“107. Dr Freedman confirmed that she had now read the various documents she had not had sight of when preparing her letter of25 October 2023 . She had also read the updating documents that had been filed since that time. She confirmed that nothing she had read has given her cause to change her recommendations, save that she accepted the view of the Guardian and the Social Worker that ongoing low level direct contact between James and the father would be unwieldy. This was something she had left open as a possibility in her report, but she now accepted that it could not happen. 108. She was taken to task on this in cross examination by [counsel for the father], who put to her that it was her job simply to opine whether or not it is in James’s interests to have face to face contact, whilst it was for someone else to talk about the practicalities or difficulties of that. Her evidence on this point was that she was not instructed to assess James. She holds strongly the professional view that if at all possible, children should know both parents, but she has also to listen carefully to the people who are instructed to consider James’s life. She cannot separate herself entirely from what others have said. In this case the Guardian and the social workers have said they do not think face to face contact is viable and they have said that for a number of reasons, which Dr Freedman takes seriously and respects. She accepted that if the identified difficulties could be ironed out, then direct contact would be in James’s interests, but this was not something she thought could happen overnight.”
“135. However, on balance I do not find the flaws in her written report to be fatal to her overall conclusions. The most important conclusion that Dr Freedman draws, aside from illustrating to the court the nature of each parent's difficulties and the therapeutic input required to address those, is the conclusion she makes that the mother is making efforts to move away from her past self and past relationship. The mother has a degree of insight and self-awareness, and a motivation to change, which Dr Freedman found to be entirely absent in the father. That conclusion is not, in my judgment, marred by her treatment of what the mother told her in interview. Dr Freedman has identified in the mother a candidate for whom therapeutic intervention could be very successful, and an individual whose “door is open” to making the changes required, and she has reached the opposite [conclusion] about the father. This of course is well within her area of considerable expertise and furthermore, as shall become clear below, is not contradicted by any of the other evidence before me, and so I accept those conclusions.”
“240. I found the father to be sincere in his love for his son, and I understand the frustration and anxiety he must feel at the present situation. I do not doubt that he feels victimised; it is clear from the fact finding outcomes (both the parents’ admissions and the judge’s findings) that both parents have behaved terribly in the past, and neither of them has always been focused on James’s welfare. But the father’s oral evidence lent weight to the views of Dr Freedman and the social work professionals that whereas the mother has recognised her part in things and is working hard to improve the situation, the father appears stuck. He returned repeatedly to his narrative of blaming the mother for everything and justifying his behaviour as being a result of hers, and as I have said, his evidence was egocentric; he remains at the centre of his thought processes. Much of his evidence appeared to me to be more about undermining the mother than about giving me any reassurances about his own conduct. 241. Whilst he has assured me that he would not intentionally do anything to undermine James’s placement with the mother, I did not entirely believe him. Indeed, I consider on balance that it is likely he will find that he cannot help himself, such is the extent of his entrenched views of the mother, and I think it safe to say that the father continues to have an agenda where it comes to the mother that is not just about James’s welfare.”
“265. I found the guardian to be a very thoughtful witness. She has clearly given considerable thought to the local authority’s care plan, the mother’s requests for various orders and the way in which the orders sought all combine. She had conducted a meticulous and difficult balancing exercise, and I believe her entirely when she says it was not at all an easy decision to endorse the local authority’s plan for the cessation of direct contact between James and the father.”
“280. I am satisfied therefore that it is not the case that the local authority’s case about the cessation of contact should simply fall away because of issues in Dr Freedman’s report. It is a position shared between all of the professionals and based upon a holistic evaluation of the evidence. Where there is consensus between all the professionals in the proceedings and I am satisfied that their evidence is adequate and has not been undermined, it is quite right to say that I must take that particularly seriously and that I would need to have clear and cogent reasons… to go behind those recommendations.”
“289. The primary change in James’s circumstances that is being proposed by the LA is that he will cease having direct contact with the father. Over the course of these proceedings, James has been enjoying regular contact with the father and has developed a weekly routine of which this contact is an important part. His relationship with the father has blossomed and it is clear that the father is an important person to James… 295. The likely effect on James of a change in circumstances must, in this case, be balanced against the likely effects on him of direct contact continuing, and I consider this below under the next subheading. Harm suffered or that he is likely to suffer 296. The harm James has suffered in the past is well documented and well-rehearsed throughout the written evidence in these proceedings. It is reflected in the findings that have been made and the final threshold document. I do not think it necessary to repeat it here. 297. Of more importance at this stage in the proceedings, is the harm that James is likely to suffer, going forwards. In the event that direct contact with the father is ceased, then James will suffer the harm that is outlined in the previous paragraphs in consideration of changes in circumstances. If direct contact is continued however, then in this case James faces a raft of other risks of harm. 298. Most importantly, there is a risk that James’s placement with the mother will destabilise either through the father actually taking steps to achieve this or, more likely, through the mother's fear or perception that he may do (or is doing) so. The mother has a diagnosis of CPTSD and it has been identified that fear of further interference by the father in her life (justified or otherwise) has the potential of triggering her symptoms. When triggered, she is likely to be unable to provide James with the parenting care that he needs. 299. This means that, even if one takes at face value the father’s assertion that he has no intention of ever doing anything that would disrupt the placement, the risk nonetheless remains until such time as the mother has successfully completed treatment for her CPTSD. This treatment is likely to take two years to complete. 300. Having heard from the father at length I have formed the view that despite his stated intentions, there is a strong likelihood that at some stage he will be unable to help himself in doing something that could, or does, undermine the placement. His view of the mother is so negative and so entrenched that I think it only a matter of time before something occurs that causes him to react. In my judgment therefore, the risk of destabilisation of James’s placement should be viewed not only in terms of the mother's perception of potential risk but also as an actual risk, still posed by the father. 301. If James’s placement with his mother is destabilised such that she cannot offer him good enough care, the family will find itself back in the court arena. James will endure another set of professionals becoming involved in his life and the uncertainty of further proceedings. He may not, ultimately, be able to remain living within his birth family. 302. Other than the risk of destabilisation of the placement, I heard from the professionals that there is risk of emotional harm to James from either parent if he should hear or perceive that parent being negative about the other. Exposed to that kind of behaviour, he could grow up to resent either one of his parents. Ms Cannon warned me that as it is the mother who will be imposing boundaries and dealing with the day to day, there was a risk that James would end up resenting her rather than the father. 303. Because it has broadly been agreed that it is better, especially for the mother because of her CPTSD but in reality, for both parents, if the father does not know where the mother and James are living, there is also risk to James arising from the pressure he will come under as he grows older, to ensure that he does not say anything during contact that might give away confidential information. The guardian explained how difficult, and how wrong, it would be to ask James to withhold information from the father. 304. Not only would a child of James’s age find that extremely difficult to do (and I consider it extremely likely that it is only a matter of time before James says something at contact which does give away the mother’s location or that of his nursery), but it would set a precedent for him whereby he could become unclear about what he can say to whom. In the event of, for example, problems in his home life with the mother, this represents a significant safeguarding concern as James will not feel that he is able to turn to trusted adults for help. The concept of having to keep secrets is not a good one to instil in a young child. 305. The ramifications of having to withhold information, and of any accidental leak of confidential information on his part, may not be something that James himself feels particularly in the next couple of years, unless it leads to destabilisation of his placement, but the wider emotional impact on him as he progresses through childhood and adolescence could be significant. 306. Whilst much of this analysis is phrased in the context of a future risk of harm, I do not consider it to be speculative. The evidence in this case demonstrates that there is a real prospect, a likelihood on the balance of probabilities, of these risks becoming reality.”
“Child Arrangements Order – Termination of Contact 24. Applications for a child arrangements order unders.8 of the Children Act 1989 require the court to apply the principles set out ins.1 of the 1989 Act . In this case, the order sought is that there be no contact between G and her father. Within this context, I in particular note and bear in mind that s.1(2A) of theChildren Act 1989 provides as follows: “(2A) A court, in circumstances mentioned in subsection (4)(a) or (7), is as respects each parent within subsection (6)(a) to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child's welfare.” 25. With respect to assessing whether the contrary is shown for the purposes of s.1(2A) of theChildren Act 1989 , I further bear in mind that the courts have, historically, held that it is almost always in the interest of a child whose parents are separated that he or she should have contact with the parent with whom he or she is not living. This principle, and the following further applicable principles can be drawn from the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Re C (Direct Contact: Suspension)[2011] 2 FLR 912 at [47], Re W (Direct Contact)[2013] 1 FLR 494 and Re J-M (A Child)[2014] EWCA Civ 434 at [25]: i) The welfare of the child is paramount and the child’s best interests must take precedence over any other consideration. ii) There is a positive obligation on the State and therefore on the judge to take measures to promote contact, grappling with all available alternatives and taking all necessary steps that can reasonably be demanded, before abandoning hope of achieving contact. iii) However, the positive obligation on the State, and therefore on the court, is not absolute. Whilst authorities must do their utmost to facilitate the co-operation and understanding of all concerned, any obligation to apply coercion in this area must be limited since the interests, as well as the rights and freedoms of all concerned must be taken into account and, more particularly, so must the best interests of the child. iv) Excessive weight should not be accorded to short term problems and the court should take a medium and long term view. v) Contact should be terminated only in exceptional circumstances where there are cogent reasons for doing so, as a last resort, when there is no alternative, and only if contact will be detrimental to the child’s welfare. vi) The key question, and the question requiring stricter scrutiny, is whether the court has taken all necessary steps to facilitate contact as can reasonably be demanded in the circumstances of the particular case. 26. These principles must be read in light ofFPR 2010 PD12J , entitled Child Arrangements and Contact Orders: Domestic Abuse and Harm, which provides as follows at paragraph [7]: “In proceedings relating to a child arrangements order, the court presumes that the involvement of a parent in a child’s life will further the child’s welfare, unless there is evidence to the contrary. The Court must in every case consider carefully whether the statutory presumption applies, having particular regard to any allegation or admission of harm by domestic abuse to the child or parent or any evidence indicating such harm or risk of harm.” 27. The foregoing principles set out inPD12J are expressed by reference to domestic abuse. However, it is plain that this approach will apply, in proceedings relating to a child arrangements order, to all allegations or admissions of harm to the child or parent relevant to the question of contact or evidence indicating such harm or risk of harm. Within this context, I note that paragraphs 35 to 37 ofPD12J enjoin the court, inter alia, to take the following factors into account when considering child arrangements in cases where the court is satisfied that such harm has occurred: i) The court should ensure that any order for contact will not expose the child to an unmanageable risk of harm and will be in the best interests of the child. ii) The court should apply the individual matters in the welfare checklist set out ins.1(3) of the Children Act 1989 with reference to the harm that has occurred and any expert risk assessment obtained. iii) In particular, the court should consider any harm which the child, and the parent with whom the child is living, is at risk of suffering if a child arrangements order is made. iv) The court should make an order for contact only if it is satisfied that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured before, during and after contact. v) The court should consider, inter alia, whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of abuse against the other parent and the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past abuse and the potential for future abuse.”
“Right to family life 98. I must have regard to the respective rights to respect for their family life of the child and their parents underArt.8 ECHR ; while having in mind that where any balancing of rights between parent and child is necessary the interests of the child must prevail (Yousuf v Netherlands[2003] 1 FLR 210 ). Such intervention or intrusion as the Court decides upon into that family life must be necessary and proportionate to the harm that would otherwise be likely to be experienced by the child. 99.The approach to be drawn from domestic authorities is clearly accepted within European jurisprudence: where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child’s health and development, a parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such ties be maintained (see Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no.41615/07,6 July 2010 ; S 136; R. and H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35348/06,31 May 2011 S 73).”