“[b]ecome a leader in zero-emission flight, kick-starting commercialisation of UK sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), and developing a UK SAF mandate, to enable the delivery of 10% SAF by 2030, and we will be supporting UK industry with£180m funding to support the development of SAF plants.”
“We will address aviation emissions through new technology such as electric and hydrogen aircraft, the commercialisation of sustainable aviation fuels, increasing operational efficiencies, developing and implementing market-based measures and GHG removal methods, while influencing consumers to make more sustainable choices when flying.”
“40. Earlier this year we consulted on our Jet Zero Strategy, which will set out the steps we will take to reach net zero aviation emissions by 2050. We have also consulted on a target for UK domestic aviation to reach net zero by 2040. 41. We are supporting the development of new and zero carbon UK aircraft technology through the Aerospace Technology Institute (ATI) programme and fund zero emission flight infrastructure R&D at UK airports. As part of the Jet Zero ambition, the Aerospace Technology Institute (ATI) provides R&D funding, matched by industry, to support the design and development of new aerospace technologies, with particular focus on zero carbon technologies, that are most likely to grow the UK’s share in the global market. We are also investing£3 million in 2021/22 through the Zero Emission Flight Infrastructure competition to accelerate R&D into infrastructure requirements at airports and airfields to handle new forms of zero emission aircraft. 42. We will accelerate the commercialisation of UK sustainable aviation fuels (SAF). Our ambition is to enable delivery of 10% SAF by 2030 and we will be supporting UK industry with a£180 million funding to support the development of SAF plants. This builds on our recently launched£15 million Green Fuels, Green Skies competition. We will also establish a SAF clearing house, the first of its kind announced in Europe, to enable the UK to certify new fuels.”
“Demand management policies in place [in the early 2020s] to ensure emissions remain aligned with a net-zero emissions pathway, if efficiency and low-carbon fuels under-deliver”. ii) ‘The Sixth Carbon Budget: The UK’s Path to Net Zero’ (December 2020): this explained that the Balanced Net Zero Pathway was based on a gradual reduction in aviation emissions due to demand management, improved efficiency and a modest use of sustainable aviation fuels. The CCC referred to the difficulty, at that stage, of applying a fixed ratio of multiplier to estimate non-CO 2 emissions, but advised that aviation non-CO 2 warming should be capped by or before 2050 and that without such mitigation “this would require year-on-year demand growth to be reduced to essentially zero by or before 2050”. iii) ‘The Sixth Carbon Budget: Aviation’(December 2020): this advised: “Demand management policy should be implemented, as given expected developments in efficiency and SAF deployment, demand growth will need to be lower than baseline assumptions, and likely constrained to 25% growth by 2050 from 2018 levels for the sector to contribute to UK Net Zero. If efficiency or SAF do not develop as expected, further demand management will be required. Conversely, if efficiency and SAF develop quicker, it may be possible for demand growth to rise above 25%, provided that additional non-CO 2 effects are acceptable or can be mitigated. A demand management framework will therefore need to be developed and in place by the mid-2020s to annually assess and, if required, act as a backstop to control sector GHG emissions and non-CO 2 effects.” iv) ‘Progress in reducing emissions 2021 Report to Parliament’ (June 2021): this stated that the “[l]ack of ambition for aviation demand management would result in higher emissions of 6.4 MtCO 2e/year in 2030 relative to the CCC pathway for aviation emissions.”
“The Government’s announcements on aviation to date have not set any ambition to constrain aviation demand growth through policy, beyond vague proposals on carbon pricing, despite demand measures being one of the few interventions that lowers both CO 2 emissions and non-CO 2 effects from aviation. Given the risks outlined above, as well as risks of under-delivery on emissions reductions in other sectors, the Government should actively develop the option to implement policy to manage aviation demand.” vi) ‘Progress in reducing emissions 2023 Report to Parliament’(June 2023): the CCC highlighted the unaddressed risks in respect of sustainable aviation fuel, and that “insufficient policy has been brought forward to address demand management”
“Given demand management is an effective way of reducing aviation CO 2 and non-CO 2 emissions, demand policies could be viewed as an alternative measure for course correction.”
“The [JZS] sets a trajectory for the sector to reach net-zero by 2050 – or Jet Zero as we define it. Its delivery will see UK aviation emissions reduce even further than the levels called for by our climate advisors – with a pathway that should see emissions never-again reach the pre-pandemic levels of 2019. To deliver this outcome, alongside our Jet Zero target we aim for domestic aviation and airports to be net zero and zero-emission respectively by 2040. It is a strategy that will both decarbonise the sector and allow people to keep flying. Pre-pandemic, aviation contributed at least£22 billion to our economy and 230,000 direct jobs across the country. It is crucial that we support the rapid development of technologies that maintain the benefits of air travel whilst maximising the opportunities that decarbonisation brings to the UK. Those opportunities include the domestic production of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), which could support up to 5,200 jobs by 2035 and help regenerate industrial sites across the country, notably in areas outside London, such as the North-East, contributing to levelling up the UK and improving our fuel security. We have today set out a new commitment of having at least five commercial SAF plants under construction by 2025, and we have also confirmed that the Government will mandate at least 10% SAF to be blended into conventional aviation fuels by the end of the decade – one of the most ambitious targets globally. Bolstering that effort means investing in pioneering projects. This is why today we are also launching the Advanced Fuels Fund with a£165 million competition, building on previous funding, such as the£15m Green Fuels, Green Skies competition, to stimulate the start-up of commercial SAF production facilities in the UK. Alongside this, we have also announced that we are progressing to the next phase of our£1 million competition to deliver the first ever net zero transatlantic flight powered by 100% SAF. […] The Jet Zero strategy will future proof the aviation industry, securing the economic benefits of new green jobs and industries, and delivering the technologies and fuels that will keep passengers flying in a decarbonised world.”
“The approach set out in this Strategy is aligned with the Net Zero Strategy (NZS), Transport Decarbonisation Plan (TDP), and Flightpath to the Future. The NZS set out our economy-wide plan for achieving net zero by 2050, for meeting our carbon budgets and Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement. The TDP set out the Government’s commitments and actions needed to decarbonise the entire transport system. The Flightpath to the Future set out our strategic framework for the aviation sector, which focusses on establishing a modern, innovative, and efficient sector over the next ten years with decarbonisation and sustainability key priorities. The Jet Zero Strategy builds on these three documents setting out our framework and plans for decarbonising aviation.”
“35. When developing the JZS, the ambition at the time was to go further than the NZS and set a world-leading, ambitious goal of net zero emissions from the aviation sector by 2050. It was produced in addition to the TDP, FTTF, and NZS to address the complex issues involved in decarbonising aviation. The Government considers aviation a “hard to abate sector” due to the time it takes to adapt the design and operation of aircraft, and the relatively nascent and costly nature of technologies needed to decarbonise. The international nature of the aviation sector is an additional challenge, and the global development of fuels, technologies and infrastructure is necessary to support the aims of the UK sector to achieve its net zero goal. All this also helps to understand why aviation emissions were excluded from the 2050 target in the CCA. 36. The JZS recognised, however, that air travel provides significant social benefits that must be considered in the context of aviation decarbonisation. This includes visiting distant friends and relatives, providing a range of holiday destinations and broadening people’s cultural experiences. It also recognised that aviation is a major contributor to the UK economy, stating: “Before COVID-19, it facilitated£95.2 billion of UK’s non-EU trade exports; contributed at least£22 billion directly to GDP; directly provided at least 230,000 jobs across all regions of the country and underpins the competitiveness and global reach of our national and our regional economies.” 37. In balancing these complexities and important competing benefits during the development of the JZS, the SST also considered the advice provided by the CCC in their various reports between 2020 and 2022, in particular the CCC’s advice that DDM measures would be required to achieve sufficient reductions in aviation emissions, as well as its advice on measuring and limiting non-CO 2 emissions, and on no net expansion of UK airport capacity unless the aviation sector was on track to its net zero goals. The SST accepted various aspects of the CCC's advice and a number of their recommendations, but rejected the advice on DDM, for reasons I discuss below.” “Before COVID-19, it facilitated£95.2 billion of UK’s non-EU trade exports; contributed at least£22 billion directly to GDP; directly provided at least 230,000 jobs across all regions of the country and underpins the competitiveness and global reach of our national and our regional economies.”
“70. As I state above (§37), when deciding upon the approach to take to DDM measures, the SST had regard to the advice provided by the CCC that DDM measures would be required to achieve sufficient reductions in aviation emissions. It is of note, in this regard, that the CCC’s ‘Balanced Pathway’ and the JZS ‘High Ambition Scenario’ share much of the same underlying assumptions. The aviation pathway developed by the CCC uses the Department’s aviation model. The CCC’s baseline passenger numbers, airport capacities and underlying economic assumptions are consistent with those in the JZS (subject to the limited updates made to the aviation model prior to the JZS further technical consultation). 71. The CCC’s ‘Balanced Pathway’ differs from the JZS in three ways. First, it is based on limiting passenger growth to 25% above 2018 levels, in line with their recommendations, against a baseline of 64% growth. Second, it assumed a different level of SAF uptake (the CCC assumes a 25% SAF uptake by 2050, rising to 95% in their Tailwinds scenario, while the JZS ‘High Ambition Scenario’ reaches 50% in 2050). Third, it does not make any assumption about the uptake of zero emission aircraft. 72. All assumptions in the JZS, including those regarding the uptake of SAF and zero emissions aircraft, where the Department’s assessment differs from that of the CCC, were based on evidence and subsequent analysis and assessments conducted by departmental experts. Some of the evidence utilised in the JZS assumptions was not available at the time the CCC carried out its analysis to establish its ‘Balanced Pathway’. The assumptions on the uptake of SAF and zero emission aircraft in the High Ambition scenario, and justifications for these assumptions, are set out in each of the analytical documents accompanying the 2021 Consultation, the JZS further technical consultation and the final JZS. 73. The CCC’s Sixth Carbon Budget advice, published in December 2020, was one of several evidence sources considered when formulating the approach to the JZS consultation. The CCC’s report considers a wide range of potential SAF uptakes across its five scenarios, ranging from 5% to 95% in 2050. Therefore, the JZS High Ambition assumption of 50% in 2050 is well within this range. The CCC’s report did not include analysis on zero emission aircraft as the Department’s aviation model, also used by the CCC, did not have the capability to model these aircraft types prior to the JZS analysis. Referring to electric and hydrogen aircraft, their report states that “2050 penetrations of these options are likely to be limited, or they could occupy small niches”. 74. However, ultimately the assumptions used in the JZS analysis were the result of technical judgements made by experienced analysts working within the Department, following significant engagement through the two consultation exercises. Alongside the CCC’s report, a range of other evidence sources were considered, some of which were published after the CCC’s report, including the Air Transport Action Group’s (ATAG) Waypoint 2050 report (published September 2020), the Destination 2050 report (published February 2021), the International Air Transport Association’s (IATA) Technology Roadmap (published 2019), Sustainable Aviation’s roadmap (published 2019), Clean Sky 2’s report into hydrogen-powered aviation (published May 2020), and news and press releases from relevant companies such as ZeroAvia and Airbus. 75. These matters supported the view of officials, and ultimately the SST’s decision, that it was not necessary for the proposed JZS to include DDM measures, in contrast to the approach recommended by the CCC.”
“That you agree we must address the issue of ‘demand management’ in the Transport Decarbonisation Plan (TDP) and Net Zero Aviation Consultation (NZAC), that it is currently credible to reject measures to directly limit demand for flights or passenger numbers,if this is done alongside consulting on a position that stronger demand management policies are deployed as a “back stop” or “last resort” in the event our technology-focussed approach is proven to be off-track; this will assure our approach is more robust, and galvanise action on our priority technology measures.”
“3. ‘Demand management’ is a widely recognised and used term to describe a spectrum of actions to moderate the number of flights/passengers. Annex 1 illustrates this broad range. 4. In their Carbon Budget 6 advice, the CCC made two demand-related recommendations: that we operate a 'no net expansion of UK airport capacity policy, and that 'demand is constrained to 25% growth by 2050 from 2018 levels'. To reduce carbon emissions France recently announced their intention to ban internal flights where train alternatives under 2.5 hours exist, and 80% of members of the UK Climate Assembly in 2020 supported a tax on frequent flyers to do the same. There is public and industry interest in the UK's approach. 5. The TDP and NZAC will set out how we will achieve net zero aviation, and the associated co-benefits on noise and air quality. Given (1) advice of the CCC, (2) requests for clarity from the sector, (3) that expansion plans for the 21 biggest airports see capacity growth of up to 67% by 2050, (4) suggestions of public support and (5) action from international partners on domestic flights, we believe the UK must set out its position on this issue.”
“6. We do not recommend adopting the approach suggested by the CCC to immediately limit airport expansion or directly constrain passenger growth. Covid has had a significant impact on the aviation sector and may well lead to lower long-term demand forecasts as a result. Now is not the time to be announcing further curbs on the sector. 7. Crucially, there are alternatives. The CCC's "Widespread Innovation" scenario sees greater emissions reductions than their "Balanced Pathway" despite double the demand growth, because of greater uptake of decarbonisation technologies. Sustainable Aviation's 2020 Roadmap sees net zero reached in 2050 with a 65% increase in demand. A similar European study saw net zero reached with just 8% residual emissions, with no direct demand constraint. Rather than an overly precautionary approach that seeks to limit demand now - at significant economic and social cost - we advocate for a technology- focused approach, to accelerate the transition to zero and net zero emission flight. 8. To support this, we recommend consulting on deploying measures that constrain supply as a 'last resort', only to be used if both (a) the sector was proven to be off-track in delivering the emissions reductions we need, and (b) there were no other intervention options to reduce emissions. This has two advantages by ensuring: a. A credible pathway to net-zero: Technology-led pathways are promising, but there is no guarantee of success. The technologies we need - sustainable aviation fuels, zero emission aircraft, and greenhouse gas removal technologies - are all at an early stage; and we cannot guarantee they will deliver the carbon savings required. Retaining the option of further managing demand if the technology does not deliver will strengthen the credibility and robustness of our net zero pathway, and moderate some criticism of us not taking on board the CCC's advice, and lagging behind our international partners. b. Ensuring sector-wide focus on technology led net-zero: for the technology-led approach to succeed, it will need all parts of the aviation sector to play their part: aerospace manufacturers, airports and airlines. Knowing that a lack of decarbonisation progress may limit their growth potential will incentivise progress, galvanise efforts and ensure such a backstop is never required. Without certainty on the government's position, parts of the sector may feel immune to their decarbonisation obligations. 9. Ministers have removed references to a demand 'backstop' or 'last resort' from submissions on the TOP and NZAC. However, describing interventionist demand management measures as a 'last resort' has been suggested by Jet Zero Council CEO (and Heathrow COO) Emma Gilthorpe, who views it as proportionate for a responsible Government committed to its climate change targets. It is also favoured by the pan-sector Sustainable Aviation partnership. Whilst neither want to see Government restrict demand, they are concerned that without reference to it as a 'last resort', our plans will not be seen as credible, and the sector will not sufficiently focus on making the transition. We agree.”
“It is a strategy that will deliver the requirement to decarbonise aviation, and the benefits of doing so, whilst allowing the sector to thrive, and hardworking families to continue to enjoy their annual holiday abroad; we want Britons to continue to have access to affordable flights, allowing them to enjoy holidays, visit friends and family overseas and to travel for business. Decarbonising, whilst retaining the connectivity we cherish and preserving our aviation sector means we must act quickly to revolutionise the technologies needed across the aviation industry: develop cleaner aircraft, produce and use more sustainable fuels, and make our airspace and airports more efficient. This is your opportunity to help shape our strategy and give your perspective on how we decarbonise the aviation sector whilst continuing to benefit from the connectivity, jobs and economic benefits it provides.”
“1.1 Aviation and the UK go hand in hand. We were pioneers of early flight, and the sector has long been at the heart of our economic success. It is vital for trade and the distribution of goods, creates jobs, connects friends and family, and – crucially for an island nation – links us to the rest of the world. Flight is essential for our Global Britain ambitions of openness as a society and an economy. 1.2 The importance of aviation to the UK is why we are supporting the sector through the COVID-19 pandemic – by the end of September 2021, the air transport sector (airlines, airports, and related services) will have benefited from around£7bn of government support. But we know that the virus has had a devastating effect, and our airports, airlines and aircraft manufacturers are all feeling the financial impact of reduced demand.”
“2.1 The aim of our strategy is for aviation to decarbonise in a way that preserves the benefits of air travel and delivers clean growth of the UK sector by maximising the opportunities that decarbonisation can bring.”
“3.39 Flying is a social and economic good, and one that we wholeheartedly support as a key part of building a Global Britain; our strategy will focus on decarbonising aviation and delivering sustainable flying for everyone. This Government is committed to tackling the CO 2 emissions from flights, whilst preserving the ability for people to fly. 3.40 COVID-19 has devastated passenger numbers over the short-term, and we do not yet know what the longer-term effects on demand might be. Only as the pandemic continues to come under control and consumer confidence returns, will we begin to understand how it will affect the sector over the longer-term. 3.41 Nonetheless, even if the sector returns to a pre-COVID-19 demand trajectory, as we have assumed in our analysis, we currently believe the sector can achieve Jet Zero without the Government needing to intervene directly to limit aviation growth. The industry's need to rebuild from a lower base is likely to mean that plans for airport expansion will be slower to come forward. Our analysis shows that there are scenarios that can achieve similar or greater CO 2 reductions to those in the CCC’s Balanced Pathway(which limits growth to 25% by 2050 compared to 2018 levels compared to a baseline of 65% growth) by focussing on new fuels and technology, with the knock-on economic and social benefit, rather than capping demand.”
“We are working to address non-CO 2 impacts in the following ways: • Many of the measures to improve efficiencies, rollout SAF, and accelerate zero emission flight are expected to have a positive impact on reducing non-CO 2 emissions and effects. Where there is evidence to the contrary, we will carefully consider the overall impact on the climate. • We are improving our understanding of the impact of the non-CO 2 emissions and will ensure that the latest scientific understanding of aviation non-CO 2 effects is used to inform our policy. • ICAO now has standards in place to regulate all aircraft emissions with significant climate effects. We will continue to negotiate for these to be improved over time as well as consideration of other measures such as operational guidance and regulation of fuel composition. • We will consider the outcomes of EUROCONTROL’s Contrail Prevention Trial and whether it would be beneficial to undertake similar trials in the UK in the future.”
“This approach to modelling capacity was consistent with the EAD to the JZS analytical annex, which was published at the same time as the JZS. In the JZS analytical annex, the assumptions on passenger demand were higher than those in the EAD. This is due to the significant aviation model development that occurred between the two publications and the updated carbon price assumptions that were introduced in the Jet Zero further technical consultation 2022. In the JZS analytical annex, passenger numbers in Scenario 1 were 74% higher in 2050 than 2018 and in scenarios 2, 3 and 4 they were 70% higher.”
“We expect the approach set out in this draft strategy could impact demand for aviation indirectly. Where new fuels and technologies are more expensive than their fossil-fuel equivalents, and where the cost of CO 2 emissions are correctly priced into business models, we expect, as with any price rise, a moderation of demand growth.”
“There were no direct demand management proposals included in the Jet Zero Consultation, however, these measures were raised in response to many of the questions asked. Responses from the aviation industry were largely supportive of the proposals set out in the consultation; however, there was significant challenge from individual respondents and some organisations regarding the lack of direct demand management proposals, which were perceived as measures which could have a more immediate effect on reducing emissions from aviation. The most frequently raised subjects were airport expansion, with references to the Government's Airports National Policy Statement and its Making Best Use of Existing Runways policies; a frequent flyer levy; taxing aviation fuel and adding VAT to ticket sales. Encouraging more sustainable modes of transport, such as travelling by rail rather than via domestic flights, was also a common theme. These responses often referenced the CCC’s Balanced Net Zero Pathway for aviation where growth is restricted to 25% by 2050 compared to 2018 levels, compared to unconstrained growth of around 65% over the same period. Respondents suggested a further scenario could be included in the final Jet Zero Strategy, which explored the impacts of reduced demand.”
“Some responses to both consultations raised the need to also consider non-CO 2 emissions from aviation. We recognise that both the CO 2 emissions and non-CO 2 impacts of aviation affect the climate, and through the Jet Zero Strategy we have set out our commitments to develop our understanding and potential mitigations of these impacts. Although CO 2 makes up the vast majority of GHG emissions for aviation, the illustrative scenarios presented in the Jet Zero Strategy are expressed as CO 2e which includes emissions from other GHGs such as methane (CH 4) and nitrous oxide (N 2O). The analysis does not currently take into account the effects of other non-CO 2 impacts such as contrails and Nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions due to the current uncertainties around their scale, and a lack of a clear methodology to monitor the non-CO 2 impacts of aviation. However, we continue to work closely with academia and industry as the scientific understanding develops in this area, and will consider introducing a methodology to monitor these impacts as the evidence becomes available. As before, our five-year reviews will enable us to update our modelling, which could include analysis of non-CO 2 impacts as and when the science allows.”
“Whilst we did not consult on any direct demand management measures through either the Jet Zero consultation or further technical consultation, this theme was raised regularly by respondents to every question posed. The aviation sector is important for the whole of the UK economy in terms of connectivity, direct economic activity, trade, investment and jobs. Before COVID-19, it facilitated£95.2bn of UK’s non-EU trade exports; contributed at least£22bn directly to GDP; and directly provided at least 230,000 jobs across all regions of the country. The Government remains committed to growth in the aviation sector where it is justified and to working with industry to ensure a sustainable recovery from the pandemic. Our analysis set out in the Jet Zero further technical consultation shows that the aviation sector can achieve Jet Zero without the Government needing to intervene directly to limit aviation growth, with scenarios that can achieve our net zero targets by focusing on new fuels and technology, with knock-on economic and social benefits, without limiting demand. Our “High ambition” scenario, has residual emissions of 19.3 MtCO 2e in 2050, compared to 23 MtCO 2e residual emissions in the CCC’s Balanced Pathway. We recognise that to achieve this trajectory we will need to see significant investment in, and uptake of, new technologies and operational processes and the Government is committed to working with the sector to ensure we achieve our aims. Furthermore, our analysis includes updated airport capacity assumptions consistent with known expansion plans at UK airports and where our forecasting suggests higher demand in the future. Airport growth has a key role to play in boosting our global connectivity and levelling up in the UK. The Government is, and remains, supportive of airport expansion where it can be delivered within our environmental obligations. Our existing policy frameworks for airport planning - the ANPS and MBU - provide a robust and balanced framework for airports to grow sustainably within our strict environmental criteria. We do not, therefore, consider restrictions on airport growth to be a necessary measure. Although our strategy does not include direct demand management measures, in our updated "High ambition" scenario, the demand impact of carbon pricing results in 27% of abatement in 2050, demonstrating how our economy-wide carbon pricing schemes deliver significant carbon savings and act to moderate demand. Many respondents expressed their support for a frequent flyer levy (FFL) as the primary tax on the aviation sector. As part of the Treasury’s consultation on aviation tax reform, the Government sought views on whether an FFL could replace APD as the principal tax on the aviation sector. In the responses received to the consultation, the Government received a wide range of views on this, which it considered carefully. Following the consultation, the Government published a response which outlined that it was minded to retain APD as the principal tax on the aviation sector, noting particular continuing concerns around the possible administrative complexity and data processing, handling and privacy of an FFL. The Chancellor also announced a package of APD reforms to be introduced from April 2023 that aim to bolster air connectivity within the Union and further align the tax with the Government’s environmental objectives. …. Our Jet Zero Strategy confirms our approach to supporting consumers to make sustainable travel choices, restates our commitment to global leadership in decarbonising the aviation sector, and emphasises the work we will do with industry and academia to achieve our Jet Zero goals. It also shows our commitment to scaling up the UK SAF industry, and confirms that we will continue to support industrial R&D through the ATI Programme through funding. These policies demonstrate our commitment to tackling climate change and delivering Jet Zero. As a responsible government, and given the nascent nature of the technologies required to decarbonise aviation, we have committed to reviewing our strategy every five years and adapting our approach based on progress made. We will measure progress against our emissions reduction trajectory and key performance indicators which have been set out across each of our policy measures in the Jet Zero Strategy.”
“Against the backdrop of the CCC’s 2023 Progress Report, and the Department’s intention to keep the JZS under review (as reflected in One year on), as well as the ongoing JZS1 litigation, the SST indicated that he would like to reconsider with an open mind DDM policy options, as well as JZS consultation responses, and relevant developments and literature since the JZS consultation, including the CCC’s advice, in order to take a new decision on whether DDM should form part of our approach to decarbonising aviation.”
“Issue 1. This submission provides advice on direct demand management (DDM) in the context of the Jet Zero Strategy (JZS) and the Climate Change Committee's (CCC) latest report, and seeks your view on whether officials should further develop policy options on DDM. Recommendation 2. That you: Note the CCC's latest progress report to Parliament and their references to and recommendations on aviation DDM (Annex A and B). Note the implications for our JZS from updated DfT modelling and the most prominent and relevant external literature since the publication of the JZS (Annex C). Consider the factual summary of JZS consultation responses that relate to DDM (Annex D), the published summary of consultation responses and government response (Annex E) and the summary of potential DDM policy options (Annex F). Agree that based on the latest evidence, we should continue to pursue the approach set out in the JZS and provide a steer on whether officials should further develop policy options on DDM either as part of the regular JZS review process or sooner. Background 3. The JZS has been criticised by environmental groups and members of the public for failing to incorporate policy measures on DDM. They suggest Government should have followed the CCC's advice in their Sixth Carbon Budget report, which states that DDM measures should be implemented to limit aviation growth to 25% by 2050 compared to 2018 levels (with unconstrained growth projected at ~65% over the same period). We are defending two judicial review claims against the JZS, which include grounds relating to the CCC's advice, and that the then SoS had a "closed mind" in relation to DDM. 4. The CCC criticised the lack of a demand management framework in the JZS in their June 2022 Annual Report to Parliament. In their 2023 Progress Report on 28 June, they reiterate their position that the JZS is high-risk due to its reliance on nascent technology and make the same core recommendations to introduce measures on DDM as the most effective way of reducing aviation's CO 2 emissions. They again recommend development of policy options to address aviation demand, including 'no airport expansion without a UK-wide capacity-management framework'. Considerations 5. The CCC's latest Progress Report provides an opportunity to further consider DDM in our approach to decarbonising aviation, particularly given the high degree of uncertainty within our JZS. This uncertainty derives from many technologies required to decarbonise aviation being in early development, and the intentionally ambitious assumptions made in the JZS about their contribution to emission reductions. 6. We have reviewed the most prominent literature since publication, which demonstrates that our assumptions relating to different technologies continue to be towards the upper end of what is likely to be feasible. We do not consider that any literature reviewed as part of this exercise, including the CCC's most recent report, represent material changes that would require a further public consultation on the JZS. 7. We have also recently updated our modelling, which continues to show that Jet Zero could be achieved under more pessimistic assumptions about future technologies, without the use of DDM. This indicates that our strategy remains reasonable, although given the inherent uncertainty, our approach will continue to reflect a balanced judgement call. The analytical assurance rating is medium. Details of the literature review and our updated modelling, along with an analytical assurance statement are at Annex C. 8. The responses to the JZS consultations relating to DDM should also be considered. The key themes are at Annex D, which largely focussed on preventing unconstrained growth, taxation measures and supporting domestic rail routes. It should be noted that most responses from the aviation industry did not advocate DDM as with the right support, they considered that measures set out in the consultation would be sufficient to meet Jet Zero. Annex E includes the full published summary of responses and government response. 9. Taking these responses and wider literature into account, we have also developed a list of potential DDM policy options that could be taken forward, covering: management of airport capacity; aviation tax measures; and modal shift. This is provided at Annex F. 10. You will want to consider all of the information in this submission and annexes carefully, and specifically note the ongoing uncertainty relating to the development of technologies and fuels needed to decarbonise aviation. On balance, we recommend that you agree we should continue pursuing the approach set out in the JZS as we consider that our underpinning assumptions remain reasonable. We request you also provide a steer on whether we should further develop policy options on DDM as part of the regular JZS review process or sooner. We have committed to reviewing progress against our emissions reduction trajectory annually from 2025, and our overall strategy every five years. 11. Legal Issues: The legal issues relating to this submission are at Annex G. 12. Public Sector Equality Duty: An equality analysis for the JZS was carried out (Annex H), which includes considerations of the impact of DDM. It identified that there may be some indirect impacts to people or groups in relation to the protected characteristics of age, disability, and race, as well as local population demographics. A further assessment has not been undertaken at this stage, as the policy proposal has not been developed further since the commitment was made in the JZS. However, the public sector equality duty is a continuing duty and further equality assessments will be undertaken during the development of policy options on DDM if you provide this steer.”
“The Secretary of State, Minister Norman and Baroness Vere have reviewed this submission and agreed, based on the latest evidence, the Department should continue to pursue the approach set out in the Jet Zero Strategy. They also agreed that no further policy development on DDM was required at this time. The Secretary of State, Minister Norman and Baroness Vere have considered the factual summary of JZS consultation responses that related to DDM, the published summary of consultation responses and Government response and the summary of potential direct demand management policy options. They have also noted the CCC's latest progress report to Parliament (including references to and recommendations on aviation DDM) and implications for the JZS from updated DfT modelling and the most prominent and relevant external literature since the publication of the JZS.”
“98. The second ground on which the Lord Chancellor’s Decision is challenged encompasses a number of arguments falling under the general head of “irrationality” or, as it is more accurately described, unreasonableness. This legal basis for judicial review has two aspects. The first is concerned with whether the decision under review is capable of being justified or whether in the classic Wednesbury formulation it is “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”: see Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp[1948] 1 KB 223 , 233-4. Another, simpler formulation of the test which avoids tautology is whether the decision is outside the range of reasonable decisions open to the decision-maker: see e.g. Boddington v British Transport Police[1998] UKHL 13 ;[1999] 2 AC 143 , 175 (Lord Steyn). The second aspect of irrationality/unreasonableness is concerned with the process by which the decision was reached. A decision may be challenged on the basis that there is a demonstrable flaw in the reasoning which led to it - for example, that significant reliance was placed on an irrelevant consideration, or that there was no evidence to support an important step in the reasoning, or that the reasoning involved a serious logical or methodological error. Factual error, although it has been recognised as a separate principle, can also be regarded as an example of flawed reasoning - the test being whether a mistake as to a fact which was uncontentious and objectively verifiable played a material part in the decision-maker’s reasoning: see E v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2004] EWCA Civ 49 ;[2004] QB 1044 .”
“70. The general principles on the Tameside duty were summarised by Haddon-Cave J in R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice[2014] EWHC 1662 (Admin) at paras. 99-100. In that passage, having referred to the speech of Lord Diplock in Tameside, Haddon-Cave J summarised the relevant principles which are to be derived from authorities since Tameside itself as follows. First, the obligation on the decision-maker is only to take such steps to inform himself as are reasonable. Secondly, subject to a Wednesbury challenge, it is for the public body and not the court to decide upon the manner and intensity of enquiry to be undertaken: see R (Khatun) v Newham LBC[2004] EWCA Civ 55 ,[2005] QB 37 , at para. 35 (Laws LJ). Thirdly, the court should not intervene merely because it considers that further enquiries would have been sensible or desirable. It should intervene only if no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the basis of the enquiries made that it possessed the information necessary for its decision. Fourthly, the court should establish what material was before the authority and should only strike down a decision not to make further enquiries if no reasonable authority possessed of that material could suppose that the enquiries they had made were sufficient. Fifthly, the principle that the decision-maker must call his own attention to considerations relevant to his decision, a duty which in practice may require him to consult outside bodies with a particular knowledge or involvement in the case, does not spring from a duty of procedural fairness to the applicant but rather from the Secretary of State’s duty so to inform himself as to arrive at a rational conclusion. Sixthly, the wider the discretion conferred on the Secretary of State, the more important it must be that he has all the relevant material to enable him properly to exercise it.”
“116. ….. A useful summation of the law was given by Simon Brown LJ in R v Somerset County Council, Ex p Fewings[1995] 1 WLR 1037 , 1049, in which he identified three categories of consideration, as follows: “… [T]he judge speaks of a ‘decision-maker who fails to take account of all and only those considerations material to his task’. It is important to bear in mind, however, … that there are in fact three categories of consideration. First, those clearly (whether expressly or impliedly) identified by the statute as considerations to which regard must be had. Second, those clearly identified by the statute as considerations to which regard must not be had. Third, those to which the decision-maker may have regard if in his judgment and discretion he thinks it right to do so. There is, in short, a margin of appreciation within which the decision-maker may decide just what considerations should play a part in his reasoning process.” 117. The three categories of consideration were identified by Cooke J in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in CREEDNZ Inc v Governor General[1981] NZLR 172 , 183: “What has to be emphasised is that it is only when the statute expressly or impliedly identifies considerations required to be taken into account by the [relevant public authority] as a matter of legal obligation that the court holds a decision invalid on the ground now invoked. It is not enough that a consideration is one that may properly be taken into account, nor even that it is one which many people, including the court itself, would have taken into account if they had to make the decision.”
“(1) The Secretary of State must prepare such proposals and policies as the Secretary of State considers will enable the carbon budgets that have been set under this Act to be met. (2) The proposals and policies must be prepared with a view to meeting – (a) the target in section 1 (the target for 2050), and (b) any targets set under section 5(1)(c) (power to set targets for later years). (3) The proposals and policies, taken as a whole, must be such as to contribute to sustainable development. (4) In preparing the proposals and policies, the Secretary of State may take into account the proposals and policies the Secretary of State considers may be prepared by other national authorities.”
“83. In our view, the Secretary of State with responsibility for the functions contained in Part 1 is uniquely well placed to discharge the duty in section 13 . He has an overview of the whole economy, is conscious of the likely levels of greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors of it for the budgetary period or periods in question, and is able to judge the potential for appropriate action to ensure the meeting of carbon budgets. The section 13(1) duty therefore corresponds to the “whole economy” or “economy-wide” approach envisaged in Part 1, with a single Secretary of State holding responsibility for the setting and implementation of the carbon budgets. 84. We reject the piecemeal or multipartite approach to the performance of the section 13 duty advocated by Mr Wolfe, in which that particular task is divided between different ministers and departments of government, each responsible under section 13 for some notional proportion or “share” of the carbon budget for an individual sector of the economy. That is not what section 13 states, and we do not consider it is what Parliament intended. 85. This is not to say, however, that other ministers and departments are unable to prepare measures of their own that may have the effect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and assisting the achievement of “net zero”
“93. … It is true that SSBEIS, when preparing his own proposals and policies under section 13, had looked to other ministers and departments, including DEFRA, to acquaint him with relevant strategies of their own. But in doing so he was not transferring to them the duty imposed only upon him. Rather, he was seeking their help in preparing the proposals and policies that he considered would enable the carbon budgets to be met. This was a judgment that he alone had to make under section 13, on the basis of an assessment spanning the whole economy, not merely an individual sector of it such as agriculture or the production of food.”
“By referring to a trajectory, this more accurately reflects the analysis undertaken because the modelling shows the relative potential contribution of each policy measure being projected up to 2050 on an annual basis based on several key input assumptions. The analysis does not reflect a defined maximum permitted amount of emissions. As stated in the JZS, our intention is to review the trajectory over time and the relative contribution of each measure based on the latest available evidence.”
“Yes or no, should we close this particular care home, this particular school etc?”
“Required, as we are, to make a taxation-related scheme for application to all the inhabitants of our borough, should we make one in the terms which we here propose?” 25 In R v Brent London Borough Council, Ex p Gunning(1985) 84 LGR 168 Hodgson J quashed Brent’s decision to close two schools on the ground that the manner of its prior consultation, particularly with the parents, had been unlawful. He said, at p 189: “Mr Sedley submits that these basic requirements are essential if the consultation process is to have a sensible content. First, that consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage. Second, that the proposer must give sufficient reasons for any proposal to permit of intelligent consideration and response. Third . . . that adequate time must be given for consideration and response and, finally, fourth, that the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any statutory proposals.”
“It has to be remembered that consultation is not litigation: the consulting authority is not required to publicise every submission it receives or (absent some statutory obligation) to disclose all its advice. Its obligation is to let those who have a potential interest in the subject matter know in clear terms what the proposal is and exactly why it is under positive consideration, telling them enough (which may be a good deal) to enable them to make an intelligent response. The obligation, although it may be quite onerous, goes no further than this.”
“In this statutory context fairness does not require the council in the consultation process to mention other options which it has decided not to incorporate into its published draft scheme; much less does fairness require that the consultation document contain an explanation as to why those options were not incorporated in the draft scheme.”
“consulting about a proposal does inevitably involve inviting and considering views about possible alternatives.”
“40. That is not to say that a duty to consult invariably requires the provision of information about options which have been rejected. The matter may be made clear, one way or the other, by the terms of the relevant statutory provisions, as it was in R (Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Foundation Trust) v Joint Committee of Primary Care Trusts (2012) 126 BMLR 134. To the extent that the issue is left open by the relevant statutory provisions, the question will generally be whether, in the particular context, the provision of such information is necessary in order for the consultees to express meaningful views on the proposal.”
“29 It is also clear from the authorities that the courts have to allow the consultant body a wide degree of discretion as to the options on which to consult: as the Divisional Court held in Vale of Glamorgan Council v Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice[2011] EWHC 1532 (Admin) at [24]: “there is no general principle that a Minister entering into consultation must consult on all the possible alternative ways in which a specific objective might arguably be capable of being achieved. It would make the process of consultation inordinately complex and time consuming if that were so. Maurice Kay J recognised this in the Medway case, at para 26: “Other things being equal, it was permissible for him (that is, the Secretary of State) to narrow the range of options within which he would consult and eventually decide. Consultation is not negotiation. It is a process within which a decision maker at a formative stage in the decision making process invites representations on one or more possible courses of action. In the words of Lord Woolf MR in Ex p Coughlan[2001] QB 213 , para 112, the decision-maker’s obligation is to let those who have potential interest in the subject matter know in clear terms what the proposal is and why exactly it is under positive consideration, telling them enough (which may be a good deal) to enable them to make an intelligent response. The obligation, although it may be quite onerous, goes no further than this. This passage was approved by the Court of Appeal in R (Forest Heath District Council) v Electoral Commission Boundary Committee for England[2010] PTSR 1205 , para 54.” 30 Mr Michael Beloff QC …. Cited a number of other authorities for this point, such as R v Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex p Nichol(1989) 87 LGR 435 , R (Kidderminster and District Community Health Council) v Worcestershire Heath Council[1999] EWCA Civ 1525 (refusal of permission to appeal), R (Tinn) v Secretary of State for Transport[2006] EWHC 193 (Admin), and, at the request of McCombe LJ, R (Beale) v Camden London Borough Council[2004] EWHC 6 (Admin) (Munby J). I need not cite passages from these authorities save the following pertinent dictum of Auld LJ in the Kidderminster case: “[Regulation 18(1) which required consultation on certain proposals] did not require it to give focus to proposals which it no longer had under consideration. In any event, the process of consultation did not, and designedly could not, preclude outright opposition to the one proposed, which opposition might prompt the authority to reconsider it and/or any of its discarded six options and/or to consider any new ones.” 31 In other words, there is in general no obligation on a public body to consult on options it has discarded. The statement in De Smith’s Judicial Review, 7th ed (2013), para 7-054 that there should be consultation on “every viable option”, taken on its own, is not supported by the authorities.” “there is no general principle that a Minister entering into consultation must consult on all the possible alternative ways in which a specific objective might arguably be capable of being achieved. It would make the process of consultation inordinately complex and time consuming if that were so. Maurice Kay J recognised this in the Medway case, at para 26: “Other things being equal, it was permissible for him (that is, the Secretary of State) to narrow the range of options within which he would consult and eventually decide. Consultation is not negotiation. It is a process within which a decision maker at a formative stage in the decision making process invites representations on one or more possible courses of action. In the words of Lord Woolf MR in Ex p Coughlan[2001] QB 213 , para 112, the decision-maker’s obligation is to let those who have potential interest in the subject matter know in clear terms what the proposal is and why exactly it is under positive consideration, telling them enough (which may be a good deal) to enable them to make an intelligent response. The obligation, although it may be quite onerous, goes no further than this. This passage was approved by the Court of Appeal in R (Forest Heath District Council) v Electoral Commission Boundary Committee for England[2010] PTSR 1205 , para 54.” “[Regulation 18(1) which required consultation on certain proposals] did not require it to give focus to proposals which it no longer had under consideration. In any event, the process of consultation did not, and designedly could not, preclude outright opposition to the one proposed, which opposition might prompt the authority to reconsider it and/or any of its discarded six options and/or to consider any new ones.”
“Do not ask questions about issues on which you already have a final view.”
“32. Judicial review, generally, is concerned with actions or other events which have, or will have, substantive legal consequences: for example, by conferring new legal rights or powers, or by restricting existing legal rights or interests. Typically there is a process of initiation, consultation, and review, culminating in the formal action or event (“the substantive event”) which creates the new legal right or restriction. For example, the substantive event may be the grant of a planning permission, following a formal process of application, consultation and resolution by the determining authority. Although each step in the process may be subject to specific legal requirements, it is only at the stage of the formal grant of planning permission that a new legal right is created. 33. Judicial review proceedings may come after the substantive event, with a view to having it set aside or “quashed”; or in advance, when it is threatened or in preparation, with a view to having it stayed or “prohibited”
“Impact assessment requirement I’d recommend speaking to your analysts, some impact assessment may be useful to guide policy development. Whether you need one, is dependent on what stage of consultation this is. If this is more of a Green Paper/Call for Evidence (i.e. you will do a future consultation on the exact changes you want to make at a later date), then an impact assessment can be done at this stage. If this is the last time you’ll consult before going ahead and making the changes, an impact assessment is important and should only not be done in very specific circumstances (it may delay implementation of the policy). It does also vary with exactly what you’re doing, and who’s impacted, generally they’re only needed where there’s requirements being placed on business.”
“Given this is a consultation on a strategy rather than specific policy proposals, we don’t think there is any requirement for an impact assessment. We’ve actually already consulted [a person whose name was redacted] on our evidence and analysis doc and he seemed fine with that and it not being an impact assessment so I think we’re covered.”
“airport expansion has a role to play in realising benefits for the UK through boosting our global connectivity and levelling up. The framework is clear that we continue to be supportive of airport growth where it is justified, and our existing policy frameworks for airport planning provide a robust and balanced framework for airports to grow sustainably within our strict environmental criteria. We have also been clear expansion of any airport in England must meet our climate change obligations to be able to proceed.”
“The Government’s existing planning policy frameworks, along with the Jet Zero Strategy and the Flightpath to the Future strategic framework for aviation, have full effect and are material considerations in the statutory planning process for proposed airport development.”
“The capacity assumptions required by the model do not pre-judge the outcome of any future planning applications, including decisions taken by Ministers. The capacity assumptions do not represent any proposal for limits on future capacity growth at specific airports, nor do they indicate maximum appropriate levels of capacity growth at specific airports for the purpose of planning decision-making. However, specific assumptions must be made on several inputs, including about the future runway capacity of the main airports in the UK, for NAPAM to operate. In line with a precautionary approach to the level of future carbon emissions, and to reflect the uncertainty around future developments in this area, we have assumed capacities that are consistent with current planning applications, including proposals on which airports have consulted the public (e.g., statutory pre-application consultation). Increasing capacity limits in this way allows the analysis to focus on testing the potential of abatement technologies to meet the challenge of net zero, without capacity constraints imposing an extra demand restriction or simply causing emissions to be exported to competing overseas airports.”
“149. Public sector equality duty (1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to— (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it. (2) […] (3) Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to— (a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are connected to that characteristic; (b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it; (c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low.”
“Although socio-economic background is not a protected characteristic under theEquality Act 2010 , numerous comments were received on the possible impact on families with low incomes, for example, arguing that any rises in fuel costs resulting from policies or new technologies could make it too costly for them to fly. Data from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation suggests that this could indirectly have a greater impact on people from ethnic minorities or disabled people, who have a higher rate of poverty than the white ethnic group or non-disabled people.”
“I accept that the Government Consultation Response Document did not properly reflect the findings of the EA. This was simply the result of a drafting error. The Government consultation response was drafted alongside the development of the EA and reflects the conclusions from the version sent to Ministers on26 May 2022 , whereas the EA was updated and sent to Ministers again on27 June 2022 . However, the text in the Government consultation response itself was not updated in line with the updated EA conclusions.”
“57…. the March 2002 decision emerged from consultation and Keene J (as he then was) stated in R v. London Borough of Islington ex parte East ([1996] ELR 74 at 88) there was no duty "to consult further on [an] amended proposal which had itself emerged from the consultation process. It was a proposal reflecting the consultation process itself". As I will explain, that was the position here.”
“As aviation decarbonisation technologies are still at an early stage of development, there continues to be substantial uncertainty surrounding their respective contributions to decarbonising the sector… The one area where evidence suggests our assumptions could potentially be too optimistic is relating to the expected efficiency improvement from next generation airframe and engine technology (under the system efficiencies measure), though inconsistencies in metrics make this difficult to say definitively. This is an area in which we plan to pursue further research. However, our overall annual average system efficiency assumptions are in line with those suggested by the literature.”
“The JZS analytical annex recognised that the High Ambition scenario was intentionally ambitious and that numerous barriers would need to be overcome for it to be realised. The literature published since the publication of the Jet Zero further technical consultation provides further evidence that the assumptions relating to the future development and uptake of aviation decarbonisation technologies are towards the upper end of what the literature suggests is feasible.”
“Further analysis would need to be undertaken to assess how much of DfT’s 70% passenger growth projection is facilitated by already approved airport expansion schemes and how much is from those that are at an earlier planning stage. However, we can assume that already approved schemes (e.g. Stansted, Bristol and Southampton) will likely only be a small proportion of the overall capacity increase as it is the major schemes (e.g. Heathrow and Gatwick) that are yet to receive planning consent that will have the biggest impact.”
“Agree that based on the latest evidence, we should continue to pursue the approach set out in the JZS and provide a steer on whether officials should further develop policy options on DDM either as part of the regular JZS review process or sooner.”