“Would you have a few minutes today for me to come and sign the accounts and also sign the share transfer. As per our agreement with Mr Baldudak I will keep 5% of the company shares and 95% will be on (sic) Mr Baldudak’s name. In return the company will not have to pay back his loan.”
“My remaining 5% shares will be transferred to Erdem as per his instruction as the company did not manage to repay the investment loan in agreed time. If I need to sign any documents please let me know.”
“…we need to see you for shares transfer and amending the amount owed to Erdem”
“The essential rationale of the illegality doctrine is that it would be contrary to the public interest to enforce a claim if to do so would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system (or, possibly, certain aspects of public morality, the boundaries of which have never been made entirely clear and which do not arise for consideration in this case). In assessing whether the public interest would be harmed in that way, it is necessary (a) to consider the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim, (b) to consider any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact and (c) to consider whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts.”
“In considering whether it would be disproportionate to refuse relief to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled, as a matter of public policy, various factors may be relevant. Professor Burrows’ list is helpful but I would not attempt to lay down a prescriptive or definitive list because of the infinite possible variety of cases. Potentially relevant factors include the seriousness of the conduct, its centrality to the contract, whether it was intentional and whether there was marked disparity in the parties’ respective culpability …”
“The majority [in Patel v Mirza] considered that it would be only in a rare case that the enforcement of a claim might be regarded as harmful to the integrity of the legal system, and thus declined by the court. We consider that in practice it will, as Lord Toulson suggested, now be only an exceptional case where the court will not entertain a claim at all, such that evidence of an illegal purpose is wholly inadmissible.”
“The decision in the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza that, where a contract is unenforceable because of illegality, restitution should normally be available, at least where the contract has not been fully executed, appears to endorse the outcome in Tribe v Tribe.”
“Now, the rule of this Court, as I understand it, as to agents, is not a technical or arbitrary rule. It is a rule founded upon the highest and truest principles of morality. No man can in this Court, acting as agent, be allowed to put himself in a position in which his interest and his duty will be in conflict. The court will not inquire, and is not in a position to ascertain, whether the bank has lost or not lost by the acts of its directors. All that the court has to do is examine whether a profit has been made by an agent, without the knowledge of his principal, in the course and execution.”
“There is no completely rigid rule that a director may not be involved in the business of a company which is in competition with another company of which he was a director.”
“I should also say something about the burden of proof. Where a person in a fiduciary position receives property of his principal, the burden is on him to account. This principle applies to company directors as it does to trustees. It is, therefore, for GSL to prove that Mr Young received a particular payment from the company; but, where it does so, it is for him to show that the payment was proper.”
“Visa ending in 4814 Mark Matteo Expires 05/22 Used for checkout.”
“A service agreement with a director may be express or implied. The courts seem prepared to say there is a presumption of a contract of employment if the director is required to work full-time for the company in return for a salary (Trussed Steel Concrete Co Ltd v Green[1946] Ch 115 per Cohen J, Folami v Nigerline (UK) Ltd[1978] ICR 277 , EAT), but much depends on the actual evidence in each case.”
“Elias P considered the case law in Clark v Clark Construction Initiatives Ltd[2008] IRLR 364 ,[2008] ICR 635 , EAT and gave the following guidance to tribunals (at para 98) when deciding whether the contract of employment of a majority shareholder should be given effect.” (1) The onus is on the party denying a contract; where an individual has paid an employee's tax and NI, prima facie he is entitled to an employee's rights. (2) The mere fact of majority shareholding (or de facto control) does not in itself prevent a contract arising. (3) Similarly, entrepreneur status does not in itself prevent a contract arising. (4) If the parties conduct themselves according to the contract (eg as to hours and holidays), that is a strong pointer towards employment. (5) Conversely, if their conduct is inconsistent with (or not governed by) the contract, that is a strong pointer against employment. (6) The assertion that there is a genuine contract will be undermined if there is nothing in writing. (7) The taking of loans from the company (or them guaranteeing of its debts) are not intrinsically inconsistent with employment. (8) Although majority shareholding and/or control will always be relevant and may be decisive, that fact alone should not justify a finding of no employment. When the decision of the EAT was appealed to the Court of Appeal ([2008] EWCA Civ 1446 ,[2009] ICR 718 ) it was not on this point which Sedley LJ said was 'unsurprising… in view of the comprehensive overview of the law to be found at paragraphs 61–98 of the judgment given by Elias P in the EAT, which practitioners will find of considerable assistance in this difficult terrain'. This was also the approach of the Court of Appeal when the point arose directly before them shortly afterwards in Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v Neufeld[2009] IRLR 475 ,[2009] ICR 1183 , CA (treated by the government department as a test case to clarify the position). In this appeal in two joined cases it was held that directors with 90% and 100% shareholdings respectively in their companies were employees on the facts. The judgment was given by Rimer LJ who, having set out extensively the above history of this controversy, approved Elias P's guidance in Clark subject to two qualifications to which it must now be read: (1) guideline (1) should not be read as constituting a formal reversal of the burden of proof on to the party denying employment status; it may still be necessary for the putative employee to do more than produce documentation to satisfy the tribunal; (2) guideline (6) may be expressed too negatively — lack of writing may be an important consideration but if the parties' conduct tends to show a true contract of employment 'we would not wish tribunals to seize too readily on the absence of a written agreement to justify a rejection of the claim.”
“A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground- (a) that the company’s affairs are being or have been conduced in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself)…”
“From Lord Hoffmann’s speech one can deduce the following principles: (1) The concept of unfairness, although objective in its focus, is not to be considered in a vacuum. An assessment that conduct is unfair has to be made against the legal background of the corporate structure under consideration. This will usually take the form of the articles of association and any collateral agreements between shareholders which identify their rights and obligations as members of the company. Both are subject to established equitable principles which may moderate the exercise of strict legal rights when insistence on the enforcement of such rights would be unconscionable; (2) It follows that it will not ordinarily be unfair for the affairs of a company to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its articles or any other relevant and legally enforceable agreement, unless it would be inequitable for those agreements to be enforced in the particular circumstances under consideration. Unfairness may, to use Lord Hoffmann’s words, “consist in a breach of the rules or in using rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith”: see p.1099A; the conduct need not therefore be unlawful, but it must be inequitable; (3) Although it is impossible to provide an exhaustive definition of the circumstances in which the application of equitable principles would render it unjust for a party to insist on his strict legal rights, those principles are to be applied according to settled and established equitable rules and not by reference to some indefinite notion of fairness; (4) To be unfair, the conduct complained of need not be such as would have justified the making of a winding-up order on just and equitable grounds as formerly required unders.210 of the Companies Act 1948 ; (5) A useful test is always to ask whether the exercise of the power or rights in question would involve a breach of an agreement or understanding between the parties which it would be unfair to allow a member to ignore. Such agreements do not have to be contractually binding in order to found the equity; (6) It is not enough merely to show that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down. There is no right of unilateral withdrawal for a shareholder when trust and confidence between shareholders no longer exist. It is, however, different if that breakdown in relations then causes the majority to exclude the petitioner from the management of the company or otherwise to cause him prejudice in his capacity as a shareholder. and at paragraph 64, he said : “The use by the majority of the powers and voting rights conferred by the articles cannot be regarded as contrary to good faith where they are invoked to protect the company from conduct which is itself either in breach of a relevant agreement, or otherwise detrimental to the well-being of the company and its assets.”