Maidstone Borough Council v Fred King [2026] EWHC 1965 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1965 (KB)

KB-2022-003122

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 29 July 2026

Before

MR JUSTICE GRIFFITHS

Between

MAIDSTONE BOROUGH COUNCILClaimant

FRED KINGDefendant

Scott Stemp (instructed by Ivy Legal Limited) for Claimant

Shaun Murphy (partner in Edwards Duthie Shamash Solicitors) for Defendant

Hearing Hearing dates: 22 and 29 July 2026

Judgment (Approved)

Mr Justice Griffiths directs that this shall be the definitive version

of the judgment delivered at the conclusion of the hearing.

It will be circulated to the parties or their representatives by e-mail

and released to the National Archives.

[1]The claimant Maidstone Borough Council (“the Council”) has applied to commit the defendant for contempt of court because of his failure to comply with: i) An Interim Order made by Jonathan Glasson KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dated 13 October 2022 (“the Interim Order”); and ii) A Final Order made by HHJ Siddique (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dated 16 December 2024 (“the Final Order”).

The evidence

[2]In support of the application and in response to it, I have the following evidence: i) The affidavit of Neill James Whittaker (“Mr Whittaker”) sworn on 23 April 2025 (“Whittaker 1”). Mr Whittaker is the person contracted by the claimant to investigate breaches of planning control which led to the Interim Order and the Final Order. ii) The witness statement of Shaun Philip Murphy (“Mr Murphy”) dated 18 April 2026 (“Murphy 1”). Mr Murphy is the defendant’s solicitor. iii) The defendant’s witness statement dated 20 April 2026 (“King 1”). iv) Mr Murphy’s witness statement dated 20 April 2026 (“Murphy 2”). v) The defendant’s witness statement dated 6 June 2026 (“King 2”). vi) Mr Whittaker’s affidavit sworn on 6 July 2026 (“Whittaker 2”). vii) The defendant’s witness statement dated 18 July 2026 (“King 3”).

[3]I gave the defendant’s solicitor, Mr Murphy, the opportunity of cross examining Mr Whittaker, who was in court, but he decided not to.

[4]I gave the defendant the opportunity of giving additional evidence orally from the witness box if he wished, and of being cross-examined. I reminded him of his right of silence. The defendant decided not to give any evidence over and above his three witness statements and he did not offer himself for cross examination.

[5]After the hearing on 22 July 2026 (“the Hearing”), I reserved my judgment and re-listed the case for judgment to be given and a sentence passed on 29 July. On the day, Mr King served a further witness statement (“King 4”) dated 29 July 2026 and I was also given by Mr King’s solicitor an email from Jade Crayden dated half an hour before midnight on 28 July 2026. Ms Crayden was described in Murphy 1 as Mr King’s daughter-in-law and in King 4 it is explained that she is the partner of Mr King’s son, who is also called Fred King.

[6]There were some conflicts or unresolved questions of fact in the evidence at the Hearing. These were to a large extent resolved by admissions on behalf of the defendant by Mr Murphy and concessions as to the scope of its case on behalf of the claimant by Counsel. I offered an adjournment for any additional evidence to be filed, or for the developments at the Hearing to be considered and if so advised responded to. Both the claimant and the defendant decided that they preferred to close the evidence and submissions at the Hearing on 22 July, with a view to a reserved judgment being given and sentence being passed on 29 July, which is today.

[7]The application is in respect of civil contempts (breaches of orders of the court) but the burden of proof is on the claimant to prove them and the standard of proof is the criminal standard of proof.

The facts

[8]I find the following facts proved on the evidence to the criminal standard.

[9]Both the Interim Order and the Final Order concern land known as Warren Lands to the north of Lenham Heath Road and east of Headcorn Road, Sandway, Maidstone, ME18 2NB which are shown edged red on a plan attached to the Interim Order and to the Final Order (“the Site”). The Site is within the planning jurisdiction of the Council.

[10]The Site is in open countryside and is adjacent to the Sandway Conservation Area. To the north is the Eurotunnel railway. The lawful use of the site is as an undeveloped green field for agricultural purposes.

[11]Title to the Site is registered to the name of Philip Fleming as administrator of the estate of Sally Irene Town (“Ms Town”) who lived on the Site until 2016 and has since died.

[12]Ownership of the Site is currently disputed between the defendant, the administrator and the beneficiaries of Ms Town’s estate. The beneficiaries do not include the defendant. The defendant has claimed ownership on the basis of an alleged occupation since May 2022. However, he has recently left the Site and no longer claims ownership, although he does remain in de facto control of the Site and has as recently as this week returned to it in order to begin his efforts to comply with the Final Order.

[13]In 1991, the Council issued an Enforcement Notice which was upheld with amendments on appeal. As amended, the breach alleged by the Enforcement Notice was:

“The making of an unauthorised change in the use of the land to a mixed use for the purposes of agriculture, the purposes of a caravan site, and the purposes of stationing a mobile home for residential use.”

[14]As amended, the requirements of the Enforcement Notice were:

“1. To cease the use of the land as a caravan site and for the purposes of stationing a mobile home for residential purposes. 2. To remove the mobile and home and caravans from the land.”

[15]During the ownership of Ms Towns, a mobile home appeared on the Site (contrary to the requirements of the Enforcement Notice). It was there in April 2003. By September 2022, although it was still on the Site, it was derelict.

[16]On 21 September 2022, Mr Whittaker made a witness statement in support of what became the Interim Order. Mr King was the first defendant. The second defendant was persons unknown (who are no longer parties) and I am not concerned with them. The Council’s planning enforcement team had made site visits on 15 June, 24 June and 1 September 2022. They found (on 15 June) that clearance works had taken place around the old mobile home and elsewhere on the Site; (on 24 June) that a further mobile home and touring caravan had appeared on the Site, and the defendant was living in the mobile home; and (on 1 September 2022) that a large steel building frame had been placed in the middle of the Site.

[17]On 29 September 2022, the defendant made a certificate of lawfulness application for his mobile home on the Site to be used as a dwelling house. This was refused by the Council on 10 October 2022 and an appeal was later dismissed.

[18]The Interim Order dated 13 October 2022 was made on notice to the defendant. It was endorsed with a Penal Notice and it was served on him. Paragraph 1 ordered that, until trial or further

[19]Paragraph 3 of the Interim Order provided:

“For the avoidance of doubt, Paragraph 1 above shall not prevent the First Defendant and his dependent family from continuing to live on the Site in one static and one touring caravan.”

[20]On 22 November 2022, the defendant applied(a) to demolish the dwelling,

(b) to erect a bungalow,

(c) to refurbish hardstanding for one static caravan and storage of two touring caravans, to be ancillary to the dwelling and

(d) for refurbishment of existing access. This application was refused by the Council on 10 March 2023. The defendant appealed.

[21]On 12 October 2023, the defendant applied to change the use of the Site to a caravan site for use by an extended gypsy/traveller family, including(a) demolition of the existing dwelling,

(b) siting of three static caravans and three touring caravans

(d) installation of packet treatment plant. This was refused by the Council on 20 December 2023. The defendant appealed.

[22]The two appeals were linked and an appeal hearing was set for 8 October 2024.

[23]In March 2024 the Council received reports that additional caravans had been brought onto the Site, in breach of the Interim Order. They sent a letter to the defendant on 28 March 2024 giving him seven days to remove them.

[24]On 23 May 2024, Mr Whittaker visited the Site and spoke to the defendant. He saw four touring caravans and a mobile home. The defendant said that his son and his son’s then partner (who I now know to be Ms Jade Crayden) lived in the mobile home with their seven children. The defendant and his girlfriend lived in one of the touring caravans, his son studied in another, another was occupied by a couple called Gavin and Margaret Fisher (who said they were paying rent to Mr King) and another was not occupied. The Interim Injunction only allowed one mobile home (static caravan) and one touring caravan; and it only allowed even these to be inhabited by the defendant “and his dependent family”, which did not include the Fishers. The defendant told Mr Whittaker that he understood that the Fishers were on site in breach of the injunction, but he thought he was doing the right thing by providing them with somewhere to live, because of their needs.

[25]The appeal hearing took place on 8 October 2024 before an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State (“the Inspector”), who was Mr David Murray BA (Hons), DMS, MRTPI. At the hearing, the Inspector received evidence and was addressed by the defendant, the defendant’s agent, and the defendant’s then partner.

[26]The Inspector dismissed both appeals on 29 October 2024. His decision was 13 pages long and it was closely reasoned. He found against the defendant after deciding the following issues: i) Whether the principle of development accorded with the strategy in the development plan. ii) The effect on the character and appearance of the area including the rural landscape. iii) Whether the Site lies in a sustainable location with good accessibility to a range of services and modes of transport. iv) The effect on the character and appearance of the Sandway Conservation Area. v) The effect on the Stodmarsh Marshes Special Area of Conservation through the additional overnight accommodation resulting in increased nutrient to this habitat and whether the proposal adversely affects its integrity. vi) The effect on protected species within the site and whether there would be a net gain in biodiversity. vii) The effect on highway capacity, safety and amenity. viii) The need for and supply of gypsy/traveller sites. ix) The availability of alternative sites; and x) The personal circumstances of the appellant and best interests of children.

[27]His reasons for dismissing the appeals included findings that: i) The principle of development was in conflict with policy. ii) There was a significant harmful effect on the rural character and appearance of the area. iii) The design of the buildings and caravans on site was at odds with and did not enhance the distinctiveness of the area. iv) The development was not in a sustainable location. v) The development harmed the setting of the Sandway Conservation Area. vi) The development had a potentially significant effect on the integrity of the Stodmarsh Special Area of Conservation; and vii) The development had a potentially severe effect on highway safety.

[28]The Inspector gave significant weight to the needs of the defendant and his family. The Inspector said that there was a lack of alternative sites and a deficit in site supply in the short to medium term. He considered the public sector equality duty and the defendant’s protected characteristic as a Romany Gypsy. However, the Inspector found that these points did not outweigh the conflict with the development plan and national guidance. The defendant’s personal circumstances did not justify a temporary permission. The defendant’s

European Convention on Human Rights Article 8

rights were not violated, because the dismissal of the appeals was proportionate and necessary.

[29]The Final Order was made on 17 December 2024. It was served on the defendant endorsed with a Penal Notice. The defendant was by this point the only defendant. The Final Order made the following orders against the defendant:

“IT IS ORDERED THAT 1. Unless authorised by a grant of planning permission (including the discharge of all conditions attached to a grant of planning permission), or with the express written consent of the Council the Defendant shall not himself, nor cause or permit: a. The bringing onto the Site of any caravan, mobile home, motor home or camper van; b. Any caravan, mobile home, motor home or camper van to be or to remain on the Site; c. The residential use of the Site; d. The bringing onto the Site, or the erection on the Site, of any building or structure for any purpose associated with or incidental to residential use of the Site; e. The carrying out of engineering operations or works on the Site; f. The changing of land levels of the Site; g. The laying or spreading of any material on the Site to create a hard surface. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1(b) above, within 1 month of the date of this Order the First Defendant shall: a. Remove all mobile homes and caravans from the Land [i.e the Site]; b. Remove all vehicles currently stored or parked on the Land; And within 3 months of the date of this Order the First Defendant shall: c. Remove the hardstanding from the Land; d. Remove the steel framed building from the Land; e. Remove lighting apparatus from the Land.” a. The bringing onto the Site of any caravan, mobile home, motor home or camper van; b. Any caravan, mobile home, motor home or camper van to be or to remain on the Site; c. The residential use of the Site; d. The bringing onto the Site, or the erection on the Site, of any building or structure for any purpose associated with or incidental to residential use of the Site; e. The carrying out of engineering operations or works on the Site; f. The changing of land levels of the Site; g. The laying or spreading of any material on the Site to create a hard surface. a. Remove all mobile homes and caravans from the Land [i.e the Site]; b. Remove all vehicles currently stored or parked on the Land; And within 3 months of the date of this Order the First Defendant shall: c. Remove the hardstanding from the Land; d. Remove the steel framed building from the Land; e. Remove lighting apparatus from the Land.”

[30]Therefore, as was perhaps to be expected, the Final Order was more stringent than the Interim Order and it also included mandatory orders which the Interim Order did not contain. There was no scope for any mobile homes or caravans to remain on the Site. There was a positive obligation on the defendant to remove them all. There was a positive obligation on the defendant, also, to remove the hardstanding.

[31]Mr Whittaker visited the Site on 17 February 2025 and spoke to the defendant. A mobile home and three caravans were still on the Site. There were also various vehicles there: a Silver Mercedes, a red Citroen, a Ford Ranger, a Bedford lorry, a white flatbed van, and a white and green flatbed lorry. The hardstanding was still there. The defendant identified members of his extended family who were living with him on the Site. Four members of the Fisher household (not related to the defendant) were living there. The total number of those named, not including the defendant himself, was ten.

[32]Mr Whittaker saw that a trench had been dug, which he considered a breach of paragraph 1.e. of the Final Order.

[33]The Council decided to bring committal proceedings and served on the defendant Whittaker 1 (dated, as I have said, 23 April 2025) which set out the facts I have just outlined. The defendant therefore knew exactly what was alleged against him.

[34]The contempt application was issued on 17 June 2025 and duly served on the defendant, with supporting evidence.

[35]Murphy 1 (dated 18 April 2026) said that the defendant had difficulty in complying with the Interim Order and Final Order because he could not find another caravan site.

[36]That was beside the point. The Final Order was in force, never appealed, was capable of being obeyed, and had to be obeyed. It was not open to the defendant to say he, his family, and the Fisher family would carry on living on the Site because Mr King or anybody else decided this was for the best. Only one person from the Site, apart from Mr King himself, has ever contacted the Council about their housing situation. That was Leanne Phillips, who had moved onto the Site quite recently with her partner and her 4 year old son and who said they were paying rent to Mr King and produced a rental agreement to that effect (Mr King does not accept that he was receiving rent). She contacted the Council on 22 January 2026 and was housed by the Council from 17 March 2026. Mr King did not contact the Council about his housing situation until 20 April 2026, when he said he was homeless, although he was on the Site when Mr Whittaker visited on 12 June 2026. Ms Crayden and her former partner (Mr King’s son) have also never contacted the Council to seek assistance with housing (this was confirmed to me today, 29 July 2026).

[37]King 1 (dated 20 April 2026) admitted being in breach of the Final Order because mobile homes and caravans were still on the Site, as were a number of vehicles. It seems that there were more vehicles that Mr Whittaker had seen, because King 1 lists a total of six cars and three lorries. Mr King did say, however, that the steel frame had been removed, and it is accepted by the Council that, now at least, it is no longer there. That deals with para 2.d. of the Final Order. In King 1, the defendant acknowledged the requirement of the Final Order that he remove the hard standing and lighting apparatus and did not claim to have complied in that respect.

[38]So the defendant was (in King 1) admitting, explicitly in some cases, implicitly in others, that he had not complied with the requirements of paragraphs 2.a., 2.b., 2.c or 2.e. of the Final Order. He said that although he had not complied with the court orders, none of it was wilful “in the sense that I am in an impossible position”.

[39]However, he was not, I find, in an impossible position. He had the ability to comply with the orders and to have the vehicles and other objects moved on. He had the ability to remove himself and his extended family and get the Fishers and their family to leave too. He was in charge. What he had caused or allowed to be brought on to the Site, and what he had caused or allowed to be done on the Site to turn it from what was meant to be a green field into an increasingly crowded and developed residential settlement, he was able to undo. I will return to this when I have reviewed all the evidence, including King 4, which has a bearing on this point, but this conclusion was initially confirmed, not only by the evidence as a whole, but also by the fact that at the Hearing he agreed that he would fully if belatedly comply with paragraph 2 of the Final Order provided he was given more time to do so.

[40]Murphy 2, dated 20 April 2026, expressed the hope that all the defendant’s problems might be solved if he were to be successful in pending or future planning applications. In view of the comprehensive failure of the defendant’s previous applications, including the very full reasoning of the appeal decisions by the Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State, this was not realistic. The defendant’s admissions

[41]On 22 April 2026, a hearing took place before Tom Little KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court. At that hearing, the defendant admitted being in contempt of court for breaching: i) The Interim Order by retaining and allowing four mobile homes and caravans to remain on the Site and using and allowing them to be used for residential purposes; and ii) The Final Order by retaining and allowing mobile homes and caravans to remain on the Site and using and allowing them to be used for residential purposes.

[42]These admissions were recorded in recitals to the order of Mr Little KC as was the defendant’s apology for the said breaches.

[43]Mr Murphy submitted to me that the admissions recorded in the order of Tom Little KC should be regarded as equivalent to a basis of plea in a criminal case in the Crown Court and, therefore, that the defendant should be treated, for the purposes of sentence, as not being affected by any fact, including those he had admitted in evidence himself, outside the strict limits of what he had admitted to in the recitals to Mr Little KC’s order.

[44]I do not agree with that. A basis of plea, even in a criminal case, is not a unilateral act. It has to be accepted by the prosecution and by the court as definitive if it is to limit the factual basis of sentence and, sometimes, it is not accepted. In that case, the fact finding is left with the court and is at large, notwithstanding the tender of a basis of plea: R v Newton

(1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 388

, R v Underwood

[2004] EWCA Crim 2256

. Per Judge LJ in Underwood: “The essential principle is that the sentencing judge must do justice. So far as possible the offender should be sentenced on the basis which accurately reflects the facts of the individual case.” (para 2) “We emphasise that whether or not the basis of plea is “agreed”, the judge is not bound by any such agreement and is entitled of his own motion to insist that any evidence relevant to the facts in dispute should be called before him.” (para 6)

[45]The same applies to civil proceedings for contempt of court. The contempt is a matter for the court, and so is the penalty. The role of the applicant is to bring it before the court, but the court must do justice. A person alleged to be in contempt of court cannot tie the court’s hands by making a strategic admission and then arguing that nothing else should be taken notice of. Admissions are to be encouraged, and it is in accordance with the overriding objective that disputes of fact should not be resolved if it is not proportionate to resolve them, for example because the effect on penalty is likely to be negligible. But, once an alleged contempt is before the court, it is for the court to decide what disputes of fact may be relevant or material, and to resolve them by means of a fair procedure. This may, in an appropriate case, mean that further evidence is received, or that those who have already given evidence in a witness statement or affidavit are cross examined. The guiding principles will be proportionality and the interests of justice.

[46]The defendants’ admissions to Tom Little KC were not put forward as a basis of plea. Nor were they accepted as such, whether by the applicant or by the court. They were exactly what they said they were: they were admissions. What was not admitted to the court would have to be proved. The defendant’s admissions added to the evidence he and others had already filed. They narrowed issues, insofar as they put some matters beyond dispute (and admissions attract credit when it comes to punishment). However, nothing in the body of the order of Mr Little KC or in the recitals, said that these admissions were, or should be, accepted by the Council or the court as the sum total of the matters to be taken into account on the question of penalty. The defendants’ admissions were tendered in conjunction with very recent evidence on the defendant’s own behalf (dated only a few days before the hearing) which contained other admissions and narrowed the issues, therefore, in other respects.

[47]The order did not purport to limit the ambit of the evidence to be considered in due course. On the contrary, it made provision (in addition to the evidence already filed from both sides) for further evidence to be filed, in accordance with a timetable, followed by written submissions, on both sides, as to punishment and disposal of the application. The order did not say that future evidence was to be considered without the earlier evidence, or that for some reason earlier evidence should no longer be admissible. It was a consequence of the order, and in my judgment obvious from the order, that a future hearing would consider all the evidence, including admissions made by the defendant in his recent evidence, and not only his admissions to the court of Tom Little KC, when making its decision as to disposal of the committal application. Events after the order of Tom Little KC

[48]Notwithstanding his admissions and his apology, the defendant still did not, after the order of Tom Little KC, comply with paras 2.a., b. c. or e. of the Final Order. It was admitted on his behalf at the Hearing before me on 22 July that he had still not complied with the first three of those sub-paragraphs.

[49]Instead, the defendant made another planning application which, like all the others, got nowhere. On 20 April 2026 he made a planning application for change of use of the Site; including the stationing of two mobile homes and two touring caravans for Gypsy/Traveller occupation, and installation of an access track. On 7 May 2026 the Council exercised its power under section 70C of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to decline to determine the application. This was because consideration of the possibility of allowing the Site to become Gypsy/Traveller accommodation, instead of a green field as required by its current planning status, had been thoroughly considered and rejected by the Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State.

[50]On 12 June 2026 Mr Whittaker visited the Site again and spoke to the defendant. What he found is set out in Whittaker 2 (the affidavit sworn on 6 July 2026). The defendant was at the Site. The defendant told Mr Whittaker he had moved his caravan off the Site and was now homeless and sleeping in his car. His latest relationship had broken down and he was now single. He had not lived on the Site since 26 April 2026.

[51]Photographs were taken which showed that there had been more breaches of the Final Order. Materials had been laid to create a hard surface, in contravention of para 1.g. A new mobile home had been brought on to the Site, in breach of para 1.a. Two new touring caravans had been brought onto the Site in breach of para 1.a. Mr Whittaker’s observation was that they replaced the two previous touring caravans which had been occupied by the Fisher family and the defendant and his then partner (who is no longer with him). In breach of para 2.a., there were still mobile homes and caravans on the Site. There were also still vehicles on the Site, in breach of para 2.b. There were still areas of hardstanding, in breach of para 2.c. At no time during a 20 minute conversation between the defendant and Mr Whittaker did the defendant suggest that anyone other than himself was in charge of the Site, or responsible for these changes. So far as the breaches were concerned, the defendant was wholly responsible, because the obligation to comply with the Final Order lay exclusively with him. I find as a fact that he could have done what was required of him, but had, at this point and previously, decided (exercising his own judgment about what was best) not to do so. This was the very essence of a deliberate contempt of court.

[52]King 3 is dated 18 July 2026. It takes issue with some of Mr Whittaker’s observations. However, as I have said, the defendant’s representative decided not to cross examine Mr Whittaker and the defendant decided not to offer himself for cross examination. The defendant’s challenges are expressed in para 20 of King 3 as follows:

“a. What is described as the new touring caravan is a misdescription. This is occupied by Maggie and Gavin Fischer. They have been living in this caravan for at least two years I do not know why it is described as "new"; b. I do not agree that I had anything to do with the laying of the hard surface. I know about this. It was done by my son. This was not encouraged by me; c. What is described as the new mobile home is the home now occupied by Amy Waller and twins, […] both aged 13 years. They have been living with Amy, at the request of Social Services since the 6 April 2026. Amy Waller has been living in this mobile home for at least a year and I do not know why it is described as new; d. In his draft Affidavit Mr Whittaker suggests that there are two new touring caravans on site in contravention of Court Orders. I do not agree this is correct. There are no new touring caravans on the site so far as I am aware.”

[53]Mr Whittaker’s observations are supported by photographs. He had conducted all the site visits and was therefore in a good position to observe what was new and what was not. However, on examination of the photographs, I accept that the new mobile home is new (in the sense that it is not old) but that it is the same as the one photographed on Mr Whittaker’s earlier Site visit on 23 May 2024. However, what is new is that it is, in the photographs taken on 12 June 2026, now on the edge of a large area of hard standing (extending across a large area of the Site, ending at the boundary with the road) and surrounded on three sides by a fence.

[54]The defendant blames the installation of hard standing on his son but he does not deny that he himself has made no effort to remove it as required by para 2.c. of the Final Order.

[55]Leaving aside two static mobile homes (one old and one said to be new), three touring caravans are also clearly shown on the photographs. One is said to have been seen by Mr Whittaker before, and two are said to be new but, although the defendant takes issue with whether they are new or not, they are there, and demonstrate that the defendant is in breach of para 2.a. of the Final Order. This required the defendant to remove “all mobile homes and caravans” from the Site within 1 month from the date of the order on 17 December 2024, which is now over 18 months ago.

[56]The defendant does not in King 3 deny Mr Whittaker’s observations of vehicles on the Site. These vehicles are in Mr Whittaker’s photographs. The aerial photograph taken on 12 June 2026 (Bundle pp 521-522) shows a large number of vehicles of various types and sizes. They include cars, trucks, and lorries. There are at least nine in total. The defendant was required by para 2.b. of the Final Order to remove all vehicles currently stored or parked on the Site.

[57]I am told, and I accept, that the lighting apparatus referred to in para 2.e. of the Final Order has been removed from the Site.

The present position

[58]Based on the defendant’s admissions, and the unchallenged evidence, including photographs, I find that it has been proved to the criminal standard that the defendant: i) Has not removed all mobile homes and caravans from the Site, in breach of para 2.a. of the Final Order. ii) Has not removed all vehicles from the Site. Para 2.b. of the Final Order required him to remove all vehicles currently stored or parked on the Site. It may be (and I will give him the benefit of the doubt) that this should include only those vehicles stored or parked on the Site at the date of the Final Order. These included a flatbed lorry, a vintage lorry, a Citroen car, and a red Bedford lorry all of which appear to be in the most recent photographs as well. iii) Has not removed the hard standing from the Site, in breach of para 2.c. of the Final Order. iv) Has removed the steel framed building from the Site referred to in para 2.d. of the Final Order. He asserts that he has and the Council does not contest that. v) Has removed the lighting apparatus from the Site, referred to in para 2.e. of the Final Order. This was asserted at the Hearing and not contested by the Council.

[59]The outstanding mandatory orders are, therefore, paras 2.a., 2.b. and 2.c. of the Final Order. These are important paragraphs, covering, as they do, the presence of mobile homes, caravans, vehicles and hardstanding on the Site, which have effectively turned what should be a green field into a small residential settlement occupied by adults and children. I note, however, that hardstanding is not referred to in the contempt application notice.

[60]I also refer to para 1 of the Final Order, which provides that (unless authorised by a grant of planning permission, including the discharge of all conditions attached to a grant of planning permission, or with the express written consent of the Council), the defendant should not himself, nor cause or permit:a. The bringing onto the Site of any caravan, mobile home, motor home or camper van;

b. Any caravan, mobile home, motor home or camper van to be or to remain on the Site;

c. The residential use of the Site;

d. The bringing onto the Site, or the erection on the Site, of any building or structure for any purpose associated with or incidental to residential use of the Site;

e. The carrying out of engineering operations or works on the Site;

f. The changing of land levels of the Site; or

g. The laying or spreading of any material on the Site to create a hard surface.

[61]I was told, and I accept, that the Council has neither the power nor the resources to put the Site back into the condition it should be in. It is therefore important that the defendant complies with the Final Order. Only if he does, will the breaches of planning control be rectified, at least to the extent provided for by the Final Order. Failure to comply with the Final Order is not a technical matter. It has real and continuing consequences for the Site, and the landscape, and the environment around it. Those consequences are set out in the appeal decisions of the Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State.

[62]On every site visit, the defendant was obviously the person in control of the Site and of the provision of accommodation to the other people living there, regardless of the issues about who was the lawful owner. The evidence indicates that no-one but the defendant was ultimately responsible for the presence of the vehicles and caravans on the Site. He was, as I have said, in charge. All Mr Whittaker’s conversations were with him, and the defendant deferred to nobody else. What the defendant had caused or allowed to be brought onto the Site (which was everything referred to in the relevant parts of the Final Order) he could also have taken away.

[63]A striking feature of the defendant’s evidence and of the submissions initially made to me at the Hearing was that the defendant showed no intention of complying with the Final Order. Instead, his evidence as a whole at that point consisted of various explanations of why he should not be expected to comply. He gave evidence that he thought it was best for those living with him on the Site to be there, for their own benefit because of their own various needs, which included children and families with special needs. (The strong suggestion in the evidence that he also benefitted, from rent payments, cannot be proved by the Council to the criminal standard of proof and may for present purposes be discounted.) The defendant doubted (although there was at the time of the Hearing no evidence that he had made any effort to test this) that alternative accommodation could be found. The defendant (particularly in the submissions made on his behalf at the Hearing) initially threw the onus onto the Council to find him and the others on Site somewhere else to live, preferably a gypsy/traveller caravan site, or to grant planning permission so that he might be permitted to do what he has so far been doing in breach of the Final Order and of planning controls.

[64]That was ill-advised. The Final Order was final and there was no appeal. The defendant is, on his own admission, in contempt of court and in continuing contempt of court. The purpose of the Hearing is to determine penalty, not to reverse the Final Order or make it a dead letter. This is not a time for deflection or distraction. The Council is not the respondent. The defendant is the respondent. The defendant is in contempt of court, not the Council.

[65]The defendant’s position changed in the course of the Hearing on 22 July 2026. On instructions, the defendant’s representative told me towards the end of the Hearing that the defendant had now agreed that he would, after all, comply with the Final Order if given more time to do so.

[66]On the eve of the hearing today, 29 July 2026, which was listed for judgment to be delivered and a sentence passed, King 4 was served in draft and the email from Jade Crayden was also sent.

[67]King 4 documents what appears to have been Mr King’s first ever attempt to comply with the Final Order, as he committed to at the Hearing on 22 July. He said that he spoke to his daughter-in-law Jade Crayden on Saturday 25 July and suggested to her that her caravan could be moved to another site where she could be with her family. She was agreeable to that. On a day he describes as “yesterday”, which seems to have been 27 July (the day before his witness statement was prepared in draft), he tried to move her caravan (apparently therefore with her agreement) using a lorry and with the help of a friend. The move was mishandled, they got the caravan stuck into a hole on the Site, and the caravan was damaged.

[68]Perhaps not surprisingly, Ms Crayden then became angry, swore at him, and changed her attitude. She said things such as “This is not your job”, “You don’t even own the land”, “Let the Council take us to Court” and “They have not put you in charge”. Her children (the defendant’s grandchildren), whose ages range up to 18 years, then joined in and started complaining and telling Mr King to go away. At this point, relatives of the defendant’s former partner (Amy Waller) came on to the land. His former partner is still living on the Site, with the 13 year old twin children of the Fishers, who are also still living there. These relatives shouted at him that it was not his business to remove any caravans and he was not to do the Council’s bidding. Then the defendant’s own son turned up. I am told that he is no longer living on the Site, although his former partner (Jade Crayden) and their 8 children are. He took off his shirt and wanted to fight. He was also angry about the damage caused to his family’s caravan.

[69]Ms Crayden’s email referred to her children’s needs for stability and, in particular, the needs of one child with a diagnosis of ADHD and two others awaiting assessments for ADHD and autism. She says she is not in a position to secure alternative accommodation independently. However, she does not claim to have made any efforts to secure alternative accommodation, whether through the Council or otherwise. The Council acknowledged in court today that as the relevant housing department it would have obligations to assist with housing if approached, and that the County Council, as both the education authority and children’s services authority, will have statutory obligations to assist with education and welfare if approached, in respect of children and adults with relevant needs.

[70]The Site is not suitable accommodation. That was established by the careful decision of the Inspector, who considered Convention rights amongst other matters.

[71]Therefore, neither King 4 nor Ms Crayden’s email provide a sound basis for the Final Order to be disregarded rather than enforced.

[72]There is, however, force in the point made on the defendant’s behalf this morning by Mr Murphy, which is that the defendant has only his powers of persuasion, rather than any legal power, to get even members of his own family off the Site. He does not renege on his commitment, at the Hearing on 22 July, to comply with the Final Order. He does, however, ask for time to do so.

[73]We should not be in this position. The defendant should have made the efforts, which he made for the first time a few days ago, when the Final Order was made against him on 16 December 2024 and, indeed, he should not have invited or allowed the people presently on the Site to live with him there at all. But I must and will deal with matters as they now are, and not as they might have been if things had been done differently.

[74]To that end, the Council has indicated through Counsel that it will urgently exercise its own powers to assist Mr King in clearing the Site of its current occupants. They are (according to a list provided to me today, signed by Mr King, and drawn up on his instructions) as follows: i) Amy Waller (age 28). ii) Gavin and Maggie Fisher or Fischer (adults) and their twin children (both aged 13). iii) Jade Crayden (aged 35) and her eight children (grandchildren of the defendant), whose ages range from 9 weeks to 18 years. I do not in this judgment name the children, but their names are on the list.

[75]I would expect all these people to leave sooner rather than later, especially when they realise that Mr King’s liberty really does depend on it. I expect that the anger generated by the botched caravan move can be dealt with (Mr King has already made compensation by giving up his own car) and that the attitude of compliance, which was demonstrated until the damage to the caravan, can be restored. But, even on the worst case scenario, following the steps to enforcement by the Council against the named individuals worked through by Counsel at the hearing today, the Council will be able to secure their removal, forcibly if necessary, within 6 months at most, exercising its powers (for example, under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990). This does not absolve Mr King from using his own powers, persistently and to the utmost, to comply with the Final Order. He must do so immediately, and he must not give up. He cannot sit back and leave it all to the Council. If he does, he will not be in a good position if and when the case should return to this court.

[76]For comparison, the Final Order dated 16 December 2024 gave the defendant one month from the date of the order (that is, until 16 January 2025) to remove all mobile homes and caravans (para 2.a.) and to remove all vehicles currently stored or parked on the Site (para 2.b.). It gave him three months from the date of the order (that is, until 16 March 2025) to remove the hardstanding from the Site (para 2.c.).

[77]At the Hearing on 22 July 2026, the defendant’s representative at first said (on instructions) that the defendant would remove the hardstanding within a month, but that he did not know how long it would take him to comply with paras 2.a. and 2.b. (removal of mobile homes, caravans and other vehicles). He suggested “up to 3 months” for those elements. Upon further reflection and consultation with the defendant, the defendant’s solicitor indicated that finding alternative accommodation for those living on the Site, and finding alternative locations for the caravans, including storage, if necessary, “could take as long as 8 months”.

[78]There is nothing in the evidence to justify eight months as the long stop and I am sure that eight months will not be required. Anyone living on the Site will have either to find alternative accommodation or to be provided with alternative accommodation by agencies who may be under an obligation to do that. The inhabitants include families with young children; although there were other adults without children, and some people have already left. Those remaining on Site are members of two families, the larger family being the grandchildren of the defendant and their mother, Ms Crayden. The evidence shows that the population of the Site has shifted over time.

[79]Three months is ample time for other arrangements to be made, whatever they may turn out to be. Three months was the period sought by Mr Murphy at the adjourned hearing today, 29 July. There is no reason why removal of the hardstanding cannot be achieved within a month as originally suggested. The caravans and other vehicles and fixed structures can be removed by one means or another (either to be destroyed, or to be relocated, or to be stored) within three months also. There is no reason to suppose, on the evidence, that more than three months will be required. The defendant must exert himself and invoke the assistance of others if necessary. Three months is a long time for this sort of change. It is ample time. It is also the period allowed in the Final Order, which was never challenged.

[80]I do, however, recognise the value of allowing the longer period of six months as a long-stop, since that is the timescale within which, on a worst case scenario, the Council will be able to enforce the vacation of the Site using its own powers.

[81]The defendant refers to health difficulties, and I am sorry to hear about them. There is no medical report, and no medical records or letters have been put in evidence. However, in King 1 dated April 2026 the defendant says (and I accept) he is not in good physical health and is awaiting test results; and also that he has mental health problems for which he has been receiving treatment, including medication, for the best part of 30 years. However, he also says that he works up and down the country as an odd job man doing gardening jobs, farm work and patios and driveways, as well as repairing classic vehicles. This suggests that he does have the ability to discharge his obligations under the Final Order, whether by himself or with the assistance of others, for example in the matter of clearing the Site and removing the hardstanding. He has shown that in his efforts of the day before yesterday to remove the caravan, with the assistance of a lorry and a friend.

[82]The contempts of court identified in box 7 of the contempt application are as follows:

“The Interim Order allows for one static caravan and one touring caravan to be on the Land. The Defendant has, on or before 1st April 2024, caused or permitted an additional touring caravan to be brought to and kept on the Land, in breach of paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of the Interim Order. The Final Order requires residential use of the Land to cease and all caravans and mobile homes and vehicles to be removed from the Land by 16 January 2025. The continued existence of 4 caravans (3 used residentially), one mobile home (used residentially), and 6 vehicles on the Land is in breach of paragraphs 1(b), 1(c), 2(a) and 2(b) of the Final Order.”

[83]Whilst I accept, to the credit of the defendant, his commitment also to remove the hardstanding, I will not take the hardstanding into account when setting punitive elements, because it is not referred to in the application notice.

The law

[84]The burden of proof is on the applicant and the standard of proof is the criminal standard. A person is guilty of contempt by breach of an order only if all the following factors are proved to the relevant standard (FWFarnsworth v Lacy

[2013] EWHC 3487 (Ch)

per Proudman J at para 20): i) Having received notice of the order the contemnor did an act prohibited by the order or failed to do an act required by the order within the time set by the order. ii) He intended to do the act or failed to do the act as the case may be. iii) He had knowledge of all the facts which would make the carrying out of the prohibited act or the omission to do the required act a breach of the order. iv) The act constituting the breach must be deliberate rather than merely inadvertent, but an intention to commit a breach is not necessary, although intention or lack of intention to flout the court's order is relevant to penalty.

[85]I am satisfied to the criminal standard that all these elements have been proved in relation to the contempts of court alleged in this application.

[86]In Attorney General v Crosland

[2021] UKSC 15

, the following guidance on sentence was given by the Supreme Court, at para 44:

“General guidance as to the approach to penalty is provided in the Court of Appeal decision in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan [2019] EWCA Civ 392; [2019] 1 WLR 3833, paras 57 to 71. That was a case of criminal contempt consisting in the making of false statements of truth by expert witnesses. The recommended approach may be summarised as follows: 1. The court should adopt an approach analogous to that in criminal cases where the Sentencing Council's Guidelines require the court to assess the seriousness of the conduct by reference to the offender's culpability and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused. 2. In light of its determination of seriousness, the court must first consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty. 3. If the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty will suffice, the court must impose the shortest period of imprisonment which properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt. 4. Due weight should be given to matters of mitigation, such as genuine remorse, previous positive character and similar matters. 5. Due weight should also be given to the impact of committal on persons other than the contemnor, such as children of vulnerable adults in their care. 6. There should be a reduction for an early admission of the contempt to be calculated consistently with the approach set out in the Sentencing Council's Guidelines on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea. 7. Once the appropriate term has been arrived at, consideration should be given to suspending the term of imprisonment. Usually the court will already have taken into account mitigating factors when setting the appropriate term such that there is no powerful factor making suspension appropriate, but a serious effect on others, such as children or vulnerable adults in the contemnor's care, may justify suspension.”

[87]The court may impose an immediate custodial sentence of up to two years (s14(1) Contempt of Court Act 1981) or an unlimited fine or order sequestration (s14(2)). The maximum sentence of two years applies regardless of how many separate acts of contempt are proved: In re R (A Minor) (Contempt: Sentence)

[1994] 1 WLR 487

per Sir Thomas Bingham MR at 491A-F.

[88]A period of imprisonment is imposed by way of an order of committal. Execution of the order requires the issue of a warrant of committal. The court may suspend execution of the order or warrant of committal under CPR 81.9(2). (HM Solicitor General v Yaxley-Lennon

[2024] EWHC 2732 (KB)

per Johnson J at para 36.)

[89]The object of the penalty is to both punish conduct in defiance of court orders as well as serving a coercive function by holding out the threat of future punishment as a means of securing the protection which the injunction is primarily there to do (Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick

[2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch)

per Lawrence Collins J at 8).

[90]In JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko (No 2)

[2011] EWCA Civ 1241

, [20212] 1 WLR 350, a sentence of 21 months’ immediate imprisonment was passed on a contemnor who was in continuing breach of an order to provide information ancillary to a freezing order, of which 9 months was identified as the punitive element, the balance of 12 months being coercive. Per Jackson LJ at paras 55-57 and para 67 (with whom Lord Neuberger MR and Carnwath LJ agreed):

“(…) Where there is a continuing failure to disclose relevant information, the court should consider imposing a long sentence, possibly even the maximum of two years, in order to encourage future co-operation by the contemnor. 56 In the case of continuing breach, out of fairness to the contemnor, the court may see fit to indicate (a) what portion of the sentence should be served in any event as punishment for past breaches and (b) what portion of the sentence the court might consider remitting in the event of prompt and full compliance thereafter. Any such indication would be persuasive, but not binding upon a future court. 57 It should also be noted that what the court is passing is a nominal sentence. The actual time spent in prison will be less, because of remission, possible release on tagging and so forth. The court does not have regard to those factors in determining the proper sentence in any case. 67 In the Shalson case (unreported) 9 July 2001 Neuberger J made the point that the shorter the punitive element of the sentence the greater the incentive on the contemnor to comply by disclosing the information required. I agree. On the other hand there is also a public interest in requiring contemnors to serve a proper sentence for past non-compliance with court orders, even if those contemnors are in continuing breach. The punitive element of the sentence both punishes the contemnor and deters others from disregarding court orders.”

[91]Per Hamblen and Holroyde LJJ in Financial Conduct Authority v McKendrick

[2019] EWCA Civ 524

[2019] 4 WLR 65

, at paras 40-41:

“40 Breach of a court order is always serious, because it undermines the administration of justice. We therefore agree with the observations of Jackson LJ in the Solodchenko case (see para 31 above) as to the inherent seriousness of a breach of a court order, and as to the likelihood that nothing other than a prison sentence will suﬃce to punish such a serious contempt of court. The length of that sentence will, of course, depend on all the circumstances of the case, but again we agree with the observations of Jackson LJ as to the length of sentence which may often be appropriate. Mr Underwood was correct to submit that the decision as to the length of sentence appropriate in a particular case must take into account that the maximum sentence is committal to prison for two years. However, because the maximum term is comparatively short, we do not think that the maximum can be reserved for the very worst sort of contempt which can be imagined. Rather, there will be a comparatively broad range of conduct which can fairly be regarded as falling within the most serious category and as therefore justifying a sentence at or near the maximum. 41 As the judge recognised, it may sometimes be necessary for the sentence for this form of contempt of court to include an element intended to encourage belated compliance with the court’s order. Where that is the case, that element of the sentence is in principle one which maybe remitted if the contemnor subsequently purges his contempt by complying with the order.”

[92]Per Leech J in Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd v Khan

[2022] EWHC 45 (Ch)

at para 52:

“(1) There are no formal sentencing guidelines for sentence/sanction in committal proceedings. (2) Sentences/sanctions are fact specific. (3) The Court should bear in mind the desirability of keeping offenders and, in particular, first-time offenders, out of prison: see Templeton Insurance Ltd v Thomas [2013] EWCA Civ 35 and Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v Gersamia [2015] EWHC 821 (Comm).”

[93]In Crypto Open Patent Alliance v Wright

[2024] EWHC 3316 (Ch)

, Mellor J at para 77 gave four examples of sentences which were structured in order to maximise their coercive as well as their punitive effect:

“i) Addou v Bennabi [2024] EWHC 2702 (Fam) at para. 15: The respondent, who was responsible for removing a child from the jurisdiction, was made subject to a sentence that was suspended on terms that it would not take effect if he returned the child to the jurisdiction in a set time. ii) Tonstate Group Ltd v Wojakovski [2023] EWHC 3447 (Ch) at paras. 46-48: The defendant, who was in contempt for dealing in assets contrary to a court order, was made subject to a sentence that was suspended on terms that it would be activated if he breached any court order in the actions within a period of one year. However, I note that at [46] Edwin Johnson J. specifically exempted (a) any breach of an order to pay costs and (b) any breach of a case management direction. iii) Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc [2023] EWHC 2563 (Comm), 4 WLR 76 at para. 32: The second defendant, who was in contempt for failing to comply with asset disclosure orders, was made subject to a sentence that was suspended on terms that it would not take effect if he complied with a series of very detailed provisions requiring further disclosure. iv) Dattani v Rasheed [2022] EWHC 3671 (Ch) at para. 11: The first defendant, who was in contempt for failing properly to comply with an order for provision of information about proceeds of sale of an asset, was made subject to a sentence that was suspended on terms which included (i) that he provide the requisite information and (ii) that he comply with all further orders which the court should make for a period of one year.”

[94]Section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020 does not apply to sentencing for contempt of court: see section 222(2) of the Sentencing Act. Therefore, there is no presumption in favour of suspension for those convicted after 22 March 2026: Khan v North of England Coachworks

[2026] EWCA Civ 656

per Coulson LJ at para 53.

[95]However, with that qualification, it is “always a good idea” for the court to consider the Sentencing Council’s guideline on Imposition of community and custodial sentences, per Coulson LJ in Khan at para 49, citing Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan

[2019] EWCA Civ 392

[2019] 1 WLR 3833

, paras 30 and 58.

[96]The guideline, in respect of sentences (such as those I am now considering) which are not subject to section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020, identifies the following relevant factors. i) Factors indicating that it may be appropriate to suspend a custodial sentence are: a) Realistic prospect of rehabilitation in the community. b) Offender does not present high risk of reoffending or harm. c) Strong personal mitigation. d) Immediate custody will result in significant harmful impact upon others, including any dependent children or where the offender is pregnant or postnatal (has given birth in the previous 12 months). ii) Factors indicating that it may not be appropriate to suspend a custodial sentence are: a) Offender presents a risk to any person. b) The seriousness of the offence means that appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody. c) History of poor compliance with court orders AND unlikely to comply in the future.

[97]I have cited these cases because of the guidance they give on matters of principle. However, per Coulson LJ in Khan v North of England Coachworks

[2026] EWCA Civ 656

at para 31:

“On the issue of sanction, it is unlikely that the appeal court will be assisted by the citation of other first instance cases where particular sanctions were imposed on particular contemnors on particular facts. The law of contempt is so broad, and arises in so many different ways, that the precise sanctions imposed in other cases are usually unilluminating.”

[98]In the absence of a sentencing guideline, and given the variety of situations in which contempt proceedings arise, checklists cannot be applied slavishly. What is relevant and significant will vary from case to case as will the weight to be given to different factors. However, it is right to recognise the widespread influence of the factors identified by Lawrence Collins J in Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick

[2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch)

at para 13, cited (for example) by the Court of Appeal in Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Hussain

[2022] EWCA Civ 1264

[2023] 1 WLR 396

at para 120, with an additional point added by Popplewell J in Asia Islamic Trade Finance Fund Ltd v Drum Risk Management Ltd

[2015] EWHC 3748 (Comm)

“(a) whether the claimant has been prejudiced by virtue of the contempt and whether the prejudice is capable of remedy; (b) the extent to which the contemnor has acted under pressure; (c) whether the breach of the order was deliberate or unintentional; (d) the degree of culpability; (e) whether the contemnor has been placed in breach of the order by reason of the conduct of others; (f) whether the contemnor appreciates the seriousness of the deliberate breach; (g) whether the contemnor has co-operated; (h) whether there has been any acceptance of responsibility, any apology, any remorse or any reasonable excuse put forward.”

Sentence

[99]The defendant’s contempts were serious. They were deliberate. They were consequential. They were not committed at the direction of or under pressure from anyone else. They were a choice made by the defendant, who knew that he was acting in breach of court orders. They were entirely his responsibility. They continued over a significant period of time and still continue to the date of the Hearing on 22 July. Culpability is high. Harm is significant but not irreversible and affects land rather than people (except to the extent that people are affected by breaches of planning control); I therefore assess harm as medium to high.

[100]A seriously aggravating feature is that the defendant has previously been made the subject of an injunction order and received a suspended sentence of imprisonment for breach. The injunction was imposed by HHJ Simpkiss at Dartford County Court on 25 August 2017 following breaches of planning controls similar to those in this case, pursuant to section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The claimant was Medway Council. The defendant breached the injunction and was made the subject of a suspended sentence of imprisonment of 24 weeks on 24 August 2018, suspended for one year on condition that the order was complied with. The defendant then complied with that order.

[101]There is little or no offence mitigation.

[102]There is some personal mitigation, in that the defendant, who is 64 years old, has health issues and is now living in his car. There was, by the end of the Hearing, a recognition of responsibility and a commitment to put matters right. Some attempts were made to begin on this since the Hearing, as set out in King 4. That was very late, but it is better to do things late than never. These are all mitigating features.

[103]The contempts are so serious, having regard to the aggravating and mitigating features, that only a custodial penalty will suffice.

[104]Because the mandatory elements of the Final Order have not been complied with, and the defendant is now willing to comply with them, the coercive element of any sentence is more important than anything else, although the punitive element is also important. Therefore, I will take the exceptional course of prioritising compliance with the Final Order, and allowing the defendant time to make good his promises of compliance within the next six months.

[105]The shortest sentence I can pass is one of 9 months’ imprisonment, including a punitive element of four and a half months and a coercive element of four and a half months. I will give the defendant maximum credit for the admissions and apologies he gave to Tom Little KC, and for his most recent efforts to comply, reducing the sentence to one of 6 months’ imprisonment, including a punitive element of 3 months and a coercive element of 3 months.

[106]In relation to the possibility of suspension, and bearing in mind the seven factors in the Sentencing Council’s imposition guideline: i) There is a previous example of non-compliance with a court order, leading to a suspended sentence of imprisonment. ii) The breaches are serious and continuing. iii) The defendant presents a high risk of both non-compliance and reoffending in the absence of coercion but the sentence I pass can deter that if the coercive and punitive elements are judged correctly. iv) There is personal mitigation, but it is not very strong. v) Immediate custody will not result in significant harmful impact on others. vi) The defendant does not present a risk to any person. vii) There is no prospect of rehabilitation in the community.

[107]Giving priority to the need to secure the defendant’s compliance with the unfulfilled mandatory requirements of the Final Order, I will suspend the sentence, on the following terms: i) The sentence will be suspended for two years, that is, until 29 July 2028. ii) If the defendant has fully complied with the Final Order, including but not limited to the mandatory requirements, 6 months from today (that is, by 28 January 2027), the coercive element of the six-month sentence (3 months) will not have to be served at all and the punitive element of the sentence (the other 3 months) will continue to be suspended for the remainder of the 2 years, that is, until 29 July 2028. iii) If the defendant has not fully complied with the Final Order, including but not limited to the mandatory requirements, 6 months from today (that is, by 28 January 2027), both the coercive and punitive elements of the sentence (totalling 6 months) will have to be served in custody, starting on 28 January 2026. If, during that sentence, the defendant fully complies with the Final Order, he will, upon full compliance, only have to serve a total of 3 months, counted from the start of his immediate custodial sentence. This might result in his immediate release. iv) In the event of any breach of the Final Order before 29 July 2028, the defendant will be brought back to court and the custodial sentence may be activated and made immediate, in whole or in part, in addition to any other penalty the court may impose.

[108]Should the defendant find himself in custody, he will only be required to serve one half of the applicable or remaining sentence in custody. At the half way point of the applicable or remaining custodial sentence, he will be released, like other prisoners who have served half their sentence. However, he will continue to be bound by the Final Order in every respect, before, during and after release from custody, and also after the period of suspension has ended on 29 July 2028.

order

“Unless authorised by a grant of planning permission (including the discharge of all conditions attached to a grant of planning permission), or unless authorised by a Certificate of Lawful Use or Development, or with the express written consent of the Council, the First and Second Defendants shall not until further Order of the Court cause or permit: [a] the bringing onto the Site of any further caravan, mobile home, motor home or camper van, and/or [b] any more than one static caravan and one touring caravan to be or to remain on the Site, and/or [c] the bringing onto the Site, or the erection on the Site, of any building or structure for any purpose associated with or incidental to the residential use of the Site, and/or [d] the carrying out of engineering operations or works on the Site, and/or [e] the changing of the levels of the Site, and/or [f] the bringing onto the Site of any building materials or materials for the creation of hard surfaces. [g] the laying or spreading of any material on the Site to create a hard surface.” [d] the carrying out of engineering operations or works on the Site, and/or [e] the changing of the levels of the Site, and/or