"We agreed that NGS was to be a special purpose vehicle, in other words that its only business would be the Gadget Shop, leaving those investing free to pursue other investments in the future. [WCC] would not have been interested in investing if we were not free to follow our other interests and pursue other deals unhampered."
"(a) At present restrictions on what could be done o/s [outside] GS applied to all s/h [shareholders] - PW wanted the ability for us all to do other things so should only apply to JE. (b) Should be SPV for the deal - i.e. no deadlock break both sides have the ability to do other deals but would not commit GS unless we basically all agreed."
"I asked Mr Hunter why he wanted to move NGS to Glasgow. He told me that he did not intend "to be part time" and that he was putting his reputation on the line. He said that he wanted the management of NGS to be on his doorstep. He also told me that Mr Gorman often rang him up to 20 times a day about NGS business."
"Mr Gorman was either in tears or close to tears, the main shareholders were arguing and fighting with the executive team of the Gadget Shop, Jonathan Elvidge was being told how greedy he was. The whole meeting had broken down, my Lord. It was for me a very difficult meeting. I was not used to the displays of emotion and aggression. I though it could have been much better handled."
"I said to Mr Hunter that there was no point proceeding with the expansion plan and wasting money on it if the acquisition was to proceed. Mr Hunter agreed. Mr Hunter said that NGS was in the race to acquire [Birthdays]. He said things were going well in the negotiations which were continuing and that the shareholders in [Birthdays] were keen to sell. We agreed that NGS would pursue the acquisition and that the expansion plan would be put on hold."
"In the 6 months January 2004 - June 2004 we would look at rationalising the support functions across the business. This would include : a. Closing gadgetshop distribution centre in Hull and moving the operation to Bury b. Reducing the Birthdays head office administration head count to 95 which, together with gadgetshop's 45 personnel, would provide a support team of 140 [£1.5million sales per Birthdays employee compared to Clinton Cards£1.9million ] c. Relocating administration staff to gadgetshop CSO in Glasgow"
"1. to buy your client's shares to be valued as at the end of August 2003 as if NGS had then purchased [Birthdays] at the price [WCC] in fact paid for it…. Alternatively 2. your client will be given the opportunity to "follow his money" and fund his share of the acquisition costs of [Birthdays] in order that NGS can acquire [Birthdays] on the same basis as originally acquired by [WCC]"
"5.1 Unless the Shareholders holding in excess of 65% of the issued Shares otherwise agree in writing the Shareholders shall exercise their power in relation to the Company so as to ensure that: ……… all business of the Company, other than routine day-to-day business specifically delegated to the Managing Director in writing, is undertaken and transacted by the Board; the business of the Company is carried on pursuant to policies laid down from time to time by the Board; ………. (i) the company does not make any material change in the nature of its business as carried on from time to time or commence any new business not being ancillary or incidental to such business; the Company does not arrange any overdraft or other borrowing facilities; ………. (l) the Company does not increase, alter or in any way reorganise any part of the share capital of the Company; ……… (n) the Company does not acquire or invest in another company or business or incorporate any subsidiary; ………. 5.2 The expression "the Company" where used in Clause 5.1 shall be deemed to include each of the other companies (if any) in the Company's Group from time to time to the intent and effect that the provisions of Clause 5.1 shall apply in relation to each such company as they apply in relation to the Company." c. Clause 7 dealing with promotion of NGS's business. Clause 7.1 provides: "
"If any provision of this Agreement is inconsistent with the Articles, this Agreement shall prevail and the Shareholders shall procure that such amendments are made to the Articles to remove such inconsistency." e. Clause 22 dealing with notices. "
"(1) A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial."
"In deciding what is fair or unfair for the purposes of s 459, it is important to have in mind that fairness is being used in the context of a commercial relationship. The articles of association are just what their name implies: the contractual terms which govern the relationships of the shareholders with the company and each other. They determine the powers of the board and the company in general meeting and everyone who becomes a member of a company is taken to have agreed to them. Since keeping promises and honouring agreements is probably the most important element of commercial fairness, the starting point in any case under s 459 will be to ask whether the conduct of which the shareholder complains was in accordance with the articles of association."
"This is not, to my mind, a case in which it can be said that conduct that was unfair to the petitioners was prejudicial to their interests because it resulted in a serious diminution of, or in serious jeopardy to, the value of their shares. Of course, the misuse by Mr Purslow of the company's money was reflected in its profit-and-loss account and to the extent that it reduced the company's profits or increased its losses, it reduced the value of the petitioners' shares. But it cannot have been a major cause of the diminution in the value of those shares. The reason why I have concluded that it was conduct unfairly prejudicial to the petitioners' interests is that it was inherently so. By its very nature the misapplication of a company's assets by those in control of its affairs for their own benefit or for the benefit of their family and friends, is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of minority shareholders….."
"Counsel for the petitioners asked: ‘If misconduct in the management of the company's affairs does not without more constitute unfairly prejudicial management, what extra ingredient is required?' In my judgment the distinction between misconduct and unfairly prejudicial management does not lie in the particular acts or omissions of which complaint is made, but in the nature of the complaint and the remedy necessary to meet it. It is a matter of perspective. The metaphor is not a supermarket trolley but a hologram. If the whole gist of the complaint lies in the unlawfulness of the acts or omissions complained of, so that it may be adequately redressed by the remedy provided by law for the wrong, the complaint is one of misconduct simpliciter. There is no need to assume the burden of alleging and proving that the acts or omissions complained of evidence or constitute unfairly prejudicial management of the company's affairs. It is otherwise if the unlawfulness of the acts or omissions complained of is not the whole gist of the complaint, so that it would not be adequately redressed by the remedy provided by law for the wrong. In such a case it is necessary to assume that burden, but it is no longer necessary to establish that the acts or omissions in question were unlawful, and a much wider remedy may be sought. A good illustration of the distinction is provided by Re a company (No 005287 of 1985)[1986] BCLC 68 . In that case the petitioners, who were minority shareholders, alleged that the respondent, who was the majority shareholder, had disposed of the company's assets in breach of his fiduciary duty to the company and in a manner which was unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the petitioner. Hoffmann J refused to strike out the petition, holding that the fact that the petitioners could have brought a derivative action did not prevent them seeking relief under s 459. Again, I respectfully agree. The very same facts may well found either a derivative action or a s 459 petition. But that should not disguise the fact that the nature of the complaint and the appropriate relief is different in the two cases. Had the petitioners' true complaint been of the unlawfulness of the respondent's conduct, so that it would be met by an order for restitution, then a derivative action would have been appropriate and a s 459 petition would not. But that was not the true nature of the petitioners' complaint. They did not rely on the unlawfulness of the respondent's conduct to found their cause of action; and they would not have been content with an order that the respondent make restitution to the company. They relied on the respondent's unlawful conduct as evidence of the manner in which he had conducted the company's affairs for his own benefit and in disregard of their interests as minority shareholders; and they wanted to be bought out. They wanted relief from mismanagement, not a remedy for misconduct. When the petitioners launched the present proceedings, they wrongly believed that Mr Richmond was managing the affairs of the company in a manner which disregarded their interests and those of the creditors generally. That was a perfectly proper complaint to bring under s 27. Long before the case came to trial, however, it had become a simple action for professional negligence and nothing more. That, if established, would amount to misconduct; but it would neither constitute nor evidence unfairly prejudicial management. In my judgment it would be a misuse of language to describe an administrator who has managed the company's affairs fairly and impartially and with a proper regard for the interests of all the creditors (and members where necessary), conscientiously endeavouring to do his best for them, but who has through oversight or inadvertence fallen below the standards of a reasonably competent insolvency practitioner in the carrying out of some particular transaction, as having managed the affairs of the company in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the creditors."
"The phrase "fiduciary duties" is a dangerous one, giving rise to a mistaken assumption that all fiduciaries owe the same duties in all circumstances. That is not the case. Although, so far as I am aware, every fiduciary is under a duty not to make a profit from his position (unless such profit is authorised), the fiduciary duties owed, for example, by an express trustee are not the same as those owed by an agent. Moreover, and more relevantly, the extent and nature of the fiduciary duties owed in any particular case fall to be determined by reference to any underlying contractual relationship between the parties. Thus, in the case of an agent employed under a contract, the scope of his fiduciary duties is determined by the terms of the underlying contract. Although an agent is, in the absence of contractual provision, in breach of his fiduciary duties if he acts for another who is in competition with his principal, if the contract under which he is acting authorises him so to do, the normal fiduciary duties are modified accordingly: see Kelly v Cooper [1993] A.C. 205, and the cases there cited. The existence of a contract does not exclude the co-existence of concurrent fiduciary duties (indeed, the contract may well be their source); but the contract can and does modify the extent and nature of the general duty that would otherwise arise."
"It is perhaps stated most highly against trustees or directors in the celebrated speech of Lord Cranworth L.C. in Aberdeen Railway v. Blaikie, where he said: "
"If a trustee or other fiduciary without authority makes a profit directly or indirectly from the use of property subject to the trust or other fiduciary relationship, or in the course of the fiduciary relationship and by reason of his fiduciary position, then he is not permitted to retain the profit."
"1319. The relevant principle in relation to companies was "forcefully expressed and elegantly explained" in the joint judgment of Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ in the High Court of Australia in Furs Ltd v Tomkies(1936) 54 CLR 583 at 592 as follows: "…..the inflexible rule that, except under the authority of a provision in the articles of association, no director shall obtain for himself a profit by means of a transaction in which he is concerned on behalf of the company unless all material facts are disclosed to the shareholders and by resolution a general meeting approves of his doing so or all the shareholders acquiesce. An undisclosed profit which a director derives from the execution of his fiduciary duties belongs in equity to the company. It is no answer to the application of the rule that the profit is of a kind which the company itself could not have obtained, or that no loss is caused to the company by the gain of the director. It is a principle resting upon the impossibility of allowing the conflict of duty and interest which is involved in the pursuit of private advantage in the course of dealing in a fiduciary capacity with the affairs of the company. If, when it is his duty to safeguard and further the interests of the company, he uses the occasion as a means of profit to himself, he raises an opposition between the duty he has undertaken and his own self interest, beyond which it is neither wise nor practicable for the law to look for a criterion of liability. The consequences of such a conflict are not discoverable. Both justice and policy are against their investigation." 1320. This passage was recently cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Gwembe Valley Development v Koshy (No. 3)[2004] 1 BCLC 131 , 146 at paragraph 44, who noted at paragraph 45 that this was "the same equitable doctrine of accountability for unauthorised profits as was applied by the House of Lords in Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver[1967] 2 AC 134 n." 1321. In Regal Hastings v. Gulliver the House of Lords stressed that the "no profit" rule applies even where the fiduciary has acted in good faith. As Lord Russell put it[1967] 2 AC 134 , 144: "
"The contract was accordingly taken over by this company, by whom the work was carried out and the profits made."
"……men who assume the complete control of a company's business must remember that they are not at liberty to sacrifice the interests which they are bound to protect, and, while ostensibly acting for the company, divert in their own favour business which should properly belong to the company they represent."
"Descending from the generality, the fiduciary relationship goes at least this far: a director or a senior officer.…. is precluded from obtaining for himself, either secretly or without the approval of the company (which would have to be properly manifested on full disclosure of the facts), any property or business advantage either belonging to the company or for which it has been negotiating; and especially is this so when the director or officer is a participant in the negotiations on behalf of the company… An examination of the case law in this Court and in the Courts of other like jurisdictions on the fiduciary duties of directors and senior officers shows the pervasiveness of an ethic in this area of the law. In my opinion, this ethic disqualifies a director or other senior officer from usurping for himself or diverting to another person or company with whom or with which he is associated a maturing business opportunity which his company is actively pursuing…"
"Therefore, I feel impelled to the conclusion that when the defendant embarked on this course of conduct of getting information … using that information and preparing those documents … and sending them off…, he was guilty of putting himself into the position in which his duty to his employers, the plaintiffs, and his own private interests conflicted and conflicted grievously. There being the fiduciary relationship I have described, it seems to me plain that it was his duty once he got this information to pass it to his employers and not to guard it for his own personal purposes and profit. He put himself into the position when his duty and his interests conflicted."
"Therefore, if the plaintiffs succeed they will get a profit which they probably would not have got for themselves had the defendant fulfilled his duty. If the defendant is allowed to keep that profit he will have got something which he was able to get solely by reason of his breach of fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs When one looks at the way the cases have gone over the centuries it is plain that the question whether or not the benefit would have been obtained but for the breach of trust has always been treated as irrelevant. I mentioned Keech v. Sandford a few moments ago and this fact will also be found emphasised if one looks at some of the speeches in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver (Note) [1967] 2 A.C. 134 though it is true, as was pointed out to me, that if one looks at some of the language used in the speeches in Regal such phrases as "he must account for any benefit which he obtains in the course of and owing to his directorship" will be found……. ………..It is an over-riding principle of equity that a man must not be allowed to put himself in a position in which his fiduciary duty and his interests conflict. The variety of cases where that can happen is infinite."
"In my judgment the underlying basis of the liability of a director who exploits after his resignation a maturing business opportunity of the company is that the opportunity is to be treated as if it were property of the company in relation to which the director had fiduciary duties. By seeking to exploit the opportunity after resignation he is appropriating for himself that property. He is just as accountable as a trustee who retires without properly accounting for trust property. In the case of the director he becomes a constructive trustee of the fruits of his abuse of the company's property, which he has acquired in circumstances where he knowingly had a conflict of interest, and exploited it by resigning from the company."
"In a case such as the present, where a fiduciary has exploited a commercial opportunity for his own benefit, the relevant question, in my judgment, is not whether the party to whom the duty is owed (the company, in the instant case) had some kind of beneficial interest in the opportunity: in my judgment that would be too formalistic and restrictive an approach. Rather, the question is simply whether the fiduciary's exploitation of the opportunity is such as to attract the application of the ["no conflicts"] rule."
"The law relating to the accountability of a director (or former director) for profits derived from the diversion of corporate opportunities is still developing. As the cases stand it is I think possible to draw the following conclusions: If a person diverts to himself a business opportunity while in office, he may be liable to account for profits under the "no conflict rule" or the "no profit rule" or both; The application of the "no conflict rule" does not depend on establishing that the company has a proprietary interest in the business opportunity that has been diverted; After a person ceases to be in office, he may be liable for the diversion of a business opportunity either under the "no profit rule"; or because the business opportunity itself is to be treated as the property of the company (in the sense of an intangible asset) and hence is treated for this purpose as trust property."
"As regards the use by a partner of information obtained by him in the course of the transaction of partnership business, or by reason of his connection with the firm, the principle is that if he avails himself of it for any purpose which is within the scope of the partnership business, or of any competing business, the profits of which belong to the firm, he must account to the firm for any benefits which he may have derived from such information, but there is no principle or authority which entitles a firm to benefits derived by a partner from the use of information for purposes which are wholly without the scope of the firm's business, nor does the language of Lord Justice Cotton in Dean v MacDowell warrant any such notion. By "information which the partnership is entitled to" is meant information which can be used for the purposes of the partnership. It is not the source of the information, but the use to which it is applied, which is important in such matters. To hold that a partner can never derive any personal benefit from information which he obtains as a partner would be manifestly absurd."
"The answer, however, to this claim is short and conclusive. It was no part of the business of [the firm] to promote or reconstruct companies, nor to advise them how to improve the management of them, All such matters were quite foreign to the business of [the firm]…..He never was in fact acting for his firm in this matter, nor did his partners ever suppose he was, or treat him as so acting…."
"This shows the limitation which must be kept in mind in considering the sense in which each partner is agent of the partnership, but does not assist the appellants. Mr Boardman continued to be in a fiduciary position up to and including the time when the shares were purchased (March 1959), and the scope of the trust concerning which his fiduciary relationship existed was not limited in the same way as a partnership carrying on a particular business. It cannot, in my opinion, be said that the purchase of shares in Lester & Harris was outside the scope of the fiduciary relationship in which Mr Boardman stood to the trust."
"Analogy was sought to be obtained from the case of Aas v Benham where it was said that before an agent is to be accountable the profits must be made within the scope of the agency (see Lindley LJ at 255-6). That, however, was a case of partnership where the scope of the partners' power to bind the partnership can be closely defined in relation to the partnership deed. In the present case the knowledge and information obtained by Boardman was obtained in the course of the fiduciary position in which he had placed himself….."
"This is an attractive argument, but it does not seem to me to give due weight to the fact that the appellants obtained both the information which satisfied them that the purchase of the shares would be a good investment and the opportunity of acquiring them as a result of acting for certain purposes on behalf of the trustees. Information is, of course, not property in the strict sense of that word [Lord Hodson (see at p107) did, however, refer to the confidential information as "property of the trust" and Lord Guest expressed a similar view (see at p115)] and, as I have already stated, it does not necessarily follow that because an agent acquired information and opportunity while acting in a fiduciary capacity he is accountable to his principals for any profit that comes his way as the result of the use he makes of that information and opportunity. His liability to account must depend on the facts of the case. "
"In the result, I am of opinion that the directors standing in a fiduciary relationship to Regal in regard to the exercise of their powers as directors, and having obtained these shares by reason and only by reason of the fact that they were directors of Regal and in the course of the execution of that office, are accountable for the profits which they have made out of them. The equitable rule laid down in Keech v Sandford and Ex parte James and similar authorities applies to them in full force."
"Prima facie an interest in a going concern ought to be valued at the date on which it is ordered to be purchased."
"The general trend of authority over the last 15 years appears to us to support that as the starting point, while recognising that there are many cases in which fairness (to one side or the other) requires the court to take another date. It would be wrong to try to enumerate all those cases but some of them can be illustrated by the authorities already referred to (i) Where a company has been deprived of its business, an early valuation date (and compensating adjustments) may be required in fairness to the claimant (Meyer). Where a company has been reconstructed or its business has changed significantly, so that it has a new economic identity, an early valuation date may be required in fairness to one or both parties (OC Transport, and to a lesser degree London School of Economics). But an improper alteration in the issued share capital, unaccompanied by any change in the business, will not necessarily have that outcome (DR Chemicals). Where a minority shareholder has a petition on foot and there is a general fall in the market, the court may in fairness to the claimant have the shares valued at an early date, especially if it strongly disapproves of the majority shareholder's prejudicial conduct (Cumana). But a claimant is not entitled to what the deputy judge called a one-way bet, and the court will not direct an early valuation date simply to give the claimant the most advantageous exit from the company, especially where severe prejudice has not been made out (Elgindata). All these points may be heavily influenced by the parties' conduct in making and accepting or rejecting offers either before or during the course of the proceedings (O'Neill v Phillips)."
"But the unfairness does not lie in the exclusion alone but in exclusion without a reasonable offer. If the respondent to a petition has plainly made a reasonable offer, then the exclusion as such will not be unfairly prejudicial and he will be entitled to have the petition struck out. It is therefore very important that participants in such companies should be able to know what counts as a reasonable offer."