“democracy, the rule of law, liberty and respect and tolerance of other faiths and beliefs.”
“(1)(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”
“(a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. (4) In this section- (a) “action” includes outside the United Kingdom,… (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom. (5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.”
“The duty does not confer new functions on any specified authority. The term “due regard” as used in the Act means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions. The purpose of the guidance is to assist authorities to decide what this means in practice.”
“Islamist extremists regard Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a ‘war with Islam’, creating a narrative of ‘them and us’. Their ideology includes the uncompromising belief that people cannot be both Muslim and British, and that Muslims living here should not participate in our democracy. Islamist extremists specifically attack the principles of civic participation and social cohesion. These extremists purport to identify grievances to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution.”
“12. In fulfilling the duty in section 26 of the Act, we expect all specified authorities to participate fully in work to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. How they do this, and the extent to which they do this, will depend on many factors, for example, the age of the individual, how much interaction they have with them, etc. The specified authorities in Schedule 6 to the Act are those judged to have a role in protecting vulnerable people and/or our national security. The duty is likely to be relevant to fulfilling other responsibilities such as the duty arising fromsection 149 of the Equality Act 2010 . 13.This guidance identifies best practice for each of the main sectors and describes ways in which they can comply with the duty. It includes sources of further advice and provides information on how compliance with the duty will be monitored.”
“We expect local authorities to use the existing counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs), produced for every region by the police to assess the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism. This includes not just violent extremism, but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit. Guidance on CTLPs is available here.”
“Being drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit.”
“‘Having due regard’ means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions. ‘Extremism’ is defined in the 2011 Prevent strategy as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas. ‘Non-violent extremism’ is extremism as defined above, which is not accompanied by violence. ‘Prevention’ in the context of this document means reducing or eliminating the risk of individuals becoming involved in terrorism. Prevent includes but is not confined to the identification and referral of those at risk of being drawn into terrorism into appropriate interventions. These interventions aim to divert vulnerable people from radicalisation. ‘Radicalisation’ refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.”
“This includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism….” “This” clearly referred back to the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism. The risk, Mr Bowen contended, is therefore a risk of being drawn into non-violent extremism, that is being drawn into “active or vocal opposition to fundamental British values.”
“(a) to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions.”
“RHEBs’ commitment to freedom of speech and the rationality underpinning the advancement of knowledge means that they represent one of our most important arenas for challenging extremist views and ideologies. But young people continue to make up a disproportionately high number of those arrested in this country for terrorist-related offences and of those who are travelling to join terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq. RHEBs must be vigilant and aware of the risks this poses.”
“Furthermore, when deciding whether or not to host a particular speaker, RHEBs should consider carefully whether the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups. In these circumstances the event should not be allowed to proceed except where RHEBs are entirely convinced that such risk can be fully mitigated without cancellation of the event. This includes ensuring that, where any event is being allowed to proceed, speakers with extremist views that could draw people into terrorism are challenged with opposing views as part of that same event, rather than in a separate forum. Where RHEBs are in any doubt that the risk cannot be fully mitigated they should exercise caution and not allow the event to proceed.”
“19. RHEBs will be expected to carry out a risk assessment for their institution which assesses where and how their students might be at risk of being drawn into terrorism. This includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit. Help and support will be available to do this. 20. We would expect the risk assessment to look at institutional policies regarding the campus and student welfare, including equality and diversity and the safety and welfare of students and staff. We would also expect the risk assessment to assess the physical management of the university estate including policies and procedures for events held by staff, students or visitors and relationships with external bodies and community groups who may use premises, or work in partnership with the institution.”
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers… 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
“There is growing opposition by a broad coalition of organisations and individuals to a number of aspects of the Prevent strategy, including those aspects of the Prevent Guidance that are challenged in these proceedings as affecting rights of free speech and free assembly and freedom of religion. In particular, there is significant opposition to the extension of the Prevent Duty in the Prevent Guidance to include ‘non-violent extremism’, the vague and overbroad definition of ‘extremism’ and ‘British values’ and the guidance that Universities must prevent speakers if they are not ‘entirely convinced’ any risk of a person ‘being drawn into terrorism’ cannot be ‘fully mitigated’. The concerns raised are directly relevant to the legality and proportionality of the prevent Guidance as developed at paras 186ff, below.”
“26. In certain specific situations, the Court has accepted that an applicant may be a potential victim. For example, where he was not able to establish that the legislation he complained of had actually been applied to him on account of the secret nature of the measures it authorised (Klass and Others v Germany) or where an alien’s removal had been ordered, but not enforced, and where enforcement would have exposed him in the receiving country to treatment contrary toArticle 3 of the Convention or to an infringement of his rights underArticle 8 of the Convention (Soering v the United Kingdom). 27. However, in order to be able to claim to be a victim in such a situation, an applicant must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting him or her personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient… 28. The Court has also underlined that the Convention does not envisage the bringing of an actio popularis for the interpretation of the rights it contains or permit individuals to complain about a provision of a domestic law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention (Aksu v Turkey [GC], § 50; Burden v the United Kingdom [GC], § 33). 29. However, it is open to a person to contend that a law violates his or her rights, in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, if he or she is required either to modify his or her conduct or risks being prosecuted or if he or she is a member of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the legislation...”
“36 In the case of Kennedy v the United Kingdom the Court held that in order to assess, in a particular case, whether an individual can claim an interference as a result of the mere existence of legislation permitting secret surveillance measures, the Court must have regard to the availability of any remedies at the national level and the risk of secret surveillance measures being applied to him. Where there is no possibility of challenging the alleged application of secret surveillance measures at domestic level, widespread suspicion and concern among the general public that secret surveillance powers are being abused cannot be said to be unjustified. In such cases, even where the actual risk of surveillance is low, there is a greater need for scrutiny by the Court. Most recently, the Court adopted, in Zakharov v Russia, a harmonised approach based on Kennedy, according to which firstly the Court will take into account the scope of the legislation permitting secret surveillance measures by examining whether the applicant can possibly be affected by it, either because he or she belongs to a group of persons targeted by the contested legislation or because the legislation directly affect all users of communication services by instituting a system where any person can have his or her communications intercepted; and secondly the Court will take into account the availability or remedies at the national level and will adjust the degree of scrutiny depending on the effectiveness of such remedies… 38… The Court considers that it cannot be excluded that the applicants are at risk of being subjected to such measures should the authorities perceive that to do so might be of use to pre-empt or avert a threat foreseen by the legislation – especially since the law contains the notion of “person concerned identified… as a range of persons” which might include indeed any person.”
“67 However, the Court has concluded that an applicant is entitled to “(claim) to be the victim of a violation” of the Convention, even if he is not able to allege in support of his application that he has been subject to a concrete interference. In such instances the question whether the applicants were actually the victims of any violation of the Convention involves determining whether the contested legislation is in itself compatible with the Convention’s provisions (for the compatibility of art.301 of the Turkish Criminal Code see under (B) below). While the present case refers to freedom of expression and not to surveillance as in the Klass case, where the difficulties of knowing that one is under surveillance are a factor to be considered in the determination of victim status, the applicant has shown that he is subject to a level of interference with his art.10 rights. The applicant has shown that he is actually concerned with a public issue (the question whether the events of 1915 qualify as genocide), and that he was involved in the generation of the specific content targeted by art.301, and therefore he is directly affected. 68 Furthermore, it is also open to a person to contend that a law violates his rights, in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, if he is required either to modify his conduct because of it or risk being prosecuted or if he is a member of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the legislation. The Court further notes the chilling effect that the fear of sanction has on the exercise of freedom of expression, even in the event of an eventual acquittal, considering the likelihood of such fear discouraging one from making similar statements in the future.”
“In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalisation, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred. Terrorist groups of all kinds very often draw upon ideologies which have been developed, disseminated and popularised by extremist organisations that appear to be non-violent (such as groups which need to use violence nor specifically and openly endorse its use by others). Some politically extreme organisations routinely claim that: the West is perpetually at war with Islam; there can be no legitimate interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims in this country or elsewhere; and that Muslims living here cannot legitimately and or effectively participate in our democratic society. Islamist extremists can specifically attack the principles of participation and cohesion, rejection of which we judge to be associated with an increased willingness to use violence… Islamist extremists can purport to identify problems to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution. ... Evidence also shows that some people who have engaged in terrorist-related activity here have previously participated in extremist organisations... In some cases, people who have been radicalised to the point of approving of terrorism have passed through a prior extremist phase. But this is not always so. Some people are recruited into a terrorist organisation and radicalised at the same time.”
“Where extremism takes root and our values are undermined the consequences are clear. The social fabric of our country is weakened. Violence goes unchallenged. Women’s rights are fundamentally eroded. There is discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religious belief or sexual orientation. There is no longer equal access to the labour market, to the law, or to wider society. Communities become isolated and cut off from one another. Intolerance, hatred and bigotry become normalised.”
“Across the country there is evidence of extremists, driven by ideology, promoting or justifying actions which run directly contrary to our shared values. This causes harm to society in general and is used to radicalise vulnerable people. Increasingly, extremists make sophisticated use of modern communications, including social media, to spread their extreme ideology and attract recruits in large numbers.”
“no one becomes a terrorist from a standing start. It starts with a process of radicalisation. When you look in detail at the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were first influenced by what some would call non-violent extremists.”
“Islamist extremists are driven by a core ideological need to overthrow the foundations of modern society and rid it of what they perceive to be un-Islamic elements, not only non-Muslims, but also Muslims who do not conform to their warped interpretation of Islam.”
“Universities and colleges provide one of our most important arenas for challenging extremist views and ideologies.”
“We expect student bodies such as the NUS to avoid providing a platform for extremist speakers.”
“51 As regards the relationship between democracy and Sharia, the Court reiterates that in Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v Turkey it noted, among other things, that it was difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on Sharia. It considered that Sharia, which faithfully reflected the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, was stable and invariable and clearly diverged from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervened in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts. … Admittedly, there is no doubt that, like any other remark directed against the Convention's underlying values, expressions that seek to spread, incite or justify hatred based on intolerance, including religious intolerance, do not enjoy the protection afforded byArt.10 of the Convention . However, the Court considers that the mere fact of defending Sharia, without calling for violence to establish it, cannot be regarded as “hate speech”
“11. Witnesses agreed that there does not appear to be any clear template for the factors which might lead to radicalisation. David Anderson described to us two possible contributory factors – grievances and ideals. The sources of grievances varied extensively but could include poor family relationships, bullying at school or within social groupings, and the UK’s foreign policy. David Anderson explained that, once this negative viewpoint had set in, in some people radical ideology then “battens on to the grievance and makes sense of the grievance and that makes sense of the person’s life”. 12. Some other factors we have identified that may contribute to radicalisation include an element of brainwashing, and involvement in gang violence and low-level crime. Perceived grievances about UK foreign policy seem to relate particularly to matters involving Islamic countries. There may also be an issue for some young people around identity, and an inability for parents to pass on their views about the traditional practice of religion, or to enable their children to challenge beliefs, particularly where parents lack the necessary English-language skills.”
“18. There is no evidence that shows a single path or one single event which draws a young person to the scourge of extremism: every case is different. Identifying people at risk of being radicalised and then attracted to extremist behaviour is very challenging. It also makes the task of countering extreme views complex and difficult. If the Government adopts a broad-brush approach, which fails to take account of the complexities, and of the gaps in existing knowledge and understanding of the factors contributing to radicalisation, that would be counter-productive and fuel the attraction of the extremist narrative rather than dampening it. 19. The Government must take a much more sophisticated approach both to identifying the factors which instigate radicalisation and in the measures it takes to tackle this. We recommend the Government work with a cross-section of academic institutions in the UK that work on radicalisation, to marshal existing intelligence and research and develop a more effective understanding of the factors leading to extremism. This should include speaking to the families of known extremists to draw on their experiences. Without such a solid foundation, the strategies in the proposed new Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill are likely to approach the issues and entire communities in an unfocussed manner, and therefore ultimately to be ineffective.”
“48. In my judgment, the irrelevance of an opinion expressed by a parliamentary select committee to an issue that falls to be determined by the courts arises from the nature of the judicial process, the independence of the judiciary and of its decisions, and the respect that the legislative and judicial branches of government owe to each other. “49. However, it is also important to recognise the limitations of these principles. There is no reason why the courts should not receive evidence of the proceedings of Parliament when they are simply relevant historical facts or events: no ‘questioning’ arises in such a case: see para 35 above. Similarly, it is of the essence of the judicial function that the courts should determine issues of law arising from legislation and delegated legislation. Thus, there can be no suggestion of a breach of parliamentary privilege if the courts decide that legislation is incompatible with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: by enacting theHuman Rights Act 1998 , Parliament has expressly authorised the court to determine questions of compatibility, even though a minister may have made a declaration under section 19 of his view that the measure in question is compatible.”
“68…. There is certainly no suggestion that a court should take as authority, or even look to the view of parliamentarians on whether legislation is compatible with the ECHR. Indeed, it is a specific consequence of theHuman Rights Act 1998 that it is the responsibility of the court to decide whether legislation is compatible. 69 In any event, a court certainly cannot refer to parliamentary material to question its truth or accuracy: see Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2)[2004] 1 AC 816 , para 65, per Lord Nicholls, and the Office of Government Commerce case[2010] QB 98 , para 47. Looking to the view of parliamentarians on whether legislation is compatible with the ECHR will inevitably lead the court into assessing the validity (and accuracy) of these views which is clearly forbidden territory….”
“The Extremism Analysis Unit (EAU) was established with a remit to analyse extremism in this country and abroad where it has a direct impact on the UK and/or UK interests. The EAU is a cross-government resource, with government departments able to commission research and analysis. The EAU and Home Office officials engage widely with partners across government, academia and, communities. The Unit currently has 14 staff and is intended to grow by a further 10. This is met out of existing budget. The Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament for the work of the EAU. The EAU does not blacklist individuals or organisations.”
“2.6 In summary, the role of EAU is to help improve government’s understanding of extremism and related trends, providing the Office for Counter-Extremism and other customer departments (see below) with expertise and advice to inform the implementation of the Counter-Extremism Strategy and wider counter-extremism work. Examples of this work include analysis of extremist ideologies and narratives to support campaign work and analysis of groups, networks and themes to inform policy formulation, e.g. the Review of the Funding of Extremism announced by the then Prime Minister on30 November 2015 .”
“EAU conducts “all source” research for customers across government, using material from a wide range of sources such as other government departments, local authorities, Home Office data sources, and interviews with experts, e.g. academics, local community leaders and the police. EAU also accesses a wide range of publicly available “open source material” including academic articles, journals, news media, websites, blogs and social media.”
“Just because a piece of information posted on the internet may be “open source” (i.e. publicly available to view) it does not necessarily mean that the person who is the subject of that information has no expectation of privacy in relation to that information. Just viewing that information, even repeatedly, is unlikely to be an invasion of privacy. However, when a public authority is recording, storing and using open source information in order to build up a profile of a person or group of people (in circumstances where we could be seen to be “monitoring” that individual via the internet), there is potential for such activity to be viewed as an interference with individuals’ privacy rights. In these circumstances processes should be followed to ensure that any interference is necessary and proportionate and that steps have been taken to minimise intrusion.”
“Dr Butt Dr Butt is not amongst the most prolific speakers and does not routinely expound views in public that could be considered contrary to British values. Nonetheless, having reviewed the evidence, we are satisfied in the overall judgement that Dr Butt has actively and vocally opposed fundamental British values, as set out in the government’s definition of extremism. • Dr Butt is the chief editor of Islam21c, a publication that has hosted material contrary to British values. We judge this constitutes actively condoning such views. • He has himself expressed views contrary to fundamental British values in this publication and on social media, appearing to compare homosexuals to paedophiles and supporting FGM. • On one of four occasions he spoke at universities in 2014, he appeared alongside CAGE and has used social media to support CAGE’s position on Mohammed Emwazi (‘Jihadi John’), which has been to try to justify Emwazi’s resort to violence.”
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety… for the prevention of disorder or crime… or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
“It must extend to every occasion on which a person has a reasonable expectation that there will be no interference with the broader right of personal autonomy recognised in the case law of the Strasbourg court. This is consistent with the recognition that there may be some matters about which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, notwithstanding that they occur in public and are patent to all the world. In this context mere observation cannot, save perhaps in extreme circumstances, engage article 8, but the systematic retention of information may do.”
“These cases, and others like them, all have particular features which differentiate them both from each other and from the present cases. But it is clear that the state’s systematic collection and storage in retrievable form even of public information about an individual is an interference with private life. For that reason I think that the Court of Appeal was right to hold (overruling the Divisional Court in Catt) that article 8.1 was engaged.”
“193. …Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or reported in a public manner, a person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor in this assessment (see P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 57, ECHR 2001-IX). 194. In the present case, the information requested consisted of the names of public defenders and the number of times they had been appointed to act as counsel in certain jurisdictions. For the Court, the request for these names, although they constituted personal data, related predominantly to the conduct of professional activities in the context of public proceedings. In this sense, public defenders’ professional activities cannot be considered to be a private matter. Moreover, the information sought did not relate to the public defenders’ actions or decisions in connection with the carrying out of their tasks as legal representative or consultations with their clients. The Government have not demonstrated that disclosure of the information requested for the specific purposes of the applicant’s inquiry could have affected the public defenders’ enjoyment of the right to respect for private life within the meaning ofArticle 8 of the Convention . 195. The Court also finds that the disclosure of public defenders’ names and the number of their respective appointments would not have subjected them to exposure to a degree surpassing that which they could possibly have foreseen when registering as public defenders (compare and contrast Peck v the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, § 62, ECHR 2003-I). There is no reason to assume that information about the names of public defenders and their appointments could not be known to the public through other means, such as information contained in lists of legal-aid providers, court hearing schedules and public court hearings, although it is clear that it was not collated at the moment of the survey. 196. Against this background, the interests invoked by the Government with reference toArticle 8 of the Convention are not of such a nature and degree as could warrant engaging the application of this provision and bringing it into play in a balancing exercise against the applicant NGO’s right as protected by paragraph 1 of Article 10.”
“if it is covert but not intrusive and is undertaken – (a) for the purposes of a specific investigation or a specific operation; (b) in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person (whether or not one specifically identified for the purposes of the investigation or operation); …”