“The following statements are alleged to have been made without an honest belief in their truth:- (1) That the respondent had attempted to comply with the Disclosure Order in full and had complied with the Disclosure Order so far as he was able (paragraph 24 of the December witness statement). (2) That the respondent knew nothing about the AAA Transactions (paragraph 4 of the December affidavit). (3) That the respondent had no more information relevant to the Disclosure Order and nothing further to add to the evidence provided in his December affidavit (paragraph 61 of the March witness statement). (4) That the respondent had limited involvement in the AAA Transactions (paragraph 10(a) of the July affidavit). (5) That the respondent’s recollection of the AAA Transactions is and always has been very limited (paragraph 10(b) of the July affidavit).”
“I am also required to explain what steps I still need to take in order to comply with the Order. I have, however, in what I have set out above, attempted in fact to comply with the Order in full. It follows that I do not intend to apply to discharge the Order. I now believe that I have complied so far as I am able.”
“I know nothing, so far as I can recall, about any of the transactions whereby US$300 million of AAA-rated investments were allegedly fraudulently transferred by the Bank to the BVI Defendants.”
“For the reasons referred to above I have no more information required by the Order to give. That should be an end to the matter, since I am told that the Court will not make orders in vain and, if I am subject to cross-examination I have nothing further to add to the evidence I have already provided in my Affidavit.”
“(a) As will be apparent from this affidavit and as I have maintained throughout, I had limited involvement in the Relevant Transactions and the time I spent dealing with these matters was minimal; (b) In light of the above, my recollection of these matters is, and has always been, very limited. I was previously unable to properly recall my involvement, not having reference to relevant contemporaneous documents. Before I was provided with the Bundles I only had access to a few isolated emails, selected by the Claimant to support its case that I was “intimately involved” with the Relevant Transactions. Whilst I knew this not to be the case, I did not recall the emails clearly and was unable to provide a proper explanation for them out of context;”
“136. This point is connected also with the inter-relation between this contempt application and the determination of the substantive issues pleaded against Mr Ereshchenko in respect of his alleged dishonest assistance in breaches of fiduciary duty. I have already set out the pleaded case. It is important to understand at the outset the consequence of deciding that Mr Ereshchenko had lied in the respects alleged in relation to the AAA Transactions. The allegation, in effect, is that Mr Ereshchenko did recall the details of the AAA Transactions, and could, therefore, have given further details about them, despite the absence of a great deal of contemporaneous documentation. Mr Smith argues, for reasons I shall come to, that it is obvious that Mr Ereshchenko must have recalled the AAA Transactions in December 2010. It is, of course, far more likely that the details of the AAA Transactions would have remained uppermost in Mr Ereshchenko’s mind if he was intimately involved with them as the Bank says he was. If I were to decide, therefore, that Mr Ereshchenko lied in saying he did not recall any details, I would be going a long way towards (if not actually) deciding that Mr Ereshchenko knew all about the AAA Transactions because he was a significant player in their creation and execution. The consequence would be that I would be taking a significant step (at least) towards deciding the issue in the action against him, namely whether he was liable for the dishonest assistance in a breach of fiduciary duty as claimed by the Bank.”
“139. I want next to consider Mr Smith’s important submission that, in the light of the events between the nationalisation of the Bank in February 2009 and December 2010, it is inconceivable that Mr Ereshchenko did not know a great deal more than he was prepared to say about the AAA Transactions. Mr Smith points to the series of events recorded in my chronology. He relies on the cataclysmic collapse of the Bank and the flight to London of Mr Ablyazov and Mr Solodchenko; on Mr Surapbergenov’s visit to London and the concerns he expressed; on the initiation of “intense” legal proceedings by the Bank about which Mr Ereshchenko admitted he knew; the fact that Mr Surapbergenov was sentenced to 7 years in prison in Kazakhstan; the closing down of Eastbridge due to these events; on the disappearance of his partner, Mr Udovenko in December 2009; and on a whole host of other catastrophic circumstances that led to the collapse of Mr Ereshchenko’s business activities as he had known them. Mr Smith then points to Mr Ereshchenko’s own evidence that he was frightened and panicked by the service of the Disclosure Order. He submitted that all this added up to an inevitability that he knew what it was all about. He must have recognised the names of the BVI Defendants and the Further Recipients, with which he had been involved, from the Disclosure Order itself, and must have known that he had dealt on their behalf with the AAA Transactions. Accordingly, when Mr Ereshchenko said he could not recall the AAA Transactions, he was, according to Mr Smith, deliberately lying. 140. This is a formidable case. Were it to be advanced after the court had determined at a trial that Mr Ereshchenko’s role in the AAA Transactions was pivotal or at least instrumental (as the Bank suggests) it might be conclusive. But, in my judgment, at this stage of the proceedings, it is just one element, albeit an important one, to consider when seeking to evaluate the evidence as a whole.”
“I have tried to see, in the case of each of the statements said to be a lie, whether there is material upon which I can be satisfied, so that I am sure, that Mr Ereshchenko’s statement was a lie.”
“143. One of the points with which I have found difficulty has been Mr Ereshchenko’s denial that he recognised the names of the BVI Defendants or the Further Recipients when he received the Disclosure Order. He said, as I have quoted above, that he struggled to match the names with Mr Surapbergenov’s transactions. I find it hard to accept that Mr Ereshchenko did not know what he was being asked about when he was served with the Disclosure Order. I say that because of the build up of disastrous events upon which Mr Smith relies, and because Mr Ereshchenko’s own December statement says that he has “no knowledge about the establishment of the BVI Defendants or the Further Recipients” indicating that he was familiar with those companies. Even if he did play a peripheral role in the AAA Transactions as he maintains, the documents show that he had relatively frequently seen the names of these companies in the headings to emails and in other documents. Even if he was not a central player, the Disclosure Order would surely have jogged his recollection. Moreover, the fact that Mr Ereshchenko was frightened and panicked when he got the Disclosure Order indicates to me that he knew that it signalled his involvement in the litigation that had caused his business to collapse and his colleagues to disappear. 144. This conclusion does not, however, lead inexorably, as Mr Smith submitted, to the conclusion that Mr Ereshchenko lied in the respects pleaded. Nor indeed that he lied about his recollection of the BVI Defendants. I rather think, as I put to the parties in closing submissions, that Mr Ereshchenko behaved like an ostrich. He knew that his worst fears had been realised when he received the Disclosure Order. He knew that he was becoming embroiled in the litigation that had engulfed his former colleagues, but he did not want to admit it, even to himself. In this context, his reaction was rather like the ostrich sticking its head in the sand – and in Mr Ereshchenko’s case, I think, not daring to look up in case his already frightening situation became worse. This was, I think, why he did not properly read the materials served by the Bank until much later, when in the lead up to the June cross-examination, he finally plucked up the courage to face his problems. 145. My view of events is, I think, confirmed by Mr Ereshchenko’s cultural and personal characteristics. He is undoubtedly an intelligent man. He is also very precise, even meticulous. Indeed, it seems that Mr Surapberganov used him specifically because he, unlike his colleagues, could get things done when they needed to be done. Moreover, I do not think what he says about his Soviet/Russian upbringing is to be ignored. I am sure that citizens are circumspect about dealings with courts and authorities in Russia, and I accept what Mr Ereshchenko has said repeatedly about not wishing to say anything unless he was sure it was right. This, I think, partly explains the unhelpful nature of the December statement. Mr Ereshchenko knows that he would have been better served if he had explained matters in more detail in his December statement, but he did not do so. I also think he was very ill-advised to make the December statement on10th December 2010 in such a rush, without coming back to the court on10th December 2010 (as I had specifically invited him to do) to ask for more time on the basis of a proper explanation of what had been done so far (to answer the 199 questions) and what needed to be done. 146. None of this, however, leads to the conclusion that the court can be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Ereshchenko deliberately lied in saying either that he had attempted to comply with the Disclosure Order in full so far as he was able, or that he knew nothing, as far as he could recall, about the AAA Transactions. If the second statement had stood entirely alone, I would not have thought it truthful (at least on the present evidence). But it did not. It has to be read with the December statement in which Mr Ereshchenko explains why he cannot recall the necessary details of the AAA Transactions. It must be remembered that he was not being asked to give a freestyle description of all he could remember about the AAA Transactions. He was being asked to answer a series of extremely detailed questions about specific transactions that had taken place some 2 to 2½ years before, and in respect of which he had no documents to hand. Mr Ereshchenko’s meticulous approach led him to say, truthfully as he saw it: if you ask me today whether I can tell you, without documents, who instructed the payment of $x by A to B on the nth June 2008, I simply cannot recall. I would not be surprised if he could not. And it is to be remembered that he is not charged with failure to answer the questions in the Disclosure Order, but only with falsely saying that he could recall nothing about the AAA Transactions – in the context of his December statement. 147. It is also to be remembered that in paragraphs 4-19 of his December statement, Mr Ereshchenko does explain the reasons why he said he could not recall the necessary details of the AAA Transactions. Of course, he would have been better to say that he would be pleased to help if the documents were provided – or even generally. But he did not, probably because of what he had seen had happened to his former colleagues and his obvious fear of what was going to happen next. 148. Taking all the evidence into account, I am wholly unable to conclude at this stage, beyond reasonable doubt or so that I am sure, that Mr Ereshchenko lied when he made these two statements, or that he made these statements without any belief in their truth. I think he was being careful about what he said – perhaps unduly careful – but that is a different thing. I do not rule out that, after a full trial, these statements may look different. But taking the matter today as I must, I cannot determine that Mr Ereshchenko committed a contempt of court by saying in December 2010 either that he had attempted to comply with the Disclosure Order in full so far as he was able, or that he knew nothing, as far as he could recall, about the AAA Transactions (in the context of his December statement).”
“149. Mr Smith’s point about this statement is that Mr Ereshchenko had had 2½ months since his December statement, that he had had more time to read the evidence produced by the Bank and the available contemporaneous documents and that he had had nothing much else to do. This analysis is not borne out by the evidence. Undoubtedly, the Bank had not left Mr Ereshchenko alone in the intervening period. It had restrained him from travelling, joined him in as a defendant to the action, searched Eastbridge, and applied to cross-examine him. Moreover, I think that Mr Ereshchenko was, by1st March 2011 , still somewhat in denial. He had not yet reached the position where he decided that he needed to face the Bank head-on, which was the position he reached by the June cross-examination at the latest. I, therefore, accept his evidence that he had, by1st March 2011 , still only read limited parts of the case against him – however stupid that was. 150. I can only repeat that Mr Ereshchenko is a careful man and was a careful witness. He made many mistakes, but I cannot be satisfied at this stage beyond reasonable doubt or so that I am sure that he lied when he said in his March statement that he had no more information relevant to the Disclosure Order and nothing further to add to the evidence provided in his December affidavit.”
“152. The question of whether Mr Ereshchenko had limited involvement in the AAA Transactions is a matter for the trial. I cannot say how the evidence will then look. Whether involvement is “limited” is anyway a matter of judgment. There is a legitimate range within which different people might use the word to describe different levels of involvement. The documents I have seen do show, as I have said, that others were certainly far more intimately involved in the AAA Transactions. It will be for the Judge at trial to decide what Mr Ereshchenko did and whether that amounted to a culpable involvement or not. Once that decision is made, this question may look different. 153. The same comments can properly be made about the question of the truthfulness of Mr Ereshchenko’s statement in July 2011 that his recollection of the AAA Transactions is and always has been very limited. As I put to Mr Smith on the first day of the committal hearing, it is always going to be difficult, without hard evidence of what a witness recalled at a particular time, to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he lied when he claimed to have a poor recollection. There was no hard evidence that Mr Ereshchenko actually recalled more about the AAA Transactions than he was saying either in July 2011, March 2011 or indeed in December 2010.”
“159. Both parties to this application have treated the committal application somewhat like a state trial. I formed the view early on in the hearing that they had got it rather out of proportion. A committal of this kind needs to be clear – beyond reasonable doubt. Finely balanced judgments about a witnesses’ state of knowledge at particular times against the backdrop of years of complex documentation have no sensible place in such an application. 160. All that said, nothing that I have said in this judgment should be taken as determining anything finally in the action. If the Bank had left this committal application over until after the trial, things might, as I have repeatedly said, have looked different. I know not. 161. I am, however, quite clear that, on the present evidence, the Bank has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Ereshchenko lied in any of the 8 specific respects that it particularised. Put shortly, I cannot now be sure that Mr Ereshchenko knew more about the AAA Transactions than he was saying in his December statement, nor that he had not answered any of the 199 specific questions in the Disclosure Order as far as he was able at the time. Nor can I now be sure that he knew he had access to documents that might have helped him respond. [That comment is relevant to the three allegations of contempt which are not pursued on this appeal.] 162. As I have tried to explain in this judgment, Mr Ereshchenko’s approach in his December statement, December affidavit and March affidavit was not helpful. He would have done much better to have explained more and to have offered to help the Bank to ascertain the answers to their questions – particularly the few that they really wanted to know the answers to, like where the US$45 million left in Bubris had ended up. Mr Ereshchenko’s fright and panic did not help the situation, and I am convinced that his ostrich-like response was itself the cause of much of what happened. 163. Since the July affidavit (in July 2011), Mr Ereshchenko has been rather more forthcoming, and I have seen no evidence that leads me to believe that there is presently any evidence tending to show that the recent explanations he has given have not been accurate. 164. If the Bank wishes to pursue its case against Mr Ereshchenko, it must prepare for trial. There is no evidence that Mr Ereshchenko obtained any money from the alleged fraud in relation to the AAA Transactions, but that does not mean that he may not be liable for dishonest assistance in breaches of fiduciary duty. Nothing I have said in this judgment based on exiguous evidence should be taken by either party as being a comment either way on the substantive issues. They are for another day.”
“It is only in exceptional circumstances that an appellate court should reverse a finding by a trial judge on a question of fact (and particularly on the state of mind of a party) when the judge has had the advantage of seeing the party giving evidence in the witness box. Therefore I do not think that it would have been right for the Court of Appeal in this case to have come to a different conclusion from the judge and to have held that Mr Leach was dishonest in that when he transferred the moneys to Mr Yardley he knew that his conduct was dishonest by the standards of responsible and honest solicitors.”
“The need for appellate caution in reversing the judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance … of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation.”
“Therefore, while the wording of this statement [i.e. the statement which is the subject of the charge] is perhaps unclear, my intention in making the statement was to convey the fact that I could not at that time recall anything in relation to the specific transactions/transfers set out in the schedule[s] to the Disclosure Order because, as explained above, I did not recognise them.”