A Council v Mother & Ors [2026] EWFC 217 (B)

[2026] EWFC 217 (B)

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT CHESTER CASE NO:

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989

AND IN THE MATTER OF C

BEFORE HER HONOUR JUDGE HESFORD

Between

A COUNCILApplicant

MOTHERRespondent

FATHERRespondent

THE CHILD C

(BY HER CHILDREN’S GUARDIAN)

3rd Respondent

______________________________________________

FINAL WELFARE JUDGMENT

FOLLOWING HEARING 24 JULY 2026

JUDGMENT DATED 29 JULY 2026

_______________________________________________

Ms Edmunds for Applicant

Mr Carey for First Respondent

Mr Barnes KC and Mr Steward for Second Respondent

Ms Lomax and Mr Povoas for Child via her Guardian

This judgment was handed down in private on 31 July 2026. It consists of 25 pages. The Judge has given permission for judgment (and any of the facts and matters contained in it) to be published on condition that in any report, no person other than the advocates or the solicitors instructing them (and other persons identified by name in the judgment itself) may be identified by name, current address or location [including school or work place]. In particular the anonymity of the children and the adult members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that these conditions are strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. For the avoidance of doubt, the strict prohibition on publishing the names and current addresses of the parties and the child will continue to apply where that information has been obtained by using the contents of this judgment to discover information already in the public domain.

Her Honour Judge Hesford:

Date 2026-07-18

[1]INTRODUCTION This is my final judgment in care proceedings concerning C, now aged approximately 18 months. It should be read in conjunction with the fact-finding judgment reference

[2026] EWFC 33 (B)

Link: A Council v Mother & Ors - Find Case Law - The National Archives

[2]On 29 January 2026, I delivered a fact-finding judgment and made detailed findings. In summary I found that C sustained extensive, life-changing injuries at the hands of her father, caused by a violent assault. These included bruising, multiple bilateral rib and clavicle fractures, damage to her frenulum, but most significantly, brain and spinal cord injuries including haemorrhages. She will be significantly disabled as a result of these severe brain injuries. I made no findings against C’s mother.

[3]The court now determines the welfare issues, C’s welfare being my paramount consideration pursuant to s.1 Children Act 1989. As the factual findings had already been determined, the welfare issues were resolved following skeleton arguments, oral submissions and consideration of the written evidence, this being agreed by all parties. All contents have been considered even if not specifically addressed.

[4]I received positive updates concerning C following her return to her mother's care. She is settled and thriving. Her mother is growing in confidence as a carer and is developing new skills, including the use of Makaton and sign language, to support C's communication and development. I express the hope that C continues to progress and thrive.

[5]This judgment is structured as follows: Section 1: Introduction Section 2: The parties’ positions Section 3 The legal framework Section 4 The Local Authority evidence Section 5: The mother’s evidence Section 6: The father’s evidence Section 7: The Guardian’s evidence Section 8: Analysis and decisions Section 8.1: C’s home and the Supervision Order Section 8.2 Contact Section 8.3 Parental Responsibility Section 8.4 Name Change Section 8.5 Section 91(14) CA 89 Section 9: Summary, Final Decisions and Orders

[2]THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

[6]The Local Authority plan was for C to live with her mother with a Child Arrangement Order supported by a Supervision Order. This was agreed by the mother and Guardian and in his skeleton argument filed the day before this hearing, by the father. There were various other matters in dispute which I will address later in this judgment, being Parental Responsibility, C’s surname, contact and Section 91(14) Children Act 1989.

[3]THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

[7]In light of the findings set out in my fact-finding judgment, I am satisfied that the threshold criteria pursuant to s.31(2) Children Act 1989 are met. C has suffered significant physical harm at the hands of her father. I therefore now proceed to determine what outcome best promotes C’s welfare.

[8]C’s welfare is my paramount consideration (s.1(1) Children Act 1989). The court must undertake a global, holistic and evaluative assessment including consideration of the welfare checklist, identification, analysis and comparison of all realistic options, and a final balancing exercise.

[9]The provisions of the Children Act 1989 are well known and I will not set them out in detail. In summary, the court can make orders to regulate who a child lives with and spends time with under section 8 Children Act 1989. The court can make orders saying that there should be no time spent with a parent.The court can also, make orders which regulate or prohibit decision making including the exercise of parental responsibility and the name of a child. In accordance with s.9(6) Children Act 1989, section 8 orders ordinarily cease at the age of 16 unless the circumstances are exceptional.

[10]The court can make a Supervision Order under s.31 Children Act 1989 in place of a care order and this can be for up to 12 months.

[11]Any order I make engages Article 8 rights. I must therefore ensure that any interference is necessary and proportionate. This applies to all the decisions which I make in this matter.

[12]These proceedings are not concerned with punishment. The findings I have made are relevant insofar as they inform the assessment of future risk (Re J (Children)

[2013] UKSC 9

). I must evaluate the extent of any ongoing risk, the parents’ insight (or absence of it), their capacity for change, and their ability to prioritise C’s safety.

[13]I must adopt the least interventionist order consistent with C’s welfare, but must not hesitate to make orders that are necessary to protect her (Re C and B (Care

[14]There are four specific matters which have arisen and I will address the legal framework for each individually.

[15]Parental Responsibility: Parental Responsibility (PR) comprises the rights and duties that a parent has in relation to a child, including making important decisions about the child's upbringing, education and medical treatment. Birth mothers automatically acquire PR, and fathers named on the birth certificate obtain PR pursuant to s.4(1)(a) Children Act 1989. PR acquired by an unmarried father in this way may be restricted or terminated under s.4(2A) Children Act 1989. Restrictions on the exercise of PR may also be imposed through Prohibited Steps Orders or Specific Issue Orders.

[16]In any application to restrict or terminate PR, the child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration, although the welfare checklist in s.1(3) Children Act 1989 is not mandatory. The no-order principle also applies. The burden of proof lies on the applicant, and any removal of PR must be justified and proportionate. The central question is whether the continuation of PR promotes the child's welfare.

[17]Earlier authorities, particularly Re P (Terminating Parental Responsibility)

[1995] 1 FLR 1048

, emphasised the exceptional nature of removing PR. More recent cases, including Re A (Termination of Parental Responsibility)

[2014] 1 FLR 1305

, Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility)

[2015] 1 FLR 166

, D v E (Termination of Parental Responsibility)

[2021] EWFC 37

and Re GF (A Minor)

[2023] EWFC 203

, have focused more directly on welfare, whilst recognising that termination remains a serious and exceptional order. The Court of Appeal in Re D confirmed that there is no presumption that an unmarried father should retain PR; the question is whether retention serves the child's welfare. In D v E, MacDonald J reviewed the authorities and confirmed that the child's welfare is the sole guiding principle. Relevant considerations included the parent's commitment to the child, the attachment between them, whether PR can be exercised beneficially, and whether, if PR did not already exist, it would be granted today.

[18]The court should thus consider the welfare benefit, if any, flowing from the parent's continued possession of PR, whether there is a realistic prospect that PR will be exercised beneficially in future, and whether removal would cause emotional, psychological or practical harm to the child. The court must also consider whether the continuation of PR serves any useful protective or beneficial function for the child. If there remains a meaningful present or future welfare benefit, removal is unlikely. Conversely, where there is no relationship, no realistic prospect of beneficial exercise of PR, and no welfare purpose served by its continuation, termination may better promote the child's welfare.Although the removal of PR is a serious step requiring proper justification and proportionality, the ultimate question remains whether it is in the child's best interests for the parent to retain PR.

[19]Change of Name: There are numerous relevant authorities, including Dawson v Wearmouth

[1999] 2 AC 308

; Re W, Re A, Re B (Change of Name)

[1999] 2 FLR 930

; Re T (Change of Surname)

[1998] 2 FLR 620

; Re C (A Child) (Change of Given Name)

[2024] EWCA Civ 1582

; D v E; and XX v XX

[2025] EWHC 2756 (Fam)

[20]The principles emerging from those authorities are well established. A child's name, and particularly their surname, is an important aspect of their identity and heritage. There is no presumption in favour of either parent's surname and each case turns on its own facts. The child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration, with particular regard being given to issues of stability and continuity in the child's life. The court will generally be slow to approve a change of name where doing so would undermine, diminish or sever a meaningful relationship with a parent. Equally, the greater the involvement of the non-resident parent in the child's life, the more difficult it will usually be to justify the removal of that parent's surname. The wishes and feelings of the child are also relevant and will carry increasing weight as the child grows older and demonstrates greater maturity.

[21]In summary, a surname is a significant marker of a child's identity. The court's task is to determine whether the proposed change best promotes the child's welfare, having regard to the child's identity, heritage, need for stability, and relationship with each parent.

[22]Contact: In public law care proceedings, under Section 34 Children Act 1989, when a child is placed under an Interim Care Order or a full Care Order, the local authority has a legal duty to promote reasonable contact between a child and their parents, even if abuse has been proven. However, contact is only ordered if it is safe for the child. The court may order supervised contact, indirect contact (such as letters), or suspend contact entirely if the risk of harm is unmanageable.

[23]Following public law fact-findings in which a parent has been found to have perpetrated physical abuse of the child, there is no presumption that direct contact should follow. The court's task is to undertake a welfare evaluation under s.1 Children Act 1989, informed by the findings made and also the guidance in FPR PD 12J. Welfare of the child remains paramount when considering which, if any, private law orders should be made under s.8 Children Act 1989

[24]Case law from both Public and Private Law matters is relevant and includes Re B (Care: Contact: Local Authority's plans)

[1993] 1 FLR 543

; Re S (Children) (Termination of Contact)

[2005] EWCA Civ 355

; Re H-W (A Child)

[2017] EWCA Civ 1581

; and Re H-N and Others

[2021] EWCA Civ 448

. The issue of contact was addressed in detail in the cases of D v E (termination of parental responsibility)

[2021] EWFC 37

and thereafter Re H (A Child: Domestic Abuse)

[2024] EWCA Civ 326

where Macdonald J’s summary of the law was approved by the Court of Appeal. FPR Practice Direction 12J also applies, as a “live with” child arrangement order in favour of the mother is sought and the father seeks a contact order.

[25]

Section 91(14) Children Act 1989

Section 91(14) Children Act 1989 provides that, when disposing of an application under the Act, the court may direct that no further application of a specified kind be made by a named person without first obtaining the permission of the court. I have considered the authorities relating to the exercise of that jurisdiction, including Re C (A Child) (Relocation: Domestic Abuse: Section 91(14) Orders)

[2026] EWHC 1591

; Re P (Section 91(14)) Guidelines (Residence and Religious Heritage)

[1999] 3 WLR 1164

; Re A (A Child) (Supervised contact) (s91(14) Children Act 1989 orders)

[2021] EWCA Civ 1749

; D v E

[2021] EWFC 37

; A & T (Children), Re (Appeal: Duration of Section 91(14) Order)

[2025] EWHC 3052

. The central principles of Re P are well known and established and need not be repeated in full.

[26]I have also had regard to the review of the relevant principles by Henke J in Re C (A Child) (Relocation: Domestic Abuse: Section 91(14) Orders)

[2026] EWHC 1591 (Fam)

. Henke J emphasised that the court must consider the matters set out in PD12Q, including the duration and scope of any restriction, and ensure that any order is proportionate to the harm it is intended to prevent.

[27]Henke J further reaffirmed that Re A (A Child) (Supervised Contact) (Section 91(14) Children Act 1989 Orders) [2021] EWCA Civ, remains authoritative, in which the Court of Appeal endorsed the guidelines in Re P. These establish that a s.91(14) order is an exceptional measure, to be used sparingly and with great care as a restriction upon a person's right to bring proceedings concerning a child. The court must weigh all relevant circumstances, treat the child's welfare as paramount, and ensure that both the scope and duration of any restriction are no greater than is necessary to protect the child or primary carers from unacceptable strain or harm.

[28]It is against this full legal framework that I turn to consider the welfare checklist, the realistic options for C’s care, and the outcome which best secures her safety, stability and lifelong welfare.

[4]THE LOCAL AUTHORITY EVIDENCE

[29]Following the fact-finding decision, the Local Authority filed an addendum parenting assessment of Ms M which was positive and C was thereafter transitioned back to the mother’s care. There have been no concerns since C’s return although the Local Authority are aware of potential weaknesses such as identification of risk, trauma, C’s unknown medical and other needs and the identification of appropriate support and services, and proposed a 6 month Supervision Order which would offer support and monitoring. They considered that Ms M should be able to make decisions regarding C, her health and education needs without the involvement of Mr F.Unrestricted exercise of Parental Responsibility by Mr F presented an ongoing risk of harm and initially they considered that it should be restricted through a lifelong Prohibited Steps Order, which prevented Mr F from seeking to gain any information in respect of C’s health and education and prevented him from attempting to restrict Ms M decision making. They later supported the mother’s application to terminate Mr F’s PR. They supported the change of name application. And an order preventing further applications by the father.

[30]They set out a detailed history of Mr F’s missed family time sessions with C and confirmed that he missed most of the monthly sessions from February 2026 to date, with his excuses being work, traffic and his holiday. Contact had taken place in May. They were clear that he failed to prioritise C. Cancellations often happened when C had already been transported to contact. They were firm that any contact between C and her father should be indirect only. There remained an unacceptable significant risk of further physical harm and emotional harm arising from ongoing family time due to his lack of acceptance of the findings, lack of emotional connection and his lack of consistency.He did not recognise C’s emotional needs or her need for consistency and routine and in their opinion, there was no clear benefit to C in seeing her father.

[31]A risk assessment of Mr F was undertaken, during only one session as Mr F failed to make arrangements to meet further, despite the offer of various alternative appointments. He blamed the Local Authority for not being updated in relation to C yet it was clear that he had not accessed documents sent to him. The outcome was negative for reasons including his refusal to accept responsibility, lack of commitment to attending family time and also his lack of understanding of the seriousness and impact of C’s injuries. He did not engage in discussion about this and instead appeared to remain primarily focused on the impact of the situation upon himself, rather than C’s changing needs.

[5]THE MOTHER’S EVIDENCE

[32]The mother filed 2 statements following the fact-finding judgment. She accepted the findings. C was transitioned home to her care and she agreed to the making of a 6 or 12 month Supervision Order. She sought to change C’s surname to be the same as her own as she considered this to be in C’s best interests and for the discharge of Mr F’s Parental Responsibility, pointing out his lack of remorse, insight and commitment. She considered that he was trying to exercise control over C and herself by his demands concerning contact and supported this being only bi-annual and indirect but not including photographs. She was undergoing therapy, receiving support from agencies and her parents, would work with professionals and was wholly committed to caring for C. She was willing for the paternal family to have contact but only on the basis that they accepted the findings of the Court, and that a member of her family would be present for the contact, as she was not prepared to personally supervise contact.

[6]THE FATHER’S EVIDENCE

[33]The father filed two statements since the fact-finding judgment. He continued to dispute the findingsand maintained that the mother was responsible for C’s injuries, thus C should not be placed with her, nor should she remain with the maternal grandparents. He sought direct contact, to be supervised professionally or by his niece. He disputed the Local Authority’s evidence that he had simply failed to attend family time, offering a number of excuses including work commitments (he had changed jobs), traffic but ultimately accepted that his attendance was inconsistent. He sought to retain full Parental Responsibility and disagreed that C could be caused emotional harm by ongoing family time. He supported a 12 month Supervision Order. He opposed any change to C’s name.

[34]In addition to his statement, Mr F filed an application for direct contact and obtained a report from Togetherness for Families, a specialist independent supervised contact provider. Following a detailed review, the organisation declined to undertake supervision. Its conclusion was unequivocal. Having considered the severity of the injuries, Togetherness concluded that the level of risk exceeded that which could safely be managed within a community-based supervised contact setting. It stated that it did not consider its service capable of safely managing or mitigating the risks identified and that it lacked sufficient confidence that contact could be facilitated safely, even within a supervised room-based environment. The organisation noted that the father had been assessed as demonstrating manipulative and dishonest behaviours. In its professional judgment, those matters increased the complexity of risk management and created concern that supervision itself could be undermined. It expressly concluded that the risks could not be adequately reduced by the level of supervision available within its service.

[35]I consider that evidence to be relevant. It comes from an independent organisation whose day-to-day work involves the facilitation of supervised contact in difficult and challenging cases. This is not an organisation inexperienced in managing risk. On the contrary, it routinely supervises contact in circumstances involving substantial safeguarding concerns. Yet it has concluded that the risks in this particular case exceed those which can safely be managed through supervision.

[36]Mr F agreed at the final hearing to the making of the order that C should live with the mother yet this was not the position he had taken in his written evidence or indeed in discussions with the Guardian.

[7]THE GUARDIAN’S EVIDENCE

[37]The Guardian’s final report recommended rehabilitation to the mother with a 12 month Supervision Order. She did not support any form of direct contact between C and her father, noting that he had seen her only once since February and whatever his excuses, he had failed to prioritise C or be proactive in updating himself about her, instead blaming others including the mother’s family and the Local Authority. She questioned the value to C of direct contact given the assessments undertaken in the proceedings, his lack of acceptance of the judgment, his lack of honesty and lack of ability to prioritise C with his focus remaining on himself. On behalf of C, she considered it to be C’s right to not have her father be part of her life or for him to have the ability to make decisions on her behalf. She was not confident that Mr F would exercise his parental responsibility in C’s best interests and thought he would use it as a means to exert control over C and Ms M:

“She cannot be expected to co-parent with Mr F, nor do I think this would be safe. I do not feel that Mr F should be in a position where he should be consulted on matters concerning C or be part of the decision making, particularly in relation to her health needs, needs that he caused.”

She supported the termination of Parental Responsibility and supported the mother’s application to change C’s surname. She supported the making of a 10 year barring order.

[38]She was troubled by Mr F’s lack of understanding of C’s development, since he did not perceive her to have any difficulties despite it being clear that she is significantly behind her peers in terms of meeting milestones. She was also troubled by his suggestion that C should not be placed with her mother or maternal grandparents long term and considered that he was unable to recognise what is best for her.

[39]The Supervision Order should be for 12 months and also include work with the paternal family about contact and their understanding and acceptance of the decisions. The period of 12 months would cover the full transition and settling of C as well as time for decisions regarding the potential prosecution of the father if the police decide to charge him, which would be unsettling for the mother (and thus C) either way. There are also new emerging needs of C which will require support and signposting and time to reflect and consider everything that the family has been through which may require additional emotional support.

[8]ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS

THE WELFARE CHECKLIST

[40]I will assess the most pertinent issues here although C’s welfare has been my paramount consideration throughout this judgment. I will address welfare issues further when considering the specific matters in dispute.

[41]Wishes and feelings: At C's young age, her wishes and feelings cannot be ascertained. The court must therefore focus on identifying the arrangements that best promote her welfare throughout her childhood. The court can nevertheless identify the arrangements most likely to promote security, stability and protection from harm. The court must be cautious about attributing views to a child of this age. However, as she matures and comes to understand the findings and their consequences, the impact of any relationship with her father is likely to require careful consideration. Indeed there is a risk that she could find it very hard to understand why she was being made to see the person who caused her such significant harm or indeed why he should be in a position to make decisions concerning her future. This is particularly relevant as her father still blames her mother for her injuries. She may wish to see her extended paternal family if it is safe for her to do so and if they can act in her best interests rather than those of her father.

[42]Physical, emotional and educational needs: By virtue of her young age and the effects of her injuries, C is wholly dependent on her carer to meet all of her needs and she requires a safe and stable home environment which can afford her attuned and consistent parenting, including love and affection, stimulation to promote her development, and protection from potential harm. C has additional needs as a result of Mr F’s actions; she will be significantly disabled for life. The evidence from the medics highlighted that as a result of the inflicted injuries C has the following life-long conditions or is at risk of developing:• Moderate to severe long-term disability with significant learning difficulties (this may include her vision being affected, feeding, speech and language and being doubly incontinent as well as requiring a wheelchair);

• Cerebral palsy (at the intermediate or more severe end of the spectrum);

• Neurodevelopmental delay.

• Significant problems with understanding and emotional regulations as well as behavioural problems;

• The development and continuation of her epilepsy;

• There will likely be a poor level of independent and social functioning;

• She will require medications and community services like physiotherapy.

[43]We do not know what C’s needs will look like in the longer term and what this means for her in terms of her development and the support she will require in her day to day life. Currently she is undergoing physiotherapy to assist the development of her gross motor skills. She is unable to walk or crawl but the physios are hopeful. She will need considerable support throughout her minority and her mother is happy to accept this and work with professionals. Ms M also has the support of her parents, approved foster carers, and a Supervision Order will also offer support. It can also protect C from the risks her father poses to her welfare and safety.

[44]The likely effect on her of any change in her circumstances: C is now back home with her mother and if I approve the plans of the Local Authority, this will not change. She has transitioned and settled well. The re-introduction of regular direct contact with her father would represent a change to the more recent history and could have a destabilising effect upon her, particularly if his commitment remained sporadic. In his own submissions, it was clear that financial issues may play a part in the regularity of any supervised contact such that monthly may not be affordable. This could mean disruptive last minute changes, as have happened recently. If I remove Mr F’s PR, this will potentially be a change for C as her mother will be able to make decisions without consultation. In my judgment that would potentially be a positive change. She would also, if the mother’s application was granted, have a change to her name. This would not have any impact upon her at this stage as she is unaware of her name but she may become aware of the change at a later date. In deciding whether to grant the changes sought, the court must consider the impact of the parent-child relationship. I am satisfied that at this stage, her relationship with her father is now minimal.

[45]Her age, sex, background and any characteristics which the court considers relevant: I have addressed these earlier in this analysis and throughout this judgment.

[46]Any harm which she has suffered or is at risk of suffering: C has already suffered from catastrophic harm at the hands of her father and she would plainly be at risk of further harm if placed in his care. Any proposal for contact requires careful scrutiny in light of the findings, the father's continuing denial, and the professional evidence regarding risk. The initial assessment from “Togetherness” (prepared at the request of the father for his contact application) is clear that in their opinion the risk is very significant, such that they refused to even consider supervising his contact, “we do not believe it would be in the child's best interests for our service to facilitate contact in these circumstances”.

[47]C is now settled in the care of her mother and appears happy. Provided the mother continues to accept and access support and guidance, there is no evidence to suggest that this will not continue. C would be at risk of emotional harm if her mother was distressed due to having to facilitate contact with the father or maintain links/consult with him.

[48]How capable each of his parents is of meeting her needs: Mr F is presently unable to meet C's needs and there is no evidence before me that he could do so within any foreseeable timescale. Ms M has been assessed as being able to care for C with appropriate support.

[49]The range of powers available to the court: I have various options in relation to orders, ranging from public orders to private law “live with” or “no / contact” orders, to no orders at all. I could also make additional orders such as Prohibited Steps orders and Specific Issue Orders in relation to PR and names. I can also make an order preventing further applications.

PROPORTIONALITY AND OPTIONS

[50]I remind myself throughout that the findings made against the father do not themselves determine the welfare outcome. The issue is not punishment for past conduct but the impact of those findings upon C's present and future welfare. My assessment therefore focuses upon risk, insight, capacity for change, and the ability of each parent to meet C's lifelong needs. In this case the realistic options are limited, but each must nevertheless be evaluated. Return to the father’s care

[51]For the reasons given, a return to the care of the father is not safe or viable and indeed this is accepted by Mr F. Foster Care

[52]This is not a suitable option for C. It was not considered by any party save potentially the father, as until the final hearing he did not agree to C’s placement in her mother’s care, nor did he believe that she should be placed with her maternal grandparents in the alternative, despite their exemplary care of C throughout these proceedings. Remain with the Maternal Grandparents

[53]This would provide safety, but would represent a greater interference with family life than necessary given the availability of a suitable placement with her mother. Return to the mother’s care

[54]This option will provide C with permanence within the family, with her mother, secures her safety through her mother’s protective capacity and represents a less interventionist and more proportionate outcome. I am satisfied that any risks can be appropriately managed within this placement, supported by clear support and guidance under the Supervision Order and ongoing support services as required. These may be extensive for C as the full extent of her disabilities is revealed as she grows.

[55]In comparing these options, I am satisfied that placement with her mother meets C’s need for safety and is the option which best provides for her welfare needs, supported by the Local Authority, medical and other necessary services, and by the extended maternal family. 8.1. C’S HOME AND THE SUPERVISION ORDER

[56]C is now home with her mother following the implementation of the transition plan. This return took place on a staged basis and was complete by early June 2026. The parenting assessment of the mother in September 2025 was positive (save for outstanding fact-finding) as was the addendum completed in April 2026.It highlighted that Ms M has insight in relation to the impact of C’s injuries, the capacity to recognise risk in others and the mechanisms available to ensure she and C are safe. It also highlighted that Ms M understands C’s needs and has the capacity to meet them, and led to the recommendation for C to transition back to her mother’s care. There are some vulnerabilities, such as mother being rather naïve and trusting in relationships but she has undertaken work to address this. Ms M has a diagnosis of Autism and struggles with communication. She has processing and sensory issues, and her cognitive ability is in the borderline range with significant difficulties with verbal reasoning, memory and processing speed. She has engaged with health professionals and undertaken her own research in relation to C’s current and potential future needs, so she is equipped to support C’s development. Ms M is reflective of her relationship with Mr F and has shown significant insight as to the risk he poses. She has a strong support network who will continue to support her care of C in the longer term. She and C have a strong and secure attachment.

[57]A Local Authority risk assessment of Mr F in April 2026 highlighted that he did not prioritise his engagement in the assessment, that there was no capacity to change at present as he does not accept the findings that he caused C’s injuries and that his lack of acceptance was a barrier to completing any work that could reduce the risks he poses. It further highlighted that there had been poor engagement with him attending the family time arrangements and as such, they recommended that the sessions be reduced to monthly. He has attended only one session, for various reasons. In my judgment, he has failed to give appropriate priority to his contact with C, and there is no evidential basis for concluding that this would change in the future.

[58]It is due to these various issues coupled with C’s special needs and very recent return home that the Local Authority proposed a Supervision Order which was agreed by all parties. This would allow the Local Authority to assess support needs for the family. The Guardian was firm that the order should be for 12 months to allow more time for C to settle with her mother, to address her emerging needs and for other matters such as the ongoing police investigation. We are now aware that there will be no charging decision until at least December. The mother would prefer 6 months but would not object to 12 months. Father supported 12 months, but an element of that was due to his hope for ongoing direct contact with C.

[59]Whilst I accept the Local Authority's submission that the court must adopt the least interventionist order consistent with C's welfare, I am not satisfied that a six-month Supervision Order would adequately meet her needs. This conclusion does not arise from any lack of confidence in the mother's care of C. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the mother has demonstrated commitment, insight and the capacity to meet C's needs with appropriate support. However, C's circumstances are exceptional. Her rehabilitation home is recent, having been completed not long before this final hearing, and the full consequences of the injuries she sustained have yet to emerge. The medical evidence establishes that C's developmental, educational, therapeutic and physical needs are likely to evolve significantly as she grows and that the extent of her future disabilities remains uncertain.

[60]A period of twelve months will allow the Local Authority to support the family as C's emerging needs become clearer, ensure appropriate services and therapies are established, and assist the mother in managing the complex demands arising from C's disabilities. Given the recent rehabilitation home, the uncertainty surrounding C's long-term needs, and the mother's identified vulnerabilities, I am satisfied that six months would not provide sufficient support or oversight.

[61]I have given consideration as to whether a 6 month order should be made on the basis that the Local Authority could apply to extend the order for a further 6 months if they consider this necessary when they conduct their review. I have rejected this on the basis that these parents have now already been involved in highly emotive and distressing proceedings for over 15 months and to bring the matter back to court in a mere 6 months time cannot be fair to them, it would reopen issues and likely delay personal recovery as well as potentially increase animosity and bring the parents into contact with each other when there is no good reason to do this.

[62]I accept the Guardian's evidence that a twelve-month order will allow time for work with the wider family network and for support to be provided should developments arise from the ongoing police investigation. I do not treat the possibility of criminal proceedings as a determinative factor. Rather, it is one of a number of circumstances which may have a direct impact upon the emotional wellbeing of C's primary carer and therefore upon C's welfare.

[63]Considering the matter globally, I am satisfied that a twelve-month Supervision Order is necessary, proportionate and firmly rooted in C's welfare needs. It represents the minimum level of continuing public law involvement required to support this recent rehabilitation, to assist the family in responding to C's developing disabilities and needs, and to promote the stability of her placement throughout the crucial first year following her return to her mother's care. A six-month order would not provide sufficient time to achieve those objectives.

[64]I am also satisfied that this is an exceptional case, and the Child Arrangements Order for C to live with her mother should last beyond 16. C, in light of her needs, requires certainty, security and protection around her living arrangements until she attains the age of 18 years. I regard this as one of the rare exceptional circumstances cases contemplated by s.9(6) Children Act 1989. The combination of C's catastrophic injuries, anticipated lifelong disability, need for extensive healthcare and educational planning, and the continuing risks presented by the father create circumstances well outside the norm. Ongoing certainty regarding her primary home throughout her minority is itself a welfare benefit. 8.2. CONTACT

[65]There is a general recognition that children benefit from a relationship with both parents where such a relationship is safe and promotes their welfare. However, there is no parental right to contact and the court's task is to determine whether contact would be in C's best interests, her welfare being the court's paramount consideration. I have considered the welfare checklist, the findings made in these proceedings, the written and oral evidence, and the submissions of all parties. The starting point for this welfare evaluation is the court's finding that Mr F was responsible for the injuries sustained by C. Those injuries were of exceptional gravity and have left C with significant lifelong disabilities and uncertainties regarding her future development. The court must therefore assess any future relationship between C and her father in the context of those findings.

[66]I have carefully considered whether direct contact would promote C's welfare. In doing so I recognise the potential benefit that may ordinarily flow from a child maintaining a relationship with a parent. However, there are a number of factors which weigh heavily against direct contact in this case.

[67]Firstly, Mr F continues to deny responsibility for the injuries and attributes them to the mother. He has demonstrated little if any insight into the harm caused to C or the risks arising from his behaviour. The absence of insight is significant because it leaves the court with no confidence that the risks identified have reduced or can presently be managed safely. Further, there continues to be a risk that he may undermine the placement of C with her mother if he continues to apportion blame to her.

[68]Secondly, there is little evidence of any meaningful current relationship between father and child. He has not exercised a consistent parenting role and has seen C only infrequently since the findings were made.C derives no identifiable emotional, practical or developmental benefit from his involvement. In respect of the time which C has previously spent with her father, there have been some concerns around his commitment to the sessions, his handling of C and how she has presented at times where she has been distressed, albeit Mr F’s opinion was that the sessions which had taken place were entirely positive. In respect of missed sessions, various explanations were given but the Guardian was clear in her report that she still considered that he had failed to prioritise C. He has seen her only once since February. The evidence thus established that the father has little or no present relationship with C. There is no evidence of attachment. There has been no recent consistent parental involvement.

[69]Thirdly, I have considered whether supervised contact could adequately manage the risks. The Local Authority have continued to promote and supervise the father’s (limited) contact as they were legally required to do during the proceedings, and they could potentially continue in the future, although once the public law proceedings were concluded this would be unlikely. Supervision may provide an appropriate safeguard. In this case, however, the independent assessment commissioned by the father did not support that conclusion with Togetherness for Families declining to facilitate supervised contact, concluding that the risks presented exceeded those capable of being safely managed within its service. Of particular concern to them were the seriousness of the injuries, the father's lack of insight, and concerns regarding manipulative and dishonest behaviours. I attach some weight to that independent assessment, albeit it is only an opinion. It does, at the very least rule out at least one potential provider. Direct risk is, however, only one of the relevant factors and not conclusive or determinative.

[70]I have also considered the position of the mother. Any direct contact arrangement would inevitably have an impact upon her as C's primary carer. Given the findings made by the court, her concerns regarding the father are entirely understandable. The emotional wellbeing and stability of C's primary carer are relevant welfare considerations because they directly affect C's day-to-day care and sense of security.

[71]Finally, although C is too young to understand the circumstances of these proceedings, the court must consider her future welfare as well as her immediate welfare. There is a realistic possibility that, as C matures and comes to understand the findings, direct contact may generate emotional difficulties or conflict. I do not treat that as determinative. It is one factor amongst many and carries substantially less weight than the father's continuing denial, lack of insight, absence of relationship, and the professional assessments including that of the Local Authority.

[72]Assessing those matters together, I am satisfied that the potential benefits of direct contact are outweighed by the risks and lead me to conclude that direct contact would not presently promote C's welfare. I therefore refuse the father's application for direct contact. This conclusion is based on the current evidence and circumstances. Should there be a change in circumstances in the future, any future application would fall to be determined on the evidence then available.

[73]I am satisfied that limited indirect contact remains appropriate. The proposal supported by the Local Authority, the mother and the Guardian, namely the exchange of letters and cards twice yearly, strikes an appropriate balance between preserving a limited link and protecting C's welfare. I agree that photographs should not be included in order to protect C's privacy and prevent the disclosure of information about her whereabouts and circumstances.

[74]I also support the continuation of C's relationship with members of her paternal family where this can be achieved safely and in a manner consistent with her welfare. Any such arrangements should remain subject to appropriate assessment, recognition of the court's findings, and agreement with the mother. It is not appropriate or necessary for an order in relation to that contact. 8.3. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

[75]The Local Authority applied to restrict the father’s PR via a Prohibited Steps Order and the Guardian supported that application. The mother then sought an order terminating the father's parental responsibility pursuant to s.4(2A) Children Act 1989. In the alternative, she invited the court to impose extensive restrictions upon the exercise of that responsibility. Ultimately the Local Authority and Guardian supported the mother’s application for termination of PR.

[76]The most significant feature of this case is the father's conduct towards C. The court has previously found that the father caused serious injuries to C. Those findings were the foundation of the public law intervention and remain binding. The father has never accepted responsibility, still blames the mother despite her being completely exonerated by this court, did not accept that C should live with her despite this and of additional concern, he did not even accept that the maternal grandparents were suitable to care for C despite their excellent and committed care since these proceedings commenced and C’s obvious attachment to them. He had not at any point considered the implications that those positions might have for C’s future arrangements. His submissions being focused primarily on challenging the proposed arrangements rather than identifying how C's welfare would be promoted. Although a failure to admit wrongdoing is not of itself determinative, continuing denial prevents any proper insight into the harm suffered by the child. It prevents acknowledgement of risk and significantly undermines the possibility of rehabilitation. The absence of insight is particularly significant where the proven conduct concerns serious physical harm inflicted upon the child herself which has life changing effects.

[77]Mr F has very limited involvement with C, as I have already addressed concerning contact and will not repeat here. He performs no parenting role and contributes nothing to C's day-to-day welfare. Applying the considerations identified in Re P, Re D, D v E and the subsequent authorities, I am satisfied that the father's commitment to C has, for a considerable period, been extremely limited. Most significantly, the evidence does not establish any present welfare benefit flowing to C from the father's continued possession of parental responsibility. The fact that I would not grant parental responsibility were an application made today is a factor that reinforces my conclusion that no current welfare benefit flows from its continuation

[78]I recognise that parental responsibility is an important legal status and that its removal from a parent is a grave and exceptional step. I remind myself that the purpose of the court's jurisdiction is not to punish a parent for past conduct, however serious, nor to remove parental responsibility merely because contact is not taking place. Equally, the court is not concerned with preserving parental status for its own sake. The question remains whether the continuation of parental responsibility serves C's welfare interests, taking her welfare as my paramount consideration.

[79]I acknowledge that parental responsibility ordinarily serves important functions. It recognises a parent's status, facilitates involvement in major decisions affecting a child, preserves a framework for consultation and may provide a basis for future rehabilitation of the parent-child relationship. Those are all matters to which I have given careful consideration. However, when examined against the facts of this particular case, I am unable to identify any realistic present or future welfare benefit arising from the father's continued possession of parental responsibility. Those findings are reflected in the father's current position. He has developed little or no insight into the harm suffered by C or the decisions required to meet her needs. This is particularly significant given C's life-changing injuries and her likely need for complex and evolving medical, therapeutic, educational and disability-related support throughout her childhood. Decisions concerning treatment, therapies, specialist assessments and educational provision, including a potential Education, Health and Care Plan, will require informed and effective decision-making over many years. There is no evidential basis upon which I could conclude that the father is capable of contributing constructively to those decisions; indeed, the evidence points firmly in the opposite direction.

[80]I have considered with particular care whether parental responsibility could be preserved through extensive Prohibited Steps Orders or Specific Issue Orders, as initially proposed by the Local Authority and the Guardian, as a less interventionist and more proportionate course. Whilst that will often be appropriate, I am not satisfied that it is so in this case. Given the father's continuing denial of responsibility, lack of insight, absence of any real relationship with C, and inability to contribute constructively to decisions concerning her welfare, I can identify no area in which the continued exercise of parental responsibility would benefit her. A comprehensive regime of restrictions would require the court to anticipate numerous future decisions affecting a child whose needs will evolve significantly over time, whilst preserving a legal status serving no useful welfare purpose and leaving scope for continuing conflict and uncertainty. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the evidence justifies the more exceptional course.

[81]I also consider whether termination itself would occasion any identifiable harm to C. I am satisfied that it would not. Unlike cases where a child enjoys an established and beneficial relationship with the parent concerned, C has no such relationship with her father. There is no evidence that termination would cause her emotional harm, destabilise her sense of identity or deprive her of any practical benefit. Her paternal heritage will remain part of her personal history irrespective of whether the father retains parental responsibility.

[82]Having carried out the required welfare evaluation, I am satisfied that no present or foreseeable welfare benefit flows from the father's continued possession of parental responsibility. Conversely, its continuation carries a real risk of future conflict and disruption.

[83]I remind myself once more that termination of parental responsibility remains a draconian and exceptional order. I make clear that I do not terminate parental responsibility merely because the father inflicted serious injuries upon C, as serious findings alone do not automatically justify such an order. The continuation of parental responsibility carries a significant risk of instability and adverse impact upon C's welfare, whilst its termination will not cause her any identifiable harm. Having considered and rejected less interventionist alternatives for the reasons already set out, I am satisfied that termination is necessary, proportionate, and better promotes C's welfare than preserving parental responsibility in any form.

[84]I am satisfied that termination of parental responsibility is a necessary and proportionate interference with the father's Article 8 rights because no lesser measure would adequately protect C's welfare.

[85]Accordingly, pursuant to s.4(2A) Children Act 1989, I order that the father's parental responsibility for C shall be terminated. 8.4. NAME CHANGE

[86]The mother seeks permission for C's surname to be changed from [existing surname of Mr F] to [mothers surname]. She submits that C no longer has a relationship with her father, that she derives her sense of security and belonging exclusively from her mother's household, and that it would promote her welfare to share the surname of the family by whom she is being raised. She further submits that the [F’s surname] has become associated by her with the traumatic events that have shaped C's early life and that, as C matures and comes to understand the circumstances surrounding her injuries, the continuation of that surname may have an adverse emotional impact upon her.

[87]I begin from the proposition that a surname is an important component of a child's identity, heritage and sense of self. Any application to change a child's surname must therefore be approached with care. However, the facts of this case are unusual and grave. This is not a case involving two parents who continue to play significant roles in a child's life and who seek competing recognition through the child's surname. I have given weight to the fact that the father was found responsible for all of the injuries suffered by C. This is a case where the parent whose surname the child presently bears has been found to have inflicted serious physical harm upon that child.That fact is relevant, although not determinative.

[88]The authorities place weight upon preserving a meaningful relationship between a child and the parent whose surname is proposed to be removed. In this case, however, C has very limited relationship with her father. I accept the mother's evidence that Mr F has shown limited commitment to maintaining contact and little engagement in developing a relationship with her. The Guardian's evidence was that he has a poor understanding of C's needs, personality and developmental difficulties and does not truly know her. He has seemingly demonstrated limited insight into the harm caused or its consequences for C's future welfare. In those circumstances, there is little realistic prospect of a safe and beneficial parental relationship developing in the foreseeable future.

[89]I also accept the mother's evidence that, as C grows older, the injuries she suffered may become a continuing reminder of what her father did to her. Whilst a change of surname cannot erase the past, the court is entitled to consider the emotional significance that a surname may carry for a child whose father has been found to have caused her serious injuries.

[90]I have considered carefully whether the proposed change would amount to an inappropriate attempt to erase the father from C's life. I am satisfied that it does not. The order does not alter C's biological identity, paternal heritage or ability in later life to understand her family history. Her paternal heritage will remain part of her identity irrespective of surname. However, a surname is not simply a record of biological connection; it is also a marker of present identity, belonging and family life. The reality of C's circumstances is that she lives exclusively within her mother's household and derives her care, stability, emotional security and sense of family from that family unit. I have already decided that Mr F should have no direct contact with C and should not retain parental responsibility for her. In those circumstances, the mother’s surname better reflects C's lived reality and is likely to promote consistency, clarity and a sense of belonging as she grows older.

[91]Considering all the circumstances and applying s.1 Children Act 1989 and the authorities to which I have referred, I am satisfied that the welfare advantages of the proposed change substantially outweigh the factors favouring retention of the surname [F’s surname]. The father was found to have inflicted serious injuries upon C, continues to deny responsibility for those injuries, has not demonstrated insight into the harm caused, and has no meaningful relationship with her. By contrast, the mother’s surname reflects the family unit within which C lives, is cared for, and derives her security, stability and sense of belonging. I am satisfied that changing C's surname from [F’s surname] to [M’s surname] is in her best interests and best promotes her welfare, identity and family life. I make clear that this order is not intended to erase either the father's existence or C's paternal heritage, which will remain an important part of her personal history irrespective of the surname she bears. 8.5 SECTION 91(14) CA 1989

[92]The mother, the Local Authority and the Guardian all supported the making of a s.91(14) order. The Local Authority initially proposed a duration of four years but ultimately supported the Guardian's position that a ten-year order was appropriate. The Guardian considered this to be an exceptional case and submitted that a ten-year period would provide C with stability and protection throughout a substantial part of her childhood whilst preserving the possibility of a future reassessment when she is older. The mother supported that position.

[93]This is not a case involving ordinary post-proceedings disagreement between separated parents, nor one where a short period of protection is required to allow a child to settle into court-ordered arrangements. The findings made against the father are exceptional and, relevant to this issue as well as the others already addressed, Mr F continues to deny responsibility, maintains allegations against the mother, and demonstrate little insight into either the impact of his conduct or C's welfare needs. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that there is a real risk that future applications would seek, directly or indirectly, to revisit issues that have already been conclusively determined. The concern is not merely that such applications may lack merit, but that the process of responding to further litigation would itself expose C and her primary carer to continuing uncertainty, emotional strain and instability. That risk is particularly acute in this case because, as a consequence of her injuries, C will require extensive medical, therapeutic, educational and welfare support throughout her childhood, with her needs likely to evolve significantly as she develops. Stability and consistency in planning for her future are therefore of particular importance. Any repeated litigation concerning contact, parental involvement or related welfare issues would risk undermining that stability, place an additional burden upon the mother as C's primary carer, and thereby have an adverse impact upon C's welfare.

[94]I accept that the father has not engaged in a history of repetitive, vexatious or serial litigation. However, as both Re P and the subsequent authorities make clear, such a history is not a prerequisite to the making of a s.91(14) order. The court may impose a leave requirement where there is clear evidence that, absent such protection, the child or primary carer would be exposed to unacceptable strain. I am satisfied that such evidence exists here.This is not a case about vexatious litigation, it is about protecting a profoundly injured child and her sole carer from the destabilising effect of litigation.

[95]Applying the well-established principles identified in Re P, Re A and Re C governing the exercise of this jurisdiction, I am satisfied that this is one of the exceptional cases in which a leave requirement is justified. The circumstances extend well beyond the ordinary need for a child to settle following litigation or the commonplace conflict that may arise between separated adults. The evidence demonstrates a serious risk that, absent a restriction, C and her primary carer would be exposed to unacceptable strain and uncertainty.

[96]I have considered carefully whether the imposition of a leave requirement would constitute a proportionate interference with the father's right of access to the court. I am satisfied that it would. The proposed order does not prevent the father from making future applications. It simply requires him first to obtain the court's permission before doing so.The order therefore operates as a filter and not as a bar.I am satisfied that the combination of a leave requirement and the father's continuing right to seek permission from the court represents the least interventionist measure capable of adequately protecting C's welfare.

[97]In accordance with PD12Q and the relevant authorities, I have considered whether a period such as three, five or seven years would provide sufficient protection. I am satisfied that it would not. The factors justifying a s.91(14) order are not temporary but arise from C's permanent and life-changing injuries, the father's continuing denial of responsibility and lack of insight, and the likelihood of significant welfare, medical and educational decision-making throughout her childhood. At the expiry of such orders C would still be a young child with evolving disabilities and ongoing educational, therapeutic and medical needs. The factors which presently justify protection would be unlikely to have materially diminished simply through the passage of time. In the absence of genuine evidence of insight, rehabilitation or other material change, there is no realistic basis upon which the court could presently anticipate a successful application concerning contact or any greater parental role. A shorter order would therefore fail adequately to protect C and her primary carer from the strain and uncertainty of further litigation.

[98]I also considered whether a longer period, extending until C's sixteenth birthday or for an indefinite duration, would be justified. I am not persuaded that such a restriction is presently necessary. The ten-year period proposed by the Guardian appropriately recognises both the seriousness of the current circumstances and the possibility that, as C matures, her wishes and feelings may assume greater significance. Although it is impossible to predict the extent to which she will ultimately be able to formulate and express informed views given the nature and long-term consequences of her injuries, she will, by that stage, be significantly older and better placed so far as her functioning permits, to contribute to decisions concerning any future relationship with her father.I am satisfied that a shorter period would not provide sufficient protection from the risks identified above, whilst a longer period extending to her sixteenth birthday or adulthood would be more restrictive than is presently necessary. A ten-year duration will carry C through the entirety of her childhood years during which her disabilities, educational arrangements and therapeutic interventions are most likely to be developing. It strikes a balance between providing meaningful stability and preserving the opportunity for reconsideration before adulthood. It also preserves the father's right to seek the court's intervention should there be genuine evidence of insight, rehabilitation or other material change of circumstances. I conclude that a leave requirement for ten years is a proportionate and necessary order.

[99]In selecting the duration, I have not sought to punish the father for the findings made against him. The purpose of the order is protective rather than punitive. The duration reflects the risks identified above and I am satisfied that no less restrictive measure would adequately protect C's welfare.

[100]Accordingly, I shall make an order pursuant to s.91(14) Children Act 1989 prohibiting the father from making any application under section 8 Children Act 1989 in relation to C, including applications concerning contact, specific issue orders or prohibited steps orders, without first obtaining the permission of the court for a period of ten years. The order is not an absolute bar to future applications. Should there in future be genuine evidence of insight, rehabilitation or other material change of circumstances, the father will remain entitled to seek leave, and any such application can then be considered on its merits.

[101]Finally, standing back and considering the matter globally, I have reviewed each proposed order both individually and cumulatively. I recognise that the combined effect of the orders I make is highly interventionist in relation to the father. However, I am satisfied that each order serves a distinct welfare purpose. No order is made to punish the father for past conduct. Each is made only because I am satisfied that it is necessary to protect and promote C's welfare and that no less interventionist alternative would adequately achieve that objective. I am satisfied that the package of orders is proportionate when viewed through the lens of Article 8 and the lifelong consequences of the injuries suffered by C.

[9]SUMMARY, FINAL DECISIONS AND ORDERS

[102]Drawing all matters together, C has suffered catastrophic harm at the hands of her father. He continues to present an ongoing risk to her welfare. By contrast, the mother has been positively assessed as able to meet C’s needs. She has demonstrated insight, commitment and protective capacity and, with appropriate support, is able to provide C with a safe, stable and permanent home.

[103]I am satisfied that it is in C’s best interests for a Child Arrangements Order to be made providing that she lives with her mother and for a Supervision Order to remain in place for twelve months. Given C's exceptional circumstances, I am satisfied that this is one of the rare cases contemplated by s.9(6) Children Act 1989 and that the Child Arrangements Order should continue until age 18.

[104]I am further satisfied that direct contact with the father would not promote C’s welfare. Indirect contact by way of cards and letters twice yearly is appropriate. Any relationship with members of the paternal family should be left to agreement, subject to appropriate assessment and safeguards.

[105]I am satisfied that it is in C’s best interests for her surname to be changed from [F’s surname] to [M’s surname]. The change reflects the reality of her family life, promotes her sense of identity and belonging within the family unit in which she is being raised, and causes her no identifiable harm.

[106]I am also satisfied that this is an exceptional case in which the termination of the father’s parental responsibility is justified. No present or foreseeable welfare benefit flows to C from his continued possession of parental responsibility, whereas its retention carries a real risk of future conflict and disruption affecting both C and her primary carer.

[107]Finally, I am satisfied that a ten-year order pursuant to s.91(14) Children Act 1989 is necessary, proportionate and protective. This is an exceptional case. Future litigation would risk causing unacceptable strain and instability, whilst C’s lifelong and developing needs require consistency, certainty and careful long-term planning. A ten-year leave requirement strikes the appropriate balance between protecting C’s welfare and preserving the father's right to seek the court's permission should circumstances materially change.

[108]I am fully conscious of the significant impact these combined orders will have upon the father's future role in C’s life. They are not made to punish him. Each order has been considered both individually and cumulatively and is made only because I am satisfied that it is necessary to protect and promote C’s welfare. Mr F remains C’s father and will continue to form part of her personal history, regardless of the orders made today.

[109]My decisions are as follows, and I await a draft order for approval in due course.• I make a Child Arrangement Order for C to live with her mother.

• I make a 12 month Supervision Order.

• I do not make any direct contact order for Mr F. I do note that there is agreement for one final direct contact to take place. I am satisfied that an order for the same is not required. Mr F should be permitted to take some photographs of C on the day.I regard this as a transitional farewell occasion rather than the commencement or continuation of a direct relationship.

• Indirect Contact: Contact with C’s father should be indirect via letters and cards (only, no photographs) on a bi-annual basis and should be via an agreed third party (such as the Local Authority or a relative, following planned discussions and agreement within the maternal family and the Local Authority). Contact with the extended paternal family shall be wholly at the discretion of the mother, again following risk assessment and discussions with the local authority and maternal family. I make no order for the same, contact may occur by agreement following satisfactory assessment.

• Pursuant to s.4(2A) Children Act 1989, I order that the father's Parental Responsibility for C shall be forthwith terminated.

• The mother's Specific Issue application to change C’s surname is granted. Permission is granted for the child formerly known as C [F’s surname] to be known henceforth as C [M’s surname]. The mother shall be permitted to amend all relevant educational, medical and administrative records accordingly.

• Finally, I make an order under Section 91(14) Children Act 1989 barring the father from making further court applications without permission for a period of 10 years. Her Honour Judge Hesford 29 July 2026

Order

Future Harm)

[2001] 1 FLR 611

). The court’s task is to determine the outcome that is right for the child.