“[Candey], and its predecessor in title CANDEY LLP, was instructed by [Mr Farrar] to carry out litigation services since the commencement of Proceedings in accordance with a Damages Based Agreement dated23 October 2013 , recently amended to a Conditional Fee Arrangement (CFA), the condition not yet being satisfied. In consideration for entering into this Deed of Assignment (Deed), the CFA is terminated by consent with immediate effect.” (4) Liabilities, in the form of various judgment debts, of Mr Farrar in the amount of£453,870.92 plus interest and costs, which Mr Farrar was unable to pay and in respect of which a bankruptcy petition might be presented. The recitals then state: “(E) [Mr Farrar] does not have sufficient funds with which to continue the Proceedings to their conclusion. [Mr Farrar] has fully investigated alternative funding options and, after doing so, has concluded that it is in his best commercial interest to enter into this Deed. (F) [Mr Farrar] and [Candey] agree that entering into this Deed provides each with the best opportunity to recover any monies from [Mr Miller]. (G) [Mr Farrar] has been advised to take independent legal advice in relation to entering into this Deed. (H) [Mr Farrar] has agreed to assign all of the benefits in the Proceedings (but not any burdens to include any historic adverse costs liability) to [Candey] on the terms set out in this Deed. (I) [Mr Farrar] will receive a distribution from any Recoveries as set out below.”
“2.1 Subject to the terms of this Deed, [Mr Farrar] hereby assigns unconditionally, irrevocably and absolutely to [Candey] all of [Mr Farrar’s] title, interest and benefits in and to the Assigned Claims with effect from the Assignment Date. 2.2 [Candey] agrees that it shall accept the assignment referred to in clause 2.1 and distribute any sums in accordance with the Distribution of Recoveries within 28 days of receipt of the Recoveries.”
“In a litigation climate where legal representatives can both share in the fruits of the claim they advance and underwrite their client’s costs risk of the claim and thereby enable an impecunious client to pursue a just claim, why should the court decline to hear, on grounds of public policy, the claim of an impecunious litigant which has been assigned to an entity in which he has an interest and which assignment creates the opportunity to open an otherwise closed door to reasonable and proportionate protection in costs on the application and for the benefit of the defendant (which, if not complied with will bring about the termination of the litigation at much less potentially irrecoverable expense to the defendant than would have been the case had the claim not been assigned)?”
“...access for customers to justice is therefore enhanced; the courts recognise the need for innovative but responsible ways of increasing access to justice for the impecunious: see the comments of Danckwerts J in Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd[1955] Ch 363 , 386-387...”
“...an agreement between a person providing advocacy services, litigation services or claims management services and the recipient of those services which provides that - (i) the recipient is to make a payment to the person providing the services if the recipient obtains a specified financial benefit in connection with the matter in relation to which the services are provided, and (ii) the amount of that payment is to be determined by reference to the amount of the financial benefit obtained...”
“(a) a conditional fee agreement is an agreement with a person providing advocacy or litigation services which provides for his fees and expenses, or any part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances; and (b) a conditional fee agreement provides for a success fee if it provides for the amount of any fees to which it applies to be increased, in specified circumstances, above the amount which would be payable if it were not payable only in specified circumstances; and (c) references to a success fee, in relation to a conditional fee agreement, are to the amount of the increase.”
“In order to preserve the honour and honesty of the profession it was a rule of law which the court had laid down and would always insist upon that a solicitor could not make an arrangement of any kind with his client during the litigation he was conducting so as to give him any advantage in respect of the result of that litigation.” [18] Buckley and Scarman LJJ agreed with Lord Denning MR as to the principle. Buckley LJ said this[1975] QB 373 , 401-402: “A contingency fee, that is, an arrangement under which the legal advisers of a litigant shall be remunerated only in the event of the litigant succeeding in recovering money or other property in the action, has hitherto always been regarded as illegal under English law on the ground that it involves maintenance of the action by the legal adviser. Moreover, where, as is usual in such a case, the remuneration which the adviser is to receive is to be, or to be measured by, a proportion of the fund or of the value of the property recovered, the arrangement may fall within that particular class of maintenance called champerty...It may, however, be worthwhile to indicate briefly the nature of the public policy question. It can, I think, be summarised in two statements. First, in litigation a professional lawyer’s role is to advise his client with a clear eye and an unbiased judgment. Secondly, a solicitor retained to conduct litigation is not merely the agent and adviser to his client, but also an officer of the court with a duty to the court to ensure that his client’s case, which he must, of course, present and conduct with the utmost care of his client’s interests, is also presented and conducted with scrupulous fairness and integrity. A barrister owes similar obligations. A legal adviser who acquires a personal financial interest in the outcome of the litigation may obviously find himself in a situation in which that interest conflicts with those obligations...””
“[37] However, with the sole exception of the Thai Trading case,[1998] QB 781 , there seems to be no support for the application of such an approach where the allegedly champertous agreement is entered into with a person who is conducting the litigation in question (or providing advocacy services in connection therewith). Such agreements have, as I see it, always been treated as a special category or species of champertous agreements, and are subject to stricter rules. That is clear from what Oliver LJ said in the Trendtex case,[1980] QB 629 , 663, and from what Steyn LJ and Lord Mustill said in Giles v. Thompson,[1993] 3 All ER 321 , 332, and[1994] 1 AC 142 , 163 respectively. It was also the effect of the reasoning of Schiemann and May LJJ in Awwad’s case,[2001] QB 570 , 593 and 600 respectively. [38] Despite Mr James’s submission to the contrary, I believe that this view also accords with that of this court in Factortame (No 8),[2003] QB 381 : see per Lord Phillips MR at [23] and [33] to [35]. Further, Lord Phillips MR’s citation of Buckley LJ’s observations in Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2),[1975] QB 373 , 401-402, and his reference to Awwad’s case, at[2003] QB 381 , [60] and [61] respectively, undermine the notion that he was intending to depart from the principles in those cases. Indeed, one would have expected a very full discussion and analysis of the law if he was intending to differ from a decision of the Court of Appeal less than two years earlier. Further, the only reason that Lord Phillips MR considered whether Grant Thornton had been conducting the litigation was because the approach in Giles v. Thompson[1993] 3 All ER 321 ;[1994] 1 AC 142 would have been inappropriate if they had been doing so. [39] I accept that Thai Trading,[1998] QB 781 gives some real support to the notion that it is now appropriate to consider a fresh approach to the law of champerty, even in relation to arrangements with those who conduct litigation. However, although the trenchant judgment of Millett LJ is powerful and deserves respect, it was clearly per incuriam, and, in relation to the point I am currently considering, as mentioned in [24] above, inconsistent with the subsequent decisions of this court in Awwad,[2001] QB 570 and Factortame (No 8),[2003] QB 381 . [40] In my judgment, when it comes to agreements involving those who conduct litigation or provide advocacy services, the common law of champerty remains substantially as it was described and discussed in Wallersteiner v. Moir (No 2),[1975] QB 373 and Awwad’s case,[2001] QB 570 . This is for two main reasons. The first is to be found in the passages in the judgments of Buckley LJ in the former case at[1975] QB 373 , 401, and of Oliver LJ in the Trendtex case,[1980] QB 629 , 663. The second reason, articulated in Awwad’s case[2001] QB 570 , 593, 600, by Schiemann and May LJJ, is that, in section 58 of the 1990 Act (as amended) the legislature has laid down the rules as to which previously champertous agreements may be entered into by those conducting litigation and those providing advocacy services, and which may not. [41] There is a third reason, at least in my judgment, for this conclusion. As already indicated, there is obvious attraction in the notion that there should be no general rule as to whether an agreement with a person conducting the relevant litigation which involves him benefiting from the success of the litigation, is unlawful, and that each case should be assessed on its merits. However, there is also much to be said for clear rules so that all parties, solicitor and claimant client as well as the defendant, know where they stand rather than waiting for a determination as to the validity of a potentially champertous agreement on the overall merits. There is also much to be said for a properly funded legal profession, which has no need to have recourse to conditional fees or contingency fees or the like. It is a matter for the legislature if such arrangements are thought to be necessary for economic or other reasons, and, if they are so necessary, then it is for the legislature to decide on their ambit.”
“If you lose you will be liable to pay your Opponents’ costs and expenses, a risk you may be able to insure. Any contract for ATE insurance will be between you and the insurer but we will assist you in taking out such insurance if necessary.”
“32 It is also trite that in every case conducted under a contingency agreement (and especially in DBAs) the lawyer has a commercial interest in the continuation and result of the case. It is therefore axiomatic that if the claim is assigned to the lawyer, there is still a genuine commercial interest. This would even be the case whether or not the litigation could continue but for the assignment. 33 By regulation, Parliament has legitimised contingency arrangements and therefore the financial interest of lawyers in the outcome. Unlike medieval times, lawyers are regulated and the historic risks associated with champerty do not arise. The complaint that the Defendant really seems to be making is that Parliament should not have allowed contingency arrangements. That is obviously unsustainable.”
“In the event you recover any damages, monies, other sums and/or derive any benefits (excluding our hourly rate costs and expenses) (“Proceeds”) from claims against Mr David Charles Lawson Miller and/or or related parties (“your Opponents”) whether by court order, agreement, settlement or otherwise, you will pay us 50% of the Proceeds inclusive of VAT if applicable (“the Payment”).” (ii) There are many reasons why Mr Farrar might be unable to fulfil this personal obligation, despite wishing to. As the Assignment notes, Mr Farrar was cash-poor and at risk of bankruptcy. If made bankrupt, Candey would - like all other unsecured creditors - have a claim in the bankrupt estate, and might (on a pari passu distribution) recover only a portion of the fees due and owing. We know that Mr Farrar had substantial debts due to Mr Miller’s companies (and now to Mr Miller) and (even disregarding any question of set-off) there is an obvious risk that any recoveries from the Proceedings would be so eroded that Candey would recover less than its entitlement under the DBA. (iii) That risk is removed by the Assignment. Any recoveries from the Proceedings would be a receivable for Candey, and only after Candey’s claims were satisfied would there be any payment to Mr Farrar or his estate. The effect of the Assignment is thus to render Candey in effect a secured creditor, having first call on any recovery out of the Proceedings. (iv) Candey contended that the lien that a solicitor has meant that the Assignment actually made no such difference when compared to the situation under the DBA. Candey would (so it contended) have a lien over moneys payable to Mr Farrar pursuant to the DBA. That raises the interesting question as to the priority as between (i) two judgment debts (where there may be set off) and (ii) a solicitor’s lien. I was addressed at length on these interesting questions (in supplemental written submissions produced by the parties at my request), but it seems to me that I do not need to resolve these (as yet) hypothetical questions. It is enough for me to note that the Assignment has the arguable potential - to put it no higher than that - of improving Candey’s financial position over that which would pertain if the DBA between Mr Farrar and Candey governed. (iv) Keeping Mr Miller “on the hook”