"It was common ground that the standard of proof is that which applies in criminal proceedings and therefore the applicant, on whom the burden of proof lies, must make the court sure of the facts which are alleged to constitute the contempt. This much was common ground, but the principle goes further than that. When the court is concerned with the circumstances in which a contempt has been committed and thus with the gravity of the defendant's conduct, it must be satisfied to the point of being sure of any matters which it would regard as adverse to the defendant or which would tend to lead to it to view his action in a more serious light and so affect its view of the appropriate penalty: see Z Bank v D1[1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep 656 ,667."
"Mr Bhalla accepts that this was indeed the test that the Judge should have applied, but he has submitted that, when the evidence is considered, the Judge cannot have applied that test but was satisfied with a lesser standard of proof. Mr Bhalla has sought, by analysis of the individual heads of contempt found by the Judge, to show that the standard of proof, the criminal standard, that had to be applied was not satisfied. As to that exercise, I would make this observation. It is not right to consider individual heads of contempt in isolation. They are details on a broad canvas. An important question when that canvas is considered is whether it portrays the picture of a Defendant seeking to comply with the orders of the Court or a Defendant bent on flouting them. It is right that the individual details of the canvas should be informed by the overall picture. But, having said that, each head of contempt that has been held proved must be established beyond reasonable doubt."
"Miss Andrews has submitted that the judge was wrong in his approach and that he should have approached the matter on the basis that the burden of proving that the defendant's assets had been reduced below£242,500 lay on the Plaintiff and that notwithstanding any difficulties arising about that matter, nevertheless, the notice of motion must be deemed to be defective. She said the judge was wrong in not approaching the matter on that basis. She also submits that the judge was wrong in relying upon R v Edwards and in saying that the evidential burden of proving compliance with the proviso rested on the defendant. I disagree with these submissions. From a practical point of view, the whole would be inoperable if that were to be the correct approach in this case. In this case, there was overwhelming evidence of very substantial dealings indeed, by this defendant at a time when there were outstanding claims against him by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Furthermore there was subsequently an unsatisfied judgment. In these circumstances, I have no doubt that the learned judge was correct in his approach. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal in relation to the finding of the contempt."
"In our judgment this line of authority establishes that over the centuries the common law, as a result of experience and the need to ensure that justice is done both to the community and to defendants, has evolved an exception to the fundamental rule of our criminal law that the prosecution must prove every element of the offence charged. This exception, like so much else in the common law, was hammered out on the anvil of pleading. It is limited to offences arising under enactments which prohibit the doing of an act save in specified circumstances or by persons of specified classes or with specified qualifications or with the licence or permission of specified authorities. Whenever the prosecution seeks to rely on this exception, the court must construe the enactment under which the charge is laid. If the true construction is that the enactment prohibits the doing of acts, subject to provisoes, exemptions and the like, then the prosecution can rely upon the exception. In our judgment its application does not depend upon either the fact, or the presumption, that the defendant has peculiar knowledge enabling him to prove the positive of any negative averment. As Wigmore pointed out in his great Treatise on Evidence (1905), vol. 4, p. 3525, this concept of peculiar knowledge furnishes no working rule. If it did, defendants would have to prove lack of intent. What does provide a working rule is what the common law evolved from a rule of pleading. We have striven to identify it in this judgment. Like nearly all rules it could be applied oppressively; but the courts have ample powers to curb and discourage oppressive prosecutors and do not hesitate to use them. Two consequences follow from the view we have taken as to the evolution and nature of this exception. First, as it comes into operation upon an enactment being construed in a particular way, there is no need for the prosecution to prove a prima facie case of lack of excuse, qualification or the like; and secondly, what shifts is the onus: it is for the defendant to prove that he was entitled to do the prohibited act. What rests on him is the legal or, as it is sometimes called, the persuasive burden of proof. It is not the evidential burden."
"In my judgment, if a person or a corporation is restrained by injunction from doing a particular act, that person or corporation commits a breach of the injunction, and is liable for process for contempt, if he or it in fact does the act, and it is no answer to say that the act was not contumacious in the sense that, in doing it, there was no direct intention to disobey the order. I think the expression "wilfully" in Order XLII., r. 31, is intended to exclude only such casual or accidental and unintentional acts as are referred to in Fairclough v Manchester Ship Canal Co . I think this view, though not of course expressed in the same words, is to all intents and purposes the view expressed in Attorney-General v Walthamstow Urban Council . In my opinion, further, the act need not be done by the person himself. In the case of a corporation it cannot be done by the corporation itself, at any rate in the case of such a corporation as an urban district council. Such a body can only act by its agents or servants; and I think, if the act is in fact done, it is no answer to say that, done, as it may be, by an officer or servant of the council, the council is not liable for it, even though it may have been done by the servant through carelessness, neglect, or even in dereliction of his duty. That seems to me to follow from Rantzen v Rothschild. "
"A limited company, as such, cannot carry on business. It can only do so by employing human beings to act on its behalf. The actions of its employees, acting in the course of their employment, are what constitute the carrying on of business by the company."
"The power of the Civil Procedure Rules to exclude evidence even if it is admissible is principally a case management power designed to allow the court to stop cases getting out of hand and hearing becoming interminable because more and more admissible evidence, especially hearsay evidence, is sought to be adduced."
"I agree with the Court of Appeal that the court's case management powers underCPR r 32.1 are wide enough to enable the court to make the orders indicated by the Court of Appeal in this passage. But I do question whether in the present case, had a VCF order been refused, the court would have been "bound" to make an order excluding Mr Polanski's statements from evidence if he did not present himself in court for crossexamination. Such an exclusionary order should not be made automatically in respect of the non-attendance of a party or other witness for cross-examination. Such an order should be made only if, exceptionally, justice so requires. The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly. The principle underlying theCivil Evidence Act 1995 is that in general the preferable course is to admit hearsay evidence, and let the court attach to the evidence whatever weight may be appropriate, rather than exclude it altogether."
"The substantive law following the 1995 Act, therefore, is that relevant hearsay is always admissible; there are various procedural safeguards aimed at reducing the prejudice caused to an opposing party if he is not able to cross-examine the maker of the statement; but the principal safeguard is the reduced – even to vanishing – weight to be given to a statement which has not been made in court and subject to crossexamination in the usual way. The court is to be trusted to give the statement such weight as it is worth in all the circumstances of the case."
"It is well within this objective to seek to get the parties to agree as many facts as possible, to limit the number of witnesses who may be called to give evidence on a particular issue, or to restrict the amount of documentary evidence placed before the court. But it would be a strong thing indeed to use such case management powers to exclude the admissible evidence of one of the parties on the central facts of the case. There may be circumstances in which this could be done. The unreasonable refusal of that party to subject himself to crossexamination may be one of them. It might be grossly unjust to the other party, even contrary to his right to a fair trial underarticle 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights , to decide a claim principally on the untested evidence of a party who had not been subject to cross-examination of any sort."
"The danger of admitting hearsay evidence in the case of some interlocutory motions may be avoided by the exercise by the court of its discretion to exclude it; and its admission in others may be very much in the interests of justice."
"… if hearsay evidence is admitted, the court is well able to ensure that this does not work unfairly against the person alleged to be in contempt, either in terms of that person's ability to answer matters which are deposed to on information and belief or in terms of the judge being satisfied that the high standard of proof required on contempt applications has been attained."
"Reliance upon hearsay evidence is not mandatory and the court can be trusted to ensure, so far as humanly possible, that no injustice results from the admission of such evidence."
"I start by noting that the Act does not contain any material definition of "civil proceedings" save that section 18 states that the expression includes "civil proceedings in any of the ordinary courts of law."
"I repeat that these are not proceedings brought for the furtherance of private interests. They are brought in the public interest and are in some respects like criminal proceedings. Nonetheless they are civil proceedings to which the overriding objective set out inCPR rule 1 is therefore applicable."
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him…"
"It was accepted on behalf of the claimants on this appeal – although after some hesitation – that the whole of article 6 is engaged in relation to committal proceedings – that is to say, that committal proceedings are of a criminal nature. In my view, an argument to the contrary could not have been sustained."
"Where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Art.6"
"As the requirements of Art.6(3) are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Art.6(1), the Court will examine the complaints under those two provisions taken together. The Court reiterates that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them. The Court's task under the Convention is not to give a ruling as to whether statements of witnesses were properly admitted as evidence, but rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair. The evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in the presence of the accused, with a view to adversarial argument. There are exceptions to this principle, but they must not infringe the rights of the defence. As a general rule, Art.6(1) and (3)(d) require that the defendant be given as adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either when he makes his statement or at a later stage."
"i) The admissibility of evidence is primarily for the national law; ii) Evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing and as a general rule Article 6(1) and (3)(d) require a defendant to be given a proper and adequate opportunity to challenge and question witnesses; iii) It is not necessarily incompatible with Article 6(1) and (3)(d) for depositions to be read and that can be so even if there has been no opportunity to question the witness at any stage of the proceedings. Article 6(3)(d) is simply an illustration of matters to be taken into account in considering whether a fair trial has been held. The reasons for the court holding it necessary that statements should be read and the procedures to counterbalance any handicap to the defence will be relevant to the issue, whether, where statements have been read, the trial was fair. iv) The quality of the evidence and its inherent reliability, plus the degree of caution exercised in relation to reliance on it, will also be relevant to the question whether the trial was fair."
"In R v Gokal [1997] 2 Crim App R 266 this court, considering in advance of the Human Rights Act the assistance from the European cases then available, and with express reference to the Unterpertiner case and the Kostovski case, concluded that, when considering the question of the likelihood or otherwise that the defendant could controvert the statement of one absent witness, the court should not limit itself to the question of whether the accused himself could give effective evidence so as to do so; it should also consider the reality of his opportunity to cross-examine or call other witnesses as to the relevant events, or to put the statement makers credibility in issue by other means. That being so, we would not subscribe to any formulation of the approach to be adopted which states without qualification that a conviction based solely or mainly on the impugned statement of an absent witness necessarily violates the right to fair trial under Article 6."
"Very great care must be taken in each and every case to ensure that attention is paid to the letter and spirit of the Convention and judges should not easily be persuaded that it is in the interests of justice to permit evidence to be read. Where that witness provides the sole or determinative evidence against the accused, permitting it to be read may well, depending on the circumstances, jeopardise infringing the defendant's Article 6(3)(d) rights; even if it is not the only evidence, care must be taken to ensure that the ultimate aim of each and every trial, namely, a fair hearing, is achieved."
"(1) Proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person if he makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. (2) Proceedings under this rule may be brought only – (a) by the Attorney General; or (b) with the permission of the court."
"The reason for that is the nature of the proceedings. These are not proceedings where the alleged contempt consists of the breach of an order obtained by an individual in protection or furtherance of his own private rights. It is a case of an allegation of public wrong, not private wrong. Interference with the course of justice is plainly a public wrong and it is right therefore that there should be a public control over the launching of proceedings for this species of contempt. The Attorney-General has a public function which needs no further explanation. The court from which permission is sought will be concerned to see that the case is one in which the public interest requires the committal proceedings to be brought. I repeat that these are not proceedings brought for the furtherance of private interests. They are brought in the public interest and are in some respects like criminal proceedings. Nonetheless they are civil proceedings and they are civil proceedings to which the overriding objective set out inCPR rule 1 is therefore applicable. The overriding objective enjoins the court to deal with cases justly, ensuring so far as practicable that the parties are on an equal footing, that expense is saved and that the case is dealt with in ways which are proportionate to the money involved, to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues and the financial position of each party. These are general imperatives which are as relevant in my opinion to an application for permission underCPR rule 32.14 as to any other form of civil proceedings."
"I agree with [counsel for the claimant] about the importance of statements of truth and I certainly agree that it is important that flagrant breaches of the obligation to be responsible and truthful in verifying witness statements should be policed and enforced if necessary by committal proceedings."
"5. There are two factual issues which are the key to the proceedings. They may in fact be the only factual issues which matter: (1) Were the arrangements for the sale of the airtime by Daltel, Pacifica and Globenet (as Mr Makki says) honestly entered into and (in the case of Pacifica and Globenet) did they comprise valid arm's length contracts involving a third party owned company, Weybridge, or on the other hand were they (as the Claimants say) simply a scheme designed to defraud BT and the Claimants? (2) Did Mr Makki or Mr Al-Eid own and control Globenet? 6. It is and has been from the outset central to Mr Makki's defence that Mr Al-Eid was a genuine participant in the transactions. It is and has been from the outset central to the Claimant's case that he is not."
"One thing which has particularly concerned me is the extent to which there should be allowed to be satellite litigation, particularly at this stage of the proceedings, and particularly where that satellite litigation relates to matters which are serious issues in the proceedings and in the context of which those issues will be dealt with and considered at something short of a full trial. It is inherently undesirable to have satellite litigation which is time consuming and distracting when it comes to pursuing proceedings to a full trial, and it is capable of occupying and using up an inordinate amount of court resources sometimes to no particular purpose. I must be particularly alert to ensure that that factor does not come into play so as to make the proceedings inappropriate, at least at this stage. It seems to me that in a large number of instances where the point might be taken, if not in the majority of instances where points might be taken about statements in pleadings at an early stage, it is inherently undesirable that they be taken in contempt proceedings. They will be dealt with in due course in the course of the proceedings and no doubt a trial judge will find for or against the relevant party in relation to the allegations. If the trial judge decides for the party in relation to the allegations, then there never was anything in the contempt claim. If he or she decides against that party at a trial, then a decision can be taken in the light of those findings as to the extent to which it is necessary and appropriate to take the matter further and to raise the matter again in contempt proceedings. That would seem to me to be the normal and more usual course."
"I am not giving any directions as to the witnesses attending and providing evidence for cross-examination, the reason being that, because it is a committal application, I do not think I can do so, because requiring a person to give evidence removes that person's right to decline to answer questions that might incriminate him: and the Phillips v Symes case says that it is not permissible. But, as that case does demonstrate, witnesses who provide statements, whether hearsay or otherwise, and who do not attend for cross-examination will undoubtedly find that their evidence is given less weight than someone who provides a witness statement and attends for cross-examination. But that, of course, is a matter for the judge who hears the committal application and for him to assess what procedural format the evidence takes and what weight he gives to witnesses who are cross-examined or not."
"1) the defendant is not a compellable witness; 2) if the defendant chooses to give evidence, the court may, as a matter of jurisdiction permit him to be crossexamined; 3) the court will normally exercise its discretion in favour of cross-examination, if the cross-examination can be limited to the alleged contempt; 4) if the defendant adduces evidence and declines to submit to cross-examination, the court may give his evidence very little weight; 5) the defendant cannot be made to answer questions at an interim stage, the answers to which may expose him to an application to commit for contempt."
"I find it difficult to think that there are any circumstances in which one whose committal is sought for a breach of an order of the court in civil proceedings could be compelled by the party seeking committal to give evidence against his will. To that extent, he is not a compellable witness. Where, however, the person whose committal is sought in civil contempt proceedings has voluntarily given evidence, I see no reason why he should be entitled, as of right, to decline to be crossexamined. I do not think that any such implication is to drawn from the terms of R.S.C., Ord. 52, r.6(4) I do not think that where statute does not expressly so provide, a defendant in civil contempt proceedings should be treated as being entitled to a right such as is given by theCriminal Evidence Act 1898 to a defendant in a criminal trial; that is, to make an unsworn statement without the disadvantage of subjecting himself to cross-examination"
"Mr Makki is not attending for cross-examination because the evidence put forward by the claimants is not sufficient to require him to answer it by oral evidence. Mr Al-Eid does not wish to attend court in England and is not a compellable witness. Mr Nawfal's evidence consists largely in the exhibition of third party documents and to bring him from the Lebanon would be disproportionate."
"I do not think my Client will object to giving evidence through Video Link on condition that you obtain clear and specific permission from the following government departments: 1. Ministry of Justice 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3. Ministry of Interior 4. Ministry of Security & Intelligence A final decision will be made once we have received the above clearances."
"Seeing, however, that cross-examination is not to be allowed, it means that the judge might think it right to disregard the affidavit or to give it very little weight. That would be for him."
"the property purchased by our client's father was Third Floor, Merjan Building, Middle East Street, Beirut. Our client is familiar with the building but he has no details of the purchase. Based on his guess as to the size of the building he imagines that the purchase price would be in the region of US$750 - 900,000. The property was purchased by our client's father. Our client does not know in whose name the purchase was effected, or whether there have been any subsequent changes in the title. Our client knows very little about the purchase. The questions posed by Mr Richards were posed in the hallway at our client's business premises at the end of a shocking, confusing and exhausting day. Our client was understandably tired and had had to concentrate in a very short period on a number of matters and had been closely questioned on various issues. Again therefore, our client made a genuine and honest mistake, which he rectified promptly on Saturday morning and for which he apologises."
"Further, as disclosed to the claimants' solicitors some money was used in the purchase of a property at 3rd Floor, Merjan Building, Middle East Street, Beirut but I initially had few details. I was informed by my father by telephone last Friday (5 March 2004 ) that money from the Arab Bank account referred to above was used by my father to purchase this property which is a flat, 3rd Floor, Merjan Building, in August 2003. I was prevented by clause 20 of the Search and Seize Order from speaking with anyone (including my father) about these proceedings other than for the purpose of obtaining legal advice until 4.30pm Thursday4 March 2004 . When I spoke with my father the following morning, he provided me with some information concerning the purchase of the property. He informed me that the purchase price of the property (which is a 3 bedroom flat) was US$925,000 . He said that the property was purchased by him but in my name. However, he was recently advised by his lawyer in Beirut to transfer the property from my name into his own name and he did so using a power of attorney he has held since for me since June or July 2003. He did so because he is upset with me because business loans which he has made to me have increased hugely in the last few months and I now owe him approximately£900,000 and he wanted to make sure that those obligations towards him are protected, and met. My father is the head of the family and very much in control of the family finances although he is now 76 years of age. He is a strong character. I am the youngest of seven children (I am 33 years of age) and my father has assisted me in business ventures over the last 10 years. My father had loaned me about£500,000 by last August and he told me that it was his intention to provide me with a flat when those business loans were paid off but the loans had increased in amount to about£900,000 by mid-January 2004 and that is why, my father says, he transferred the property back into his own name because he is concerned about the amount of my obligations to him. I should add that in the past my father has also brought properties for some of my siblings. My father also informed me that money from each of the three accounts in Beirut was used towards the cost of some refurbishment to the Merjan property, the estimated cost of which to date according to my father is US$300,000 . The flat is approximately 500 square metres and has required a complete fit-out."
"It is correct that I knew that my father had purchased the Merjan property in 2003 using the money in the joint account. He must have done this using my July 2003 power of attorney. I had no say in the purchase and nothing to do with it. It was simply something my father decided to do for the family and is by English standards very autocratic. Our traditions in the Lebanon are different. I was not aware at that time the purchase had been in my name."
"Mr Richards suggests that the transfers of funds on 21st and30th July 2003 were earmarked for the purchase of the Merjan property. That is not correct. First, the price was$925,000 not$950,000 . Second, inspection of the US$ account statement shows that the amount of the transfers to Beirut was determined by the sums paid in by Arbinet, not by the price of the property. After the second payment on30th July 2003 , the balance on the US$ account was reduced to$25,420 . I was simply transferring all the available funds to Beirut to take advantage of the interest rates there. The transfers continued in exactly the same way after the purchase of the property, the next being a second transfer of$750,000 on15th August 2003 ."
"At the time of the purchase in 2003 I did not ask my father in whose name the property had been purchased. My father has previously purchased property for the family. Neither I nor other members of my family asked in whose name it was purchased. Such a question would be considered rude."
"On or about the9 September 2004 I called Mr Hoteit. I started the conversation by asking if I was speaking to Mr Hussein Hoteit and he said that he was. I identified myself and told him that I had got the number from his relative who was known to my nephew. I asked Mr Hoteit whether he had a minute for a short enquiry and he confirmed that he had. I asked him if he was the builder of the two Merjan buildings and he responded in the affirmative. I asked him if he would tell me how much he sold the third floor property to Hassan Makki for and he confirmed that it had been sold for$950,000 . I asked him whether it was Hassan Makki who made the deal for the purchase of the property or whether it was his father. Mr Hoteit answered that it was Hassan Makki that came to see him personally and made the deal. I asked him how he had been paid (i.e. whether it was by cash or cheque) and he confirmed that he had been paid by a cheque drawn on the Arab Bank. I asked whether he would mind if I paid him a visit and he said he did not mind at all."
"I was unable to see Mr Hoteit until6 October 2004 . I attended him at his offices in Sakiet el Janzeer in Beirut around the corner from the Carlton Hotel. I informed him that I wanted to discuss the purchase of the third floor flat at Merjan 2 with him in a bit more detail. He informed me that about three weeks before the actual sale took place Hassan Makki had been to see the flat and later came to see him personally to negotiate the terms of purchase. Hassan Makki had tried to make a deal supported only by a deposit. However Mr Hoteit had informed him that he was not willing to accept a deposit and would not sign a contract until the purchase price had been paid in full. At that meeting they agreed the price of the purchase. Mr Hoteit informed me that Hassan Makki had told him that he had to travel to London on business but he would complete the deal with him as soon as possible. About two or three weeks later, Mr Hoteit stated that Hassan Makki sent his father (whom Mr Hoteit considered to be a mere messenger) with a banker's cheque drawn by the Arab Bank in the amount of$950,000 . Mr Makki's father informed Mr Hoteit that he had a power of attorney and would execute the sale contract on Hassan Makki's behalf. Consequently, they attended the Notary Public and executed the contract of sale on4 August 2003 ."
"Mr Mugraby asked Abu Ahmad to confirm his previous conversation with him during which Abu Ahmad had stated that he had met in person with one Hassan Makki. Abu Ahmad confirmed that Mr Hassan Makki and himself had met in person to discuss the purchase of a property in Lebanon and agree the price for such purchase (the Property). During the meeting, Mr Hassan Makki offered to pay Abu Ahmad a deposit. Abu Ahmad rejected the offer of a deposit. Mr Mugraby then asked Abu Ahmad who had executed the purchase agreement for the Property and when this had taken place by reference to the earlier meeting with Mr Hassan Makki. Abu Ahmad responded that approximately 15 days following his meeting with Mr Hassan Makki, Mr Ali Makki, father to Mr Hassan Makki executed the purchase agreement for the Property and registered such purchase. Mr Mugraby then asked whether Mr Hassan Makki was present on the date of execution to which Abu Ahmad responded negatively. Mr Mugraby asked whether Abu Ahmad knew where Mr Hassan Makki was at that time and whether he was in London. Abu Ahmad responded that he did not know whether Hassan Makki was in London or elsewhere and that this had no bearing on him. Abu Ahmad went on to say that during his meeting with Mr Ali Makki, the latter had presented a cheque to Abu Ahmad drawn on the Arab Bank and that the registration of the Property had been carried out by Mr Ali Makki."
"Mr Hoteit confirmed that during the conference call with Dr Mohammad Mugraby he believes he was somewhat confused as to whether it was Mr Makki senior or Mr Makki junior that Mr Mugraby was referring to: Mr Hoteit stated that he believes that he did not meet Mr Hassan Ali Makki on or before4 August 2003 , and that all negotiations for the purchase of the 3rd floor Merjan 2 apartment were conducted between Mr Ali Makki and his lawyer. Mr Hoteit confirmed that during the negotiations with his lawyer neither himself nor his lawyer were aware as for whom was the property being purchased, or to whose name it was going to be registered in. Mr Hoteit further confirmed that Mr Mohammed Mugraby visited him in his office approximately 6 weeks ago, and asked him to sign a Witness Statement in Arabic. Mr Hoteit refused to sign it on the basis of its inaccuracies, and that he did not want to be involved in any litigation. This is exhibited at pages 1–2."
"Mr Hoteit told me quite frankly that signing such a statement could involve his incurring legal obligations within foreign proceedings which he did not understand or know anything about and, for those reasons, he would prefer to consult his lawyers before deciding whether he was prepared to do so."
"other than that he has no other assets, beneficial interests" to which Mr Makki replied "
"SR: There are no assets that relate to monies being used from the accounts? HM: No SR: No hotel or other property? HM: No…."
"On the same day Mr Ali Makki called me to inform me and to discuss the events of that morning. I gave him legal advice, the content of which is privileged."
"Mr Hassan Makki admits that he is indebted to my client, in substantial amounts of money. The Merjan property was therefore transferred out of Mr Hassan Makki's name to protect my client's financial position, and to part satisfy the debt due from the First Defendant to my client. My client informed me that he had purchased the property in the name of his son but that he wished to transfer it out of his son's name because he was unhappy with the amount outstanding and wanted to make sure he was protected."
"Pursuant to this, and after recording my reservations, originally on my own behalf, and as attorney for my son, Mr Hasan Ali Makki, I confirm my notice to you, in writing this time, of what is summarised above, and I reserve my right, originally and as attorney, to engage in transactions on the joint account referred to, and to reject the implementation of the content of the document you have reported, whose authorship is attributed to my son, Mr Hasan Ali Makki. Therefore I adhere to my application to you to refrain from implementing this application, and I also hold to all my rights expressed in the Law of Banking Secrecy in Lebanon."
"It should be noted that the plaintiff holds a comprehensive general absolute power of attorney allowing him to represent his son (his partner in the account) in a comprehensive representation (attached herewith is a copy of the said power of attorney – Document number 4). In spite of this, that is even though the plaintiff is the general attorney for his son, his partner in the joint account, and even though he informed the defendant that he required it, originally and as attorney, to enable him to withdraw the funds because he needed them, the defendant refused to enable him to do so."
"In fact, following my reference to my client, he has informed me that he denies any dispute with his father Mr Ali Jameel Makki, absolutely. My client has informed me that he owes his father more than the value of this account, and on this basis I wish to inform you that my client is not opposed to the withdrawal by your client of all or part of the assets in this account and to receive their value by the means he considers appropriate, including market transfers. Not only this, I request the Lebanon and Overseas Bank, in my capacity as the attorney for Hasan Ali Makki, that it will cooperate with your client and enable him to deal freely and by his sole action on the said account, without the need for referring to my client, and particularly as he is permanently travelling."
"Pursuant to your decision as chairman to include the person to be included, Hasan Ali Makki, he declares as follows."
"The included person had previously replied by a letter [14 June 2004 ] the plaintiff's attorney deposited in the file in this case, as is clear in the documents served on him. The included person accepts what is stated in this memorandum and confirms that he has no dispute with his father (this did not occur essentially in his upbringing, education and environment). The included person also considers the defendant liable for its illegal freezing of the account referred to, and on this basis is responsible for not enabling the plaintiff to make transactions on the said account in accordance with the provisions of the contract that joins him and me and the defendant. The included person does not wish to close the account that is the subject of the case. Rather he agrees that his father, the plaintiff, should make transactions with its assets and use it in accordance with the provisions of the contract opening that account and the law. The included person does not wish to enter into litigation against the defendant bank, and asks it to apply those legal provisions."
"The person it has been decided to include was compelled to sign a document related to the transfer and he was given a period of grace of four hours to sign. However the person it has been decided to include did not send that document to the bank by fax or by any other means."
"In my capacity as attorney for Mr Hassan Ali Makki, please note the following: In relation to the joint bank savings account between my client and his father, Mr Ali Makki, held with you, number 003/02/350/0230869/1/5 (42533), I wish to confirm to you that my client is not the person who sent the request for the transfer by fax and he has not sent you at any time any request for payment or transfer by fax. In all cases, my client absolves you of any liability towards the third party whose name is recorded on the fax [i.e. the liquidators], which is the subject of the case pending between my client's father and you before the Judge for Summary Affairs in Beirut, Chairman Mahmoud Makkiya. That is, my client approves what his father is requesting in the said case, in which he has been included, and he absolves you from any liability that may arise from your implementation of these requests, and he will bear full responsibility in this respect whatever its source. Finally, the retention of the funds belonging to my client's father present in that account and frozen with you without ceiling or time restriction is unacceptable, is not justified, and may not continue in the light of my client bearing full responsibility in this regard as stated above."
"Further to his previous statements and in explanation of the truth and the law the person it is requested to include declares as follows: The person whose inclusion is requested did not send the request for the transfer by fax to the defendant and did not send to it at any time any application for payment or transfer by fax. He sent a letter to this effect to the defendant removing from it any liability towards the third party whose name is recorded in the fax, which is the subject of the action pending between the father of the person whose inclusion is requested, who is present, and the defendant before you. We confirm that the retention of his father's funds in that account and frozen by it without a ceiling or time limit is unreasonable and unjustified and should not continue in the light of the person whose inclusion is requested bearing every liability in that regard. (Attached is a copy of the said letter – Document number 1). Finally, the person whose inclusion is requested adopts his father's requests recorded in the summons and memoranda."
"In relation to my participation in the proceedings between my father and Blom Bank concerning the dollars in the Joint Lebanese Dollar Account, I did speak with Mr Nawfal, my lawyer in Beirut, leading to his letter to my father's lawyer dated14 June 2004 at page 51 of Exhibit "
"I note from the first memorandum of pleading that my lawyer (see page 59 of Exhibit "
"I am able to confirm that I do not continue to support my father's application to withdraw the money from BLOM Bank and that I withdraw my consent to the payment out, I am willing to provide confirmation to the Courts in Lebanon (if required) that I accept that I am bound by the terms of the Freezing Order and that I did sign the irrevocable letters of instruction (under the terms of a High Court Order which required me to sign them within 4 hours) and they were sent to the banks by Jones Day and remain irrevocable. I also withdraw my offer to indemnify Blom Bank from any liability it may have towards the Claimants."
"I make this affirmation in relation to my client's participation in the proceedings between his father and Blom Bank concerning the Joint Lebanese Dollar Account. I did speak with my client before I sent the letter to my client's father's lawyer dated14 June 2004 at page 51 of Exhibit "
"…and on this basis I wish to inform you that my client is not opposed to the withdrawal by your client of all or part of the assets in this account and to receive their value by the means he considers appropriate, including market transfers."
"The plaintiff [Ali Makki] and his partner [Mr Makki] opened the account that is the subject of the present case, which is in the US dollars, with the defendant's branch in Al-Rawcheh. They also opened with the defendant another account in Lebanese lire with the same branch too."
"I was aware that my father and I opened a joint account with Blom Bank. I never transferred Lebanese Pounds into the account, nor withdrew Lebanese Pounds from it and was not aware that there were any Lebanese Pounds in the account."
"16.1 The Respondent must immediately permit the Independent Computer Specialist to make two electronic copies (or images) of any or all of the documents (whether they are listed items or not) held on any or all of the computers or electronic data storage devices situated on or accessible from the premises. The Respondent shall permit the Independent Computer Specialist to remove the outer casing of any computer or other electronic data storage device in order to copy the data and/or documents and shall supply him with all passwords or other information reasonably required by the Independent Computer Specialist in order to enable him to make such copies. The Independent Computer Specialist shall immediately hand over the electronic copies to the Supervising Solicitor who will then keep them safely at his premises. 16.2 The Respondent must also immediately after the Independent Computer Specialist has made the copies provided for in paragraph 16.1 above give the search party effective access to the computers, computer disks, mobile telephones, telephones, personal organiser or other electronic equipment situated on or accessible from the premises, with all necessary passwords and/or software and/or other information, to enable them to be searched and shall permit them to be searched. If they contain any listed items the Respondent must cause the listed items to be displayed and/or printed out so that they can be read and copied. The Respondent must provide the Applicant's solicitors with copies of all listed items contained in the computers. 16.3 All reasonable steps shall be taken by the Applicant, the Applicant's solicitors and the Independent Computer Specialist to ensure that no damage is done to any computer data. The Applicant and his representatives may not themselves search the Respondent's computers unless they have sufficient expertise to do so without damaging the Respondent's system. 16.4 To the extent that the search provided for by paragraph 16.2 above cannot be completed within the time considered to be reasonable by the Supervising Solicitor, the Respondent shall permit the search for listed items stored on the copies obtained pursuant to paragraph 16.1 above to be conducted at the Supervising Solicitor's premises. The Respondent shall be entitled to be present at such searches and shall be entitled to have his legal representatives present at such searches."
"The Respondent must immediately inform the Applicant's solicitors (in the presence of the Supervising Solicitor) so far as he is aware where all the listed items are."
"Company Asset Documents 4. All books, papers or records of any of the First and Third Applicants and/or Globenet (UK) Limited. 5. Any documents that relate to the existence, location or value of all monies or other assets of any of the First and Third Applicants and/or Globenet (UK) Limited. 6. Any accounting or financial records that relate to either of the any [sic] of the First and Third Applicants and/or Globenet (UK) Limited. 7. Any documents that relate to any and all payments made by or to any of the First and Third Applicants and/or Globenet (UK) Limited and to all monies derived directly or indirectly from those payments and any other monies or assets which have been acquired by or which are derived from or which represent such monies. Connected Companies 8. Any documents relating to: 8.1. Daltel USA LLC (and/or any other entity that uses or trades under the name of "
"any information stored on a computer or computer hard disk or floppy disk or compact disk or magnetic tape or any other electronic medium and shall also include any electronic data storage devices including but not limited to diskettes, hard drives, CD Roms, telephone or fax memory facilities and personal organisers."
"The First Defendant has failed to comply with paragraph 17 of the search order in that on the day of the search the First Defendant did not immediately or at all inform the Applicant's solicitors so far as he was aware of where all the listed items were in that he did not disclose the whereabouts of the information held on the Switches."
"The First Defendant has failed to comply with paragraph 16.1 of the search order in that the First Defendant did not immediately or at all permit the Independent Computer Specialist to make two electronic copies (or images) of all or any of the documents (whether listed items or otherwise) held on switches AC 52 and AC85 situated at Telehouse, 65 Clifton Street ("the Switches"), which were accessible from the premises."
"12. The Respondent shall within 2 business days deliver up to the Second, Fourth and Fifth Applicants pursuant tosection 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986 any property, books, papers or records of the First and Third Applicants and/or Globenet (UK) Limited. 15. The Respondent must within 7 days of the service of this Order swear and serve on the Applicant's solicitors an Affidavit setting out what documents he has in his possession, power or control (whether such documents are in England and Wales or not) that (1) relate to or evidence the existence, location or value or details of any of his assets ("the Asset Documents") or that (2) relate to or evidence the existence, location or value or details of the Company Assets or relating to what has become of the Company Assets or that (3) are books, papers or records of the First and Third Applicants and/or Globenet (UK) Limited ("the Company Asset Documents"). 16. The Respondent must within 7 days of the service of this Order swear and serve on the Applicant's solicitor an Affidavit setting out the location of all Asset Documents and Company Asset Documents including but not limited to the address of such premises where such documents are located. If any of these documents are held in the custody of third parties on behalf of the Respondent or to the order of the Respondent (including documents in respect of which the Respondent is entitled to the delivery of copies on the payment of a fee, such as bank statements) whether in England or abroad, then the Respondent must give the name, addresses, telephone numbers and fax numbers of all such third parties and state what documents they hold. 18. The Respondent must (where possible) immediately deliver up to the Applicant's solicitors all the Asset Documents and Company Asset Documents or copies of those documents. Where it is not possible to make immediate delivery up of Asset Documents and Company Asset Documents the Respondent must deliver up such documents to the Claimant's solicitors as soon as possible and in any event within 10 working days from the date of service of this Order. In the case of bank accounts, these documents must include bank statements showing the state of the account at the date of this Order."
"28 Thus, Makki's explanation for the failure of both Pacifica and Globenet (which collectively owe BT the sum of approximately£7,000,000 ) is based on his assertion that (save for limited technical issues) Al-Eid was entirely responsible for the trading activities and business arrangements of both Weybridge and Globenet and that the independent acts and/or omissions of Al-Eid were causative of the losses ultimately suffered by BT. These "facts" are central to his Defence in these proceedings. In fact, they are nothing more than an ex post facto fabrication. 29 If Makki is to be believed, Al-Eid is a very wealthy Syrian businessman with a detailed knowledge of the telecoms market. In fact, the Claimants' enquiries and the surrounding evidence have established beyond doubt that Al-Eid is an impoverished taxi/bus driver living in straitened circumstances in a poor suburb of Damascus. 30 Without necessarily rehearsing in this skeleton all of the evidence gathered by the Claimants on this issue, the Claimants will rely, in particular, on the matters set out below."
"The Claimants submit that the only conclusion that can be drawn from this substantial body of evidence is that the Al-Eid story is a work of complete fiction, whose only purpose is to attempt to distance Makki from the trading of the airtime and to justify ex post facto his retention (through Daltel USA) of the substantial sums paid for such airtime by/through Arbinet."
"It would be my submission that all of that evidence provides – it is not only independent evidence itself as to the nature of the fraud and the fact that the Al-Eid story is a fiction, but it obviously also supports, indirectly, the evidence of Mr Albacha."
"On the basis therefore of Mr Albacha's evidence alone, it seems beyond doubt that Mr Al-Eid had no genuine involvement in the trading of airtime and that the sale agreements entered into between himself and Mr Makki (for the sale of Hillside, Weybridge, Globenet and Community) were not genuine and would have been signed by Mr Al-Eid (if indeed, it was Mr Al-Eid who signed them) at a time when Mr Makki knew that they did not relate to genuine transactions and were simply a tool in his deception."
"This clear conclusion is further supported and strengthened when one considers both the collective information obtained by the Liquidators as a result of their investigations to date (as set out above) and the numerous and unexplained inconsistencies in statements provided by Mr Makki."
"Until12 August 2003 , I was the beneficial owner of both Hillside Trading Group LLC and Weybridge Management LLC. The shares in both companies were held for me by nominees and the directors of both companies were both nominees. On7 August 2003 , I sold the entire share capital, all rights, privileges and benefits of Hillside Trading Group LLC to Mr S Al-Eid for US$25,000 . On12 August 2003 , Hillside Trading Group LLC acquired the entire share capital, all rights, privileges and benefits of Weybridge Management LLC and of another company which I was the beneficial owner, Community Technology LLC, for the total sum of US$50,000 . Agreements were signed at the Phenecia Hotel, Beirut. Further agreements for these sales were also signed at the Phenecia Hotel, Beirut on22 February 2004 . I am advised that these agreements were effective from 7 and12 August 1003 respectively under the State law of Arizona. So far as I am aware, Mr Al-Eid remains the legal and beneficial owner, the sole shareholder and the sole director of both Hillside Trading Group LLC and Weybridge Management LLC. I believe that Mr Al-Eid lives in Syria. Any correspondence to him was addressed to him care of the registered office of Hillside Trading Group LLC, 910 Foulk Road, Suite 201, Wilmington, Delaware 19803, USA. I have provided the Claimants' solicitors with the agreements concerning the sales of these companies."
"The deal with Al-Eid was concluded in June 2003. Mr Al-Eid informed me that his cousin, who is a lawyer in Syria, had drawn up a very basic Arabic contract for the sale of the companies. I did not think it necessary at that time to study the paperwork carefully or ensure that it was looked at by a US or UK based lawyer, but only thought of this subsequently. However, I signed the Arabic document and believed that this gave effect to the sale."
"Mr Al-Eid told me that on7 August 2003 he arranged for the transfer of his shares in Hillside to himself. He had, of course, already paid for the company in July 2003. He also told me that on12 August 2003 Hillside acquired all of the shares in CTL and Weybridge. Mr Al-Eid told me that these were the dates on which the transfers had been affected when I met him in Beirut in August 2003. He did not give me an explanation regarding the reasons that he had decided to wait for two months before effecting the transfer, but I did not think it was particularly significant."
"Hillside Trading Group LLC have agreed to the Terms and Conditions set out in your letter, and they have signed it. I am off to Lebanon tonight…"
"On24 September 2003 I held a meeting with Shirley Brooke of Landwell solicitors in London. On 25 September she forwarded to me (inter alia) a draft letter of intent to be sealed by Hillside (HAM4 p4-p5). I have no other communication with her relating to the letter of intent. Though the letter was drafted to refer to a price of$500,000 , I amended one copy of it to£800,000 , pursuant to my agreement with Mr Al-Eid. I took the letter to Beirut with me on 26 or27 September 2003 and Mr Al-Eid signed the£800,000 letter (HAM4 p6-p7). It is correct that the actual agreement was signed one month later, and I apologise for the error in my original witness statement."
"Below are some facts/info relating to the above structure. While, I have an agreement with all of the above companies, I need to document them, in a very tight contract(s). 1. Daltel USA LLC has an interconnect contract with Arbinet. 2. Arbinet sends the calls/traffic to Daltel USA LLC. 3. Daltel USA LLC send the traffic/calls to Community Technology LLC. 4. Community Technology LLC sends the calls/traffic to Weybridge Management LLC. 5. Weybridge Management LLC send the calls/traffic to either Globenet UK Ltd, or Pacifica Ltd. 6. Pacifica Ltd, and Globenet UK Ltd, sends these calls to BT for termination to their final destination. 7. Pacifica Ltd, and Globenet UK Ltd, are 2 separate legal entities incorporated in the UK. 8. Pacifica Ltd has a standard interconnect agreement with BT. 9. Globenet UK Ltd also has a standard interconnect with BT. 10. BT invoices Pacifica Ltd for the cost of the calls. Pacifica then invoices Weybridge Management LLC, which in turn invoices Community Technology LLC, and then finally Community Technology invoices Daltel USA LLC. 11. All of the above companies share a telecom switch in London. This switch is owned by Daltel USA LLC. 12. Daltel USA LLC's switch has been partitioned to accommodate the other companies. 13. Pacifica Ltd is my company in London. 14. Globenet (UK) Ltd was also mine, but I sold it to Hillside Trading Group LLC, on the 25th of September 2003. 15. Daltel USA LLC is mine. 16. Weybridge Management LLC, and Community Technology LLC were both incorporated on my behalf by company express in Boston. However, both companies were sold on to a third party last year, in the summer. Requirement 1 1. I need to document the sale of the companies from my self to this third party individual. 2. This person has bought the companies, in its entirety. (ALL OF THE SHARE). 3. This contract has to be personal to this third party. 4. To also hold me and my other companies harmless against any proceedings. 5. I need it to be very tight. Requirement 2 1. I need an interconnect contract between Daltel USA, LLC, and Community Technology LLC. 2. I need an interconnect contract between Community Technology LLC, and Weybridge Management LLC. Requirement 3 As per above, Daltel USA LLC owns and operates the switch in London, that has been partitioned to accommodate Community, and Weybridge, Pacifica, and Globenet. 1. I need an individual contract between each of the above companies. 2. I need to charge then a fee of$5000 per circuit per month. 3. This contract does not form and sort of joint venture, partnership….etc. 4. The contract has to be very clear as to the ownership of the switch. 5. I think the contracts between the US companies have to be subject to the exclusive laws of Delaware??? Any other terms/contract you might think would be appropriate, please feel free to document, I will call you to discuss the reasons I am documenting this."
"I am travelling to Lebanon on business. Upon my return on Monday 23rd, I shall furnish you with all the documents relating to the sale of Hillside Trading Group LLC, Weybridge Management LLC. In the meantime, I will be happy to pay you for the time taken out to deal with these queries. Do you have any money from money on account for disbursements?"
"I did not think it necessary at that time [June 2003] to study the paperwork carefully or ensure that it was looked at by a US or UK based lawyer, but only thought of this subsequently" (para 111) and "
"Call to BT Wolverhampton Interconnect Repair Team from Hassan Makki wanting to know why all links had been lost. He was informed that BT had removed the links from service and to contact his BT Commercial manager for further info. Overnight no contact from Mr Makki Mr Makki called me at 09.20 Wednesday29 October 2003 , he asked me what had happened to the Globenet (UK) capacity, why has it been removed from service? I asked him if he had any involvement with this company as I had received written confirmation that he had sold the company. He confirmed he had sold his interest to a Mrs Woods. I explained that due to customer confidentiality I was unable to discuss another customers business with him. He became rather agitated, "
"Bearing in mind that this letter has been filed on behalf of Globenet, we think it would be prudent to copy in the directors of Hillside Trading Group, i.e. Amanda Wood (and whoever else you think appropriate). Please could you provide me with Amanda Wood's email address so that I can forward all copy correspondence to her."
"Easynet International Ltd has been purchased by Globenet (UK) Limited. The purchase is an outright purchase of the entire company assets plus its share capital and includes the Annex II status and BT Interconnect Contract (NCC-SIA) that existed between BT and Easynet International Ltd and all the number ranges allocated by Oftel. The purchase was completed on1st October 2003 and the change of name was effective from24th September 2003 when Easynet International Ltd changed to Globenet (UK) Ltd. (Change of name Certificate faxed to you). The new contact details for Globenet (UK) Ltd are as follows: Globenet (UK) Ltd 1000 Great West Road Brentford TW8 9HH The company contact is: Mr. S Woods Email for general enquiries: admin@globenetuk.com"
"As you know, we have been acting on behalf of Globenet in respect of its dispute with BT, pursuant to instructions received from Mr Makki under the power of attorney which you granted him on behalf of Hillside Trading Group LLC. We understand from Mr Makki that you may be in London next week and would like to meet with you in order to take instructions as to how you wish us to proceed in this matter. Alternatively if you are not coming to London, then I would be grateful if you could forward me your contact details and an appropriate time for me to call you next week. I attach the latest letter received from BT in respect of Globenet which requests that we disclose the name of the directors of Hillside and which further points out that certain invoices are now due for payment but remain unpaid. We are not intending to respond to this letter until we have spoken with you."
"Please note I have sold the company hook, line and sinker. All queries should be sent to admin@globenetuk.com. Please send them an e-mail ASAP."
"It is true that on behalf of Mr Al-Eid I instructed Netcom to register the domain name www.globenetuk.com. This had 2 purposes. The first was that when Globenet was up and running it was required to advertise that it provided telecommunication services to the general public otherwise it would lose its Annex II status. The second purpose was for emails. All emails that were sent to Globenet were always read by Mr Al-Eid. I gave him instructions on how to access and send emails. This could easily be done from Syria from any PC by simply logging onto the internet then typing the URL www.mail2web.com, then double clicking the advanced login, then finally proceeding to type in the Server name or IP address (popd.globenetuk.com), followed by the user name or login name (admin+globenetuk.com) and finally the password. This procedure gave him complete control. This is exhibited at pages 1–3."
"The claimants are quite probably correct in stating that Mr Makki should not have paid these monies into Lebanese joint accounts. However, the claimants have no locus standi to complain about that. The money is not their money, nor are they creditors of DUSA. If the companies' trading had been allowed to continue, then Weybridge would have issued its invoices to DUSA and the Arbinet monies would have been used to pay them. However BT did not allow trading to continue, preferring to put the claimant companies into liquidation and sue for fraud. This has resulted in Mr Makki's father refusing to allow the banks to comply with Mr Makki's instruction to repatriate the funds."
"If Makki is to be believed, Al-Eid is a very wealthy businessman with a detailed knowledge of the telecoms market. In fact, the claimants' enquiries and the surrounding evidence have established beyond a doubt that Al-Eid is an impoverished taxi/bus driver living in straitened circumstances in a poor suburb of Damascus."
"I worked as an architect for the local government for 13 years before becoming involved in general trading and in the travel and tourism business. This travel and tourism business involves transportation and guided tours to the Dead Sea, the Red Sea and Petra in Jordan and to the Roman ruins in Lebanon. We also arrange transportation for worshippers from Lebanon to Syria, and from Syria to the Holy city of Najaf in Iraq. I have various interests in various businesses, with different levels of income. I am financially independent, with substantial means but having taken legal advice I am not willing to disclose full details at this stage. A reference from one of my bankers in Beirut, the Lebanon and Gulf Banks is exhibited at page 1."
"I deny absolutely the suggestion that I am an impoverished taxi driver. I have an interest in a travel company which has a turnover in excess of 1 million dollars a year."
"It is also evident from the copy of Mr Al-Eid's National Union Membership Card (see pages 10–13) obtained from the Land Transportation Union which lists the details Mr Al-Eid submitted for his ID card that he renewed his membership (number 24634/2004) on2nd September 2004 ."
"To: Social insurance Applicant: Shilash Al-Eid Please issue me a statement of my services and a statement of dismissing in your company to present them to the bar association"
"To the bar association Upon reviewing our computer operator, it was found that the above mentioned person was working for Yassin Kraki, under no. 16291/721399 from 20.04.2002 up to 30.10.2004"
"34. Approximately half an hour later, I received a phone call on my mobile from a man who introduced himself as Shilash Eid and asked me directly what I wanted him for as he thought I needed him for a business. I clearly explained to him that I wanted to see him with the view of clarifying his position with regard to an ongoing legal case in Britain. Mr Eid then requested that he calls me within four hours and the telephone conversation ended. 35. Approximately four hours later, Mr Shilash Eid called me back on my mobile and said that he was accompanied by his lawyer and requested me to explain the whole matter to his lawyer. 36. When I asked Shilash's lawyer to introduce himself he refused however, I went on and explained that Shilash Eid was in big legal trouble as his name was associated with foreign companies registered in his name. The lawyer then stated "
"41. Approximately half an hour later, I received a phone call from Shilash on my special mobile 092416184, and after I explained to him in detail all the legal implications that surround him and that meeting up with the English lawyers and making a statement will clear his name. He stated "do you think I am crazy to give up the new BMW, a villa in Damascus and the money offered to me by Hassan Makki in return of giving a statement"
"I do not trace people", he then said that he wanted to meet me accompanied by his lawyer, I said that I will not be available as I am travelling to Lebanon. He then asked me to write down his number 00447775524747 in order that I keep it and said that he will be contacting me when he returns back to London."
"On Thursday12th August 2004 , I received a telephone call from a man who introduced himself as Mr Al-Eid's uncle, and who claimed to be a lawyer. I explained the issues surrounding Mr Al-Eid's purported ownership of the companies in the UK, and he said that Mr Al-Eid was a very poor man, and that this was likely to be the tricks of Abou Ali/Hassan Makki."
"46. Earlier this year sometime in early August a person called me who gave the name Boshr Abdul-Mawla. He said that he was a lawyer calling from the city of Homos and that a foreign company had engaged him to negotiate with me. He said that the company employing him would pay me fourteen thousand American dollars if I would give a statement saying that the companies I own in the United States, Weybridge Management LLC, Hillside Trading Group LLC and Community Technology LLC were not mine but were owned by Hassan Makki. He further offered me a car and subsequently tickets to Spain, France or Egypt with accommodation for me and my family. I refused to give a false statement. I have reported this matter to the Syrian Police. "
"Having located Mr Al-Eid in Dara'a, I was instructed to approach Mr Al-Eid to ask him if he owns companies in the UK and, if not, if he would be willing to make a formal statement. I was further instructed that, if Mr Al-Eid was not willing to meet with the Claimants' lawyers in Damascus, they were willing to meet him at a location of his choice outside Syria and to pay for his air ticket, accommodation and reasonable disbursements."