“1. By 4pm on5 May 2022 , the Defendants must produce or deliver up to the Agent all Listed Items in their possession or control (including, for the avoidance of doubt, any emails which are Listed Items that are held by the account for the following email addresses: sophiek@sophiekhan.co.uk or legal@justforpublicltd.org.uk and any other email addresses used in connection with the Practices in the past 12 months). Unless otherwise agreed in writing with the Agent, the items must be delivered to the Agent’s Address on a weekday between 9am and 5pm and the Agent must be given 24 hours’ notice of the date and time of delivery of the documents, by email to John.Owen@gordonsllp.com. 2. The First Defendant must by 4pm on5 May 2022 provide all necessary usernames and passwords to give effective access to the Listed Items that she delivers up to enable them to be searched, accessed and the contents (or data accessible therefrom) imaged by the Claimant or on its behalf. 3. If she knows or believes that any of the Listed Items are in the possession or under the control of any person other than any of the Defendants, the First Defendant must by 4pm on5 May 2022 notify the Agent by e-mail to John.Owen@gordonsllp.com, identifying such persons (together with (if known) their addresses and contact information). Further, the First Defendant shall, on the request of the Agent, deliver to any person in possession of such Listed Item a letter of authority (in such terms as the Agent may reasonably require) instructing such persons to produce and deliver the Document to the Agent. 4. The First Defendant must use all reasonable endeavours to obtain and provide to the Agent by 4pm on5 May 2022 all such usernames, passwords and other information, as may be necessary to enable the Agent or members of the Agent’s Team to access to the account relating to the following email address: legal@justforpublicltd.org.uk. Any access to the said email account by the Claimant, its Agent or members of the Agent’s Team shall be subject to the provisions in paragraphs 7 to 11 below. The Claimant has liberty to apply to request that further email addresses be added to this paragraph. 5. If the Defendants are unable to comply with paragraphs 1 to 3 above, the First Defendant must, by 4pm on5 May 2022 , serve upon the Agent a signed witness statement with a statement of truth explaining the steps that she has taken to comply, why she has been unable to do so and when she will be able to do so. 6. Upon taking possession of the Listed Items, the Claimant must serve on the Defendants a notice complying with Paragraph 9(7) of Schedule 1.”
“22.4 ‘Computer’ – includes all types of computer, such as personal computers, laptops, tablets, handheld devices and all other forms of personal digital assistant. 22.5. ‘Documents’ – all documents of whatsoever nature, whether in hard copy or soft copy, connected with the Practices or with any trust of which the First Defendant is or was a trustee 22.6. ‘Former Clients’ – any former clients of the Practices. 22.7. ‘Listed Items’ – as defined in Schedule A. 22.9 ‘Property’ – any property in the possession of or under the control of any of the Defendants or the Practices which the Claimant reasonably requires for the purpose of accessing information contained in the Documents.”
“The facts alleged to constitute the contempt are the following: 1. At all material times, the Defendants have had Listed Items in their possession and/or under their control and it was within the power of the Defendants to comply with paragraph 1 of the Order. 2. The Defendants were validly and effectively served with the Order in accordance with paragraph 17 of the Order and thereby had notice of the Order and the terms of the Order. The deemed date of service of the Order pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Order was3 May 2022 . 3. The Defendants have nevertheless failed to produce or deliver up any Listed Items to the Agent by 4pm on5 May 2022 in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Order or at all. The Defendants have therefore breached paragraph 1 of the Order. 4. The Defendants have also failed to serve upon the Agent, by 4pm on5 May 2022 , a signed witness statement with a statement of truth explaining the steps that they have taken to comply with paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Order and why they have been unable to do so and when they will be able to do so. The Defendants have therefore breached paragraph 5 of the Order. 5. Further or alternatively, in her capacity as a director of the Second Defendant and/or the Third Defendant, the First Defendant has wilfully failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Second Defendant and/or the Third Defendant complied with paragraph 1 and/or paragraph 5 of the Order.”
“There was no dispute as to the law. As appears above (paragraph 61)CPR r 81.4 (2)(h) requires that the committal application includes "a brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute the contempt, set out numerically in chronological order". This reflects a long-standing requirement that the defendant to a committal application should know exactly what it is that he is accused of: see Harmsworth v Harmsworth[1987] 1 WLR 1676 at 1683C per Nicholls LJ, re L (A Child)[2016] EWCA Civ 173 at [73] per Vos LJ and Group Seven Ltd v Allied Investment Corporation Ltd[2013] EWHC 1509 (Ch) at [38] per Hildyard J. In Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc[2022] EWHC 3536 (Comm) at [77] Cockerill J summarised the cases and formulated the test as follows: "Would such a person, having regard to the background against which the committal application notice is launched, be in any doubt as to the substance of the breaches alleged?" This formulation of the test was accepted by both parties.”
"Summary of facts alleged to constitute the contempt (set these out very briefly in chronological order in numbered points)"
“That was the main point made by Mr Counsell and the only one which he developed orally. I do not think this complaint is made out. As Ms Dilnot said, the requirement inCPR r 81.4 (2)(h) to set out "a brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute the contempt" does not require a fully particularised pleading (cf Form N600 which refers to setting out the facts "very briefly "). It is more akin to a count on an indictment. It must leave the defendant in no doubt as to the substance of the breaches alleged, but it does not need to do more than that. Here the substance of the breaches alleged was that Mr Hussain had been responsible for producing or sending (or causing, procuring or permitting someone else to produce or send) the various letters and other documents itemised. In relation to the 9 April letter, for example, what was being said was that Mr Hussain was responsible for that letter. That was the gravamen of the charge, and was what he was supposed to have done. I do not think he was left in any real doubt what he was accused of. There was no doubt the letters had been sent; there was no doubt what they said; what was in issue, and what Mr Hussain was charged with, was whether he was responsible for them.”
“(1) The Society may give notice to the solicitor or his firm requiring the production or delivery to any person appointed by the Society at a time and place to be fixed by the Society— (a) where the powers conferred by this Part of this Schedule are exercisable by virtue of paragraph 1, of all documents in the possession or under the control of the solicitor or his firm in connection with his practice or former practice or with any trust of which the solicitor is or was a trustee; and (b) where they are exercisable by virtue of paragraph 3, of all documents in the possession or under the control of the solicitor or his firm in connection with the trust or other matters of which the Society is satisfied (whether or not they relate also to other matters)…. (5) If on an application by the Society the High Court is satisfied that there is reason to suspect that documents in relation to which the powers conferred by sub-paragraph (1) are exercisable have come into the possession or under the control of some person other than the solicitor or his firm, the court may order that person to produce or deliver the documents to any person appointed by the Society at such time and place as may be specified in the order and authorise him to take possession of them on behalf of the Society.”
“Statute has put The Law Society in a special position in relation to solicitors generally. The society has many important powers which are exercisable in the public interest. In many ways the society is the guardian not only of the profession but also of the public in its relation with solicitors. The powers of intervention conferred by Schedule 1 are plainly powers that are intended to enable the society to nip in the bud, so far as possible, cases of dishonesty by solicitors. The power to act on suspicion is a strong power, and there must often be a real element of risk in its exercise. But the decision of Parliament that the society is to have power to act on suspicion necessarily involves a decision that the society is to take whatever risks are involved in so acting; and those include risks both to the society and to the solicitors concerned.”
“As part of my role as an intervention agent, I would usually assess all live files (whether physical or electronic) belonging to the solicitor or firm subject to the intervention, contact all clients with live matters so that my team and I could arrange for the transfer of the files relating to that firm's or solicitors' practice to another solicitor who could act on their behalf. This is particularly important for litigation matters where there are deadlines and limitation periods which must be met and/or hearings to be attended. Archived files are stored by the SRA until requested by clients. Usually, email, post and fax communi-cations are all redirected to the relevant intervention agent to ensure that correspondence on website of the firm/solicitor will also be taken down to ensure that the public is not misled into thinking that the firm/solicitor is still operating and/or practising. The SRA also uplifts all accounting records so that the money held for clients can be identified and returned to them. Clients are also advised to make a claim to the SRA Compensation Fund if there is money that the firm/solicitor has failed to account to them for or has dishonestly taken.”
“It is, however, the essence of a successful case of circumstantial evidence that the whole is stronger than individual parts. It becomes a net from which there is no escape. That is why a jury is often directed to avoid piecemeal consideration of a circumstantial case: R v. Hillier (2007) 233 ALR 63 (HCA), cited in Archbold 2012 at para 10-3. Or, as Lord Simon of Glaisdale put it in R v. Kilbourne[1973] AC 729 at 758 “Circumstantial evidence…works by cumulatively, in geometrical progression, eliminating other possibilities”
“…the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. That means that the essential ingredients of each element must be so proved. It does not mean that every fact – every piece of evidence – relied upon to prove an element by inference must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Intent, for example, is, save for statutory exceptions, an element of every crime. It is something which, apart from admissions, must be proved by inference. But the jury may quite properly draw the necessary inference having regard to the whole of the evidence, whether or not each individual piece of evidence relied upon is proved beyond reasonable doubt, provided they reach their conclusion upon the criminal standard of proof. Indeed, the probative force of a mass of evidence may be cumulative, making it pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately.”
“These authorities indicate that (1) in this context "notice" is equivalent to "service" and vice versa ; (2) the Court's civil contempt jurisdiction is engaged if the claimant proves to the criminal standard that the order in question was served, and that the defendant performed at least one deliberate act that, as a matter of fact, was non- compliant with the order; (3) there is no further requirement of mens rea, though the respondent's state of knowledge may be important in deciding what if any action to take in respect of the contempt. I agree also with the Judge's description of the appellant's argument below: "it replaces the very clear rules on service with an altogether incoherent additional criterion for the service of the order." But nor am I comfortable with the notion that service in accordance with an order properly made can be set aside if the respondent shows that it would be "unjust in the circumstances" to proceed. This is not how the Court saw the matter in Cuadrilla, nor is it a basis on which good service can generally be set aside. It also seems to me too nebulous a test.”
“I have made a decision that I will not do anything to comply with the order myself or to ensure that the company complies with the order and I do not care whether this failure places the company in breach.”
“9. I accept that I did not file a statement pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Order before now. However, since I appealed the Order, the Claimant was apparently willing to await the outcome of my application for permission to appeal. They did not issue the Contempt Application until4 October 2022 after the making of the Order of Arnold LJ, of21 September 2022 , refusing me permission to appeal. I was therefore awaiting the outcome of my permission to appeal application, albeit I accept that there was no formal stay ordered. Once the Claimant issued the Contempt Application (which was less than two weeks after my application for permission to appeal was refused), I felt I could not serve a statement pursuant to Paragraph 5 until I had taken formal legal advice on the Contempt Application, especially as I then had a right to silence. 10. Moreover, since I believed I had none of the Listed Items, there was nothing, or virtually nothing, for me to say in any statement pursuant to paragraph 5 and I did not believe that I was failing to comply with the Order by not filing what would be no more than a bare “nil return” statement that I had none of the Listed Items in my possession, custody or control. 11. If I was wrong about that then I sincerely apologise to the court, emphasise that no disrespect was thereby intended and also sincerely apologise if that has become the reason for this Application now taking up the court’s valuable time. 12. I particularly apologise further as I have, in fact, found the records mentioned at 8c. above which were at my home address and which I had simply forgotten about and was thus not aware of. Accordingly, I have now exhibited them to this affidavit. 13. Since the Order was made, I have carried out a thorough search at both the offices of the Defendants at 9 Portland Towers, Leicester LE2 2PG, and at Wimbledon Village Business Centre, Thornton House, Thornton Road SW19 4NG, and my home address, 8 Ridgway, Wimbledon, London SW19 4QN in case there might be anything else there that I might have forgotten about or overlooked. I have found nothing else disclosable under the Order. There is no other place that I could search to find any of the Listed Items and, I repeat, I do not now have any of the Listed Items in my possession, custody or control. 14. Accordingly, since I believed that I simply did not have in my possession, custody or control any of the Listed Items, I could not therefore produce or deliver up what I do not have and thus cannot be in breach of the Order (save to the extent that the court feels that I should have filed a “zero return” statement pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Order, in which case I again profoundly apologise and ask the court to take this affidavit as late compliance in respect thereof).”
“As to paragraph 53.2 of C skeleton 2, the email address sohiek@sophiekhan.co.uk was a personal email address and its mailbox only contained emails personal to me. I did not use that email address for work purposes. Accordingly, there were no Listed Items in that mail box and, in any case, after the Miles J Order I searched it just to be sure.”
“15. Just For Public Ltd represented my family at the Jury Inquest in October 2021. 16. The Jury was unable to reach a verdict and a new final inquest hearing is due to be listed in the Summer of 2022. 17. Just For Public Ltd continue to represent my family in the inquest proceedings. 18. I do not give consent to Just For Public Ltd to release my case file to the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority or to any other organisation, as we need the case file to be able to do the work on the inquest proceedings. 19. I would also like to say that documents on my case file are private and confidential and I only want Just For Public Ltd to hold onto these documents.”
“In response to paragraph 56, the remaining former clients of the Second Defendant, now with Just for Public Limited, have either been contacted by Gordons LLP or been informed by the Coroner or the Court Service as to the intervention, and I exhibit the witness statements of Mr [ ] McCarthy, Mrs E[ ] Beynon, Mr [ ] Plumbley and Mr [ ] Smith made in December 2021 originally in support of the set-aside applications.”
“On10 August 2021 , before the intervention, the Second Defendant sold its client portfolio to the Third Defendant, a not for profit organisation. This included the client files of nine clients. Of those clients, three have asked for their papers to be sent to them. The case papers have been supplied to them. (As a consequence, the Defendants dispute what is said at [55] of Ms. Crawford’s statement if it is intended to suggest otherwise). The other clients wish their cases to remain with the Third Defendant. They do not wish their files to be delivered: see the statements of Mr [ ] McCarthy, Mrs E[ ] Beynon, Mr [ ] Smith and Mr [ ] Plumbley dated December 2021 that were filed for the set-aside application hearing. Further, these clients do not wish their files to be delivered to the SRA.”
“4. Firstly, Ms Khan contends (paragraph 36) that she and JFP had ceased acting for all relevant clients no later than the end of April 2022. As to this: 4.1 The Court already has before it evidence of JFP representing one of the clients at a pre-inquest hearing on1 June 2022 , in the form of a ruling from the Coroner criticising Ms Khan’s involvement in the submissions. 4.2 Moreover, the same Coroner gave a ruling on31 October 2022 , following submissions by Mr Khan of JFP, dismissing an application to allow Ms Khan to question witnesses as a Mackenzie Friend. This ruling is exhibited to Mr Owen’s affidavit Each of Ms Khan’s personal Twitter account, the connected ‘taserlawyer’ Twitter account, and JFP’s Twitter account, have posted Tweets in November 2022 commenting on the outcome of the same inquest and describing Ms Khan as the Beynon family’s lawyer.”
“Paragraph 4.1 – JFP was not representing a former client of either mine or of the Second Defendant (“SK & Co”) but a new client, namely Ms V[ ] Beynon and, moreover, in a fresh inquest, the jury having been discharged in the former inquest on25 October 2021 , long before the Miles J Order. V[ ] Beynon became a client in January 2022. The former client of mine or of SK & Co was Mrs E[ ] Beynon and that was for the inquest prior to the discharge of the jury on25 October 2021 and she ceased some time thereafter to be a client. Ruling 1 of the Coroner of1 June 2022 (“Ruling 1”) given at the pre-inquest review hearing (“PIR”) deals with the common law discretion and the issue of permission under rule 19(1) of theCoroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 to address the Coroner and examine witnesses. Since the client was a new client, it has no relevance to the subject matter of this contempt hearing and of delivery-up, or non-delivery, of the documents required by the Miles J Order. Inclusion of Ruling 1 in the evidence has only the purpose, therefore, to influence the court against me by smear and by material that is prejudicial and not probative. Paragraph 4.2 – this refers to the very late evidence of Mr John Owen in his affidavit dated1 December 2022 and to Ruling 2 of the Coroner of31 October 2022 (“Ruling 2”), given at the commencement of the fresh inquest, and, since, as stated above, JFP’s client was a new client, Ms V[ ] Beynon, in a fresh inquest, the same applies as for paragraph 4.1. It is not relevant to the Miles J Order nor, therefore, to this contempt application and is another attempt to smear me by material that is prejudicial and not probative. Paragraph 4.3 – relates to three twitter posts which were made by me but which each quote the words of a media outlet entitled “Wales Online”
“It is believed that Mr Beynon’s daughter is taking the lead in the present phase.”
“The other clients wish their cases to remain with the Third Defendant. They do not wish their files to be delivered”
“In September 2017 a Mr Humpston instructed the Firm in relation to two claims against Kent Police and Ashford Borough Council. In May 2018 he decided he no longer wished to instruct the Firm and asked for his papers to be returned and for a copy of the complaints procedure. The following month he sent a letter of complaint to the Firm, and in September 2018 he made a complaint to the SRA about SK and the Firm. In March 2019 the SRA requested information from SK by3 April 2019 . She replied in May stating that having reviewed Mr Humpston's file she could not see what assistance could be gained from the documents sought. Mr Humpston then complained to the Legal Ombudsman about SK and the Firm. The SRA wrote again in August 2019 pursuing the original request for documents. SK declined the request on the basis that the Ombudsman was already investigating the same issue. In September 2019 the Ombudsman made a misconduct referral to the SRA, reporting that SK had failed to co-operate with the Ombudsman's investigation into the complaint, had requested unreasonable extensions of time, and failed to provide requested documents. In November 2019 the Ombudsman issued a final decision, finding the Firm's service was unreasonable in some of the respects alleged by Mr Humpston. The Firm was ordered to pay£250 in compensation and within 30 days to send all documents to Mr Humpston. The Firm did not comply, and after a number of unsuccessful attempts to obtain the Firm's compliance, on22 January 2020 the Ombudsman made a further misconduct referral to the SRA. This resulted in the SRA issuing a further document production notice to the Firm under section 44B of the 1974 Act requiring the Firm to produce full client files and ledgers for Mr Humpston's matters. SK continued to object to the production notice and to resist compliance. In October 2020 the SRA's solicitors sent a letter before action to SK.”
“1.2 The firm have informed me that they took on two of Mr Humpston's claims; the first against the police which was publicly funded, and the second relating to traffic wardens on a private basis. The firm say that for the first claim, they were waiting for the conclusion of Mr Humpston's criminal matter and for his full file to be released from his former solicitors. For the second claim they were providing a second opinion, as Mr Humpston had previously received negative advice. They say their advice was also negative which Mr Humpston was unhappy with They say Mr Humpston subsequently terminated the retainers with them.” “2.11 I consider the firm are failing to release Mr Humpston's documents to him and this amounts to unreasonable service. Their argument that the reason for this is because a lien is being exercised over its release, is unsubstantiated because they have provided no information to Mr Humpston about the final cost of his matter, other than an estimate at the outset. I appreciate it will be frustrating for Mr Humpston, in not being able to get his documents back. For clarity, I am not questioning the level of fees charged here because I do not know what they are and no invoice has been raised, but rather, whether there has been an agreement relating to the fees which now means until they are settled the documents will not be released. The appropriate remedy here is that Mr Humpston's documents are returned to him without delay. I will address any further remedy that may be warranted at the end in my summary.”
“Complaints Ground 2 (release of file) At Complaints Ground 2, it says this: “The firm rejected the Investigator's finding. There are two key grounds to its position -- (i) it is entitled to exercise a lien because Mr Humpston has not paid its costs and (ii) it is not a genuine request for the documents and Mr Humpston cannot be distressed if they are not returned because he cannot proceed with the claim. I note that the firm has referred to the law on the rights of solicitors to exercise a lien over documents. As a general point, I note that whilst I may have regard to the approach a court would take, I am not bound by this. Ultimately my decision is to be made based on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances." The Legal Ombudsman recognises the law on the rights of solicitors to exercise a lien over documents but does not feel it is bound by "the approach a court would take”
“It would appear that Miss Khan has no intention of complying with the decision of the ombudsman. She said that it cannot “overrule” her equitable lien paperwork. Having reviewed the extensive representations made by Miss Khan about this point, we cannot see any case law that supports her assertion that the ombudsman is not able to direct that a solicitor should return paperwork to its owner. Furthermore, and in any event, this does not properly explain why Mr Humpston has not received the compensation he was awarded.”
“The remainder of my defence file contains only documents that were supplied to me by the SRA in the SDT proceedings.”
“Mr Stewart appears to have forgotten about this letter or did not know about it.”
“SOK/Humpston/051-2 consisted of copy correspondence to Mr Humpston from Tuckers solicitors, his previous solicitors, provided to SK&Co directly by Mr Humpston. In 2018, SK&Co was exercising a lien over these documents due to unpaid fees and I informed HNK of this. In light of the planned sale of the business of SK&Co to JFP on10 August 2021 , I decided to write off the fees due and owing from Mr Humpston in respect of that file and, instead, returned SOK/Humpston/051-2 to the client by post.”
“Our client understands you have not previously seen these documents as they did not form part of the SDT proceedings.”
“Under the circumstances, we can hold onto Mr Humpston’s file”
“As to the remainder of paragraph 6.1, the cases mentioned therein (and referred to in the intervention decision of the Claimant), all long pre-date the Miles J Order. The cases of Mr Corbridge and Mr Naylor concluded in 2015 and papers were retained by the clients and not the Defendants. The cases of both Mr Martin and Mr and Mrs Coulthard concluded in 2017 and papers were retained by the clients and not the Defendants. Thus long before the Miles J Order, the Defendants had ceased to have any of these papers in their possession, custody or control.”
“When I stated “papers retained by the clients” and “long before the Miles J Order”, I was referring to the non-retention of the papers and not referring back to the year 2017 which was merely the year the cases concluded. However, I accept that the last 2 sentences of paragraph 9 may appear somewhat ambiguous and I apologise for any confusion caused thereby.”
“5.41 Since the first production notice was issued to the firm on4 August 2017 , Miss Khan has given varying explanations as to why she is unable to comply, in summary: ● The firm was exercising a lien and would only produce the files if the SRA gave an undertaking not to release paperwork to the clients. ● The Martin file would be produced by31 August 2017 . ● The Coulthard files were being costed and could not be produced. ● The firm would apply for a judicial review of the SRA's refusal to give an undertaking. ●She undertook to produce the files by12 January 2018 . She then rescinded her undertaking as the firm was exercising proprietary rights. ● There was no merit in the reports and no justification for a production notice. ● She did not have permission to release Mr Martin's file and wanted authority from his new solicitors. ● The files were delivered to the SRA on21 May 2019 and the SRA has lost them. 5.42 In her representations dated10 August 2021 , Miss Khan now repeats her earlier argument that the production notice is ill founded and there is no justification for it. This is at odds with her suggestion that she has already complied, and we repeat that had she already produced a copy of the documents it would be very easy for her to do so again. 5.43 Miss Khan's duties are clear. She needed to comply with her regulatory obligations in an open, timely and co-operative manner. She has failed to do so in breach of Principle 7 (2011). She has produced some, limited, documentation. She has only done so after years of prevarication and obfuscation. She has given repeated and conflicting reasons for her non-compliance. An individual complying in an open, timely and co-operative manner would have produced the documents prior to21 May 2019 in any event, but once they had been apparently lost, would readily produce another copy. Miss Khan has not complied promptly, in breach of Outcome 10.8 of the 2011 Code, nor has she provided all the information and explanations failure to provide the documentation, even on her own case, until21 May 2019 , and then her continuing failure to correct the position once the files were supposedly "lost", is a continuing failure to comply with paragraph 7.4 of the Solicitors code, and paragraph 3.3 of the Firm’s code.”
“103. In response to paragraph 5.41, by13 October 2017 , a complete copy of Mr Mark Martin's case file had been provided to the SRA and on15 March 2019 permission was sought from Mr Martin to release the original case file to the SRA, as he had previously instructed the Second Claimant to send his case file to the firm, Harrison Clark Rickerbys. The original case files of Mr [ ] Martin, Mr [ ] Coulthard and Mrs [ ] Coulthard (nee [ ]) were delivered to the SRA on21 May 2019 . 104. In response to paragraph 5.42, I have argued that the Production Notice dated4 August 2017 was issued without lawful justification, and I am within my rights to do so, if I believe the delegated power has been abused. As mentioned above, there has been compliance with the Production Notice. 105. In response to paragraph 5.43, there has been compliance with the Production Notice dated4 August 2017 , and all information and explanations requested by the SRA has been provided. At no point had the SRA communicated to the Second Claimant that the files delivered on21 May 2019 were supposedly "lost" and to send a copy of the copy files. As mentioned above, arrangements can be made with the SRA to provide a copy of the copy files.”
“The damages files in the Corbridge and Naylor cases being no longer required were shredded in July 2021. The only outstanding matter was chiefly about the costs of the costs assessment. The SRA has already had a full copy of all my documents in that costs dispute since they were exhibited to my representations and statements in the Intervention proceedings.”
“I J[ ] Baxter did not receive files from Ms Sophie Khan on the said dates.”
“In her own words, Khan said she refused to hand the documents over as her clients “have cases against the police and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).”
“39. Ms Khan is cognitively alert to understand the court proceedings and can put her views, opinions and wishes in her defence. However, she does not believe that the accusations are morally right. She expressed willingness to accept the outcome, particularly after spending 3 months in prison. She came across as a person, who has over-valued and odd ideas about morality and values 41. There was no expression or evidence of delusional thinking. Ms Khan, in my opinion, presented with a degree of rigidity in her thought process, with poor and limited coping skills to deal with stressful situations. 42. Ms Khan was placing over-emphasis of certain issues, that are normally not considered relevant. She also comes across as an intelligent person with limited social skills. These is generally seen to be present in people who suffer from Autism Spectrum Disorder, who are high functioning. Ms Khan also presents with dysfunctional personality traits.”