia and implement the 2022 Equalisation by way of the Amended Distribution Plan.”

“At the hearing fixed in accordance with rule 55.5(1) or at any adjournment of that hearing, the court may – (a) decide the claim; or (b) give case management directions.” (a) decide the claim; or (b) give case management directions.”

“Where the claim is genuinely disputed on grounds which appear to be substantial, case management directions given under paragraph (1)(b) will include the allocation of the claim to a track or directions to enable it to be allocated.”

“1. … [ … ] c. There has been a longstanding agreement/understanding between the Claimant/its predecessor trustees and the Defendant that the Defendant may exclusively occupy the Property until it is transferred to the Defendant absolutely, the further details of which are follows: [ … ] iii. In or around April 2007, the trustees instructed the Defendant to locate a property in England for the Defendant and her household to move into … The trustees assured the Defendant that they would purchase a property in the United Kingdom for the Defendant, her mother, grandmother, and animals including horses. They assured the Defendant that the Property would be owned by the Defendant … iv. The Defendant identified the Property as suitable in or around October 2007. v. The Defendant made an offer of £2.4m for the Property, on the understanding that the trustees would provide the purchase monies. The Defendant's understanding at that time was that the Property was to be conveyed to the Defendant directly. vi. In an email dated 28 March 2008 the trustee wrote to the Defendant stating that the Trust would purchase the Property, stating that it would be doing so "for her benefit" and that it was ‘highly unlikely that the trustees are going to deny you occupation’. The Defendant was upset by this but it was stated to the Defendant by the trustees at the time and their legal representatives that the Property was to be hers and so she accepted this. vii. The Defendant's understanding remained at that time that the Property would eventually be conveyed into her own name … [ … ] xi. On 24 December 2009, the Defendant entered into a written Licence to Occupy with P&L Trust Company Limited as Trustees of the Trust with regard to the Property (the "Licence Document"). xii. Notwithstanding the above and in particular paragraph 7 of the Licence Document, the trustee assured the Defendant that she would be able to occupy the Property for as long as she wished and that it would be conveyed to her absolutely at some future date … [ … ] xiv. Between 2008 and 2012 the Defendant invested approximately £450,000 to £700,000 on renovations to the Property, of which the trustees were aware. xv. During the course of these renovations, the trustee communicated to the Defendant on numerous occasions that the Defendant was the moral owner and in particular that the Property had been allocated to the Defendant's share under the Trust's distribution plan. xvi. From 2012 until 2017 the Defendant ensured all upkeep as necessary and where possible maintained all aspects of the property on the premise that the property was eventually to be hers. She also added and improved aspects of the property including upgrading the lodge in garden to an annex … [ … ] xxi. In 2017, the trustee advised the Defendant that purchasing the Property from the Trust would be the most prudent means of conveying it to her because it would avoid ancient capital gains tax liabilities, and that the trustee would facilitate such purchase (the ‘Option’). xxii. The trustee at that time proposed a figure of £2m as a purchase price. This was never contractually agreed in writing, but was a figure arrived at based on the valuation of the Property at that time. The understanding between the trustees and the Defendant was that the purchase when it occurred would be based on a RICS established market value. xxiii. Acting in reliance on the above, the Defendant obtained funds to assist in the purchase of the Property and engaged solicitors to commence the conveyancing process. xxiv. However, there were delays in the conveyancing owing to, inter alia, defects in title including a boundary dispute and a disagreement as to the assignment of an insurance claim following damage to the Property. xxv. In 2018, while these difficulties were being dealt with the Defendant temporarily invested the funds she had obtained to purchase the Property in a different property in Ireland (the ‘Ireland Property’). The Defendant understood from the trustees at that time that she would receive money at the termination of the trusts of which she was a beneficiary which would allow her to purchase the Property or she would be distributed it out of the Trust outright. In the alternative, she would sell the Ireland Property and use those funds. xxvi. As a result, the Defendant deferred the purchase until these matters could be resolved but continued to make the expenditures as described above [1(c)(xviii-xix)] in reliance on the understanding that the purchase would eventually be made or she would otherwise be conveyed the Property. xxvii. As a result of the above difficulties new RICS valuations were obtained, and the Property has been revealed to be worth in all likelihood less than previously thought, i.e. less than £2m. xxviii. The Defendant has subsequently sold the Ireland Property in order to release the funds required for the purchase of the Property, in reasonable reliance on the assurances offered by the Claimant and predecessor trustees including but not limited to the Option. xxix. It is only recently, being approximately the prior 18 months, that the trustee has stated that there was a possibility of them attempting to sell the Property to a third party as opposed to conveying it to the Defendant and the present dispute has arisen. 2. The first clause of the first sentence is denied. The second clause, viz, that the Defendant is in occupation of the land is admitted. The third clause, that she occupies the land pursuant to a terminated licence is denied. It is further averred that: a. The Defendant's right to occupy the Property is not limited to any rights she may have under the Licence Document. b. The Defendant has enjoyed exclusive possession since her initial occupation of the Property and pays rent and outgoings for the Property and thus enjoys a tenancy which is to last until the Claimant conveys the Property to the Defendant absolutely. c. Further or alternatively, the Defendant enjoys a licence until the Property is conveyed to her absolutely. d. Further or alternatively, the Claimant is estopped from terminating any tenancy or licence the Defendant enjoys because: i. The trustees have made express representations/representations by conduct which the Claimant as present trustee has made and adopted that the Defendant would be allowed to occupy the Property until such time as it was conveyed to the Defendant absolutely. ii. Further or alternatively, the trustees and Claimant have acquiesced in the Defendant's understanding of the same. iii. The Defendant reasonably relied to her detriment on the above representations, conduct and/or acquiescence.”

“The fifth subsentence [of the fifth paragraph of the Particulars of Claim] is denied and it is further averred that even if (which is denied) the Claimant is able to terminate the alleged licence by way of the 1 February notice, the notice did not offer the Defendant reasonable time to vacate. The Defendant further puts the Claimant to proof generally as to the validity of the notices to terminate.”

“We understand that Julia has chosen to defend the Eviction Proceedings and has sought to argue that she has a right not to be evicted from Stapleford Farm either because she has a tenancy or licence which is to last until the property is conveyed to her or in the alternative, because the Trustees are estopped from terminating any tenancy or licence. Such arguments were not raised in the Jersey proceedings; indeed, throughout the proceedings before the Royal Court in Jersey, Julia maintained the position that she would purchase Stapleford Farm. In our view, had Julia raised a potential right not to be removed and/or evicted from Stapleford Farm in the Jersey Proceedings, the Royal Court would have granted an appropriate stay in order to allow Julia a period of time within which to bring such a claim before the English Courts. In our view, if Julia failed to take appropriate action within the relevant period absent good and proper reason, the Royal Court would have resumed its consideration of the Distribution Plan. By extension, if Julia did bring an estoppel (or similar) claim within the relevant period, we consider it likely that the Royal Court would have granted a further stay to allow the issue to be determined by the English Courts.”

‘blessed the decision of the Trustees to allow Julia to have until the end of February 2024 to provide proof of funds for the purchase of Stapleford Farm, failing which eviction proceedings should be taken’. 13. I am advised (now and at the time) that all the Royal Court did on 18 January 2024 was to bless the decision of the Trustee to issue proceedings for possession of the Property in England. There was no determination of the merits of such an application, as the blessing is based on ‘reasonableness’ of the Trustees to commence such proceedings. It is for the County Court in Southampton to decide on the merits of the application under English law. [ … ] 16. I explain below my understanding of the Jersey Proceedings, as the Claimant has tried to do in its Witness Statement supporting its application. However, from the outset I am advised that given that Jersey is a separate legal jurisdiction, in order to understand the Jersey Proceedings, the Court will require an Expert’s Opinion, which can only be used and relied on with the Court’s permission. There has been no application by either party to adduce Expert’s Opinion. 17. Further, as I understand it, the Claimant is basing its arguments on abuse of process by reference to the Jersey Proceedings, selecting redacted Skeleton Arguments provided by my Jersey Advocate, cherry-picking quotes from the Affidavits that I have filed in the Jersey Proceedings and relying on a letter from the Trustees’

“36. Taking all those matters into account, I am not persuaded that this is a case where it would be right to strike out the defence as being an abuse of process on a Henderson v Henderson basis. Similarly, this is clearly not a collateral attack. It does not strike at the central decision of the Jersey Royal Court to approve the Trustees’ plan as not being unreasonable. As I say, the Jersey Royal Court was not itself stipulating a plan. 37. Finally, in my judgment, there is no viable estoppel here. It cannot be said that the final blessing was obtained because of the Defendant’s stance in the Jersey Royal Court proceedings, or that somehow the Defendant misled the Jersey Royal Court into taking that view. In fact the position is quite the opposite; the Jersey Royal Court appears to have given its final blessing despite the Defendant’s position. There is no unfair detriment or advantage in raising the issues identified in the defence, other than of course the necessarily attendant costs of litigation. Using the same broad based merits approach that I have already identified, it would not in my judgment be appropriate to find the Defendant estopped from raising these matters. 38. Lastly, we come to the question of summary judgment. This is precisely the kind of issue which Fancourt J identified in Anan. It is not the kind of issue in which it is appropriate to give a summary judgment, however weak the Defendant’s case appears to be. Accordingly, the application to strike out and for summary judgment will be dismissed. 39. So far as the application to amend is concerned, the primary objection, which is that it is in itself is abuse of process, falls away. We are left with the individual objections so helpfully identified by Mr Wells in his skeleton argument. As far as the contested ones are concerned, I have no difficulty with the second of those. This seeks to establish precisely what detriment the Defendant has incurred as part and parcel of her estoppel/constructive trust claims. She must plainly be entitled to raise that. However, I am with Mr Wells and against Mr Stewart-Wallace as far as the other two matters are concerned. The proposed declaration as to depreciation is entirely speculative and it is a matter which the Court can resolve as part of doing broad justice to satisfy any equity that it decides the Defendant has established. What I will call the Page 480 counterclaim quite plainly relates to issues which fall solely within the jurisdiction of the Jersey courts. This court has no jurisdiction over the trusts and the way in which manage and distribute the trust monies. Those two proposed amendments will not be permitted.”

“1. The Claimant did not/cannot show what the Jersey Court is likely to have done if the Defendant had taken further steps to further raise her defence or counterclaim with the Jersey Royal Court. 2. The Aldi Guidelines are not applicable at all or alternatively are not mandatory with respect to the Jersey Article 51 procedure. 3. The Defendant was not in breach of the Aldi guidelines. 4. If the Defendant was in breach of the Aldi guidelines, the Defendant’s Amended Defence and Counterclaim are nonetheless not an abuse of process and specifically the Claimant has failed to demonstrate vexation, oppression and harassment. 5. The witness statement exhibited to the Defendant’s fourth affidavit (as opposed to the Defendant’s Defence) would have been sufficient for the Jersey Royal Court to be aware of the Defendant’s defence and then-intimated counterclaim.”

“16. First, an appellate court will be cautious about allowing a new point to be raised on appeal that was not raised before the first instance court. 17. Second, an appellate court will not, generally, permit a new point to be raised on appeal if that point is such that either (a) it would necessitate new evidence or (b), had it been run below, it would have resulted in the trial being conducted differently with regards to the evidence at the trial … 18.

“43. … On a question of abuse of process of this kind raised at a preliminary stage such as this, with no oral evidence, it seems to me that the appellate court is often likely to be, and in the present case is, in as good a position as the court below to assess whether the proceedings are or are not an abuse of the process.”

“86. In these circumstances, applying the principles identified by Thomas LJ in the Aldi Stores Ltd case [2008] 1 WLR 748, it is as I see it for us to consider afresh whether this action is an abuse of process … ”

“In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”

“Henderson v. Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in early [sic] proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before.”

“16. In considering the approach to be taken by this court to the decision of the judge, it was rightly accepted by Aspinwall that the decision to be made is not the exercise of a discretion; WSP were wrong in contending otherwise. It was a decision involving the assessment of a large number of factors to which there can, in such a case, only be one correct answer to whether there is or is not an abuse of process. Nonetheless an appellate court will be reluctant to interfere with the decision of the judge where the decision rests upon balancing such a number of factors … The types of case where a judge has to balance factors are very varied and the judgments of the courts as to the tests to be applied are expressed in different terms. However, it is sufficient for the purposes of this appeal to state that an appellate court will be reluctant to interfere with the decision of the judge in the judgment he reaches on abuse of process by the balance of the factors; it will generally only interfere where the judge has taken into account immaterial factors, omitted to take account of material factors, erred in principle or come to a conclusion that was impermissible or not open to him … [ … ] 27. In circumstances such as these where Aldi had not brought a claim against WSP and Aspinwall and there are good reasons why Aldi acted as it did, I have come to the conclusion, weighing all the factors I have set out, that bringing this action was not a misuse or abuse of the process of the court. The burden was on WSP and Aspinwall to prove that it was and they failed to do so. [ … ] 29. I also wish to add a word as to the approach that should be adopted if a similar problem arises in the future. In circumstances such as those that arose in this case, the proper course is to raise the issue with the court. Aldi did write to the court, as I have set out at paragraph 2.xiii), but not in terms that made it clear what the court was being invited to do. WSP and Aspinwall knew of Aldi’s position and were before the court on numerous occasions; they did nothing to raise it. 30. Parties are sometimes faced with the issue of wishing to pursue other proceedings whilst reserving a right in existing proceedings. Often, no problem arises; in this case, Aldi, WSP and Aspinwall each in truth knew at one time or another between August 2003 and the settlement of the original action in January 2004 that there was a potential problem, but it was never raised with the court. I have already expressed the view that it should have been. The court would, at the very least, have been able to express its view as to the proper use of its resources and on the efficient and economical conduct of the litigation. It may have seen if a way could have been found to determine the issues applicable to Aldi in a manner proportionate to the size of Aldi’s claim and without the very large expenditure that would have been necessary if Aldi had to participate in the trial of the actions. It may be that the court would have said that it was for Aldi to elect whether it wished to pursue its claim in the proceedings, but if it did not, that would be the end of the matter. It might have enquired whether the action against excess underwriters could have been expedited. Whatever might have happened in this case is a matter of speculation. 31. However, for the future, if a similar issue arises in complex commercial multi-party litigation, it must be referred to the court seized of the proceedings. It is plainly not only in the interest of the parties, but also in the public interest and in the interest of the efficient use of court resources that this is done. There can be no excuse for failure to do so in the future.”

“96. For my part, I do not think that parties should keep future claims secret merely because a second claim might involve other issues. The proper course is for parties to put their cards on the table so that no one is taken by surprise and the appropriate course in case management terms can be considered by the judge. In particular parties should not keep quiet in the hope of improving their position in respect of a claim arising out of similar facts or evidence in the future. Nor should they do so simply because a second claim may involve other complex issues. On the contrary they should come clean so that the court can decide whether one or more trials is required and when. The time for such a decision to be taken is before there is a trial of any of the issues. In this way the underlying approach of the CPR, namely that of co-operation between the parties, robust case management and disposing of cases, including particular issues, justly can be forwarded and not frustrated. 97. While these considerations have been highlighted in Aldi, they have been relevant considerations at least since the CPR came into force in 1999 … ”

“63. … Thomas LJ [at [24]] begins by recognising the public interest in the avoidance of multiplicity and achieving economy and efficiency in litigation. He qualified this only by his observation that the ‘mere fact’ that a second action might require a trial could not on its own make it impermissible and that a ‘properly brought’ action could not be denied a trial on the ground of limited state resources, or because it might have been more efficiently brought. 64. By contrast, his observations about avoiding these difficulties by a prompt application for pro-active case management were directed mainly at the future rather than the past. He plainly regarded the requirement to refer a contemplated future claim for case management directions in the earlier claim as mandatory, and as serving the public interest in the efficient use of court resources. He described a failure to do so as inexcusable … 65. As has been repeatedly stated, the conduct of civil proceedings is a process in which the stakeholders include not merely the parties, but also other litigants waiting for their cases to be tried, and the public at large, who have an interest in the efficient and economic conduct of litigation. I consider that Arnold J was correct to treat a failure by the Appellant to follow guidelines laid down as mandatory future conduct in two successive reported decisions of this court as relevant matters pointing to a conclusion that the Second Claim constituted an abuse of the process of civil litigation … ”

“81. In light of these statements of principle the deputy judge was, in my view, right to say that the Aldi Stores guidelines are mandatory and that an inexcusable failure to comply with them is a relevant factor to be taken into account in assessing whether, having regard to the relevant private and public rights and in light of all of the facts of the case, a party is abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before the court an issue that it could have raised in prior proceedings. 82. Further, it seems to me to be plain that the Aldi Stores guidelines were and are indeed applicable to the proceedings with which this court is now concerned. They relate to complex dealings by the claimants with various parties over a number of years. All those dealings arose in relation to the claimants' property development business and are interrelated to some degree. In my judgment it would have made obvious good sense for the claims arising from them to be case managed by Asplin J or another judge in the course of the Al Amoudi proceedings.”

“47. In my judgment, when Thomas LJ held at the end of the passage set out in paragraph 6 above that there could be no excuse, he meant that there was no exception. It would not be open afterwards to a party to claim that it was not bound to seek management directions about a proposal not to join a party against which it might subsequently allege liability arising out of substantially the same facts. This appears to be the way in which this phrase has been interpreted in the four decisions of this Court summarised above. 48. If there is a view among commercial practitioners that the Aldi guidelines are subject to exceptions or optional, I would remind them that (following this decision) there will be at least five decisions of this Court when this Court has been asked to strike out proceedings because the Aldi guidelines have not been followed. Those who do not observe the practice cannot hereafter complain that they thought that it was a practice to which there were exceptions. The fact that the Aldi guidelines have not been translated into a rule of procedure in the CPR or been made the subject of a Practice Direction does not matter. 49. As to Mr Malek's submission that, once the judge found that Otkritie had acted in breach of the Aldi guidelines in Action 1, Action 2 was an abuse of process and should be struck out, in my judgment, that approach is clearly not consistent with Johnson v Gore Wood and its adherence to a broad merits-based assessment of whether a second action was an abuse of the process of the court. In my judgment, it is clear that this Court in Aldi did not intend to depart from the decision in Johnson v Gore Wood. So there is no hard-edged rule of law that a claim, which a party could have raised in one set of proceedings, will be struck out if that party seeks to bring it in another set of proceedings. The Aldi guidelines are a facet of the principle of a "broad merits-based judgment" as to whether this is the just outcome, which was established in Johnson v Gore Wood. [ … ] 55. … from the passage set out in paragraph 6 of this judgment, it appears that one of the matters which this Court contemplated in Aldi was that through discussion the judge would be able to make some helpful proposal as to how the trial might proceed in order to reduce the complexity of a separate trial. The solution could be quite case-specific and creative. The fundamental point in Aldi was clearly that to allow a separate trial of a claim arising out of the same facts is in general undesirable and a potential waste of the finite resources of the justice system. It may also cause undesirable delay. Hence this Court in Aldi attached such considerable importance to the application for management directions.”

“53. The applicable principles of law relating to an application to strike out for abuse of process can, therefore, be summarised as follows: 1 Although historically it was said that, absent special circumstances, a second claim could not be brought if it could have been brought in earlier proceedings (Henderson v Henderson), that is too dogmatic an approach (Johnson v Gore Wood). 2 Instead, what is required is "a broad merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and all the facts of the case, focussing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before" (Johnson v Gore Wood). 3 The burden rests on the defendant to establish that it is an abuse of process for them to be subjected to the second action (Johnson v Gore Wood, Michael Wilson). Because the focus is on abuse, it will be rare for a court to find that a subsequent action is an abuse unless it involves "unjust harassment or oppression" (Lord Clarke MR in Dexter and Lloyd LJ in Stuart v Goldberg Linde). Putting the same point another way, the courts will not lightly shut out a genuine claim unless abuse of process can clearly be made out (Lloyd LJ in Stuart v Goldberg Linde, and Simon LJ in Michael Wilson). 4 In ongoing litigation, a party who realises that he may have connected claims which are not currently pleaded must follow the Aldi guidelines, and at least raise with the court the existence of such new claims. A breach of those guidelines will give rise to a "high risk" that the second action will be found to be an abuse of process (Stuart v Goldberg Linde) and will always be a relevant factor to be taken into account in any application to strike out (Gladman). 5 However, a breach of the Aldi guidelines does not automatically mean that the second action is an abuse of process and will be struck out. The Aldi guidelines are simply one facet of the broad merits-based evaluation (Okritie). 6 A decision as to whether a claim is an abuse of process is not a matter of discretion, but the decision will turn on an evaluation which is ‘very similar’ to the balancing exercise undertaken when a judge exercises his or her discretion (Aldi, Stuart v Goldberg Linde). 7 That evaluation must consider, not only whether there has been a misuse of the court's process, oppression or harassment (Dexter), but also the causative effect of the failure to follow the Aldi guidelines (Otkritie). This may involve, for example, consideration of hypothetical consequences and possible case management outcomes (Barrow, Otkritie). 8 The evaluation will also consider the public interest, as set out in Johnson v Gore Wood and Aldi, which is unchanging from case to case (the efficient use of court resources, the needs of other users, finality etc.), and the legitimate private interests involved, which will always vary, depending on the particular facts. This may therefore involve a consideration of the consequences of striking out or not, in a broadly similar way to the third part of the test in Denton. 9 This court will be reluctant to interfere in the evaluation carried out by the judge at first instance, and will only do so if the judge took account of something he or she should not have done, failed to take into account something he or she should have done, erred in principle, or reached a conclusion that was so perverse as to be "plainly wrong" (Aldi, Stuart v Goldberg Linde).”

“102. … the Aldi case does not impose a requirement, but rather provides guidelines. As to the submission that those guidelines apply only in limited circumstances, that is not how the authorities have developed. Outotec suggests no such limitation, but does however warn against a rigid application different from the broad merits-based evaluation of whether conduct is abuse.”

“82. In a case of this kind, it is impossible to state precisely what would have happened if MW had raised the misrepresentation claims in accordance with the Aldi guidelines: as Thomas LJ noted at [30] of his judgment in that case, such things are ‘a matter of speculation’. The most important thing is that, if MW had done what they should have done, and raised the matter with the court, everyone would have known where they stood. 83. That said, a consideration of the hypothetical case management outcomes is not an entirely academic task, because it can serve as a comparator with what has actually happened … ”

“127. In my judgment, the concept of ‘immunity’ flowing from an approval decision is most easily understood as judicial shorthand for the bar on subsequent proceedings that results from an issue estoppel … ”

“24. … The principle in Henderson v Henderson has always been thought to be directed against the abuse of process involved in seeking to raise in subsequent litigation points which could and should have been raised before. There was nothing controversial or new about this notion when it was expressed by Lord Kilbrandon in Yat Tung. The point has been taken up in a large number of subsequent decisions, but for present purposes it is enough to refer to the most important of them, Johnson v Gore-Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, in which the House of Lords considered their effect … 25. … Res judicata and abuse of process are juridically very different. Res judicata is a rule of substantive law, while abuse of process is a concept which informs the exercise of the court's procedural powers. In my view, they are distinct although overlapping legal principles with the common underlying purpose of limiting abusive and duplicative litigation … ”

“66. It is clear that each of these three doctrines can apply following a judgment given in foreign proceedings as well as in earlier English proceedings … [ … ] 68. Henderson v Henderson was itself a case in which proceedings for an account had first taken place in Newfoundland and in which the claimants sought to reopen that account by raising new points in subsequent proceedings in England.”

“As a matter of principle (and we are really thrown back upon principle), whether the recognition of judgments is based upon a recognition of vested rights, or upon considerations of public interest in limiting relitigation, there seems to be no acceptable reason why the recognition of foreign judgments should not extend to the recognition of issue decisions. From the nature of things (and here it is right to recall Lord Brougham's warning) this, in the case of foreign judgments, may involve difficulties and necessitate caution. The right to ascertain the precise issue decided, by examination of the court's judgment, of the pleadings and possibly of the evidence, may well, in the case of courts whose procedure, decision-making technique, and substantive law is not the same as our own, make it difficult or even impossible to establish the identity of the issue there decided with that attempted here to be raised, or the necessity for the foreign decision. And I think that it would be right for a court in this country, when faced with a claim of issue estoppel arising out of foreign proceedings, to receive the claim with caution in circumstances where the party against whom the estoppel is raised might not have had occasion to raise the particular issue. The fact that the court can (as I have stated) examine the pleadings, evidence and other material, seems fully consistent with its right to take a broad view of the result of the foreign decision. But with these reservations, where after careful examination there appears to have been a full contestation and a clear decision on an issue, it would in my opinion be unfortunate to exclude estoppel by issue decision from the sphere of recognition.”

“The expression ‘collateral attack’ means that the second court -- in this case the County Court -- is invited to reach a decision which is inconsistent with the decision of the previous court.”

“80. … the Defendants also submitted that this could not be a case of collateral attack as that applies only where there had been a final decision in separate proceedings. I accept that the issue of whether there has been a collateral attack will often, indeed normally, arise in separate proceedings between different parties. But I do not accept that the principle is so limited. When Popplewell LJ said in Koza that the principles in Hunter apply to interlocutory proceedings he was, as I read him, referring to collateral attacks (he had just referred to Hunter as such a case). The argument in Koza was that the same principle could apply where there was a collateral attack on the practical consequences of an order as well as where what was sought was inconsistent with an earlier order. Popplewell LJ did not simply say that the principles of collateral attack had no possible relevance because they did not apply to interlocutory orders between the same parties; he addressed the argument on its merits. Hence in my view the Hunter principle can apply where there is a collateral attack on an earlier interlocutory decision in the same proceedings; the test is whether the decision being sought is inconsistent with an earlier one.”

"Subject to any rules of court made in pursuance of … this Act, where a person is called as a witness in any civil proceedings, his opinion on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence shall be admissible in evidence."

“62. … Section 3 of the 1972 Act does not purport to be all embracing or to restrict or alter the position at common law. The expert with whom CPR 35 is concerned is a person ‘who has been instructed to give or prepare expert evidence for the purpose of proceedings’. The expert evidence referred to in CPR 35.1 and 35.5 and the expert's report referred to in CPR 35.4 and CPR 35.10 are the evidence and report of such a person … 63. CPR 35 is not a comprehensive and exclusive code regulating the admission of expert evidence. It regulates the use of a particular category of expert evidence … 64. The courts have in practice received expert evidence outside the confines of CPR 35 … If CPR 35 is to be treated as an exclusive code it would appear to render inadmissible as evidence, expert literature exhibited to the report of an expert called under CPR 35 … ”

“148. … The old notion that foreign legal materials can only ever be brought before the court as part of the evidence of an expert witness is outdated. Whether the court will require evidence from an expert witness should depend on the nature of the issue and of the relevant foreign law. In an age when so much information is readily available through the internet, there may be no need to consult a foreign lawyer in order to find the text of a relevant foreign law.”

“The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if— (a) it considers that— (i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or (ii) that defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”

“21. The authorities therefore make clear that in the context of summary judgment the court is by no means barred from evaluating the evidence, and concluding that on the evidence there is no real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success. It will of course be cautious in doing so. It will bear in mind the clarity of the evidence available and the potential for other evidence to be available at trial which is likely to bear on the issues. It will avoid conducting a mini-trial. But there will be cases where the Court will be entitled to draw a line and say that – even bearing well in mind all of those points – it would be contrary to principle for a case to proceed to trial. 22. So, when faced with a summary judgment application it is not enough to say, with Mr Micawber, that something may turn up … [ … ].”

“82. The ‘issue’ to which rule 24.2 (‘the claimant has no real prospect of defending the claim or issue’) and PD24 refers is a part of the claim, whether a severable part of the proceedings (e.g. a claim for damages caused by particular acts of infringement or non-payment of several debts) or a component of a single claim (eg the question of infringement, or the existence of a duty, breach of a duty, causation or loss). It is not any factual or legal issue that is one among many that would need to be decided at trial to resolve such a claim or part of a claim. If the determination of an issue before trial has no consequences except that there is one fewer issue for trial then the court has not given summary judgment and the application was not for summary judgment. If it were otherwise, parties would be able to pick and choose the issues on which they thought their cases were strong and seek to have them determined in isolation, in an attempt to achieve a tactical victory and cause the respondent to incur heavy costs liability at an early stage.”

“(1) Where the court gives permission for a party to amend their statement of case, it may give directions as to – (a) amendments to be made to any other statement of case; and (b) service of any amended statement of case. (2) The power of the court to give permission under this rule is subject to – (a) rule 19.2 (change of parties – general); (b) rule 19.6 (special provisions about adding or substituting parties after the end of a relevant limitation period); and (c) rule 17.4 (amendments of statement of case after the end of a relevant limitation period).” (a) amendments to be made to any other statement of case; and (b) service of any amended statement of case. (a) rule 19.2 (change of parties – general); (b) rule 19.6 (special provisions about adding or substituting parties after the end of a relevant limitation period); and (c) rule 17.4 (amendments of statement of case after the end of a relevant limitation period).”

“104. This is an application to amend a pleading under CPR Part 17.3 , which is a matter of discretion. Obviously no amendment which would give rise to a pleading which was an abuse of process could be allowed. However, it is not necessary to go so far in order to refuse an amendment. If a breach of the Aldi rule is highly relevant to the question of abuse of process, a fortiori to the question of whether to exercise the discretion to permit an amendment.”

“49. It is also submitted that the Court should not bless the Trustees’ relief for eviction proceedings to commence in England, on the basis that this is unreasonable on the following grounds: i) Landscape Stud is being marketed for sale, and once sold the purchase of Stapleford Farm, can take place; ii) The Trustees talk above eviction, however, they have failed to provide any detail as to how long the eviction process will take place and how an equitable propriety [sic] claim will impact on this, the costs of the eviction and then the time that it would take for Stapleford Farm to be marketed and sold verses the current situation. Also there is no consideration on the Steps Plan; and iii) The majority of the beneficiaries would not like to see the Third Respondent evicted, including herself.” i) Landscape Stud is being marketed for sale, and once sold the purchase of Stapleford Farm, can take place; ii) The Trustees talk above eviction, however, they have failed to provide any detail as to how long the eviction process will take place and how an equitable propriety [sic] claim will impact on this, the costs of the eviction and then the time that it would take for Stapleford Farm to be marketed and sold verses the current situation. Also there is no consideration on the Steps Plan; and iii) The majority of the beneficiaries would not like to see the Third Respondent evicted, including herself.”

“47. … Accordingly, we bless the decision of the Trustees to give Julia until the end of February to come up with proof of funds for her purchase of Stapleford Farm, failing which eviction proceedings should be taken.”

“36. … Similarly, this is clearly not a collateral attack. It does not strike at the central decision of the Jersey Royal Court to approve the Trustees’ plan as not being unreasonable. As I say, the Jersey Royal Court was not itself stipulating a plan.”

“38. Lastly, we come to the question of summary judgment. This is precisely the kind of issue which Fancourt J identified in Anan. It is not the kind of issue in which it is appropriate to give a summary judgment, however weak the Defendant’s case appears to be. Accordingly, the application to strike out and for summary judgment will be dismissed.”

“82. … The most important thing is that, if MW had done what they should have done, and raised the matter with the court, everyone would have known where they stood.”

“Julia is now defending the Eviction Proceedings (at increased cost to the Family Trusts) and the Trustees find themselves unable to sell to a third party whilst those proceedings are ongoing, particularly as Julia appears to be claiming estoppel … ”

“112. … I am claiming that due to the money that I have invested and the other detriment that I have suffered, I have an equitable proprietary claim against Stapleford Farm, which will require a determination in quantum … ”

“(1) The issues which R now seeks to raise in her Defence – in essence, the assertion that she has some right not to be evicted from Stapleford Farm regardless of whether or not she buys it – could and should have been raised in the earlier proceedings before the JRC. They ‘could’ have been raised because the principal facts upon which R seeks to rely are facts which, if and to the extent that they could be established, pre-dated the JRC proceedings and would have been known to R personally. They ‘should’ have been raised because they go to the heart of the trustees’ equalisation scheme and Distribution Plan (the sale of Stapleford Farm having been recognised by the JRC as an ‘essential step’ in the equalisation process) which the JRC was being asked to consider and approve in the Article 51 proceedings … (2) As explained above, R’s failure to raise these issues before the JRC at the earliest opportunity constituted a clear and serious breach of the Aldi guidelines … (3) R has failed to offer any justification for her failure to comply with the Aldi guidelines … (4) The position which R now seeks to advance in her Defence is not merely new, but is actively inconsistent with the position taken by her before the JRC … (5) By her Defence in these proceedings, R is seeking to achieve an outcome (the trustees’ inability to sell Stapleford Farm) which would require the revision of the equalisation process, the Steps Plan and the Distribution Plan. It is submitted that, if she were successful in her Defence, the result would be that substantial work and money spent in the Article 51 proceedings, and substantial time devoted to those proceedings by the JRC, would simply have been wasted. That time and money was spent in obtaining the JRC’s ultimate approval of the equalisation process and the Amended Distribution Plan, but these would have to be revised by the trustees and reconsidered by the JRC (at further substantial cost in time and money) if R were successful in preventing the “essential step” of selling Stapleford Farm … (6) As explained above, the JRC has confirmed that the ongoing delay in the sale of Stapleford Farm is holding up the approved distributions to the four children. It is submitted that the interests of the other sibling-beneficiaries weigh substantially against allowing R to raise the Defence in these proceedings, as this would result in significant continued delay in the implementation of the distributions (and the receipt by the siblings of their ultimate inheritance from their father) which were fully approved by the JRC back in July 2024. (7) The JRC was overtly critical of R’s decision to resist the present possession proceedings. It observed, at para.44 of the 15/9/24 judgment … that ‘[R’s] defence of the Eviction Proceedings appears to be yet a further attempt on her part to delay a decision as to whether or not to purchase [Stapleford Farm]. Further delay is likely to have a financial impact on her siblings’ … (8) At para.35 of his judgment … the Judge said that it would be a very serious matter to shut R out from defending a claim for possession of her home of some 16 years. However, it is submitted that this is not a factor which weighs heavily in the balance. As the Judge noted at para.5 of his judgment … R had received some £2.3 million from the Deceased in 2017 for the specific purpose of buying Stapleford Farm. Ultimately, she did not do so and instead spent the money on buying the Landscape Stud – the possibility of losing Stapleford Farm stems from R’s own decision not to use the Deceased’s generous gift for its intended purpose … ”