C (A Child) (Relocation: Domestic Abuse: Section 91(14) Orders), Re [2026] EWHC 1591 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 1591 (Fam)Case No SD24P00271
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate 15/04/2026
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before
MS JUSTICE HENKE
Re: C (A Child) (Relocation: Domestic Abuse: Section 91(14) Orders)
Hearing Hearing date: 16 February 2026
Nicola Logan (instructed by GoodLaw Solicitors LLP) for the Applicant
The First Respondent did not attend and was not represented
Pauline Troy (instructed by Wannops LLP) for the Second Respondent
Approved Judgment
Draft circulated: 25 March 2026
Formal hand-down: 15 April 2026
Anonymisation and publication: 26 June 2026
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
Ms Justice Henke :
The History
[1]I have before me cross-applications in relation to the parties’ son, C. C was born in England. He is now 6 ½ years old. This judgment in relation to his future welfare is intended to be read as a whole.[2]C’s mother is M. His father is F. C’s parents married in England in 2019. They were divorced in 2022.[3]The first application in time is that made by F. On 2 May 2024 he applied to the Family Court sitting by C100 for an order permitting him to relocate the child outside the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales. The father wished to take C to live with him in Second Hague Convention Country where the father and the paternal family live. At paragraph 5 of his application the father set out his case in full. At paragraph 6 of the application the father stated that he wished to have an urgent hearing within the next 48 hrs because he claimed the child was at risk of harm in the mother’s care. The allegations of harm and risk of harm are set out by the father on his C1A. At paragraph 8 in his application F specifically stated that he had no reason to believe that there was any issue as to jurisdiction in this case. At paragraph 14 F gave the address of his solicitors in this jurisdiction[4]On 2 May 2024 a District Judge considered the father’s application for an urgent hearing and listed it for a First Hearing & Dispute Resolution Appointment on 18 June 2024.[5]On 3 May 2024 the mother made an application for child arrangements order; a prohibited steps order and a specific issue order. Within her C1A the mother set out the risk of harm that the father, she said, posed to C and herself. On issue the mother’s application was listed to be heard at the same time as the father’s namely on 18 June 2024.[6]For administrative reasons the First Hearing & Dispute Resolution Appointment in relation to both applications was actually heard by HHJ Talbott on 20 June 2024. At that hearing both parties were represented by Counsel. HHJ Talbott declared that the court was satisfied that it had jurisdiction in relation to the child, C based on habitual residence. He gave directions to further the litigation and joined the child C as a party to the proceedings. A solicitor and Guardian were appointed to act for C. HHJ Talbott also ordered that the mother must make C available for video contact with his father no less than twice a week each Monday and Thursday at 6pm. The parents were to communicate with each other via an agreed parenting app. HHJ Talbott dismissed the mother’s application for a prohibited steps order because one was already in place. On 7 March 2024, Mr Justice Peel, a High Court Judge, had ordered that: 7. The Father is prohibited from removing C from the jurisdiction of England and Wales without the express written permission of the Mother and the Court. 8. The Father is prohibited from removing C from the care or control of the Mother or any person or institution to whom the Mother has delegated his care or control, without the express written permission of the Mother and the Court. 9. The respondent is prohibited from applying for any travel document for C until further order. 10. Service of this order shall be effective via email[7]The remaining applications for the court to hear in June 2024 were the father's application for a Child Arrangements order for the child to relocate to live with him in Second Hague Convention Country and the mother’s application for a child arrangement order to determine the living and spending time arrangements for the child.[8]The next hearing was on 13 August 2024. All parties were legally represented. It was before HHJ Talbott who again satisfied himself that he had jurisdiction to hear the case on the basis of habitual residence. On that occasion he ordered that the mother must make the child available for video contact with the father on three occasions a week and made an order for direct supervised contact. HHJ Talbott gave further directions to progress the case.[9]On 15 November 2024 the cross-applications were again before HHJ Talbott. Again, all parties were legally represented and again HHJ Talbott satisfied himself that he had jurisdiction by reason of habitual residence and made the necessary declaration.[10]On 15 November 2024 HHJ Talbott gave directions for a fact-finding hearing to take place before him on 2 June 2025 with a time estimate of 4 days. The fact-finding hearing was listed to determine the mother’s allegation that the father retained C in Second Hague Convention Country unjustifiably and not in line with C’s best interests.[11]The fact-finding hearing came before HHJ Talbott for a pre-trial review on 22 May 2025. The father represented himself, having dismissed his legal team approximately 10 days before. The other parties had legal representatives. On this occasion the court permitted the judgment of the Second Hague Convention Country Supreme Court dated 9 January 2025 and sealed on 7 March 2025 and the Order of the Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country to be admitted into these proceedings. Given the nature of the allegations, the father was prohibited from cross-examining the mother himself. The court directed instead the appointment of a QLR to cross-examine the mother on behalf of the father at the fact-finding hearing.[12]The finding of fact hearing duly took place before HHJ Talbott on 2-4 June 2025. The father represented himself, the other parties were legally represented. The QLR cross examined the mother on behalf of the father. The approved judgment is in English at page 120/1227 of the PDF bundle and in the language of the Second Hangue Convention country at page 140/1227. I confirm I have read it carefully. The hearing had been listed to determine one factual issue between the parties, namely that F had retained C in Second Hague Convention Country unjustifiably and against C’s welfare best interests. I take the following chronology from the judgment of HHJ Talbott and the findings of fact he made:• M and F maintained a relationship until the second half of 2021 when they separated. They together with C lived in England [paragraphs 6 of his judgment].• M, F and C continued to live in England after their separation.• On a date at least a week prior to 15 November 2021, F bought tickets for himself and C to travel to Second Hague Convention Country [paragraph 8 of his judgment].• On 14 November 2021 F applied to the family court in England for an ex parte non-molestation order [paragraph 8 and 9 of his judgment]. The court in England made no findings against the mother but on 22 November 2021 granted the injunction until it could hear the case on notice to M. Mrs Justice Roberts, a High Court Judge, later found that the application F made was based on no evidence. HHJ Talbott found that the application deliberately did not disclose that the father was flying to Second Hague Convention Country the very next day and that the application that had been made by F was based on wholly inaccurate and one-sided assertions. HHJ Talbott found that F had made the application to manipulate the narrative to his perceived advantage [paragraph 68-9 of his judgment].• On 15 November 2021 F flew to Second Hague Convention Country with C with M’s permission on condition and in the expectation that F would return C to England on 26 November 2021. F had been provided M with outgoing and return boarding passes confirming the date of return before she consented to C travelling to Second Hague Convention Country for what was meant to be a holiday [paragraphs 3 and 9 of his judgment].• At the time F flew to Second Hague Convention Country with C F’s own case was that he fully intended C to return to England. That remained his case before HHJ Talbott at the hearing on 2-4 June 2025 [paragraph 5 of his judgment].• F’s own case before HHJ Talbott was that on or about 19 November 2021 he decided that he either did not want to return C to England or that it was not possible to do so [paragraph 5 of his judgment].• On 26 November 2021, the day C was supposed to return to England, F emailed M. Within that email F specified that he would not be returning to England with C [paragraph 9 of his judgment].• On 6 December 2021 M sought an ex parte order from the High Court requiring F to return C to England. The order was made by a High Court Judge in England on 13 December 2021. It required F to return C to this jurisdiction by 16 December 2021 [paragraph 10 of his judgment].• In addition, on 15 December 2021 M applied to the Second Hague Convention Country Authority for C who had been wrongfully retained in Second Hague Convention Country by his father, to be returned to this jurisdiction under the Hague Convention [paragraph 11 of his judgment].• F failed to return C to England as required by an order of the English High Court. Consequently, there was a further hearing in the High Court in England on 17 December 2021 and a further order was made requiring C to be returned to England by his father on 20 December 2021 [paragraph 12 of his judgment]. F did not return C as ordered.• On or about 22 December 2021 the police in Second Hague Convention Country began a criminal investigation into child abduction. As part of that investigation, F was interviewed on several occasions [paragraph 13 of his judgment]. The investigation was formally closed on 9 August 2022 [paragraph 16 of his judgment]• On 5 January 2022 F applied to the Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country seeking suspension of the mother’s parental responsibility for C.• On 16 February 2022 the public prosecutor in Second Hague Convention Country initiated proceedings on behalf of M for the return of C to England.• On 5 May 2022 the Hague Convention proceedings brought by the mother had its first hearing in Second Hague Convention Country. F applied to revoke the mother’s parental responsibility for C.• On 28 June 2022 there was a hearing before the High Court in England. F the hearing remotely and participated [paragraph 15 of his judgment]• On 30 June 2022 there was a hearing in Second Hague Convention Country [paragraph 15 of his judgment].• On 18 July 2022 the Juvenile Court in Second Hague Convention Country adjourned M’s Hague Convention case until 1 February 2023 [paragraph 16 of his judgment].• On 9 January 2024 the Second Hague Convention Country ’s Public Prosecutor’s Office, acting on information provided by F joined in the father’s application to revoke the mother’s parental responsibility for C and to effectively overturn the orders of the English High Court.• On 16 February 2024 the Juvenile Court sitting in Second Hague Convention Country clearly having analysed all of the actual evidence as opposed to assertions being made to them which were wholly unjustified, ordered the return of C to England and Wales and rightly in HHJ Talbott’s judgment clearly found a lack of jurisdiction in respect of the Courts in Second Hague Convention Country that being in line of course with the return orders that were made in the High Court [paragraph 19 of his judgment].• On 26 February 2024 C finally returned to England. Since then, C has remained in England where he lives with his mother [paragraph 19 of his judgment].• On 7 March 2024 a High Court Judge made an order prohibiting F from removing C from the jurisdiction of this court without the express permission of the mother or further court order.• On 2 May 2024 F made his applications in relation to C to the English courts.[13]Based on the chronology above it is clear to me and I so find that C was habitually resident in England as at 26 November 2021 when his father, F, wrongfully retained C in Second Hague Convention Country. On 16 February 2024, the second Hague convention Court hearing M’s Hague Convention application returned C to England. He has lived in England with his mother since his return on 26 February 2024. He is settled in England, attends school here, has friends here and has all his medical needs met here. England is without doubt his home. It is where he is habitually resident.[14]However, shortly before the hearing before HHJ Talbott, it came to light that the Second Hague Convention Country Supreme Court on 9 January 2025 had overturned the decision in the Juvenile Court in Second Hague Convention Country. Having heard and read all the evidence he did, HHJ Talbott found at paragraph 22 of his judgment that: … it is abundantly clear to me that the evidence base presented to the Second Hague Convention Country Supreme Court by the father was wholly inaccurate and was undoubtedly an attempt in my judgment to mislead them into making decisions which they may otherwise not have, had they been presented with for example the fullness of the evidence which I have the benefit.[15]On 4 June 2025 HHJ Talbott, based on all the information before him, including F’s written and oral evidence, found that: I am in no doubt at all that there is no conflict of jurisdictions here and that this Court retains jurisdiction, the High Court rightly made the orders they did for return and there is no suggestion that there is anything like a conflict of jurisdiction as is claimed potentially by the father [paragraph 14 of his judgment].[16]Having read all the papers before HHJ Talbott and those filed since the hearing in June 2025 and now before me, I agree with him. There is no conflict of law point here. The English family court clearly has jurisdiction in this case. Indeed, F himself accepted the jurisdiction of the court in England when he made his application to the Family Court in England on 2 May 2024.[17]Within his judgment HHJ Talbott found that F was one of the most dishonest, manipulative and frankly deceitful witnesses from whom I have heard in my courtroom. I found him to be evasive in the extreme in respect of his answers to questions. He avoided at any point reflecting on his own potential poor behaviour and the inconsistency which ran through his evidence on multiple occasions was frankly stark [paragraph 38 of his judgment]. HHJ Talbott found that F had had questions asked of the mother which were intended purely to cause the mother upset and distress. It was designed to be abusive [paragraph 38 of his judgment]. HHJ Talbott found, having heard and read all the evidence, that F had edited a GP letter about the mother upon which he relied and had done so deliberately to manipulate the evidence before him and mislead the court [paragraphs 45-52 of his judgment]. F had drafted a Separation and Cohabitation Agreement in an attempt to control M and her behaviours [paragraph 53-60]. HHJ Talbott found at paragraph 61 that the agreement was just another part of the evidence before me which easily satisfies me that the father had set about creating an entirely false evidence base for his own benefit entirely in order to retrospectively try to claim falsely that he was justified in some way in retaining C out of the jurisdiction. HHJ Talbott found that F had misled the Second Hague Convention Country Supreme Court and had obtained their decision on a false evidence base [paragraph 22 of his judgment]. HHJ Talbott found at paragraph 65 that the father had falsely asserted to the mother’s solicitors that an Second Hague Convention Country Court Order required disclosure of information about C and his whereabouts when, on his own admission, there was no such order made by the Second Hague Convention Country Courts. This was just yet another attempt to manipulate and deceive, another egregious example of his intention and manipulative and deceptive behaviour. HHJ Talbott found at paragraphs 66-67 that F had used the history of L in a manner designed to abuse M and create a false narrative to support his case. HHJ Talbott found that F had began his campaign to deliberately manipulate and create evidence to support his false narrative of the mother when he applied for the non-molestation order and that he has continued that campaign up to and within the hearing before him [ paragraphs 73], HHJ Talbott found at paragraph 73 that F set out to do whatever he could to damage C’s relationship with his mother and to ensure he kept C with him in Italy [ see also paragraphs 74-77]. At paragraphs 77 –78 of his judgment HHJ Talbott found as follows:77. In conclusion, the evidence before me is utterly overwhelming. The father took C to Second Hague Convention Country with a plan to keep him there which he then acted out. He had prior to going set about deliberately manipulating evidence, creating a situation which he knew he could then use before the Second Hague Convention Country Court and indeed the Court in this jurisdiction to try and justify his action. I make clear as I have indicated there is no conflict of jurisdictions in this case. C was born here, habitually resident here and was only in Second Hague Convention Country because he was abducted there by his father. He was then rightly returned pursuant to orders from the High Court in this jurisdiction and had it not been for the father’s wholly unjustifiable and un-child focussed behaviour, C would have remained in this jurisdiction where he is habitually resident and where he should be.78. I find that the father deliberately failed to comply with the three High Court return orders simply because he did not want to bring C back. He did not intend to bring him back when he got on the flight to Second Hague Convention Country and he never intended to until the Juvenile Court in Second Hague Convention Country with all credit to that Court, finally directed that he must do so. The impact of that sort of behaviour on C is clear to anyone with a shred of insight into what that is likely to have caused this young child. He was just two years of age and having been used to being with his mother every day he was taken from her then only to see her in supervised settings very infrequently until over two years later. I found striking the mother’s evidence as to the impact on her on having C returned after such a long time. Her description of having taken C to bed that first night and still holding him like he was two years old was extremely moving and was in my judgment yet again evidence which supports entirely how attuned and aware the mother is of the significant emotional impact this has had on C, and which may in due course show itself even further.[18]The findings made by HHJ Talbott stand. They have not been appealed.[19]The Guardian filed a final analysis on 3 October 2025, in which she recommends the following: - A Child Arrangements Order for C to live with his mother in England. - An order that C spend no direct time with his father. - A Prohibited Steps Order that the Father must not spend any time in person with C he should not approach C or the Mother or remove C from any other person, school or professional whom the mother may have entrusted C’s care. - The prohibited steps order to include that the Father should not be allowed to apply for a passport for C and C cannot travel to Second Hague Convention Country as a minor child. - The Guardian supports one hour of video time for C with his father within a UK contact centre. This video contact cannot be supervised by the mother. - Orders restricting the Father’s parental responsibility, whereby C’s mother is to make all key decisions about C’s welfare including health, education and day to day care. - The Father is not to have C’s address, school, doctor or given details of any professionals working with C for fear of him being located. - A s.91(14) Order barring the Father from making any more court applications in respect of C without firstly the consent of the court to make one.[20]M’s final statement was filed on 6 October 2025. The Mother supports the recommendations made by the Guardian.[21]On 16 October 2025 the Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country heard the case as remitted to them by the Second Hague Convention Country Supreme Court. F was present and legally represented. The child’s Guardian in Second Hague Convention Country was legally represented. The mother neither attended nor was represented, indeed I find that she did not know of the hearing until after it had taken place. F gave evidence before the Juvenile Court. He stated he did not know whether M was being treated which is a reference to her previous mental ill health which he had sought to weaponise against her in the hearing before HHJ Talbott. There is no reference in his evidence to the findings HHJ Talbott made against the father on 4 June 2025 nor the contact orders that he made in light of those findings. The Juvenile Court accordingly based on the partial evidence before it ordered that: Having considered the need to assess the current situation of the child, the Court orders as follows: the child and the mother shall each be heard; and the reports requested by the Public Prosecutor shall be obtained. HHJ Architravo is appointed to conduct the investigation, to interview the mother and to meet the child on 3 December 2025 at 10:30am. For all related matters, separate orders delegate HHJ Architravo to carry out the investigation. The Court directs the Registry to obtain the report concerning the mother and to issue an Order to Attend Court, to be sent to her address. The Court orders that the father is permitted to spend time with the child without restrictions. In view of the reassuring reports from the Second Hangue Convention country Social Services regarding the father’s parenting capacity, the child shall spend at least one weekend per month with the father. The Registry shall send a copy of this Order to the Second Hague Convention Country Social Services and to the social services responsible for the mother’s place of residence, through the Central Authority at the Ministry of Justice. The case is listed for a further hearing at 10:00am on 16 April 2026 The address given on the face of the court order is M’s former address. Her evidence is that she was not aware of the court hearing on 16 October until F notified the court on 5 November 2025 (as set out below),[22]The Father’s final statement was filed on 17 October 2025. The Father sought to challenge the Guardian’s recommendations and seeks the following: – That the Court records the Father does not pose a risk to C’s physical or emotional welfare in the context of proportionate safeguards. – Provides for regular indirect contact, at least twice a week, unsupervised – Directs staged direct contact (unsupervised) with safe handovers via a contact centre. – Provides for holiday/special occasion time – two weeks in the summer holidays and festival periods to be alternated annually, with an equal division of time. – Refuses any blanket prohibition on travel to Second Hague Convention Country . – Discharges of varies the PSO when proportionate safeguards suffice, at a timetable the Court considers appropriate. – Directs communication to be in writing through agreed channels.[23]The parents’ cross-applications were listed for a Final Hearing on 5 November 2025 before HHJ Talbott. Prior to the final hearing, the outcome of the Second Hague Convention Country Court Hearing on 16 October 2025 was unknown. The Guardian had scheduled a meeting with the F to discuss the recommendations made to the Court. When the Guardian questioned F about the outcome of the hearing before the Second Hague Convention Country Court, he stated that the outcome was “none of her business”. He later said that this is because the Order was not yet released.[24]Then at 7:38am on the day of the Final Hearing, F sent a copy of the Second Hague Convention Country Court order by email to the court in this jurisdiction. F stated that the Second Hague Convention Country Court had declared it had jurisdiction over the matter and that any other order issued not to be effective. This is not reflected within the Order of the Second Hague Convention Country Court. The Second Hague Convention Country ’s Children’s Guardian was informed by the Guardian’s solicitor of the proceedings before the Family Court. However, HHJ Talbott noted (as recorded on the Order dated 5th November 2025) that it appeared from the Order of the Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country that the Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country was not aware of these proceedings.[25]The hearing before HHJ Talbott on 5 November 2025 was thus adjourned. The court made an order requiring the mother to facilitate video contact between C and his father; continued orders prohibiting the father removing C from England and continuing orders prohibiting both parents from taking C to Second Hague Convention Country during the proceedings. HHJ Talbott also made orders for the disclosure of material from the English Courts to the Second Hague Convention Country Courts through the International Family Justice Office. The case was transferred to me.[26]In accordance with the Order dated 5th November 2025, a number of documents were sent both to the International Family Justice Office (‘IFJO’) and to the Foreign Process Section at the Royal Courts of Justice for onward transmission to the Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country. An email was received by the Guardian’s solicitor on 14th November 2025 from the IFJO confirming, at the request of Lord Justice Moylan, the documents had been forwarded to the Second Hague Convention Country Hague Network Judge with a request they be conveyed to Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country. A further email was received by the Guardian’s solicitor on 18th November informing them the Second Hague Convention Country Hague Network Judge had confirmed documents will be forwarded to Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country and that, should any translation be needed, they will ask Second Hague Convention Country Central Authority for assistance.[27]I first heard this case on 20 November 2025. M and the child were legally represented. The father was self-representing and appeared at the hearing via a CVP link. He had the benefit of an interpreter. I reminded myself that jurisdiction is a matter to be kept under review and found that since C was returned to this jurisdiction, he has been habitually resident in England. That, as is apparent from paragraph 10 of this judgment and it remains my conclusion.[28]On 20 November 2025 I also confirmed previous orders made by HHJ Talbott that C is to live with M; that F is prohibited from removing C from the care and control of his mother; that M must continue to make C available for video contact with his father once a week; that F is prohibited from travelling outside England with C and that both parents are prohibited from travelling to Second Hague Convention Country during the currency of these proceedings. I also continued order permitting the mother to withhold the address of C, and the name and address of his school and his GP. I gave permission to all parties to disclose HHJ Talbott’s judgment of 4 June 2025 to the Juvenile Court in Second Hague Convention Country. I gave directions to further the case including timetabling the evidence in relation to any further applications to be made and directed that the order be translated into Second Hague Convention Country (which it was – see page 194 and following of the Court Bundle). In addition, I gave further directions in relation to disclosure to the International Family Justice Office to enable liaison between the English and Second Hague Convention Country ’s Courts. I listed the parties cross-applications before me on 16-18 February 2026 for final determination and directed that a QLR be appointed to conduct and cross-examine the mother on behalf of the father and directed that an Interpreter should attend to interpret for the father despite his English being very good. I permitted the father to attend the February hearing remotely via CVP from Second Hague Convention Country.[29]On 11 December 2025 a C2 was issued on M’s behalf seeking the father’s attendance at the final hearing in person. I did not accede to that request having already permitted remote attendance.[30]On 30 January 2026 F issued an application to vacate the hearing listed before me on 16 February 2026 and for a relisting on a date convenient to this court. The details of his application are at paragraph 6 of his application at page 224 of the bundle. The reasons for his application are amplified in a statement of case which he submitted. It was his case that he had not been properly served with the applications, orders, notice and other judicial documents which must be served on him in accordance with Article 5 Hague Convention 1965. He contends service must be through the Second Hague Convention Country Central Authority. It is his case that by reason of defective service his ability to participate effectively in the proceedings and exercise his Article 6 rights to a fair trial have been infringed. He thus disputed all orders made since 29 February 2024. Accordingly, he sought the following relief: i. To vacate the hearing listed before Ms Justice Henke on 16–18 February 2026 at the RCJ and to re-list the hearing on an alternative date convenient to the Court; ii. To serve the Order made by Mrs Justice Henke on 20 November 2025 on the Father in accordance with Article 5 of the 1965 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters; iii. To provide certified translations of any order or document directly relevant to the proceedings; iv. To permit the Father to attend any re-listed hearing remotely via CVP; and v. To arrange for an interpreter to assist the Father at any adjourned hearing. He did not seek to set aside any previous orders nor any findings made by HHJ Talbott.[31]The contact details for F given by him or on his behalf were his address in Second Hague Convention Country and (his English number).[32]On behalf of M a response was filed to F’s C2. It is likely to have been received by him on 2 February 2026. It was proposed that the court should make an order for alternative service by email at the email address given on his C2.[33]On 4th February 2026, M’s solicitors attempted to send a draft Court Bundle to F’s email address and received the ‘Delivery Status Notification (Failure)’ at 13.10hrs which is attached to the C2 application on behalf of the mother. The same response was received by two other members of the solicitors’ firm acting for M and by the Guardian’s solicitor. However I have data before me from M’s solicitors’ IT company, which I accept, that their email was sent to and received. Further I have an email chain before me which shows, and I so find, that at 23.38hrs on 5 February 2026 F contacted M by email using email address.[34]On 4 February 2026 I made an order on the papers that the hearing before me on 16-18 February 2026 should remain listed. I made a further direction to ensure the father had an interpreter at the hearing and again permitted the father to attend the hearing remotely. In terms of service, I ordered service by WhatsApp or by registered post. The issue of the translation of further documents was adjourned to be heard before me on 16 February 2026.[35]At 11.43hrs on 5 February 2026 my order of 4 February 2026 was sent to all parties by email. My clerk used the email address provided by F on his C2 dated 30 January 2026. A delivery failure notification receipt was returned from F’s email address.[36]The solicitors on behalf of M attempted to effect service via WhatsApp in accordance with my court order. WhatsApp was no longer available on the phone number F had provided on his C2.[37]On 10 February 2026, a further message was sent by WhatsApp to the Father’s Number (contained within the order of 07.03.2024 and provided by the Mother). A single tick was given indicating received by WhatsApp server:[38]On 10 February 2026 a C2 was filed on behalf of M seeking permission to rely on further documents and to seek a further finding that the Father has falsified email receipts to say that emails to him are undeliverable, to try and thwart the effectiveness of the Final Hearing and cause delay.’[39]Thus on 11 February 2026 the solicitors for the mother attempted to effect personal service of the court bundle which included my order of 4 February 2026 upon him by courier to his given home address in Second Hague Convention Country by BBA Couriers.[40]The solicitors for M continued to attempt service by using WhatsApp and UK numbers) and email. On 12 February 2026, a delivery failure notification was received, following the position statement being sent to the Father by email, using the email address provided in the Father’s C2 Application. It is noted this delivery failure was received from postmaster rather than the automated response previously received from the father’s email address, suggesting the email account may now have been deleted.[41]On 12 February 2026, it was arranged by the mother’s solicitors for the mother’s position statement to be posted to the father in Second Hague Convention Country via DHL Express. The parcel was collected from the solicitors’ Hove office on the morning of 13 February 2026. DHL however have been unable to contact the father and thus could not complete customs clearance.[42]On 13 February 2026 the CVP Link was sent to F by the mother’s solicitors using WhatsApp on his Second Hague Convention Country ’s phone number. A single tick indicating receipt was received but not a double tick.[43]F failed to attend the hearing before me on 16 February 2026. The case was listed at 10.30am. I put it back to noon in case F attended later. A CVP link had been sent to F by the court using the email address he had provided to the court. I kept the link open in case he attended late. In the end he did not. The QLR appointed to cross-examine M on behalf of F attended as did the interpreter.

Service and Notice

[44]Article 5 Hague Convention 1965 states that: The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency, either - a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed. Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this Article, the document may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily. If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the Central Authority may require the document to be written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the official languages of the State addressed. That part of the request, in the form attached to the present Convention, which contains a summary of the document to be served, shall be served with the document.[45]The 1965 Hague Convention is only given domestic effect through laws and rules in this jurisdiction and does not have separate domestic effect. The relevant domestic rules for service are found in Part 6 of the FPR 2010. Chapter 4 deals with service out with the jurisdiction. FPR 2010 rule 6.43 provides that, where service is to be effected on a respondent out of the United Kingdom: (3) Where the applicant wishes to serve an application form, or other document, on a respondent out of the United Kingdom, it may be served by any method –(a) provided for by rule 6.45 (service through foreign governments, judicial authorities and British Consular authorities); or(b) permitted by the law of the country in which it is to be served. (4) Nothing in paragraph (3) or in any court order authorises or requires any person to do anything which is contrary to the law of the country where the application form, or other document, is to be served.’[46]In Maughan v Wilmot [2017] EWCA Civ 1668in the lead judgment Moylan LJ stated: [104] The central issue raised by Mr Bowen is whether the provisions of the 1965 Convention, as implemented through the rules in England and Wales, are mandatory and exclusive. In other words, if service is to be effected abroad, must the provisions of the Convention be applied or can service by an alternative method be ordered? [105] The answer to this question is provided by Cecil v Bayat [2011] EWCA Civ 135, [2011] 1 WLR 3086. Although the views expressed by Stanley Burnton LJ were obiter, they were after full argument and they have been consistently regarded as establishing that service by alternative means not within the scope of the 1965 Convention is permitted under our domestic provisions. He said, at para [65]:
'Because service out of the jurisdiction without the consent of the state in which service is to be effected is an interference with the sovereignty of the state, service on a party to the Hague Convention by an alternative method under CPR r. 6.15 should be regarded as exceptional, to be permitted in special circumstances only.'
He then made a number of additional observations, including (at para [67]) that:
'… in general the desire of a claimant to avoid the delay inherent in service by methods permitted by CPR r. 6.40, or that delay, cannot of itself justify an order for service by alternative means. Nor can reliance on the overriding objective. If they could, particularly in commercial cases, service in accordance with CPR r. 6.40 would be optional; indeed, service by alternative means would become normal.' [106] Stanley Burnton LJ found support for his conclusion in Knauf UK GmbH v British Gypsum Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1570, [2002] 1 WLR 907, [2002] 2 All ER 525. In that case Henry LJ, giving the judgment of the court said (at para [47]): '
It may be necessary to make exceptional orders for service by an alternative method where there is “good reason”: but a consideration of what is common ground as to the primary method for service of English process in Germany suggests that a mere desire for speed is unlikely to amount to a good reason …' He also referred to 'turning the flank' of the Conventions. [107] Returning to Cecil v Bayat [2011] EWCA Civ 135, [2011] 1 WLR 3086, Stanley Burnton LJ also considered, in general terms, when service by alternative means might be justified (at para [68]):
'Service by alternative means may be justified by facts specific to the defendant, as where there are grounds for believing that he has or will seek to avoid personal service where that is the only method permitted by the foreign law, or by facts relating to the proceedings, as where an injunction has been obtained without notice, or where an urgent application on notice … is required.'
The provisions of CPR, r 6.40 mirror those in FPR 2010, r 6.43, to which I refer below. [108] This decision has been regarded as authoritative in a number of cases including: BNP Paribas SA v Open Joint Stock Company Russian Machines and Another Company [2011] EWHC 308 (Comm), [2011] All ER (D) 79 (Dec) (at para [132]); Bacon v Automattic Inc [2012] 1 WLR 753(referred to in the White Book (Sweet and Maxwell, 2017) at para 6.15.7); Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc and Another [2014] EWHC 112 (Comm), [2014] 1 All ER (Comm) 733 (at paras [26]–[27]); Bill Kenwright Ltd v Flash Entertainment FZ LLC [2016] EWHC 1951 (QB), [2016] All ER (D) 184 (Jul) (at para [54], referring to Knauf and Deutsche); and Socieìteì Geìneìrale v Goldas Kuyumculuk Sanayi Ithalat Ihracat AS and Others; Socieìteì Geìneìrale v Goldas Kuyumculuk Sanayi Ithalat Ihracat AS and Another [2017] EWHC 667 (Comm), [2017] All ER (D) 43 (Apr) (at para [49](9)) which also refers to Bank St Petersburg OJSC and Another v Arkhangelsky and Another; Arkhangelsky and Others v Bank St Petersburg OJSC and Another [2014] EWCA Civ 593, [2014] 1 WLR 4360. In the last case, Longmore LJ expressed the view, at para [26], that: 'Although the Supreme Court (in Abela) pointed out that nothing they said would necessarily apply to Hague Convention cases, it would be surprising if there could never be good reason for alternative service in such cases.' [109] In the absence of a need to decide the point expressly, I do not consider that it would be helpful to add to what was said in Cecil v Bayat. Having survey Part 6 of the FPR 2010 Moylan LJ then stated: [114] Rules 6.43 and 6.45 are permissive ('may') and not mandatory. They do not provide that service must be effected by one of those methods. Further the words, 'in any court order', in r 6.43(4) clearly contemplate that an order might be made in respect of service and which provides for an alternative method of service. As was pointed out in Cecil v Bayat [2011] EWCA Civ 135, [2011] 1 WLR 3086(at para [60]) and in Abela v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44, [2013] 1 WLR 2043(at para [32]) an order is only required when service is sought to be effected by a method which is not permitted by the law of the country in which the document is to be served. If it is permitted, it is already authorised by the rules. [115] The only restriction is that no court order 'authorises or requires any person to do anything which is contrary to the law of the country where the application form, or other document, is to be served': r 6.43(4). And then later: [127] I would, however, emphasise that this is not to say that the existence of the 1965 Convention is not significant when the court is deciding whether to make an order for alternative service out of the jurisdiction. It clearly is. The first step is always for the court to decide whether service needs to be effected out of the jurisdiction. The 1965 Convention only applies if a document is to be transmitted abroad for service. If it does and the 1965 Convention applies, consistently with Cecil v Bayat, this should be viewed as the primary route by which service should be effected but, I acknowledge, that urgency (as in an urgent application on notice being required) will often be a feature of family cases, especially those involving children. In addition, I would point out that the 1965 Convention does not apply if the address of the person to be served is not known (Art 1(2)).[47]At the time that F issued his application in May 2024, he had solicitors acting for him with a business address which was used for service. That remained the case until approximately 10 days prior to the hearing on 22 May 2025.[48]As a litigant in person F had been served by email using the email address which was effective and used by him up to 5 February 2026 (see above). Each hearing after the fact find in June 2025 was personally attended by F who had knowledge and understanding of the hearing attended and the directions given for the next hearing. He has filed statements and participated fully in the process. F lived and worked in England for approximately five years prior to wrongfully retaining C in Second Hague Convention Country. I accept that he has a good command of English. He has chosen to file all his evidence in English. Nevertheless, at all but one hearing an interpreter has been available for his use.[49]On the face of his C2 dated 30 January 2026 F applied for a direction that all outstanding and future documents be served in accordance with Article 5 of the 1965 Hague Convention. Within his statement of case dated 29 January 2026 F stated that second Hague Convention does not permit service by email, WhatsApp or other electronic means. He claimed that by reason of defective service he has been denied a fair process and was being denied a fair trial. I do not agree.[50]Until 10 days prior to the hearing on 22 May 2025 F had solicitors acting for him. They accepted service on his behalf and there can be no doubt that there was good service.[51]The Court of Appeal in Wilmot v Maughan (above)the Court of Appeal held that the court had power by reason of r 6.1(b) of the FPR 2010 to order service outside of the jurisdiction by an alternative method (para [110]). Rule 6.43(4) was a permissive order which clearly contemplated that an order might be made in respect of service and which provided for an alternative method of service (para [114]).[52]On 4 February 2026 I permitted service by WhatsApp and registered post. Registered post is permitted in Second Hague Convention Country as is personal service.[53]In the paragraphs above I have documented the extensive steps that the solicitors for M took to effect service upon F. That included courier service of the bundle which had within it all the applications, orders, statements and other supporting documents in relation to the cross-applications dating back to F’s own application in May 2024. Service by courier is not prohibited in Second Hague Convention Country. I direct in accordance with FPR 2010 rule 6.19 that service by courier is good service. Further, I direct retrospectively that service by email to the email address F used on 5 February 2026 is good service. F has asserted that email service in Second Hague Convention Country is not accepted but provided no evidence to back his assertion.[54]Having considered the affidavit of non-service and all the evidence before me, I have come to the inescapable conclusion that F has deliberately evaded service in an attempt to disrupt the hearing listed before me and protract the litigation even further. There are no other steps that could have been taken between 30 January 2026 when F made his C2 application on 30 January 2026 and the date of the hearing before me to enable the hearing before me to be effective. As the chronology above shows the solicitors for the mother used every communication address (home address, email address and mobile phone numbers) as provided on F’s C2 to deliver the final bundle to F. The timescales for service under the 1965 Hague Convention were not compatible with a final hearing on 16 February 2026. The litigation was, as I have just found, already protracted. The proceedings before me had begun in May 2024. The applications had already been listed for final hearing on 5 November 2025 and that hearing had had to be adjourned because of F’s late disclosure of an order from the Second Hague Convention Country Court. Further I am satisfied that whilst F did not have the final court bundle, he had received all the papers within it up to and including 30 January 2026. He had filed his final evidence in support of his application.[55]Further, I am satisfied that F has had notice of the hearing before me. My order of 2025 stated the hearing dates. That order was translated into Second Hague Convention Country. F specifically refers to the hearing dates in his C2 of 30 January 2026. Within my order of 4 February 2026, I declined to adjourn the hearing as he asked. Attempts have been made to give him notice of that order by email at the address he provided to this court and which he has used before. A copy of that order is also contained within the court bundle the solicitors have sought to serve by courier. Those methods of service have been ineffective. However, in default of any order acceding to his request for an adjournment having reached him, the default position would be that the hearing remained listed as it was before he made his application and that his attendance would be via remote link. F did not attend the hearing which from his perspective would proceed unless adjourned. On 4 February 2026 I had adjourned to the hearing before me on 16 February, his application for translation of any documents and had he attended he could have made an application for documents to be translated and for an adjournment to facilitate that process. He did not despite being sent the CVP link to the email address he gave the court on the face of his application dated 30 January 2026 and which he was using as of 5 February 2026.[56]I find as a fact that F had notice of the hearing before me which commenced on 16 February 2026. He knew of all the evidence that was placed before me. I find that F had the opportunity to attend the hearing on 16 February 2026 to advance his case and respond to the evidence filed by the mother and on behalf of the child. I find that F chose not to attend the hearing on 16 February 2026. I find that given he had knowledge of the hearing, the evidence before me and the opportunity to attend his Article 6 rights to a fair trial were observed.[57]Given F’s failure to attend the hearing before me on 16 February 2026 and his litigation conduct to date about which I have made findings in this judgment, I proceeded in his absence. I note that in failing to attend F failed to attend to answer the application made by M but also to pursue his own application which is actually first in time. That was his choice.

The Law

[58]When I have made such findings, either in the paragraphs above or below this segment of the judgment, I have reminded myself that the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of the party who asserts the fact and that the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.[80]When determining the applications made under s.8 Children Act 1989, C’s welfare is my paramount consideration. I must apply for the welfare checklist in s.1(3) Children Act 1989. I must not make any order unless I consider that doing so would be better for the children than making no order. I consider that in this case it is both necessary and appropriate to make orders. This is not a case which can be left to C’s parents to resolve amongst themselves.[81]In the context of the decision, I am asked to make I particularly note and bear in mind that s.1(2A) of the CA 1989 remains in force, It provides as follows: A court, in circumstances mentioned in subsection (4)(a) or (7), is as respects each parent within subsection (6)(a) to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child's welfare.[82]When assessing whether the contrary is shown for the purposes of s.1(2A) of the CA 1989, I have reminded myself of what MacDonald J said in D v E (by her Children’s Guardian) [2021] EWFC 37. Accordingly, I bear in mind: […] that the courts have, historically, held that it is almost always in the interest of a child whose parents are separated that he or she should have contact with the parent with whom he or she is not living. This principle, and the following further applicable principles can be drawn from the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Re C (Direct Contact: Suspension) [2011] 2 FLR 912 at [47], Re W (Direct Contact) [2103] 1 FLR 494 and Re J-M (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 434 at [25]: i. The welfare of the child is paramount, and the child's best interests must take precedence over any other consideration. ii. There is a positive obligation on the State and therefore on the judge to take measures to promote contact, grappling with all available alternatives and taking all necessary steps that can reasonably be demanded, before abandoning hope of achieving contact. iii. However, the positive obligation on the State, and therefore on the court, is not absolute. Whilst authorities must do their utmost to facilitate the co-operation and understanding of all concerned, any obligation to apply coercion in this area must be limited since the interests, as well as the rights and freedoms of all concerned must be taken into account and, more particularly, so must the best interests of the child. iv. Excessive weight should not be accorded to short term problems and the court should take a medium- and long-term view. v. Contact should be terminated only in exceptional circumstances where there are cogent reasons for doing so, as a last resort, when there is no alternative, and only if contact will be detrimental to the child's welfare. The key question, and the question requiring stricter scrutiny, is whether the court has taken all necessary steps to facilitate contact as can reasonably be demanded in the circumstances of the particular case.[83]These principles must be read in light of FPR 2010 PD12J, entitled Child Arrangements and Contact Orders: Domestic Abuse and Harm.[84]I consider that the findings made by HHJ Talbott bring this case within the scope of FPR 2010, PD12J. Coercive and controlling behaviour is a form of domestic abuse. It thus seems to me to be appropriate that before proceeding any further I should set out some of the salient paragraphs of FPR 2010 PD12 J in this judgment.[85]I begin by reminding myself that as a matter of general principles paragraph 4 of the PD12J states that: 4. Domestic abuse is harmful to children, and/or puts children at risk of harm, including where they are victims of domestic abuse for example by witnessing one of their parents being violent or abusive to the other parent, or living in a home in which domestic abuse is perpetrated (even if the child is too young to be conscious of the behaviour). Children may suffer direct physical, psychological and/or emotional harm from living with and being victims of domestic abuse and may also suffer harm indirectly where the domestic abuse impairs the parenting capacity of either or both of their parents.[86]I then turn to Paragraph 7 of FPR 2010 PD12 J which states that: 7. In proceedings relating to a child arrangements order, the court presumes that the involvement of a parent in a child’s life will further the child’s welfare, unless there is evidence to the contrary. The court must in every case consider carefully whether the statutory presumption applies, having particular regard to any allegation or admission of harm by domestic abuse to the child or parent or any evidence indicating such harm or risk of harm.[87]I also take into account in paragraphs 35-37 of FPR PD12 J which state : 35. When deciding the issue of child arrangements the court should ensure that any order for contact will not expose the child to an unmanageable risk of harm and will be in the best interests of the child. 36(1) In the light of- (a) any findings of fact, (b) admissions; or (c) domestic abuse having otherwise been established, the court should apply the individual matters in the welfare checklist with reference to the domestic abuse which has occurred and any expert risk assessment obtained.(2) In particular, the court should in every case consider any harm- (a) which the child as a victim of domestic abuse, and the parent with whom the child is living, has suffered as a consequence of that domestic abuse; and (b) which the child and the parent with whom the child is living is at risk of suffering, if a child arrangements order is made.(3) The court should make an order for contact only if it is satisfied- (a) that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured before, during and after contact; and (b) that the parent with whom the child is living will not be subjected to further domestic abuse by the other parent. 37. In every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made, or where domestic abuse is otherwise established, the court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of the same. In particular, the court should consider – (a) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living; (b) the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child's relationship with the parents; (c) whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent; (d) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and (e) the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse.[88]I have reminded myself that paragraph 38 of the Practice Direction which states: Where any domestic abuse has occurred but the court, having considered any expert risk assessment and having applied the welfare checklist, nonetheless considers that direct contact is safe and beneficial for the child, the court should consider what, if any, directions or conditions are required to enable the order to be carried into effect and in particular should consider –(a) whether or not contact should be supervised, and if so, where and by whom;(b) whether to impose any conditions to be complied with by the party in whose favour the order for contact has been made and if so, the nature of those conditions, for example by way of seeking intervention (subject to any necessary consent);(c) whether such contact should be for a specified period or should contain provisions which are to have effect for a specified period; and(d) whether it will be necessary, in the child's best interests, to review the operation of the order; if so the court should set a date for the review consistent with the timetable for the child, and must give directions to ensure that at the review the court has full information about the operation of the order. Where a risk assessment has concluded that a parent poses a risk to a child or to the other parent, contact via a supported contact centre, or contact supervised by a parent or relative, is not appropriate.[89]Lastly, in relation to PD12J I consider the guidance set out in paragraph 4A which states: 4A.1 Under section 91(14) of the 1989 Act orders are available to prevent a person from making an application under that Act without leave of the court. Section 91(14) leaves a discretion to the court to determine the circumstances in which an order should be made, which may therefore be many and varied. However, section 91A specifies certain circumstances “among others” in which the court may make an order. These circumstances include where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual at risk of harm. This would include, but not be limited to, a risk of harm arising where an application could be used to carry out or continue domestic abuse. A future application could be part of a pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour or other domestic abuse toward the victim, such that a section 91(14) order is merited due to the risk of harm to the child or other individual. 4A.2 Where allegations of domestic abuse are alleged or proven, the court should consider whether a section 91(14) order might be appropriate even if an application for such an order has not been made.[90]In this case an application has been made for an order under section 91(14) and 91A of the Children Act 1989 prohibiting the father from making any further application in relation to C under the Children Act 1989 without the prior permission of the court.[91]Accordingly, I have reminded myself that s.91(14) states: On disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court.[92]Further provision about the making of orders under s.91(14) is contained in s.91A Children Act 1989. Section 91A(2) of the Children Act 1989 contains the circumstances in which a court may make an order under s.91(14) Children Act 1989. They include among others: where the court is satisfied that the making of an application for an order under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the section 91(14) order would be put (a)the child concerned, or (b)another individual (“the relevant individual”), at risk of harm. Section 91A(3) specifically states that “harm” in this section is to be read as a reference to ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health.[93]In July 2022 FPR 2010 PD12Q came into force. It sets out under paragraph 2 the key principles to be applied when making s.91(14) orders.They are:2.1 Section 91(14) orders are available to prevent a person from making future applications under the 1989 Act without leave of the court. They are a protective filter made by the court, in the interests of children.2.2 The court has a discretion to determine the circumstances in which an order would be appropriate. These circumstances may be many and varied. They include circumstances where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm (as provided in section 91A), such as psychological or emotional harm. The welfare of the child is paramount.2.3 These circumstances can also include where one party has made repeated and unreasonable applications; where a period of respite is needed following litigation; where a period of time is needed for certain actions to be taken for the protection of the child or other person; or where a person’s conduct overall is such that an order is merited to protect the welfare of the child directly, or indirectly due to damaging effects on a parent carer. Such conduct could include harassment, or other oppressive or distressing behaviour beyond or within the proceedings including via social media and e-mail, and via third parties. Such conduct might also constitute domestic abuse.2.4 A future application could also be part of a pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour or other domestic abuse toward the victim, such that a section 91(14) order is also merited due to the risk of harm to the child or other individual.2.5 There is no definition in section 91A of who the other individual could be that could be put at risk of harm. However, it is most likely to be, but is not limited to, another person who has parental responsibility for the child and/or is living with or has contact with the child, or any other individual who would be a prospective respondent to a future application.2.6 In proceedings in which domestic abuse is alleged or proven, or in which there are allegations or evidence of other harm to a child or other individual, the court should give early and ongoing consideration to whether it would be appropriate to make a section 91(14) order on disposal of the application, even if an application for such an order has not been made (since the court may make an order of its own motion – see section 91A(5)).2.7 Section 91(14) orders are a protective filter – not a bar on applications – and there is considerable scope for their use in appropriate cases. Proceedings under the 1989 Act should not be used as a means of harassment or coercive control, or further abuse against a victim of domestic abuse or other person, and the court should therefore give due consideration to whether a future application would have such an impact.2.8 The court should consider case law for further guidance and relevant principles, bearing in mind Parliament’s insertion via the 2021 Act of section 91A into the 1989 Act.[94]Paragraph 3 FPR 2010 PD12Q sets out the procedure to be adopted by the court when considering making a S91(14) order. It is relevant to note within this judgment that: 3.6 If the court decides to make a section 91(14) order, the court should give consideration as to the following matters:a. the duration of the order (see section 4);b. whether the order should cover all or only certain types of application under the 1989 Act;c. whether service of any subsequent application for leave should be prohibited until the court has made an initial determination of the merits of such an application (see section 6). Such an order delaying service would help to ensure that the very harm or other protective function that the order is intended to address, is not undermined; andd. whether upon any subsequent application for leave, the court should make an initial determination of the merits of the application without an oral hearing (see section 6).[95]As heralded above, the duration of any s.91(14) order is considered in paragraph 4 of FPR 2010 PD12 Q which states: 4.1 Sections 91(14) and 91A are silent on the duration of a section 91(14) order. The court therefore has a discretion as to the appropriate duration of the order. Any time limit imposed should be proportionate to the harm it is seeking to avoid. If the court decides to make a section 91(14) order, the court should explain its reasons for the duration ordered.[96]FPR 2010 PD12J paragraph 2.8 reminds the court to consider case law for further guidance and relevant principles, bearing in mind Parliament’s insertion via the 2021 Act of section 91A into the 1989 Act. Accordingly, I now turn to consider that case law.[97]The leading modern authority is the Court of Appeal's decision in Re A (A Child) (Supervised Contact) (Section 91(14) Children Act 1989 Orders) [2021] EWCA Civ. The lead judgment in Re A was given by King LJ. At paragraph 32 King LJ repeated the classic statement of the legal principles at play when making a s91(14) order as out in the form of guidelines in Re P ( Section 91(14) (Guidelines)(residence) and Religious Heritage) sub nom: In Re P (A Minor)(Residence[99]The guidelines in Re P are as follows:(1) Section 91(14) of the Act of 1989 should be read in conjunction with section 1(1), which makes the welfare of the child the paramount consideration.(2) The power to restrict applications to the court is discretionary and in the exercise of its discretion the court must weigh in the balance all the relevant circumstances.(3) An important consideration is that to impose a restriction is a statutory intrusion into the right of a party to bring proceedings before the court and to be heard in matters affecting his/her child.(4) The power is therefore to be used with great care and sparingly, the exception and not the rule.(5) It is generally to be seen as a useful weapon of last resort in cases of repeated and unreasonable applications.(6) In suitable circumstances (and on clear evidence), a court may impose the leave restriction in cases where the welfare of the child requires it, although there is no past history of making unreasonable applications.(7) In cases under paragraph 6 above, the court will need to be satisfied first that the facts go beyond the commonly encountered need for a time to settle to a regime ordered by the court and the all too common situation where there is animosity between the adults in dispute or between the local authority and the family and secondly that there is a serious risk that, without the imposition of the restriction, the child or the primary carers will be subject to unacceptable strain.(8) A court may impose the restriction on making applications in the absence of a request from any of the parties, subject, of course, to the rules of natural justice such as an opportunity for the parties to be heard on the point.(9) A restriction may be imposed with or without limitation of time.(10) The degree of restriction should be proportionate to the harm it is intended to avoid. Therefore the court imposing the restriction should carefully consider the extent of the restriction to be imposed and specify, where appropriate, the type of application to be restrained and the duration of the order.”[100]The modern context in which King LJ considered s.91(14) is set out in paragraphs 34-36 of her judgment. The modern legal landscape includes the advent of the smart phone and social media and the almost universal use of email as a means of instant communication. Another development considered of relevance by King LJ is the withdrawal of legal aid in the majority of private law cases leaving litigants unrepresented without the steadying influence of legal advisers. According to King LJ one of the consequences of these changes not uncommonly seen in private law proceedings is that the other parties, and often the judge him or herself, can be (and often are) bombarded with emails from a parent, whether male or female, who is representing him or herself. Such behaviour may be the result of anxiety but in other cases, as in the case before King LJ, it is part of a campaign of behaviour by one parent against the other which amounts to a deeply disturbing form of oppressive behaviour on their part.[101]In anticipation of section 67 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 which came into force after Re A and which brought into force section 91A Children Act 1989, King LJ stated at paragraphs 45-46 of her judgment45. It is not for this court to presume to interpret or to purport to provide a commentary upon a section in an Act which is not yet in force and in respect of which statutory guidance has yet to be published. It is worth however noting that the proposed new section 91A dovetails with the modern approach which I suggest should be taken to the making of s91(14) orders. In particular the provision at section 91A(2) , if brought into effect, gives statutory effect to Guideline 6 of Re P (see para 39 above) by permitting a s91(14) order to be made where the making of an application under the Children Act 1989 would put the parent or child at risk of physical or emotional harm.46. Under section 91A(4) when considering whether to grant leave the court will consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances. Again, this would put the current approach to the granting of leave on a statutory footing.[102]I also have before me applications to restrict the father’s exercise of parental responsibility in relation to C. C was born before his parent’s marriage. He is F’s legitimate child. However, F has parental responsibility for C by reason of s.4(1) Children Act 1989 and not as a result of marriage under s.2 Children Act 1989. This is an important distinction. A person who has acquired parental responsibility under S4(1) shall cease to have parental responsibility only if the court so orders – s.4(2A) Children Act 1989. In such circumstances M as a person with parental responsibility for C may apply as of right to terminate F’s parental responsibility.[103]Section 1(1) Children Act 1989 applies when the court is considering whether to terminate parental responsibility; consideration of the welfare checklist is not mandatory, but it may be helpful for the court to demonstrate this has been considered in order to provide an analytical framework. The court must also consider the no-order principle in s 1(5) – see Re A (Termination of Parental Responsibility) [2014] 1 FLR 1305, FD; Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2015] 1 FLR 166, CA.[104]The principles relevant to such applications can be summarised as follows:(a) the significance of parental responsibility is the contribution to a child's welfare that status confers on the adult concerned. The concept of parental responsibility describes an adult's responsibility to secure the welfare of their child which is to be exercised for the benefit of the child not the adult;(b) if the circumstances are such that the court would not conceivably make a parental responsibility order where one does not already exist, then the circumstances are likely to indicate that parental responsibility could be properly terminated(Re P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) [1995] 1 FLR 1048;(c) the court should consider that it is appropriate to terminate parental responsibility where there is no element of the bundle of responsibilities that make up parental responsibility which the father could in present or foreseeable circumstances exercise in a way that would be beneficial for the child (CW v SG (parental responsibility: consequential orders) [2013] 2 FLR 655);(d) where the Art 8 rights of a parent conflict with the Art 8 rights of a child, it is the rights of the child that take precedence (Yusuf v The Netherlands [2013] 1 FLR 2010).[105]In Re W (Direct Contact) [2012] EWCA Civ 999, [2013] 1 FLR 494 where the Court of Appeal had the opportunity to emphasise the importance of parental responsibility as an incident of family life. At para [80] McFarlane LJ (as he then was) said:
'Whether or not a parent has parental responsibility is not simply a matter that achieves the ticking of a box on a form. It is a significant matter of status as between parent and child and, just as important, as between each of the parents. By stressing the “responsibility” which is so clearly given prominence in the Children Act 1989, section 3 and the likely circumstance that that responsibility is shared with the other parent, it is hoped that some parents may be encouraged more readily to engage with the difficulties that undoubtedly arise when contemplating post separation contact than may hitherto been the case.'
[106]In Re C (Due Process) [2014] 1 FLR 1239, CA, Ryder LJ emphasised that a prohibited steps order is a statutory restriction on a parent’s exercise of their parental responsibility for a child and can have profound consequences. It is not a reflection of any power in one parent to restrict the other (which power does not exist), it is a court order that must be based on objective evidence. It can only be relaxed by the court and not by agreement between the parties. Accordingly, there is a high responsibility on the court not to impose such a restriction without good cause and the reason must be given. Furthermore, where a prohibited steps order is appropriate, consideration should also be given to the duration of that prohibition and the finite nature of the order must be expressed on the face of the order (R (Casey) v Restormel Borough Council [2007] EWHC 2554 (Admin), at [38]).[107]In Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2015] 1 FLR 166 the court considered the interplay with a s.91(14) order. At paragraph 29 it said: The final ground of appeal concerns the proportionality of the order made and the opportunity that there may be for applications to be mis-used by dissatisfied mothers. Mr Verdan submits that the judge should have considered what is said to be a lesser order, namely an order under s 91(14) of the CA 1989. An application under s 4(2A) of the CA 1989 and one under s 91(14) are of a materially different nature. The former is a substantive welfare question. It relates to the welfare of the child in respect of his upbringing. The latter is a procedural or adjectival protection that is ancillary to the substantive question. Its use may have the same effect but it also provides a fetter on a person's right of access to the court. The fetter is not absolute and can be issue or time limited (and usually is) but its imposition is not determinative of any ultimate welfare question but rather the less profound but sometimes critically important welfare implications of the continuation of the litigation or a part of it: Re P (A Minor) (Residence[108]Since Re D above,PD12Q has come into force. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeal considers that applications to terminate parental responsibility and applications under S91(14) are entirely different in nature.[109]InRe B and Another (Change of Names: Parental Responsibility: Evidence) [2018] 1 FLR 1471, FD, (para 40), Mr Justice Cobb summarised the following principles from the decision in Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2014] EWCA Civ 315: i. Parental responsibility “is an important status which is an incident of the family and private lives of the adults and child concerned and which is reflected in the way in which parents should exercise their responsibilities for their child. It should be rare for a father not to be afforded this status” (citing Re M (Parental Responsibility Order) [2013] EWCA Civ 969, [2014] 1 FLR, at para [14]); ii. Parental responsibility describes an adult's responsibility to secure the welfare of their child which is to be exercised for the benefit of the child not the adult (at [2015] 1 FLR 166 [11]); iii. When considering whether to limit or restrict parental responsibility, the court is considering a question with respect to the upbringing of a child, and the paramountcy principle in section 1 CA 1989 applies (see [12]) iv. By section 1(4), there is no requirement upon the court to consider the factors set out in section 1(3) (the ‘welfare checklist') but the court is not prevented from doing so and may find it helpful to use an analytical framework not least because welfare has to be considered and reasoned (see [12]).[110]InRe J (loss of parental responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344 the Court of Appeal considered the legal consequences where an individual who is not in law, a child’s father is nevertheless registered as such in the child’s birth registry. Having read it there is nothing within it which causes me to question the authorities I have set out above.[111]I have also considered the law relevant to the father’s ability to obtain and receive information from health authorities and educational authorities. In that regard I have considered Children: Restrictions on Parental Responsibility: Radicalisation and Extremism) [2016] 2 FLR 977, FD: [145] M has made an application under s 8 of the CA for specific issue and prohibited steps orders preventing F from accessing any information from schools or health services; the effect of these orders would be to fundamentally curtail F in exercising his parental responsibility. Although this would be an unusual step for the court it is not unknown, when such orders are made to safeguard the child's welfare. I have been referred to the line of authorities in which the termination of parental responsibility was considered; these include Re P (Terminating parental responsibility) [1995] 1 FLR 1048 and CW v SG [2013] EWHC 854 (Fam) , and the decision in the High Court of Mr Justice Wood, A v D (Parental Responsibility) [2013] EWHC 2963 where he followed the approach taken in both of the earlier cases and terminated the father's parental responsibility in a case where father was serving a lengthy prison sentence for grievous bodily harm committed against the child's mother. In that case it was decided that to leave the father as a joint holder of parental responsibility would leave the mother in an intolerable situation and would lead to profound instability for the child. Furthermore, the father, who had failed to express any interest in the child and had shown a lack of commitment, was considered to be principally interested in controlling the mother. [146] In the instant case, as in any when determining whether or not to terminate parental responsibility, the welfare of the child is the court's paramount consideration, and I keep in mind that such a step should only be undertaken with caution, and only where the welfare of the child requires it. I have reminded myself of the words of Lord Justice FitzGibbon in Re O'Hara as cited in Re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) [1988] AC 806 to which I have been referred. [147] The guardian supports M's application as she believes that to do otherwise would enable F to jeopardise the safety, security and stability of the children. It is her view, and one that I share, that to allow F to access health and educational information would inevitably lead to F finding out where the children and M were living. F has already demonstrated what he is likely to do once he has such information. I conclude, on the evidence and facts of this case, that to share information about the children's GP or schooling with F will not promote the children's welfare in any sense. Not only has F already shown how he would use the information to the detriment of the children and their mother, the pernicious effects on M, of the knowledge that F has information that may lead to F locating the family, are already apparent in the way that the family's lives are circumscribed. Any obligation on school or GP or local authority or agency to share information with F in the future would deeply affect and undermine the children's mother's ability to put down healthy roots in a community and establish a level of security and consistency in their schooling and in the provision of health services for the children, because of her wellfounded fears. This conclusion concurs with the guardian's views and as she recommends, I shall make the orders sought.[112]In His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum [2021] EWHC 3480 (Fam), the President of the Family Division said when considering the limitations that could be placed on the exercise of parental responsibility that: 79. […] As a matter of law, it is open to the court, when the welfare of the child(ren) requires this, for the court to limit the ability of one parent to exercise some or all aspects of parental responsibility by making a 'prohibited steps order', under CA 1989, s 8 . In H v A [2015] EWFC 58 , MacDonald J described the approach that should be taken:
"51. Where however the manner in which a parent chooses to exercise an aspect of their parental responsibility is detrimental to the welfare of the child, the court may prescribe, to whatever extent is in the child's best interests and proportionate, the exercise by that parent of their parental responsibility. 52. Within the context of this case, the court may make a prohibited steps order pursuant to s 8 of the Children Act 1989 to prevent a parent from exercising his right to see the children's school records under the Education (School Records) Regulations 1989 (see R v Leicestershire Education Authority ex parte C [1991] Fam Law 302 ). Pursuant to s 2(8) of the Children Act 1989 , the fact that a father has parental responsibility for a child does not entitle him to act in a way which would be incompatible with any order made under the Children Act 1989 . 53. In considering whether to grant a prohibited steps order each child's best interests are my paramount consideration and I must have regard to the matters set out in the 'welfare checklist' contained in s 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 . I should not make a prohibited steps order unless doing so would be better than making no order at all. 54. In P v D & Ors [2014] EWHC 2355 at [109] Baker J noted that, in very exceptional cases, the power to grant a prohibited steps order extends to making an order prohibiting a parent from taking any steps in the exercise of his or her parental responsibility. 55. Finally, it is important to note that, however extreme or exceptional the facts of a particular case, a prohibited steps order is a statutory restriction on the exercise by a parent of their parental responsibility. Any such order made by the court must accordingly be based on objective evidence. There is a high responsibility on the court not to impose such a restriction without good cause and reasons for imposing a restriction must be given (see Re C (Due Process) [2013] EWCA Civ 1412, [2014] 1 FLR 1239 ). Specific consideration must be given to the duration of the prohibition (see R (Casey) v Restormel Borough Council [2007] EWHC 2554 (Admin) at [38] ). 56. Within this context, and in circumstances where a prohibited steps order constitutes an interference with the Art 8 rights of both the parent against whom the order is made and the child who is the subject of the order, the making of, the terms of, and the duration of a prohibited steps order must be proportionate to the mischief that the order is designed to address."
[113]In addition, when making my determinations I have at all times had regard to the Art 6 and Art 8 rights of the child and both of their parents. I have reminded myself that where there is a tension between the Art 8 rights of the child on the one hand and the Art 8 rights of one or other of their parents, the Art 8 rights of the child prevail- Yousef v The Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 210.

Welfare - Analysis and Decisions

[114]C is now 6 ½ years old. He loves both his parents. He has a stable and secure home with his mother in England. C’s primary care giver was his mother until his father wrongfully retained him in Italy in November 2021. C has lived with M in England since February 2024. England is where he has his roots. It is where he goes to school and has his health needs met. C is doing well at school, and his mother supports his learning at home. C is part of the community in which he lives in England. C speaks both English and the language of the Second Hague Convention Country and is aware of his father and his Second Hague Convention Country heritage. C is thriving in his mother’s care. I accept the Guardian’s evidence that M is meeting all of C’s emotional, psychological and physical needs. The care she is giving to him has provided and will provide him with the lifelong scaffolding he will need to reach his potential. I find that to uproot C now and relocate him, with his father, in Second Hague Convention Country would be a significant change in C’s life and would be contrary to C’s best interests. C has since February 2024 spent little time in his father’s. direct company (see below) as his father has not taken up opportunities afforded to him to have direct contact with C. C wants to live with his mother not his father. C has told his Guardian within these proceedings that ' I want to live with Mummy, I want to see Daddy but I don’t want to go to see Daddy in Second Hague Convention Country on the plane because I don't want to stay in Second Hague Convention Country with Daddy because I want to live with Mummy in England’. I assess C’s wishes and feelings in the light of his age and understanding. He has a clear memory of being retained by his father in Second Hague Convention Country . He is clear that he does not want to stay with his father in Second Hague Convention Country . I do not doubt that he would like to see his father and for that contact to be face to face. However, I do not consider that C is sufficiently mature enough in his understanding to be able to appreciate and quantify the risk his father may pose to him during direct contact, including the risk of abduction.[115]F met Cs physical needs when C was in his care in Second Hague Convention Country but that must be put in context as F had wrongfully retained by C in Second Hague Convention Country. Whilst wrongfully retained, I find that F caused C emotional and psychological harm when he kept him away from M and did not facilitate effective contact between mother and son. I accept the Guardian’s evidence that F has in his discussions with her shown no insight into the impact his actions had on C and his mother. I have stood back and considered the findings HHJ Talbott has made which I have summarised above (see paragraph 17) and the findings I make in this judgment. On that factual basis I conclude that in F’s care C is likely to be exposed to F’s attempts to manipulate and coerce C’s mother. I consider that if C was placed with his father, F is unlikely to facilitate contact for C with Ms M. Thus I conclude that if C were to live with F, C would be at risk of emotional and psychological harm.[116]I find that M has mitigated the harm caused to C by his father to date. Despite F’s behaviours towards her and his continuing attempts to coerce and control her, the evidence of the Guardian, which I accept, is that M continues to speak positively about F to C. Since C’s return to England by the Second Hague Convention Country courts, M has spent 3 to 4 hours every month providing a report for F about their son. She has facilitated video calls between F and C as ordered by this court. C has spent direct time with F in England on four occasions, 20/9/24, 2/1/25, 3/1/25 and 13/3/25. Each occasion was supervised and limited in time. The orders made by HHJ Talbott permitted F to have further visits with his son but he did not avail himself of any other visits saying he could not afford the cost. F did not send C any gift for his sixth birthday.[117]HHJ Talbott made significant findings against F which I have summarised at paragraph 17 above. Based on those findings PD12J is engaged. I must consider the impact of the father’s behaviour on the mother. F’s behaviour has in my judgment been emotionally and psychologically abusive of her. He has attempted to use her past mental health against her when her mental health poses no risk to C. He has tried to control and coerce her. He continues to attempt to control and coerce her. He has told HHJ Talbott in evidence that he wishes C to return to Second Hague Convention Country to live with him and that he wants M to follow him. F’s continued litigation should in my view be viewed through the prism of his motivation. It is part of his continuing attempt to control and coerce her.[118]M has a caution for an offence against F. As HHJ Talbott has already found the facts surrounding the event giving rise to the caution are such that an application to have that caution set aside is likely to succeed. Nevertheless, I must and do consider the impact of the event that led to the caution on F in accordance with PD12J. In my judgment it has had and will have no effect on him. Indeed I find that the event which led to M receiving a caution is another example of F manipulating the narrative to suit his own ends.[119]I find that F poses a significant and continued risk to C. There is a real and ever-present risk that F if given opportunity will abduct C and keep him in Second Hague Convention Country. I find that in his care, F will, based on past behaviour, be unlikely to facilitate C’s relationship with his mother. That would be to C’s detriment and place C at risk of harm.[120]F continues to manipulate the narrative and has I find, on the papers before me misled the Second Hague Convention Country Supreme Court and the Juvenile Court in Second Hague Convention Country. Latterly he has demonstrated yet again that he will mislead the court in Second Hague Convention Country about the mother’s mental health and thus manipulate the narrative. Further I find as a fact that the father has continued to mislead the Second Hague Convention Country ’s Court by failing to disclose the judgment of HHJ Talbott to them and not providing the Second Hague Convention Country courts with the orders made in this jurisdiction about his contact with C. F has not been transparent and honest with the Second Hague Convention Country courts. Instead, he has used the Second Hague Convention Country court process to continue to try and coerce and control M and C I find that F’s pursuit of the applications in Second Hague Convention Country are to further his own interests not those of C who is clearly happy and settled with his mother in England. I find that by failing to be open and honest with the Second Hague Convention Country Court, F has exposed C and M to the Second Hague Convention Country authorities contacting the local social services in England for welfare information. C’s and M’s daily life has thus been impacted and both mother and son have suffered an unnecessary intrusion into their private lives and emotional distress.[121]I find that the way in which F has conduct of the proceedings in Second Hague Convention Country and in England amounts to litigation misconduct. I have in the previous paragraph already made findings about how he has misled by his actions and by omission the Second Hague Convention Country Courts. To that I add his behaviour before the courts in England. In particular I find that although the Second Hague Convention Country ’s Supreme Court’s judgment was sealed on 7 March 2024, F did not disclose it until 21 May 2025, the day before the PTR before HHJ Talbott, in an attempt to derail that hearing. I find that the father deliberately did not inform the parties of the outcome of the Second Hague Convention Country Court hearing on 16 October 2025 until 7.38am on 5 November 2025 again to derail the Final Hearing and cause further stress and distress to the mother. I find that since his application on 30 January 2026 the father has taken steps to try to thwart the effectiveness of the final hearing and cause delay. I find that his failure to attend before me is part of that pattern of conduct. .[122]I find that F’s continuing the litigation in Second Hague Convention Country and the attempt to prolong the litigation in England has exposed and is exposing C and his mother emotional and psychological stress and distress. I factor in that C will be directly and indirectly impacted adversely by the continuation of proceedings as he experiences his main care giver’s stress and distress.[123]I stand back and look at all the factors I have set out above and make a holistic evaluation of all the evidence before me.[124]I dismiss F’s application for C to live with him in Second Hague Convention Country. It would not be in C’s best interests to move to live with his father. I have already found that F has not met C’s emotional and psychological needs in the past and thus has caused C harm. I find, given the lack of insight shown by F, that he is likely to pose a continuing risk of emotional and psychological harm to C in the future. I do not consider that F would facilitate contact for C with his mother and find that if C lived with him in Second Hague Convention Country , C’s relationship with his mother who is his primary care giver is unlikely to be promoted. C would thus be at risk of harm. I find that given that F is entirely focused on his own needs, C’s emotional and psychological needs would not be met. I accept and factor in that by not living in Second Hague Convention Country C will not have easy access to his extended Second Hague Convention Country family and that is a loss to him. I factor in that distance will also impact on his relationship with his father. However that has to be viewed in the context of his father posing a serious risk of abduction and to C’s emotional and psychological need to have a relationship with his mother. I factor in that for C to move to live with his father in Second Hague Convention Country would be a significant change of circumstances for C. It would be contrary to C’s wishes and feelings. It would be at the risk of losing his relationship with his mother. Thus I consider that C should remain living with his mother in England where he is settled and happy. In his mother’s care all C’s needs (physical, emotional and psychological) have been met to date. Her decision making has been entirely child focused and I find that it is likely to continue to be focused on C’s best interests in the future.[125]To date M has facilitated C’s contact with F at considerable cost to herself. It places an almost intolerable stress and strain upon her given F’s abuse of her and his wrongful retention of C. By facilitating video calls from her own home she has had to endure F who has sought to control and manipulate her, appearing in her home. I agree with the Guardian’s recommendation to this court. Such contact cannot continue to take place from the mother’s home. It is intrusive and stressful for the mother. That stress has an impact on the mother and thus an indirect impact on C who turns to his mother as his major care giver. Instead video contact should be professionally supervised with C attending a contact centre in England where he will be facilitated to join the link. It will be necessary to have an interpreter present at each contact call to ensure that the supervisor understands each word of the father and son’s conversation. Such video contact is currently weekly. It will need to be reduced incrementally such that within the next two months a pattern is established that it is once a month. The costs of the contact centre, the interpreter and the supervisor shall be met by F.[126]To enable the video call contact to be meaningful M shall send to F three times a year by email an education, health and general welfare update. Those updates should be sent in August, December and April. They must not disclose C’s home address, his school’s or his GP’s address. In addition, the mother shall inform the father by email of any significant life events for C including any hospital admissions. F is required to provide an email address to the solicitors for the mother within 7 days of receipt of this order to enable the mother to send the reports and notification of significant life events to the father.[127]C has not had face to face contact with his father since March 2025. I take into account that when the Guardian observed contact between father and son it was of good quality. However, I also have to factor in that F’s failed to take up direct contact in the past and there is a real risk that he will let C down in the future. Further I consider that each time M took C to a contact centre to facilitate contact on a supervised basis between father and son, she is likely to fear that F would abduct C and suffered further stress and distress. That will have indirectly impacted on C. I also factor in that contact will be maintained by video calls as set out above. Thus standing back and asking myself what is in C’s best interests I have concluded that it is not in his best interests to have direct contact with F. Video contact closely supervised enables C to maintain his relationship with his father without exposing C to a risk of abduction and in a manner which minimises the risk of emotional and psychological harm F poses to C.[128]Given the risk of abduction in this case and the risks F would pose to C’s emotional and psychological wellbeing if he was retained by his father in the future. I make the following prohibited steps[129]Given the extent of F’s manipulative and dishonest behaviours which have included doctoring a medical report placed before HHJ Talbott and given the findings of controlling and coercive behaviours that have been made against him, I do not consider it reasonable for M to have to consult with F when making decisions about C’s health, education and day to day care. That is not to say that she will not update him about C in her thrice yearly report but it removes from her the need to consult F before making decisions and thus removes both her and C from situations in which he may attempt to control them and the narrative.[130]There is already an order in place that C should live with his mother. For the avoidance of doubt I agree that C should live with his mother. It is obviously in his best interests. I do not consider that M needs to tell F if she applies for a passport for C or removes C from the jurisdiction of England and Wales for no more than 28 consecutive days. That is the standard period of automatic permission in any lives with order. I have considered long and hard whether I should remove the prohibition on M travelling with C to Second Hague Convention Country . It was put in place because of the continuing risk of abduction posed by F to C M has family in Second Hague Convention Country she may wish to visit. If she wishes to do so, she should be able to travel there without first having to seek the court’s permission particularly given that any such application would put F on notice of the times, date and location of any visit to Second Hague Convention Country and that information would increase the risk of abduction by him. Hence I discharge that prohibition.[131]I give M permission to withhold C’s address, email, school details, GP surgery details including address and the identity of any professional working with C from F.[132]I have decided to make an order removing F’s parental responsibility for C. I have not made that decision lightly. I acknowledge the importance of a parent having parental responsibility for a child. However on the facts of this case I consider that such an order is necessary and proportionate. In my judgment the prohibited steps orders I could make to restrict rather than remove his parental responsibility are likely to be insufficient to protect C from his father’s coercive and controlling behaviours. Orders such as those prohibiting F from seeking information from health, education and social care could be made but to be effective F would have to observe them. I find that F is unlikely to observe any such orders. I do so on the basis that F has already been found to have manipulated the narrative to suit his own purposes and gain information about C when he knows that he should not have that information (see paragraph 65 of HHJ Talbott’s judgment). In his position statement prepared for the hearing on 5 November 2025 F stated that the Juvenile Court in Second Hague Convention Country had directed disclosure of C’s address. It had not. I find that since C’s return to England in February 2024, F has made false referrals about C in his mother’s care to social care and the police. In April 2024, for example, the father told the police that C was at risk in M’s care causing the police to attend his home and separate C from the mother causing significant distress and stress. Further I accept the evidence of M that when C was returned by the Second Hague Convention Country courts to England, F campaigned for C’s return to Second Hague Convention Country by public social media posts in which he peddled a false narrative. On the basis of all the findings I have made and those of HHJ Talbott I consider that it is likely that in the future F will continue to attempt to gain information about C, he will continue to construct a false narrative and will continue to use deceit to attempt to control and coerce C and M. Thus whilst I acknowledge the love between father and son in this case and that F will continue to have video calls with C which are supervised, I consider that it is in C’s best interests to remove his father’s parental responsibility for him. Absent parental responsibility, F will have no legal basis upon which to seek information about C and which he ought not to have. He will not have the ability to seek information from third parties on the basis that he has parental responsibility for C, C, in my judgment, needs that level of protection to prevent, in so far as the law can, F causing C and M further stress and distress as he seeks to control them both. Whilst the order I have made removes F’s parental responsibility, it does not take away from the fact that F is C’s biological father and that that relationship will continue.[133]That leaves the application for a s.91(14) order. I consider that it is in C’s best interests that I should make such an order. I have already made findings about F’s litigation misconduct which I factor into my decision making on this point. C has been the subject of litigation since November 2021. C needs a break from that continuous litigation. C’s best interests are served by him having a period of calm stability away from courts and professionals. He and his mother need to be protected from further litigation and the manipulation, coercion and control F seeks to exert over C and the stress and distress he seeks to cause to M. I consider that in this case a S91(14) order for 5 years is proportionate to the harm caused and likely to be caused if the litigation continues. In five years time C will be in senior school. He will be more mature and different considerations will come into play. Further I remind myself that a S91(14) order does not prohibit future welfare applications but it does insert a permissive gateway which must be crossed before any application can be made. I consider that any application for permission F may make in the future should not initially be served on M but should be considered on the papers by me, if available.[134]M made an oral application for a non-molestation order before me. There is no formal application and F has not had notice of it. Given the procedural deficiencies, I decline to make the non-molestation order sought. It should not be necessary but if, on receipt of this judgment, F behaves in a manner which makes it necessary, then M may make the necessary application which shall be reserved to me, if available.[135]I direct that a copy of this judgment together with a copy of the final order be provided to the Juvenile Court of Second Hague Convention Country through the International Family Justice Office. I permit M to share those documents and the Fact-Finding judgment with anyone engaged in a professional capacity in the Second Hague Convention Country proceedings. I permit M to share a copy of the Final Order with C’s school, GP and any other professional working with C so that they can effectively safeguard him. I permit her to share with the local authority and any professional working with C in a therapeutic capacity the judgment of HHJ Talbott, my judgment and the final order.

Order

Child’s Welfare) [2000] Fam 15; [1999] 2 FLR 573 at p19. Before proceeding to place the Re P guidelines into a modern context and to consider how the provision in section 67 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 may impact upon the guidelines when that section to be brought into force. Order: Child's Welfare) [2000] Fam 15, [1999] 3 WLR 1164, sub nom Re P (Section 91(14) Guidelines) (Residence and Religious Heritage) [1999] 2 FLR. order: F must nota. Spend direct time with the child;b. Approach the child; or come within 20 metres of him;c. Remove the child from the care of M or any person or institution (including school) to whom the Mother has entrusted the child’s care, nor instruct or encourage anybody else to do so;d. Apply for a passport for the child;e. Remove the child from the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.

Cited in 1 later judgment