“This Order is made, in part, pursuant to paragraphs 9(4), 9(5A) and 9(6) of Schedule 1 to theSolicitors Act 1974 (‘Schedule 1’) and paragraph 32(1) of Schedule 2 to theAdministration of Justice Act 1985 and requires you, the Defendants, to deliver up to the Claimant’s appointed Agent the articles specified in the Order and to allow the persons mentioned in the Order to enter the premises described in the Order and to search for, examine and remove the articles specified in the Order……….If any of you, the Defendants, disobey this Order you may be found guilty of contempt of court and may be sent to prison or fined or your assets may be seized.”
“1. Within 3 working days of service of this Order, the First and Second Defendants must produce or deliver up to the Agent all Listed Items in their possession or control (including, for the avoidance of doubt, any emails which are Listed Items that are held by the account for the following email addresses: sophiek@sophiekhan.co.uk and any other email addresses used in connection with the Practices in the past 12 months). Unless otherwise agreed in writing with the Agent, the items must be delivered to the Agent’s Address on a weekday between 9am and 5pm and the Agent must be given 24 hours’ notice of the date and time of delivery of the documents, by email to John.Owen @gordonsllp.com. 2. The First Defendant must provide all necessary usernames and passwords to give effective access to the Listed Items that she delivers up to enable them to be searched, accessed and the contents (or data accessible therefrom) imaged by the Claimant or on its behalf. 3. If she knows or believes that any of the Listed Items are in the possession or under the control of any person other than any of the Defendants, the First Defendant must notify the Agent by e-mail to John.Owen@gordonsllp.com, identifying such persons (together with (if known) their addresses and contact information). Further, the First Defendant shall, on the request of the Agent, deliver to any person in possession of such Listed Item a letter of authority (in such terms as the Agent may reasonably require) instructing such persons to produce and deliver the Document to the Agent. 4. The First Defendant must use all reasonable endeavours to obtain and provide to the Agent all such usernames, passwords and other information, as may be necessary to enable the Agent or members of the Agent’s Team to access the account relating to the following email address: enquiries@sophiekhan.co.uk. The Claimant has liberty to apply to request that further email addresses be added to this paragraph. 5. If the Defendants are unable to comply with paragraphs 1 to 4 above within 3 working days of service of this Order, the First Defendant must serve upon the Agent a signed witness statement with a statement of truth explaining the steps that she has taken to comply, why she has been unable to do so and when she will be able to do so. 6. For the avoidance of doubt, neither Defendant shall have any obligation to deliver Listed Items to the Agent if they have already been taken into the possession of the Agent pursuant to the Search and Seizure provisions below.”
“All Documents and Property including, without limitation: 1. Any files and the contents thereof relating to present or Former Clients of the Practices; 2. Any deeds or wills or other documents relating to present or Former Clients of the Practices; 3. Any ledgers relating to present or Former Clients of the Practices and all other accounting records relating to the Practices; 4. Any diaries or appointment books relating to the Practices and any other documents in which court dates and deadlines are recorded by or on behalf of the Defendants; 5. Any logs of telephone calls, incoming or outgoing correspondence or visits to the Premises relating to the Practices; 6. Any computer records relating to present or Former Clients of the Practices and accounting matters relating to their Practices. 7. Any Computer, hard disk or server used in connection with the Practice.”
“In my judgment, Irtelli v Squatriti cannot stand in the light of the many earlier and later cases which establish that once knowledge of the order is proved, and once it is proved that the contemnor knew that he was doing or omitting to do certain things, then it is not necessary for the contemnor to know that his actions put him in breach of the order; it is enough that as a matter of fact and law, they do so put him in breach.”
“Where a company is guilty of contempt,CPR 81.4 (3) provides that a committal order may be made against "any director or other officer of that company or corporation". The requirements for a director's liability in contempt under that provision were set out in Attorney General for Tuvalu v Philatetic Distribution Corporation[1990] 1 WLR 926 (Woolf LJ). In particular: i) A director is under a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the court's order is obeyed. If he or she wilfully fails to take such reasonable steps and the order is breached, he or she is liable in contempt: p. 936F. ii) The word "wilful" is intended to distinguish the situation in which a director reasonably believes that some other director or officer is taking the reasonable steps required to ensure that the court's order is obeyed: p. 936F. iii) There must be culpable conduct on the part of a director: mere inactivity is not sufficient. However, it is not necessary for the director to have actively participated in the breach of the order in order to be culpable. A failure to supervise those to whom a director has delegated responsibility can be regarded as sufficiently culpable: p. 938A-G.”
“It was common ground that proof of a breach of the undertaking did not equate to a contempt. For a contempt to be established it has to be shown that the conduct which breached the undertaking was intentional or deliberate and that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the facts which made his conduct a breach. It is unnecessary to establish that the alleged contemnor appreciated that his conduct was a breach of the undertaking. The law on this point was summarised by Warrington J in Stancomb v Trowbridge Urban District Council[1910] 2 Ch 190 at p.194: “In my judgment, if a person or a corporation is restrained by injunction from doing a particular act, that person or corporation commits a breach of the injunction, and is liable for process for contempt, if he or it in fact does the act, and it is no answer to say that the act was not contumacious in the sense that, in doing it, there was no direct intention to disobey the order.””
“The SRA does not suggest that the Court should strike Ms Khan off the Roll on the basis of or by reference to the matters which form the basis of the decision to intervene (cf. para 9 of the supplemental submissions). The strike off is sought only on the basis of the findings of contempt. This too was made clear in the SRA’s supplemental skeleton argument and the SRA’s oral submissions.”
“The court’s summary jurisdiction over solicitors is extraordinary, and therefore should only be exercised sparingly (i) if justice requires this procedure to be adopted, as opposed to some other procedure (e.g. disciplinary proceedings through the SRA, or an ordinary civil claim) (see Geoffrey Silver & Drake (a firm) v Baines (trading as Wetherfield Baines and Baines) (a firm)[1971] 1 QB 396 at page 405 per Megaw LJ) and (ii) in a clear case (ibid at page 402F-G per Lord Denning MR).”
“An application to the court to strike a solicitor off the Roll of Solicitors is a rare application. As Mr. Dutton says, a complainant who wishes such an order should normally apply to the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal under section 46 of the Act. However, in exceptional cases, it is appropriate for the application to be made to the court. In the present case, I am quite satisfied that the application is properly made to the court. First, it is not made with a view to avoiding a determination by the Disciplinary Tribunal which has the primary responsibility for control of solicitors in this connection. That is evident from the fact that the application is by the Law Society itself. Secondly, many of the points advanced for justifying the application concern Mr. Penna's conduct during the trial before Jonathan Parker J. and his subsequent conduct in connection with the three court orders to which I have referred. Thirdly, although I am not in fact being asked to make any order on it, there is a perfectly proper application for a committal order for Mr. Penna's contempt. If that application is to be made it can only be made to the court and it is sensible to combine it with the application under sections 50 and 51 of the Act. Fourthly, it is cost-effective to apply to the court. Particularly in light of the seriousness of the allegations, if the matter had gone before a tribunal they may have had to start again, which would have involved a great deal of cost and effort. Fifthly, the nature of this case is such that the specialist knowledge or expertise which the tribunal might have would not lead them to a different or differently-reasoned conclusion from the reasoned conclusion that I have reached. That view is perhaps assisted by the fact that Mr. Penna has accepted that he must be disqualified.”
“In my judgment, it is beyond argument that a solicitor sentenced to any substantial term of imprisonment should not be permitted to remain on the Roll even if suspended indefinitely. The difference between indefinite suspension and strike off might be limited to the period of time before which an application to restore (or resume) can be made and it may be that the conditions suggested by the Tribunal, if satisfied, might permit Mr Farrimond to make an application to be restored to the Roll if he feels that such an application is appropriate and sensible given the mental state into which he had descended prior to the attack. It is simply inconceivable that a prisoner, serving a sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment, should be able to describe himself as a solicitor and officer of the court albeit suspended from practice.”