“The court may order a new party to be substituted for an existing one if - (a) the existing party’s interest or liability has passed to the new party; (b) it is desirable to substitute the new party so that the court can resolve the matters in dispute in the proceedings.”
“ASSIGNMENT 13.1 No party shall assign, transfer, charge, make the subject of a trust or deal in any other manner with this agreement or any of its rights under this agreement or purport to do any of the same without the prior written consent of the other party except that the Buyer may: 13.1.1 assign the benefit of any provision to which it is entitled from time to time, in whole or in part to any company which is for the time being a member of the Buyer’s Group provided that and subject to the condition that if any such company ceases to be such a member of the Buyer’s Group then the Buyer shall procure that upon such cessation the rights under this agreement shall be reassigned or transferred back to the Buyer; or 13.1.2 assign the benefit of any provision to which it is entitled from time to time, grant security over or assign by way of security in whole or in part to any lender who provides financial facilities to the Buyer, provided, in each case, no assignee shall be entitled to greater damages or other compensation than that to which the Buyer would have been entitled had it not assigned the rights under this agreement as aforesaid.” 13.1.1 assign the benefit of any provision to which it is entitled from time to time, in whole or in part to any company which is for the time being a member of the Buyer’s Group provided that and subject to the condition that if any such company ceases to be such a member of the Buyer’s Group then the Buyer shall procure that upon such cessation the rights under this agreement shall be reassigned or transferred back to the Buyer; or 13.1.2 assign the benefit of any provision to which it is entitled from time to time, grant security over or assign by way of security in whole or in part to any lender who provides financial facilities to the Buyer, provided, in each case, no assignee shall be entitled to greater damages or other compensation than that to which the Buyer would have been entitled had it not assigned the rights under this agreement as aforesaid.”
“… the existing authorities establish that an attempted assignment of contractual rights in breach of a contractual prohibition is ineffective to transfer such contractual rights. I regard the law as being satisfactorily settled in that sense. If the law were otherwise, it would defeat the legitimate commercial reason for inserting the contractual prohibition, viz., to ensure that the original parties to the contract are not brought into direct contractual relations with third parties.”
“(1) The contract must be interpreted objectively by asking what a reasonable person, with all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties when they entered into the contract, would have understood the language of the contract to mean. (2) The court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of its drafting, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to its objective meaning. (3) Interpretation is a unitary exercise which involves an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its implications and consequences are investigated.”
“87. In these circumstances, my conclusions under this issue are as follows. The fact that a prohibition on assignment between A and B cannot allow a third party, C, as A’s purported assignee, to bring a direct contractual claim against B is not in dispute. It was held in Linden Gardens to be the consequence of the contractual prohibition … 88. The ineffectiveness of the assignment in breach of a prohibition on assignment is understandable. It is not merely a matter of contract but of property. Although the would-be assignor has legal title to property in the form of a chose in action, he lacks the power, because of the terms on which the property is held, to transfer that property so as to entitle the transferee to exercise those contractual rights himself against the other party to the contract. However, he does not lack the power to render himself a trustee in equity of the property concerned. He would only do that if the prohibition on assignment extended as far as prohibiting a declaration of trust.”
“The first rule is that a bare cause of action (i.e. not one ancillary to a property right or interest) can only be assigned where the assignee has a genuine commercial interest in enforcing the claim. At one time, it was thought that a bare cause of action could never be assigned because that amounted to trafficking in litigation, but that is no longer the law. In Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse[1982] AC 679 , the House of Lords held that, as Lord Roskill put it at 703: “… in English law an assignee who can show that he has a genuine commercial interest in the enforcement of the claim of another and to that extent takes an assignment is entitled to enforce that assignment unless by the terms of that assignment he falls foul of our law of champerty … if the assignee had a genuine commercial interest in taking the assignment and enforcing it for his own benefit, I see no reason why the assignment should be struck down as an assignment of a bare cause of action or as savouring of maintenance.” “… in English law an assignee who can show that he has a genuine commercial interest in the enforcement of the claim of another and to that extent takes an assignment is entitled to enforce that assignment unless by the terms of that assignment he falls foul of our law of champerty … if the assignee had a genuine commercial interest in taking the assignment and enforcing it for his own benefit, I see no reason why the assignment should be struck down as an assignment of a bare cause of action or as savouring of maintenance.”
“The second of these could not possibly give the appellant a genuine commercial interest in enforcing the rights of action. It can therefore be ignored. Superficially, the first ground might have something to it. A creditor of a company does have a genuine commercial interest in enforcing a right of action belonging to the company. But it is not as simple as that. He does not stand alone. His interest is only as one amongst all the creditors. If the appellant had taken the assignments of the causes of action as trustee for Kingstat, ie for the benefit of the creditors and the contributories as a whole, it would no doubt have been valid; cf Guy v Churchill(1889) 40 Ch D 481 . But he did not take it as a trustee. He took it for his own exclusive benefit and in that capacity he did not have a genuine commercial interest in enforcing the assignment. On this short ground it can be held that the assignments amounted to or savoured of maintenance and were therefore void. But I do not suggest that that is the only ground on which they can be so held. Thus at page 26H the judge said: “If these claims were in truth open to Kingstat, as a director at the date of the assignment and indeed one of the signatories of the assignment his duty must have been to have the claims pursued either by or at the very least for the benefit of the company and not to purchase them as he did for his own benefit for the sum of£1 . In my judgment, the plaintiff has not even begun to show that he had such a commercial interest as can properly be accepted as being appropriate to justify an assignment of these alleged claims.”
“This was not wanton and officious intermeddling in another person’s litigation for no good reason. It was simply the original owners retaining part of what they owned while disposing of the rest. There is nothing contrary to public policy in allowing Aerostar to pursue the claim against these defendants and no good reason why these defendants should be permitted to escape any liability that they may have. This is not, of course, to say that a shareholder will always have a genuine and substantial commercial interest in taking an assignment of the company's claims. To take an extreme example, for a minority shareholder to buy a substantial claim for a nominal sum in the hope of making a substantial profit may well be contrary to public policy. But that is not this case. Aerostar owned all the shares in CAASL and taken as a whole the transaction was a perfectly sensible business arrangement.”
“The buying and selling of choses in action is, of course, commonplace. Debts are regularly traded at a discount so that the creditor can obtain some of what he is entitled to while passing on the risks of litigation to others. Businesses are regularly sold with the benefit of their claims as well as their liabilities. Had CAASL sold all its business, including this claim, to Executive, no-one could have objected. What raised eyebrows was the sale of the business to Executive while Aerostar retained the claim. Eyebrows were raised even higher when it emerged that Aerostar had paid only$10 for the claim. This began to look like a very substantial profit, or “trafficking” in litigation.”