“(5) The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if— (a) the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is suitable for the applicant, (b) that offer of accommodation is not an offer of accommodation under Part 6 or a private rented sector offer, and (c) the authority notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section. (6) The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant— (a) ceases to be eligible for assistance, (b) becomes homeless intentionally from the accommodation made available for his occupation, (c) accepts an offer of accommodation under Part VI (allocation of housing), or (cc) accepts an offer of an assured tenancy (other than an assured shorthold tenancy) from a private landlord, (d) otherwise voluntarily ceases to occupy as his only or principal home the accommodation made available for his occupation. (7) The local housing authority shall also cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant, having been informed of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of his right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses a final offer of accommodation under Part 6. … (7AA) ... the authority shall also cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant, having been informed in writing of the matters mentioned in subsection (7AB)— (a) accepts a private rented sector offer, or (b) refuses such an offer.” (a) the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is suitable for the applicant, (b) that offer of accommodation is not an offer of accommodation under Part 6 or a private rented sector offer, and (c) the authority notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section. (a) ceases to be eligible for assistance, (b) becomes homeless intentionally from the accommodation made available for his occupation, (c) accepts an offer of accommodation under Part VI (allocation of housing), or (cc) accepts an offer of an assured tenancy (other than an assured shorthold tenancy) from a private landlord, (d) otherwise voluntarily ceases to occupy as his only or principal home the accommodation made available for his occupation. (a) accepts a private rented sector offer, or (b) refuses such an offer.”
“(a) the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance of the offer, and (b) that the applicant has the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, and (c) in a case which is not a restricted case, the effect under section 195A of a further application to a local housing authority within two years of acceptance of the offer.”
“The question is what is the ‘effect under section 195A of a further application’ within two years of the current application. The introductory words of section 195A(2) are ‘For the purpose of subsection (1)’. Section 195A(2) is a special rule, for the purpose of section 195A(1), about the time at which a person becomes homeless. In my judgment, ‘the effect under section 195A’ includes the effect of section 195A(2). It was common ground that A was not notified of the effect of section 195A(2). On the ordinary meaning of those words, he was not, therefore, told of the effect, ‘under section 195A of a further application’.”
“By the mid-1990s, a third of all judicial review applications to the High Court concerned homelessness decisions; often the dispute was essentially one of fact and primary judgment (was the person intentionally homeless? was the accommodation offered suitable?) rather than of law. … In Access to Justice, Lord Woolf recommended that the supervisory jurisdiction over the lawfulness of homelessness decision-making should be transferred to the county courts and this was swiftly implemented by Pt 7 of theHousing Act 1996 . … The existence of a review procedure in the county courts has not taken away the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction to exercise its judicial review jurisdiction in the context of decisions relating to homelessness, but that jurisdiction will now be used only in exceptional circumstances.”
“Just to update you. I feel as a 15 year I have been under immense stress and pressure from the recent events. As a family we cannot move to Derby as this has been our decision from day one …. We would like to be relocated locally if we are to be moved. Can I request any further correspondence to be made via email not via whatsapp. Please cancel the removal van for Monday ….”
“As I stated in the offer letter the councils duty to your household has been discharged, whether you accept the offer or not. Your temporary accommodation has been cancelled from tonight which means that you are required to look for your own accommodation from tomorrow if you are not accepting the offer made. I am aware that you are all very upset and nervous about the offer being out of London, however I have made the councils position very clear and also have advised you the reason for why you have been made the offer.”
“We recently advised you that your temporary accommodation … was cancelled, but you would not be asked to leave due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The Government has now lifted the restrictions on individuals/households moving. I am therefore writing to advise you that your accommodation at [the Newham Property] … has now been cancelled. Your last night … is31 August 2020 . The Council has given you adequate notice to make your own arrangements for accommodation ….”
“Request for review unders202 Housing Act 1996 … Request for temporary accommodation pending review outcome”
“On19th August 2020 , our client received a letter … from the Temporary Accommodation team that they have to leave the accommodation by31st August 2020 . Our client was shocked as she was under the impression that her review is pending …. Our client started to seek legal advice and was looking for a legal aid firm which took time. Our client informed us that she made a review request via WhatsApp message … ; we are now instructed to make further submissions on behalf of our client to support her review on why moving to Derby would not be suitable for the family ….”
“As the offer letter dated11 June 2020 was emailed to Mrs Bano the same day, the statutory timeframe for requesting the review lapsed on2 July 2020 . Using the date of28 September 2020 as the date the review was requested[,] [t]his date suggests that the request was made 109 days after the statutory deadline had lapsed.”
“in regards to accommodation pending the outcome of the review the council will not grant your request. Mrs Bano was notified that the accommodation would come to an end following the Council’s policy on Lockdown and she was to find alternative accommodation. Furthermore, we have stated that the request was made out of time and this council considers itself as relieved of its homeless duty towards Mrs Bano pursuant tosection 193 (5) of the Housing Act 1996 .”
“Ms Bano’s homeless application was closed (section 193(2) duty ended by the offer of PRS which she refused) and she remained in the Property without permission from the Council.”
“(1) The claim has been brought out of time and there is no good reason to extend time; (2) the court should exercise its discretion to refuse to grant any relief because of the undue delay since granting the relief sought would offend the principle of finality and be detrimental to good administration; (3) the claimant had alternative remedies by way of statutory review and appeal, but chose not to exercise those rights.”
“The defendant argued that there were alternative remedies available to the claimant. She should have within the appropriate time requested a review under s.202 of the Act. I have at the forefront of my thinking the judgment of Sales LJ in Glencore and the fact that judicial review is a remedy of last resort. There is unquestionably in this case a relevant statutory regime in Glencore terms. However, its applicability is based on the assumption that the decision to be reviewed was contained in the11 June 2020 offer letter or the subsequent letter of7 October 2020 . Such an ending decision could be subject to statutory review and then right of appeal on a point of law to the county court in the usual way. In the absence of challenging the decision in the way prescribed by Parliament, the claimant would need to demonstrate ‘pressing’ (Glencore at [55]) or ‘exceptional’ circumstances to bring this claim in judicial review (R v Merton London Borough Council ex p. Sembi(2000) 32 HLR 439 ; R v Brent London Borough Council ex p. O’Connor(1998) 31 HLR 923 , QBD). Given this court’s decision on the prime question about the continuation of the main duty and the failure to make an effective decision that it was ended, these arguments about alternative remedy fall away. The fact is that the main duty has not been ‘brought to an end’, as Elisabeth Laing LJ termed it in Norton at [27], in accordance with the statutory ending conditions. A fresh application under Part VII is not an alternative remedy to the recognition that the main duty continues. The question of whether Ms Bano still qualifies as a priority need would require reconsideration. This is unnecessary if the main duty has not ended. This is not, therefore, an alternative remedy to a declaration to that effect ….”
“The net effect of this analysis is that neither the 11 June nor7 October 2020 letters are decisions by the defendant ending the main duty. I judge that what the defendant has sought to do is promote the original offer letter into an ending decision. It was not. It has then attempted to convert a letter by a review officer refusing a requested suitability review into an ending decision. Once more, it was not …. What is lacking in this case is precisely what existed in Norton and Warsame: a decision to end the main duty following PRSO [i.e. private rented sector offer] and refusal/acceptance, as occurred in both cases before the Court of Appeal.”
“it is well established that in giving or refusing leave to apply for judicial review, account must be taken of alternative remedies available to the applicant. This aspect was considered by this court very recently in Reg. v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police, Ex parte Calveley [1986] 2 W.L.R. 144 and it was held that the jurisdiction would not be exercised where there was an alternative remedy by way of appeal, save in exceptional circumstances. By definition, exceptional circumstances defy definition, but where Parliament provides an appeal procedure, judicial review will have no place, unless the applicant can distinguish his case from the type of case for which the appeal procedure was provided.”
“55. In my view, the principle is based on the fact that judicial review in the High Court is ordinarily a remedy of last resort, to ensure that the rule of law is respected where no other procedure is suitable to achieve that objective. However, since it is a matter of discretion for the court, where it is clear that a public authority is acting in defiance of the rule of law the High Court will be prepared to exercise its jurisdiction then and there without waiting for some other remedial process to take its course. Also, in considering what should be taken to qualify as a suitable alternative remedy, the court should have regard to the provision which Parliament has made to cater for the usual sort of case in terms of the procedures and remedies which have been established to deal with it. If Parliament has made it clear by its legislation that a particular sort of procedure or remedy is in its view appropriate to deal with a standard case, the court should be slow to conclude in its discretion that the public interest is so pressing that it ought to intervene to exercise its judicial review function along with or instead of that statutory procedure. But of course it is possible that instances of unlawfulness will arise which are not of that standard description, in which case the availability of such a statutory procedure will be less significant as a factor. 56. Treating judicial review in ordinary circumstances as a remedy of last resort fulfils a number of objectives. It ensures the courts give priority to statutory procedures as laid down by Parliament, respecting Parliament’s judgment about what procedures are appropriate for particular contexts. It avoids expensive duplication of the effort which may be required if two sets of procedures are followed in relation to the same underlying subject matter. It minimises the potential for judicial review to be used to disrupt the smooth operation of statutory procedures which may be adequate to meet the justice of the case. It promotes proportionate allocation of judicial resources for dispute resolution and saves the High Court from undue pressure of work so that it remains available to provide speedy relief in other judicial review cases in fulfilment of its role as protector of the rule of law, where its intervention really is required.”
“it is well established that judicial review will only be granted if there is no suitable alternative remedy: Sharma v Brown-Antoine, para 14; In re McAleenon[2024] UKSC 31 ;[2024] 3 WLR 803 , paras 50–64. Where there is a statutory right of appeal in respect of an order, that is regarded as a suitable alternative remedy (save in exceptional circumstances) and will operate as a defence to a claim in judicial review to challenge the order in issue: Noeleen McAleenon, para 51; R (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Britain) v Charity Commission[2016] EWCA Civ 154 ;[2016] 1 WLR 2625 , para 19 and R (Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Comrs[2017] EWCA Civ 1716 ;[2017] 4 WLR 213 , paras 55–58.”
“The council… urges you to reconsider your proposed refusal and to arrange to accept the offer by9 February 1998 otherwise the offer will be withdrawn and no further offer will be made as a duty under homelessness legislation. You will have to leave the temporary accommodation by or before [that] date. I must also make it clear that the council is unwilling for you to remain in the temporary accommodation at the above address which was provided for your household whilst arrangements were being made for your permanent rehousing. If you are still refusing this offer, you should start making your own arrangements as to where you will stay after the termination date. I regret any disappointment which this decision may cause you but must emphasise that the council is of the opinion that the offer is suitable for you and your household and, by making it to you, the duty accepted towards you following your homelessness application has been fully discharged. The council believes that it has fulfilled the statutory housing duties accepted towards you under this Act. No further offer will be made.”
“the language [of section 202(1)(b)] is apt … to apply to a decision that a duty, once owed, is owed no longer. A decision that a duty once owed is no longer owed is, to my mind, plainly a decision as to what duty, if any, is owed at the time when the decision is taken. I can see nothing in the language which restricts decisions within paragraph (b) to decisions whether a duty arises and excludes decisions whether a duty which has arisen has ceased.”
“I am satisfied that, in the context of this legislation as a whole, it was the intention of Parliament that decisions as to matters which, if they existed, would cause a duty to cease, are decisions which can be the subject of a request for review; and so are decisions which can be the subject of an appeal on a point of law under section 204. For those reasons I take the view that the judge was wrong to decline jurisdiction in this case and that the appropriate course is to remit the matter to the county court for further decision.”
“If that be the case, so that the duty on the local authority has ceased by reason of section 193(6), I would not expect the applicants to trouble the county court judge with what will have become an academic question in relation to the termination of the duty under section 193(7).”
“The local housing authority shall also cease to be subject to the duty under this section if— (a) the applicant, having been informed of the possible consequence of refusal, refuses an offer of accommodation under Part VI, and (b) the authority are satisfied that the accommodation was suitable for him and that it was reasonable for him to accept it and notify him accordingly within 21 days of the refusal.”
“Mr Arden, relying on the amendments to section 193(7), and particularly the omission of the notification provision, submitted that section 193(7) now provides for automatic cessation of the authority’s duty if the circumstances specified there have occurred. The discharge is, he said, no longer dependent on any decision to be taken by the authority following the refusal of an offer. He dismissed as misconceived and irrelevant the indications of Lewisham’s officers, in particular by Mr Gomez in his letter of10 October 2008 and by Mr Dixon in his letter of8 January 2009 , that Lewisham only decided to regard its duty under section 193(2) as discharged some time after the applicants’ refusal of the offer. By way of riposte, Mr Latham [i.e. counsel for the applicants] … advanced several reasons as to why, notwithstanding the omission of the notification requirement in the amended section 193(7), it is implicit in the amended statutory provisions that, following refusal of an offer, the authority must notify the applicant that the authority regards itself as discharged from its duty under the subsection.”
“Although that was a decision under the unamended provisions of section 193(7), the decision remains applicable to the amended provisions. Although worded differently, the original provisions of section 193(7) provided for automatic cessation, albeit at a later date (i e after notification). In the present case it is clear from the correspondence, including in particular the letters from Mr Gomez and Mr Dixon to which we have referred in para 29 above, that Lewisham came to a decision in January 2009 about whether or not its duty had ceased under section 193(7).
“If, following the making of the offer by Lewisham or at any event once there had been a refusal of the offer, there had been a review at the same time of both the suitability and ‘reasonable to accept’ requirements as well as the decision prospectively to discharge by the making of the offer (or, if after refusal, that the conditions for discharge had been satisfied), they could have been dealt with at the same time, and by virtue of section 202(2) would not then be open for further review.”
“(5) The applicant is entitled to a review of the suitability requirement in section 193(7F) by virtue of section 202(1)(f) of the 1996 Act and of the reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F) by virtue of section 202(1)(b). It is both possible and desirable for both requirements to be reviewed at the same time. The right to a review of both requirements, and the intention to review both at the same time, should be made clear to the applicant. (6) The applicant is also entitled to a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b). If the review takes place before refusal of the final offer of accommodation, it will strictly be a review of the intention that the offer will, on refusal, result in cessation of the authority’s duty. If the review takes place after the refusal of accommodation, it will be a review of the authority’s confirmation that its duty has ceased by virtue of satisfaction of the statutory preconditions for such cessation. The applicant should be informed of the right to such review. (7) It is desirable that such a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) takes place at the same time as the review of the suitability requirement and the reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F). If it is intended that it will take place at the same time, the applicant should be so informed. (8) If the review of the suitability requirement and the reasonableness requirement and the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) take place at the same time, by virtue of section 202(2) there will be no further right to review of the decisions on any of those matters. If, however, the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty does not take place at the same time as either the review of the suitability requirement or the reasonableness requirement, matters relevant to those requirements which were not taken into account on the earlier review must be taken into account by the authority on the decision review if the matters existed prior to the refusal of the offer, even though they were not raised by the applicant at the earlier review.”