“As for the temporal delimitation of the class by reference to14 March 2009 and1 February 2018 , this is applied on account of (i) the alleged transfer to [the First Defendant] of the business of its predecessor firm on the former date, and (ii) changes in [the First Defendant’s] terms and conditions that were made on or after1 February 2018 .”
“The Claimant makes no admissions as to the relevance of the alleged transfer or of those changes and reserves the right to bring claims in respect of payments made on or before14 March 2009 , or on or after1 February 2018 . In the meantime, and pending disclosure, the Claimant infers that the commission arrangement which is the subject of the present proceedings existed before31 January 2006 and/or14 March 2009 on the same or substantially the same terms as the arrangement described below.”
“For the avoidance of doubt, the relevant class of affected clients comprises all current and former clients of [the First Defendant]: (i) that had a direct contractual relationship with [the First Defendant]; (ii) that were subject to [the First Defendant’s] standard terms of business (“ToBs”) from time to time; and (iii) in respect of the renewal of whose IP rights CPA made payments to [the First Defendant] and/or [the Second Defendant] after14 March 2009 and prior to1 February 2018 . For the avoidance of doubt, the class includes current or former clients in respect of which such payments were made before14 March 2009 and/or after1 February 2018 (although by these Amended Particulars of Claim the Claimant only claims in respect of payments made between that those dates). The Claimant reserves the right to expand the relevant class pending disclosure and/or further particulars.”
“Pursuant to Clause 2.2, [the First Defendant] undertook to practice competently, conscientiously, and objectively, to put the client’s interests foremost and to avoid conflicts of interest. Pursuant to Clause 4.1, [the First Defendant] notified its clients that it might be necessary to instruct third parties to act on their behalf (and if so then [the First Defendant] would do so), and at Clause 4.2 stated that it endeavoured to select third parties whose performance and expertise [the First Defendant] regarded as being of good quality. Pursuant to Clause 4.3, [the First Defendant] stated that its ‘Services’ did not extend to issuing reminders for and processing the renewals of any of the clients’ IP rights, absent contrary agreement. However, its “standard practice is to pass details of all cases we handle requiring such renewal agents” and the [Terms of Business] granted [the First Defendant] an authority by which the client agreed in each case to authorise [the First Defendant] to instruct [CPA] to remind the registered proprietors concerned or their appointed representatives of due dates for payment of renewal fees.”
“47. The present cases do not involve relationships, such as trustee and beneficiary or director and company, which without more clearly qualify as fiduciary. They fall within a broad and common set of relationships which involve a contractual or other legal duty to provide information or advice or recommendations. The precise scope of the duties of the brokers in the present cases, as in all cases, will require examination by reference to the terms of their engagement. 48. To ask in cases of this kind whether there is a fiduciary relationship as a pre-condition for civil liability in respect of bribery or secret commissions is, in my judgment, an unnecessarily elaborate, and perhaps inaccurate, question. The question, I consider, is the altogether simpler one of whether the payee was under a duty to provide information, advice or recommendation on an impartial or disinterested basis. If the payee was under such a duty, the payment of bribes or secret commissions exposes the payer and the payee to the applicable civil remedies. No further enquiry as to the legal nature of their relationship is required. 49. This is not to say that, in the many cases in which a fiduciary relationship clearly exists, the remedies available cannot be analysed in terms of the consequences of a breach of fiduciary duty. If a fiduciary relationship exists, it is a breach of that duty for the fiduciary to accept a secret commission or the offer of a secret commission, and in such a case the payer or offeror will be procuring or assisting a breach of fiduciary duty. Both will be liable to a range of remedies: accounts of profits, compensation for loss and rescission of transactions. 50. While that applies in those cases where there is a fiduciary relationship, that is not the essential pre-condition, which in my judgment is the much simpler question posed above. Essentially, I consider that Mr Lord's second, alternative submission is correct. While it may sometimes be appropriate to describe a duty to give disinterested advice or information as "fiduciary", it is not necessary to do so. It is the content of the duty, not the label attached to it, that matters. This, as it appears to me, is in accordance with the authorities as well as with principle. 51. I should add that in most of the cases the law on bribery and secret commissions is referred to as applying to payments to "agents", whether or not they are said to owe fiduciary duties. As will appear, I doubt whether the law on bribery is restricted to an "agent" properly so called, by which I mean a person authorised or ostensibly authorised to act on behalf of another. It is enough, in my view, that the person who is offered or paid a secret commission is, as Christopher Clarke J put it in Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk[2012] EWHC 3586 (Comm) at [108], "someone with a role in the decision-making process in relation to the transaction in question e.g. as agent, or otherwise someone who is in a position to influence or affect the decision taken by the principal.” … 92. I conclude from … authorities [cited in the judgment] that the suggested requirement for a fiduciary relationship is no more than saying that, in the type of case with which we are concerned, the payee of the bribe or secret commission must owe a duty to provide disinterested advice or recommendations or information. As I said earlier, it is the duty to be honest and impartial that matters. …”
“102. My conclusion from this over-lengthy citation of authority is that, in cases such as the present where an "agent" providing advice, information or recommendations has received or been offered a bribe or secret commission, the question that the court should ask and focus on is: did the "agent" owe a duty to be impartial and to give disinterested advice, information or recommendations? If the answer is "yes", the remedies discussed above are available. Courts have, principally in recent cases, characterised this as a fiduciary duty of loyalty. While this may be accurate, it does not mean that in such cases courts need involve themselves in complex analyses of the nature of a fiduciary relationship or the duties which may be associated with a fiduciary relationship. It would be better to avoid doing so. It is enough just to ask the straightforward question stated above.”
“BACKGROUND (A) [Bambach Europe] retained [the First Defendant] to undertake professional services work for it, including the registration of certain IP rights. (B) [Bambach Europe] contracted with [CPA, among others] to undertake renewal work in relation to those IP rights. (C) [Bambach Europe] contracted with [CPA, among others] based upon the recommendation, or pursuant to the standard terms and conditions and/or standard working practice, of [the First Defendant] (the "Referral"). (D) Investigations undertaken by [the Claimant] have revealed that, as a consequence of the Referral, payments were or may have been made by [CPA, among others] to [the First Defendant], alternatively to persons or entities associated with it, without [Bambach Europe’s] knowledge or consent …. These commissions whose amounts, continuing nature and collection through hidden charges invoiced by [CPA, among others] were not made plain to [Bambach Europe] by [the First Defendant] or [CPA] (the "Undisclosed Commission"). (E) [Bambach Europe] believes that: (a) it has unprosecuted legal claims in respect the Undisclosed Commission; (b) it would not be financially or commercially viable for [Bambach Europe] to pursue those legal claims alone; and (c) other parties are in the same position as [Bambach Europe]. (F) [Bambach Europe] understands that [the Claimant] is investigating the legal viability of similar claims with a view to [the Claimant] also receiving them by way of assignment and prosecuting them in its own name for the benefit of other assignees. (G) [Bambach Europe] has therefore agreed to assign to [the Claimant] any and all legal claims and property rights it may have in, and in connection with, the Undisclosed Commission on the terms of this Agreement with effect from its date (the "Effective Date").”
“Claims means each and every claim or right arising out of or in any way connected to the Undisclosed Commission that [Bambach Europe], either directly or indirectly, may have or seek to assert against [the First Defendant], CPA, and/or any other person, including any and all statutory, legal or equitable cause or causes of action whether in England and Wales or any other jurisdiction that are, or may be, vested in [Bambach Europe], including but not limited to any claims that [Bambach Europe] has or may have against CPA in relation to charges levied by CPA to [Bambach Europe].”
“With effect from the Effective Date, [Bambach Europe] unconditionally, irrevocably and absolutely assigns all of its rights, title, interest, and benefit in and to the Claims, and all interest due thereunder and to become due thereon, and costs which may be or become payable to [the Claimant] in respect of the recovery thereof and the right to commence, prosecute and settle proceedings in respect of the Claims in the name and sole discretion of [the Claimant].”
“4.1 [Bambach Europe] shall take such action and provide such information or documentation as [the Claimant] may reasonably request to pursue or settle the Claims or to dispute, compromise or defend any claim, action or proceedings brought against [the Claimant] under or in connection with the Claims.”
“4.3 [Bambach Europe] agrees and undertakes to [the Claimant] that any and all monies it shall receive directly from [the First Defendant] in respect of the Undisclosed Commission on or after the Effective Date shall be: (a) disclosed to [the Claimant] promptly and in any event no later than 14 days after receipt; (b) received solely for, and held on trust on behalf of, [the Claimant]; and (c) transferred to [the Claimant] promptly upon its request, following which it shall be distributed in accordance with the terms of clause 5.2 below.” “Proceeds means the money payable to [Bambach Europe] in accordance with clause 5.2 below following any settlement or determination of any Claims.” … “Distribution of the Proceeds 5.1 Subject to clause 5.2 below [Bambach Europe] acknowledges that it shall have no claim (proprietary, beneficial or otherwise) on any sums received by or payable to [the Claimant] as a consequence of the assignment or any other circumstances arising from [the Claimant’s] exercise of the rights, title, interest and benefit in and to the Claims assigned by this Agreement. Any monies or other benefit recovered by [the Claimant] in respect of the Claims shall vest in [the Claimant] absolutely. 5.2 In the event of a settlement or determination of any Claims which results in [the Claimant] receiving monies from [the First Defendant], CPA and/or any third party, [the Claimant] will pay the Proceeds to [Bambach Europe], which shall be calculated as follows: (a) The total amount received from [the First Defendant], CPA and/or any third party shall be known as the "Gross Recovered Amount". (b) [The Claimant] shall deduct from the Gross Recovered Amount: (i) all legal and other expenses incurred by [the Claimant] in the investigation, prosecution and/or settlement of the Claims; (ii) any other third party liability incurred by [the Claimant] in the investigation, prosecution and/or settlement of the Claims (including but not limited to any amounts payable to third parties who have financed the costs incurred in investigating and/or prosecuting the Claims); and (iii) an amount equal to 15% of the Gross Recovered Amount, which [the Claimant] shall retain as remuneration for investigating, prosecuting and (as the case may be) settling the Claims, producing the "Net Recovered Amount". (c) The Net Recovered Amount shall be distributed to [Bambach Europe] proportionate to [Bambach Europe’s]'s assigned Claims as against the value of other Claims assigned to [the Claimant] by other parties. 5.3 At any time, instead of participating in a distribution as envisaged by this clause 5, [Bambach Europe] can demand payment from [the Claimant] of£1 .”
“[the Particulars of Claim] do not purport to plead facts and matters that would constitute a cause of action on the part of each member of the purported class.”
“the Claimant may not act as representative pursuant toCPR 19.6 (1) because: (a) the "same interest" requirement inCPR 19.6 (1) is not satisfied for the reasons set out in paragraphs 33-35 of the Defence and Counterclaim; (b) alternatively, the Court should refuse to exercise its discretion to permit the Claimant to act as representative for the reasons set out in paragraph 36 of the Defence and Counterclaim.”
“68. I agree with the highest courts of Australia, Canada and New Zealand that, while a detailed legislative framework would be preferable, its absence (outside the field of competition law) in this country is no reason to decline to apply, or to interpret restrictively, the representative rule which has long existed (and has had a legislative basis since 1873). I also agree with the view expressed in Carnie that the very simplicity of the representative rule is in some respects a strength, allowing it to be treated as “a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice” and “applied to the exigencies of modern life as occasion requires”. … 71. The phrase “the same interest”, as it is used in the representative rule, needs to be interpreted purposively in light of the overriding objective of the civil procedure rules and the rationale for the representative procedure. The premise for a representative action is that claims are capable of being brought by (or against) a number of people which raise a common issue (or issues): hence the potential and motivation for a judgment which binds them all.”
“69. … Only one condition must be satisfied before a representative claim may be begun or allowed to continue: that is, that the representative has “the same interest” in the claim as the person(s) represented. … 71. … The purpose of requiring the representative to have “the same interest” in the claim as the persons represented is to ensure that the representative can be relied on to conduct the litigation in a way which will effectively promote and protect the interests of all the members of the represented class. That plainly is not possible where there is a conflict of interest between class members, in that an argument which would advance the cause of some would prejudice the position of others. Markt and Emerald Supplies are both examples of cases where it was found that the proposed representative action, as formulated, could not be maintained for this reason. 72. … So long as advancing the case of class members affected by the issue would not prejudice the position of others, there is no reason in principle why all should not be represented by the same person: see Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice, 4th ed (2021), para 13.49. As Professor Zuckerman also points out, concerns which may once have existed about whether the representative party could be relied on to pursue vigorously lines of argument not directly applicable to their individual case are misplaced in the modern context, where the reality is that proceedings brought to seek collective redress are not normally conducted and controlled by the nominated representative, but rather are typically driven and funded by lawyers or commercial litigation funders with the representative party merely acting as a figurehead. In these circumstances, there is no reason why a representative party cannot properly represent the interests of all members of the class, provided there is no true conflict of interest between them.”
“75. Where the same interest requirement is satisfied, the court has a discretion whether to allow a claim to proceed as a representative action. As with any power given to it by the Civil Procedure Rules, the court must in exercising its discretion seek to give effect to the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost: seeCPR rule 1.2 (a). Many of the considerations specifically included in that objective (seeCPR rule 1.1 (2)) - such as ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing, saving expense, dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the amount of money involved, ensuring that the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly, and allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases - are likely to militate in favour of allowing a claim, where practicable, to be continued as a representative action rather than leaving members of the class to pursue claims individually. … 77. … It is, however, always open to the judge managing the case to impose a requirement to notify members of the class of the proceedings and establish a simple procedure for opting out of representation, if this is considered desirable. Equally, if there are circumstances which make it appropriate to limit the represented class to persons who have positively opted into the litigation, it is open to the judge to make this a condition of representation. The procedure is entirely flexible in these respects. 78. … while it is plainly desirable that the class of persons represented should be clearly defined, the adequacy of the definition is a matter which goes to the court’s discretion in deciding whether it is just and convenient to allow the claim to be continued on a representative basis rather than being a precondition for the application of the rule. Emerald Supplies illustrates a general principle that membership of the class should not depend on the outcome of the litigation. Beyond that, whether or to what extent any practical difficulties in identifying the members of the class are material must depend on the nature and object of the proceedings. … 80. … it is not a bar to a representative claim that each represented person has in law a separate cause of action nor that the relief claimed consists of or includes damages or some other monetary relief. The potential for claiming damages in a representative action is, however, limited by the nature of the remedy of damages at common law. What limits the scope for claiming damages in representative proceedings is the compensatory principle on which damages for a civil wrong are awarded with the object of putting the claimant - as an individual - in the same position, as best money can do it, as if the wrong had not occurred. In the ordinary course, this necessitates an individualised assessment which raises no common issue and cannot fairly or effectively be carried out without the participation in the proceedings of the individuals concerned. A representative action is therefore not a suitable vehicle for such an exercise. 81. In cases where damages would require individual assessment, there may nevertheless be advantages in terms of justice and efficiency in adopting a bifurcated process - as was done, for example, in the Prudential case - whereby common issues of law or fact are decided through a representative claim, leaving any issues which require individual determination - whether they relate to liability or the amount of damages - to be dealt with at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. In Prudential[1981] Ch 229 , 255, Vinelott J expressed the view (obiter) that time would continue to run for the purpose of limitation until individual claims for damages were brought by the persons represented; see also the dicta of Fletcher Moulton LJ in Markt[1910] 2 KB 1021 , 1042, referred to at para 44 above. The court in Prudential did not have cited to it, however, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Moon v Atherton[1972] 2 QB 435 . In that case a represented person applied to be substituted for the named claimant after the limitation period had expired when the claimant (and all the other represented persons) no longer wished to continue the action. The Court of Appeal, in allowing the substitution, held that the defendant was not thereby deprived of a limitation defence, as for the purpose of limitation the represented person was already a party to the action, albeit not a “full” party. It might be clearer to say that, although the represented person did not become a “party” until substituted as the claimant, an action was brought within the meaning of the statute of limitation by that person when the representative claim was initiated. Such an analysis has been adopted in Australia, including by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd[2005] NSWCA 83; (2005) 63 NSWLR 203, and by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Credit Suisse Private Equity v Houghton[2014] NZSC 37. 82. There is no reason why damages or other monetary remedies cannot be claimed in a representative action if the entitlement can be calculated on a basis that is common to all the members of the class. Counsel for the claimant, Hugh Tomlinson QC, gave the example of a claim alleging that every member of the class was wrongly charged a fixed fee; another example might be a claim alleging that all the class members acquired the same product with the same defect which reduced its value by the same amount. In such cases the defendant’s monetary liability could be determined as a common issue and no individualised assessment would be needed. The same is true where loss suffered by the class as a whole can be calculated without reference to the losses suffered by individual class members - as in the cases mentioned at para 53 above. Such an assessment of loss on a global basis is sometimes described as a “top down” approach, in contrast to a “bottom up” approach of assessing a sum which each member of the class is individually entitled to recover. 83. The recovery of money in a representative action on either basis may give rise to problems of distribution to the members of the class, about which the representative rule is silent. Although in Independiente Morritt V-C was untroubled by such problems, questions of considerable difficulty would arise if in the present case the claimant was awarded damages in a representative capacity with regard to how such damages should be distributed, including whether there would be any legal basis for paying part of the damages to the litigation funders without the consent of each individual entitled to them: see Mulheron R, “Creating and Distributing Common Funds under the English Representative Rule” (2021) King’s Law Journal 1-33. Google has not relied on such difficulties as a reason for disallowing a representative action, however, and as these matters were only touched on in argument, I will say no more about them.”
“The mass production of goods and mass provision of services have had the result that, when legally culpable conduct occurs, a very large group of people, sometime numbering in the millions may be affected. As [Lloyd v Google] illustrates, the development of digital technologies has added to the potential for mass harm for which legal redress may be sought.”