State Bank of India & Ors v Vijay Mallya [2025] EWHC 858 (Ch)

“10.9.—(1) The petition must state for each debt in relation to which it is presented— … (f) that the debt is unsecured (subject to section 269);”

“34. The conclusiveness of a foreign judgment is dealt with in Rule 48 of Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th Ed) at 14R-118 which provides: “A foreign judgment which is final and conclusive on the merits and not impeachable under any of Rules 49 to 52 is conclusive as to any matter thereby adjudicated upon, and cannot be impeached for any error either of fact or law.” 35. The authors of Dicey state that Rule 48 has never been questioned and that the Rule is consistent with the maxims interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. They explain that Rule 48 “holds good whether the judgment is relied upon by the claimant or defendant” whether in rem or in personam. Of consequence Rule 48 “precludes a party from denying any matter of fact or law necessarily decided in the earlier judgment”

“Whether the sixth defendant has got a first charge of the movable and immovable properties of defendants 1 to 3”; defendants 1 to 3 were Kingfisher Airlines, UBHL and Dr Mallya respectively. Then he cites paragraph 92 of the DRT judgment: “The said claim of the sixth defendant cannot be accepted in view of section 31(b) of the RDDB & FI Act according to which the rights of secured creditors to realise secured debts due and payable to them by sale of assets over which security interest is created shall have priority and shall be paid in priority over all debts and government dues including revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due by them to the Central and State Government of any local authority. Further, even according to the 6th defendant, u/s 88 of Finance Act 1994, the claim of the sixth defendant will be subject to the banks claim. Hence, the claim of the sixth defendant for first charge over the charged assets of the defendants 1 to 3 is rejected and it is held that claim of the sixth defendant will be considered for distribution only as a second charge subject to the first charge of applicant banks being fully satisfied…”

“14 Chapter VI, section 31B of the Recovery of Debts Due and Financial Institutions Act 1993 cited as authority for the proposition that the Banks have a first charge over the assets of Dr Mallya in the DRT judgment provides: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the rights of secured creditors to realise secured debts due and payable to them by sale of assets over which security interest is created, shall have priority and shall be paid in priority over all other debts and Government dues including revenues, taxes…due to the Central Government, State Government or local authority” “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the rights of secured creditors to realise secured debts due and payable to them by sale of assets over which security interest is created, shall have priority and shall be paid in priority over all other debts and Government dues including revenues, taxes…due to the Central Government, State Government or local authority”

“In the event of failure of defendants to pay the said OA amount, the applicant bank is at liberty to sell the hypothecated/mortgaged movables/immovables properties described in schedules to the main petition according to law…the Applicant Banks are also at liberty to proceed against the person and properties of the defendants 1 to 4 in execution proceedings.”

“ By section 2(1)(b) a security interest means “a mortgage, charge, assignment or any other right, title or interest of any kind whatsoever upon property, created in favour of any bank or financial institution”

“it is highly likely that Shri. K. Srinvasan [the judge in the DRT] was finding not only that the debt was due but that the Banks were secured and as a first chargee have priority over other charges.”

“16. As a result of the Banks reporting a potential fraud provisional attachment orders were made pursuant to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 on an application of the Deputy Director of ED [the Enforcement Directorate]. The attachment orders are said to be “in respect of movable properties and immovable properties as detailed below”

“18. In his judgment Justice Singh set out the argument of the Banks that they have prior rights over the moveable and immovable properties in respect of Dr Mallya, UBHL and Kingfisher pursuant to the contractual provisions in the PG, a corporate guarantee and by a final order dated 19 January 2017 (the DRT judgment). The first respondent to the applications was the Deputy Director of the ED, the second to fifth respondents were Kingfisher, Dr Mallya, UBHL and Kingfisher Finvest India Ltd. The application for condonation of delay related to a delay of 562 days and the judgment of Justice Singh sets out the relevant part of the application: “4. It is further submitted the Impugned Order was passed by the Adjudicating Authority inter alia confirming the Provisional Attachment Order dated 03.09.2016 passed by the Respondent No.1 in the criminal case bearing ECIR No. ECIR/07/MBZO/2016 inter alia attaching movable and immovable properties of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are bad in law as the Appellants have prior right over the moveable and immovable properties of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 pursuant to the Personal Guarantee dated 21.12.2010, the Corporate Guarantee dated 21.12.2010 and the Final Order passed by the DRT on 19.01.2017 in O.A. No 766/2013 inter alia holding that the Respondent Nos 2 to 5 are jointly and severally liable to pay the OA amount and consequently by the Recovery Certificate in favour of the Appellants.” 19. At paragraph 10 of the Judgment: “I have gone through the application filed by the appellants for condonation of delay. This Tribunal is of the considered opinion that as a matter of fact, ED has failed to perform his duty not to implead the appellants (lenders) banks despite having full knowledge that the loan amounts have to be returned by Vijay Mallya and his associate company to the banks who are the mortgagees of the attached properties. One is failed to understand why have not done so when they were full aware. Thus, the prayer made in the application for condonation of delay is liable to be allowed as the sufficient cause has been shown…”

‘Earlier, the State Bank of India and other banks have appreciated the investigation of the ED and were also satisfied with the Provisional Attachment Order passed by the ED and the confirmation order. Once the State Bank of India and other banks have come to the notice that the ED may not agree to dispose of the properties by the banks (in view of the decree passed) till the completion of trial under Section 5(5) of the Act, the banks have decided to challenge the impugned order before this Tribunal…Therefore, it appears that in the present appeal, the banks are seeking the interim order. Admittedly, the trial may take a number of years in view of the nature of the case and bulky records. The banks are the secured creditors against the unpaid loans by the Vijay Mallya and his associate companies.’

“24. The Tribunal found that “in view of settled law on the subject, I am of the opinion the appellant Bank is the rightful claimant who have already obtained decree against the borrower from DRT” and (at paragraph 34): “The Respondent No 1 is not having any lien over the said properties as the Appellant banks are now the Legal Transferee of said properties”. 25. The Justice explained that the ED did not have title over the identified property, that the Banks are entitled to dispose of the properties if they chose and “have priority rights on assets of the secured creditors to recover the loan amount/debts by sale of assets over which security interest in created.”

“In view of facts and nature of the present case, I am of the opinion that once the banks are secured creditors and have obtained the final decree from the court which has attained finality, the banks are bound to receive the default loan amount from Vijay Mallya and his companies. He was/is active person of the companies. The loans amount has to be paid by the borrowers. It is a banks money. It must come to the banks...” 26. The result of the challenge application in the High Court of Karnataka is that the Banks succeeded in demonstrating that the contractual nature of the PG made them secured creditors over certain assets of Dr Mallya, and the security had priority over any security obtained by the ED by reason of the attachment orders and interim orders were made. The terminology used suggests that the Justice was making interim findings but there can be little doubt that the Banks were asserting rights over property as secured creditors.” “The Respondent No 1 is not having any lien over the said properties as the Appellant banks are now the Legal Transferee of said properties”. “In view of facts and nature of the present case, I am of the opinion that once the banks are secured creditors and have obtained the final decree from the court which has attained finality, the banks are bound to receive the default loan amount from Vijay Mallya and his companies. He was/is active person of the companies. The loans amount has to be paid by the borrowers. It is a banks money. It must come to the banks...”

“31. I agree with Mr Marshall that, the DRT judgment is of a competent court that found the PG gave rise to the “consequences prescribed by Indian statute under section 31B of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 (as inserted by the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2016) (“Section 31B”), namely that the rights of secured creditors to ‘realise secured debts due and payable to them by sale of assets over which security interest is created’ take priority over all other debts and government dues and that this is ‘notwithstanding anything contained in any other law’.”

“As a matter of principle (and we are really thrown back upon principle), whether the recognition of judgments is based upon a recognition of vested rights, or upon considerations of public interest in limiting relitigation, there seems to be no acceptable reason why the recognition of foreign judgments should not extend to the recognition of issue decisions. From the nature of things (and here it is right to recall Lord Brougham’s warning) this, in the case of foreign judgments, may involve difficulties and necessitate caution. The right to ascertain the precise issue decided, by examination of the court’s judgment, of the pleadings and possibly of the evidence, may well, in the case of courts whose procedure, decision-making technique, and substantive law is not the same as our own, make it difficult or even impossible to establish the identity of the issue there decided with that attempted here to be raised, or the necessity for the foreign decision. And I think that it would be right for a court in this country, when faced with a claim of issue estoppel arising out of foreign proceedings, to receive the claim with caution in circumstances where the party against whom the estoppel is raised might not have had occasion to raise the particular issue. The fact that the court can (as I have stated) examine the pleadings, evidence and other material, seems fully consistent with its right to take a broad view of the result of the foreign decision. But with these reservations, where after careful examination there appears to have been a full contestation and a clear decision on an issue, it would in my opinion be unfortunate to exclude estoppel by issue decision from the sphere of recognition.”

“The Applicant-Banks have also initiated action against the secured assets of the Defendants under the SARFAESI Act [the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002] and these documents are filed as [exhibits specified]. The said measures initiated under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act were objected to by the defendants 1 to 3 but were rejected by the Authorised Officer of the banks. Therefore, according to the applicant banks, the first defendant as principal borrower and 2nd and 3rd defendants as guarantors for the 1st defendant are all jointly and severally due and liable to pay the claim made by them in the OA [Originating Application].”

“Point No. 14 WHETHER the 6th defendant has got first charge over the movable and immovable properties of Defendants 1 to 3”

“(b) The charge of the 6th defendant shall rank as 2nd charge over the schedule properties and other receivable after satisfaction of all claims of applicant banks.” (c) In the event of failure of defendants to pay the said OA [originating application] amount, the applicant bank is at liberty to sell the hypothecated/mortgaged movables/immovables properties described in schedules of the main petition according to law as sought by the applicant bank in the OA.”

“41. The main contention of the Applicant-Banks to seek an order as prayed for in the IA No. 5080/2013 is that they have the first charge over the said shares in view of the oral undertaking given by the Ld Counsel for Defendant No 3 before this Tribunal on 26/07/2013; and in view of Clause No.5(ii)(g) of the Personal Guarantee and Corporate Guarantee executed by Defendants No 2 and 3. According to the Ld Senior Counsel Mr Naganand appearing for the Applicant-Banks, these Clauses found in the Guarantee Agreements act as a clear bar against 2nd and 3rd defendants from dealing with the subject shares in any manner whatsoever.”

“a) WHETHER the Banks have established their rights over the subject shares?; b) WHETHER the rights of the 7th and 9th defendants as pledgees will prevail over the rights of the applicant-banks?; and c) TO what relief the parties herein are entitled?”

“37) The main objections of the said defendants as stated in their respective objections are that the petition is not maintainable; that the subject shares do not form part of the securities held by the banks; that the said shares are placed with defendants 7 to 9; that this Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to affect third party rights, that the banks have no rights over the pledged shares…”

“Therefore the admitted oral undertaking given before this Tribunal is of binding nature and any action in violation by the party is void … the encumbrance here in the present case is the oral and written undertakings given by Defendants No 2 and 3 in the Personal and Corporate Guarantees executed by them and the huge claims of banks against them. The said admitted oral undertaking and the clauses in the said guarantees and the claims in OA act as a encumbrance and when the banks have made a colossal claim of around RS.6200.00 Crores against Defendants No 2 and 3, which factor has appeared in the press and which was also widely covered by the Press and media almost every date of hearing, it is not possible to accept that the 7th Defendant was an innocent guarantor.”

“50) In view of the above findings I have no hesitation to hold that creation of charge or pledge etc by the 3rd Defendant in favour of both Defendant No 9 and 7 are in violation of terms of the said oral undertaking and the Guarantee Agreements; and dependency of OA and hence are not legally valid and are hereby set aside.”

“i) The 6th defendant has claimed certain monies as arrears of service tax with interest that was collected by the first defendant and not remitted to the sixth defendant. The sixth defendant has filed his written statement in the form of an affidavit, but not filed any separate evidence affidavit. Further, the sixth defendant has also not filed any evidence to prove that the first defendant collected the service tax from its customers and failed to remit to the sixth defendant. The sixth defendant has also not filed any material to substantiate its claim of more than Rs 58 crores, before this Tribunal. The sixth defendant claims first charge over the properties of defendants 1 to 3 for recovery of its outstanding is mentioned above.”

“ Hence, this point is found against the sixth defendant.”

“There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitudes towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.”

“32. Before Bacon J, it was common ground that the question whether a person is precluded from advancing a position in one case, where they have advanced the opposite in an earlier case, is to be answered by reference to the principles set out by Sir Christopher Floyd in LA Micro Group (UK) Ltd v LA Micro Group Inc [2021] EWCA Civ 1429; [2022] 1 WLR 336, at §19-26. As he concluded at §26: “…this form of estoppel by conduct is one which is approached by means of a broad, merits-based assessment, and is not constrained by strict rules (as, for example, issue estoppel). The matters to consider include, but are not limited to, those enumerated by Ginsburg J in the New Hampshire case. It is material to ask the question whether it is apparent that the earlier decision was obtained on the footing of, or because of, the stance taken by the party in the earlier proceedings. Absent that factor, whilst the change of position may affect the credibility of the party or the witness concerned, there will not be an impression that one or other court was misled into giving its decision, so that the administration of justice risks being brought into disrepute.” 33.The New Hampshire case there referred to was New Hampshire v Maine 532 US 742, and the principles enumerated in it were: “First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position. Secondly, the court may enquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept the party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in later proceedings would create the perception that either the first or the second court was misled. Thirdly, the court may ask whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” “…this form of estoppel by conduct is one which is approached by means of a broad, merits-based assessment, and is not constrained by strict rules (as, for example, issue estoppel). The matters to consider include, but are not limited to, those enumerated by Ginsburg J in the New Hampshire case. It is material to ask the question whether it is apparent that the earlier decision was obtained on the footing of, or because of, the stance taken by the party in the earlier proceedings. Absent that factor, whilst the change of position may affect the credibility of the party or the witness concerned, there will not be an impression that one or other court was misled into giving its decision, so that the administration of justice risks being brought into disrepute.” “First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position. Secondly, the court may enquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept the party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in later proceedings would create the perception that either the first or the second court was misled. Thirdly, the court may ask whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.”

“36. Ultimately, the label is unimportant. Although Sir Christopher Floyd did not use the phrase, the form of estoppel by conduct in issue can readily be seen as a species of abuse of process. Moreover, as Mr Jourdan pointed out, it is not suggested that the Court of Appeal’s decision in LA Micro is not a binding authority on the point. Accordingly, I propose to apply the test, which it was agreed before Bacon J was the appropriate test, namely that set out in LA Micro.”

“16. The Banks subsequently challenged the attachment orders and filed three applications for condonation of delay. I am informed by counsel for Dr Mallya that the challenge application made by the Banks stated at paragraph 17 that they have “an interest in all the assets of Dr Vijay Mallya” by reason of the PG and the DRT judgment; and at paragraph 19 “the Applicants have an interest in the assets of Dr. Vijay Mallya by virtue of the Personal Guarantee dated 21.12.2010, on which basis recoveries had already been made against certain of his assets”

“4. It is further submitted the Impugned Order was passed by the Adjudicating Authority inter alia confirming the Provisional Attachment Order dated 03.09.2016 passed by the Respondent No.1 in the criminal case bearing ECIR No. ECIR/07/MBZO/2016 inter alia attaching movable and immovable properties of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are bad in law as the Appellants have prior right over the moveable and immovable properties of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 pursuant to the Personal Guarantee dated 21.12.2010, the Corporate Guarantee dated 21.12.2010 and the Final Order passed by the DRT on 19.01.2017 in O.A. No 766/2013 inter alia holding that the Respondent Nos 2 to 5 are jointly and severally liable to pay the OA amount and consequently by the Recovery Certificate in favour of the Appellants.”

“10. I have gone through the application filed by the appellants for condonation of delay. This Tribunal is of the considered opinion that as a matter of fact, ED has failed to perform his duty not to implead the appellants (lenders) banks despite having full knowledge that the loan amounts have to be returned by Vijay Mallya and his associate company to the banks who are the mortgagees of the attached properties. “ (Chief ICCJ Briggs’ emphasis). … [Paragraphs 20 and 21] “Earlier, the State Bank of India and other banks have appreciated the investigation of the ED and were also satisfied with the Provisional Attachment Order passed by the ED and the confirmation order. Once the State Bank of India and other banks have come to the notice that the ED may not agree to dispose of the properties by the banks (in view of the decree passed) till the completion of trial under Section 5(5) of the Act, the banks have decided to challenge the impugned order before this Tribunal…Therefore, it appears that in the present appeal, the banks are seeking the interim order. Admittedly, the trial may take a number of years in view of the nature of the case and bulky records. The banks are the secured creditors against the unpaid loans by the Vijay Mallya and his associate companies.” [Chief ICCJ Briggs emphasis] 24. The appellants are admittedly secured creditors who have obtained decree against the borrowers who have provided security … 32. In view of settled law on the subject, I am of the opinion that the appellant bank is the rightful claimant who have already obtained decree against the borrower from DRT under SARFAESI Act and has a priority rights to recover the loans amount forthwith.”

“33. In view of settled law on the subject, I am of the opinion that the appellant bank is the rightful claimant who have already obtained decree against the borrower from DRT under SARFAESI Act and has a priority rights to recover the loans amount forthwith.”

“74. Justice Verma turns to the common law to make good his opinion that public policy prevents the Petitioners from relinquishing any security they may hold; there is a principle of Indian law that the waiver of a statutory or non-statutory right affecting public interest is impermissible.”

“85. The parallels between the above cases and the present one are difficult to draw. I have no doubt that public policy was involved in drafting section 31B RDBA to encourage lending to businesses by permitting secured creditors to take priority over other creditors, including government bodies. However, the protection afforded is to secured creditors and not the public at large. There is nothing within the provision or the PIA 1920 that bars a waiver of security rights; indeed it expressly contemplates such waiver. As Justice Gowda pointed out section 9(2) uses very similar language to section 269 IA 1986: “if the petitioning creditor is a secured creditor, he shall in his petition either state that he is willing to relinquish his security for the benefit of creditors in the event of the debtor being adjudged insolvent…”

“It is also clear that if any element of public interest is involved and a waiver takes place by one of the parties to an agreement, such waiver will not be given effect to if it is contrary to public policy.”

“84. That maybe taking the principle too far as the court in Dhirendra Nath Gorai pointed out: many provisions are conceived in the interests of the public but not all are intended to protect the public.”

“since there is a duty to take the security, arising out of the fact that it is public money, then it is contrary to public policy to release the security under any circumstances other than enforcement.”

“19(ii) The above contention of coercion raised by the second and third defendants are so unworthy of any consideration for the simple reason that there was none. Not only the applicant banks are dealing with the public money, but it was also the defendants 1 to 3, who knowingly availed public money as loans from the banks with a promise to repay the same. It is the bounden legal duty of the banks and borrowers to ensure that such loans are properly secured by a mortgage over immovable properties, hypothecation over movables and guarantees of directors and all other types of guarantees including even that of third parties wherever offered or possible. The second and third defendants cannot expect the banks to give away public money as loans to them without even guarantee from them for the repayment in addition to other securities and loan documents…”

“49) The commercial world in India should realise that it will no longer be possible for them to avail loans of public money, default in repayment and tried to get away to the lanes and by-lanes of twisted facts.”

“32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Attorney General of India and Ors (AIR 1994 SC 2179) while dealing with the matter and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act has defined the illegally acquired properties and held that such properties are earned and acquired in ways illegal and corrupt, at the cost of the people and the state, hence these properties must justly go back where they belong. In the present case as the money belongs to the Appellant bank it is public money. … 38. In view of facts and nature of the present case, I am of the opinion that once the banks are secured creditors and have obtained the final decree from the court which has attained finality, the banks are bound to receive the default loan amount from Vijar Mallya and his companies. He was/is the active person of those companies. The loans amount has to be paid by the borrowers. It is a banks money. It must come to the banks. These are public sector banks. The decretal amount is recoverable in law being public money.”

“His opinion related to the issue of whether the Petitioners held security. Dr Mallya argues that by the representations made by the Petitioners in the Indian courts and the judgments given the Petitioners cannot deny that they are public bodies, holding security and act in the public interest.”

“88. How can these matters said, and judgments relied upon give rise to res judicata?”

“89. Once accurately described it is readily apparent that res judicata cannot succeed as an argument. The submissions made by the Petitioners at hearings in India do not constitute “a decision pronounced”

“For the reasons I have given, in my judgment, reliance on The Sennar (No 2) does not assist as: 91.1. it cannot be said the issue in this application, in which the estoppel is said to give rise to a bar, is the same issue as that decided by any of the judgments in the earlier actions; 91.2. the assertions made at hearings are not judgments (and certainly not final decisions) of the court; and 91.3. in any event asserting security rights in India is consistent with an application to amend to disclose the security and waive it for the general body of creditors.”

“ Dr Mallya’s contention was that the Petitioners had relied before the Indian courts on the public interest in their obtaining security for their loans and that that issue – as to whether the public interest was so engaged in this regard – had been determined, such that it is not now open to the Petitioners to deny that there was a public interest in their holding security.”

“The real question is over its application to our case and then the question arises, well, is there a public interest in our case that would prohibit the banks from releasing their security?… The first is that the Indian courts have in fact so decided and the matter is actually res judicata.”

“Res judicata: has the issue of whether there is a public interest in the Petitioners’ retaining the security, they represented (to the Indian courts) they held, already been subject to decision, such as to be res judicata? Dr Mallya relies on Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 as summarised in the judgment I handed down in this matter on 9 April 2020 at [34-35].”

“94. The submissions are of a similar nature to the estoppel arguments advanced. The Petitioners cannot say one thing in one set of proceedings between the same parties and say the opposite in these proceedings. In other words, the Petitioners may not approbate and reprobate. It does not follow that the Petitioners cannot relinquish their security if that is what they chose to do. There is no inconsistency of approach. The amendment to be made is, if anything, entirely consistent with the contentions previously made that the Petitioners hold security over the assets of Dr Mallya”

“unconditionally and unequivocally undertake to restore assets or its equivalent value under the PMLA Order dated 24 May 2021, if such restoration is required to be done as per the applicable laws.”

“56. As long as Dr. Mallya decides to play no part in the [criminal] trial, therefore, and the court maintains its present position of waiting for his return to the jurisdiction before concluding the matter, and in particular deciding whether the realisations will be allocated to Central Government or others who can demonstrate rights in respect of the seized assets, there is no prospect of payment in full, since it is these assets that Dr. Mallya relies upon for payment.”

“Nor, in my judgment, does the express wording of section 271(1) compel the construction contended for by the debtor. The subsection provides that the court shall not make a bankruptcy order unless it is satisfied that the debt "has been neither paid nor secured or compounded for". In my judgment, what the subsection is referring to, when read in context, is a payment which is unconditional in the sense that it is not liable to be avoided in the event that a bankruptcy order is made: that is to say a payment which is not vulnerable to the operation of section 284(1).”

“ 49. These factors, coupled with the known fact that the writ has not been served after three or more years brings me to the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the reasons for failure to serve are connected with a lack of merit when measured against the threshold test, despite it now being said that Dr. Mallya will prosecute the interest rate claim with all due diligence if the court so requires. If I am wrong about the conclusion on the merits, I am not satisfied that the writ will be pursued to conclusion so as to reduce the existing debt within a reasonable time. The debt is present, liquidated and outstanding.”

“It is for Dr Mallya to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that he is able to pay in full within a reasonable period of time. His reliance on setting aside the interest rate element of the DRT judgment where it has not been served, and giving no time frame to consider, does not pass the test of satisfying the court that the debt will be paid within a reasonable period of time”

“This is also true in respect of the challenge to the personal guarantee. The receipts of monies from realisations in India are conditional. There is no time frame as to when the petitioners will be able to retain those receipts unconditionally. There is no evidence that Dr. Mallya will return to India to deal with the criminal trial. The petitioners have the benefit of a judgment debt which has been outstanding for a long time. As matters stand, since the service of the statutory demand, Dr Mallya is deemed insolvent”

“61. Although it has been said that the debt will be paid within a reasonable period of time, it has not been put to the court what period constitutes reasonable. Given the length of time since the first hearing, I conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support unconditional payment within a reasonable period of time”