“The case in fraud against the third defendant was overwhelming.”
“WHEREAS: A. The Assignor is party to a contract, appointing the Currency Club Partnership (“the CCP”) as Trustees/Managers and Custodians to act as Agents and Fiduciary Trustees for the Assignor and for the provision of foreign exchange investment fund fiduciary, management and custodial services (“the IFFMC Contract”), commencing in or around 2013 to 2016; B. The Assignor (s) has agreed to assign the IFFMC Contract and the benefit of all contractual rights entitlement to repayment to which the Assignor is entitled, including any rights for recovery of losses, to the Assignee in accordance with the terms of this Deed.”
“this is now the end of any group claimant road from my desk unless miracles turn up…”
“…The common law fears that the champertous maintainer might be tempted for his own personal gain, to enflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses…”
“It is directed against wanton and officious intermeddling with the disputes of others in which the [maintainer]has no interest whatever, and where the assistance he renders to the one or the other party is without justification or excuse.”
“…support of legal proceedings based on a bone fide community of pecuniary interest or religion or principles or problems”
“…So, for example, an assignment of a bare right of action to a trade union, trade association, interest group, charity or another family member, or an assignment to a special purpose vehicle set up by the assignors to pursue claims against another party, might, depending on the circumstances, be upheld. What is sufficient interest may vary as perceptions of the public interest change.”
“involves what might today be referred to as cases involving “access to justice” considerations”
“459. …That there has been a considerable relaxation of the approach to questions of assignment and champerty is beyond doubt. That is reflected in the authorities which do not encourage a narrowly focussed view of the commercial aspects but are clear that it is necessary to look at the transaction as a whole. See for example Massai at [19] Giles v Thompson at 164B and Brownton [Brownton Ltd v. Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd[1985] 3 All ER 499 ] at 509(iv). 460. It appears that the court should not be looking to find the absence of commercial interest, but be more focussed on ensuring that transactions which are genuinely contrary to public policy are weeded out: Massai at [19] and Brownton at 510. 461. What is being sought to be excluded is what is sometimes called "wanton and officious intermeddling"…. 463. It seems to me that the approach adopted by the Defendants does not really grapple with this essential aspect, but is instead geared to the kind of narrow focus on commercial interest which is disapproved in the authorities.”
“…undermine the purity of justice, or would corrupt public justice..” (Sibthorpe at paragraphs 35 and 36) or which tended to undermine the need “to protect the purity of justice and the interests of vulnerable litigants”
“133 Mr Hamilton pleaded a trust claim which, again, was never very clearly elucidated. However, in closing he indicated that he was no longer pursuing this claim, accordingly I need say no more about it”; and the conspiracy claim in relation to which the first judgment reads: “131…I would not conclusively rule out such an agreement, since there was certainly evidence which was to my mind consistent with it, for instance the email to which I have already referred. But I find myself unable to conclude that the evidence as a whole has established a conspiracy to mislead investors in general, or Mr Hamilton particularly, to the necessary standard.”
“(1) Is it reasonably arguable that the opposed amendments are outside the applicable limitation period? If so, proceed to the next question; if not, then r.17.4 does not apply and the amendment may be allowed under r.17.1(2). (2) Do the proposed amendments seek to add or substitute a new cause of action? If so, proceed to the next question; if not r.17.4 does not apply and the amendment may be allowed under r.17.1(2). (3) Does the new cause of action arise out of the same or substantially the same facts as are already in issue in the existing claim? If so, then proceed to the last question; if not then the court has no power to grant permission for the proposed amendment, save by way of the “Mastercard” approach discussed in Advanced Control Systems Inc v Efacec Engenharia e Sistemas S.A.[2021] EWHC 914 (TCC) . (4) Should the court exercise its discretion to allow the amendment?”
“…In addition, disclosure by HSBC Bank in late 2023, after the trial of KB-2020-003693 revealed evidence that D 1 / 2 had also received “commission” payments of at least£ 197 , 174 direct from D12, from CC funds held under the sole control of D 12, for the purported purpose of trading. The aggregate receipts of “commissions” and/or “profits” removed by D 1 / 2 in their role of CC trustees/administrators/fiduciaries was in excess of£ 1 , 657, 191. D1/2 have wilfully, alongside D3-11, in utmost bad faith and by deliberate dishonest and unlawful concealment sought to evade restoring those funds to the assignors”
“An aggregate transfer of not less than£ 1,460,017 was removed from funds deposited by the Assignors, which had been designated by the Assignors for the purpose of trading in a currency fund, but had, instead, in breach of authority and in breach of contract, been transferred to D1 and D2 on account of unlawful “commissions””
“(l) Other deposits from the Assignors…were transferred to D 12’s several bank accounts at Standard Chartered, HSBC, CIMB and at UOB, for the purported purpose of FX trading, purportedly to be conducted by DA. However, rather than being so deployed, the evidence of the HSBC accounts of DA disclosed by HSBC Malaysia, in 2023 and 2024, provide incontrovertible evidence that DA carried out no FX trading whatsoever and stole most of the funds himself, or pursuant to directions from D1 and D2, made payments to D 1 and 2, as follows: (m) from one of DA’s two Kuala Lumpur HSBC bank accounts…between the period of1st May 2015 and2 February 2016 , DA made at least 3 payments to D 1 / 2, identified as payments for “business services” or “grant and gifts”, totalling$ 79,915 ,$ 80,477 and$ 90 , 019: total$ 250,411 ; i.e GBP£ 197 , 174. In the King’s Bench litigation (QB-2020-003693) evidence of these three very substantial receipts had been withheld… (n) therefore, an aggregate sum in excess of£ 1,460,017 plus£ 197 , 174, being£ 1,657,191 had been unlawfully transferred to D 1 / 2 from funds originally directed by the Assignors for the specific purpose of FX trading…D 1 / 2 were not entitled to these receipts of£ 1 , 657, 191…but improperly withdrawn and transferred by D 1 / 2 to D 1 / 2 on account of “commissions” or “profits”…”
“D1-11 fraudulently concealed from the assignors that their deposits would be used, inter alia… to paying commissions to D 1-11”
“31. Both D 1-11 and D12 are jointly and severally liable to the Assignors for the amounts of the secret commissions which are owed as money had and received to the use of the respective Assignor. The amount of secret “commissions” removed by D 1-11 was as follows: (a) D 1 / 2 – per paragraph 13 (n) -£ 1 , 657, 191; (b) D 3/4 -unknown at this stage but not less than£ 800,000 ; (c) D 5/6 – at least$ 830,000 , according to D 5 at Trial of KB-2020-003693; (d) D 7 – unknown at this stage, but not less than£ 800,000 ; (e) D 8/9 – unknown at this stage; (f) D 10/11 – unknown at this stage.”