The Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Wandsworth v Jerome Young [2025] EWCA Civ 1336

[2025] EWCA Civ 1336Case No CA-2025-000320
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT CENTRAL LONDON
His Honour Judge Saggerson
Claim No. H00WT502
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 21/10/2025
Before
LORD JUSTICE NEWEYLADY JUSTICE ELISABETH LAINGLORD JUSTICE COBB
Between
THE MAYOR AND BURGESSES OF THE LONDON BOROUGH OF WANDSWORTHClaimants/JEROME YOUNGDefendant/Appellant
Justin Bates KC and Daniel Grütters (instructed by Morrison Spowart Solicitors) for AppellantMatt Hutchings KC (instructed by South London Legal Partnership) for RespondentsHearing Hearing date: 7 October 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 21 October 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]In this case, the appellant, Mr Jerome Young, resists possession proceedings on the basis that he is owed the “main housing duty” under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) by the respondents, the Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Wandsworth (“the Council”). For its part, the Council contends that any issue as to the existence of the main housing duty ought to have been ventilated through the review and appeal procedures for which the 1996 Act provides and that, in any event, it has long since ceased to owe Mr Young the main housing duty.

Facts

[2]Mr Young is now in his mid-40s and single.[3]In a report dated 27 August 2019, Dr Sajid Suleman, a consultant psychiatrist, diagnosed Mr Young as suffering from autism spectrum disorder with traits of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He expressed the view that Mr Young was “more vulnerable due to his mental health difficulties and requires help with his daily activities”. He also considered that Mr Young lacked capacity to conduct Court proceedings.[4]Following receipt of this report, on 3 September 2019 the Council granted Mr Young a non-secure tenancy of 15 Ganley Court, Winstanley Estate in Battersea pursuant to section 188(1) of the 1996 Act. Shortly afterwards, in a letter to Mr Young dated 10 October 2019, the Council accepted that it owed Mr Young the main housing duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act. The Council said in the letter that it would ensure that the accommodation which Mr Young was occupying under section 188 would continue to be available to him until its duty under section 193 was discharged. It further explained that its duty could cease if, among other things, Mr Young accepted an offer of accommodation under Part VI of the 1996 Act.[5]The Council made such an offer in a letter to Mr Young dated 18 March 2020. The offer related to 25 Diprose Lodge, 750 Garratt Lane in Tooting. The heading to the letter spoke of a “Final Offer of Accommodation” and the letter stated, among other things, “Please note that by accepting this offer of accommodation the council’s homelessness duty to you will be discharged”; “we will normally make applicants only one suitable offer of housing and, if you refuse an offer of suitable accommodation, your application will be cancelled”; “This is a final offer for the purposes of S 193(7) of the Housing Act 1996 (as amended)”; and “Please note that if you unreasonably refuse this offer of accommodation or fail to attend the viewing the Council’s duty to you under S.193 of the Housing Act 1996 will cease”. The letter further explained that Mr Young had the right to request a review if he felt that that offer was unsuitable or wished to refuse it and that he could both accept the offer and request a review of its suitability. The letter concluded:
“If the decision on review is that the offer is suitable, the Council will expect you to reside in the property and the Council’s duty to you under S.193 of the Housing Act 1996 will cease. If the decision on review is that the offer is unsuitable, the Council will make a further final offer of accommodation.”
[6]On, it seems, 1 April 2020, Mr Young signed a tenancy agreement in respect of 25 Diprose Lodge. However, the commencement date had to be delayed as a result of the covid pandemic and on 4 June 2020 the Council sent Mr Young a letter proposing that the tenancy should take effect on 15 June 2020. The letter reminded Mr Young that he had “the right to request a review of the suitability of this offer irrespective of whether you wish to accept or refuse it” and ended:
“By making this final offer of accommodation available to you, the council has discharged the duty, previously accepted towards you, as an unintentionally homeless household in priority need of accommodation. If you unreasonably refuse this offer the council’s duty to you under S 193 (2) of the Housing Act 1996 may cease. In such circumstances the council will take steps to terminate your right to occupy your present temporary accommodation and will, in due course, seek possession of your temporary accommodation via the County Court.”
[7]On 10 June 2020, Mr Young’s solicitor, Mr William Flack of Morrison Spowart, emailed the Council requesting “a review pursuant to Section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 in relation to the decision that the accommodation offered to Mr Young at 25 Diprose Lodge is suitable for him”, giving “initial reasons” under the headings “Security”, “Location”, “No Viewing” and “Communication”. As regards the last two of these, Mr Flack explained that Mr Young “objects to having been forced as he considers it to sign a tenancy agreement before viewing the property” and “considers that communication between himself and the council has been in his words ridiculous”.[8]The Council agreed to undertake a review under section 202 of the 1996 Act. In a further email to Mr Flack of 12 June 2020, the Council said this:
“Further to our telephone discussions of yesterday and today in which you have confirmed that Mr Young considers that he has accepted the final offer of accommodation made in discharge of the previously accepted duty, please find attached the tenancy agreement signed by Mr Young which provides a tenancy start date of 20th April 2020. However as Mr Young was unable to move into the accommodation by that date due to the corona virus pandemic the council agreed to a delay in Mr Young taking up occupation of this accommodation and accordingly there has been no rental charge applied for that period. Mr Young has remained accommodated at his temporary accommodation address at 15 Ganley Court. I write to confirm that as agreed during our discussion, the council will arrange for keys to 25 Diprose Lodge to be delivered to Mr Young early next week …. Mr Young should return the keys to his temporary accommodation to the council not later than 6th July 2020 ….”
[9]On 1 July 2020, by which point he was no longer instructing Mr Flack, Mr Young said in an email to the Council that the placement at 25 Diprose Lodge was “going to have a significant impact on my health, future and family”. He cited “Poor health environment”, “Poor safety”, “Lack of security to freedom”, “Poor family life”, “Poor life expectancy” and the “location … between two cemeteries”. He also said:
“Wandsworth council used coercion to get me to sign the tenancy agreement during coronavirus lockdown, and then restricted me from viewing the property, which would have obviously left me outside the statutory time frame of 21 days for an appeal, so please could you inform Ms Fraser-Ellis that [there] was little or no choice but to [accept] my appeal.”
[10]Mr Young was informed of the outcome of the review in a letter from the Council dated 20 July 2020. The first paragraph stated that the letter was written “further to [Mr Young’s] request for a suitability review”. In the course of the letter, the reviewing officer noted that Mr Young had “made allegations in relation to the tenancy offer process” but these were rejected. The reviewing officer said:
“I am satisfied that the offer process was both in accordance with the council’s usual procedure, and that you were notified of all relevant information about accepting or refusing the accommodation and the potential consequences of any refusal and your right to request a review. I am therefore satisfied that you voluntarily signed the tenancy agreement document and as a consequence of that you are now the tenant of 25 Diprose Lodge and that consequently the previously accepted duty has now been discharged.”
[11]Having commented on location and other suitability considerations, the reviewing officer concluded as follows:
“102. For reasons set out in this letter, I am satisfied that the accommodation at 25 Diprose Lodge is suitable accommodation for the purposes of Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 (as amended) and that in the making of this offer, which you have accepted, discharged the previously accepted duty. 103. The decision set out in this letter represents the Council’s decision on review and, under the 1996 Act, concludes all internal review processes. 104. In the undertaking of this review I can confirm that I have found no defect, omission or irrationality in the council’s decision making and offer process.”
The reviewing officer added, however, that Mr Young had the right to appeal to the County Court on a point of law relating to the decision set out in the letter.[12]The letter said this about 15 Ganley Court:
“You are currently provided with temporary accommodation at 15 Ganley Court, this was accommodation proved to you following the acceptance of the main housing duty, which is now discharged. Consequently you must now vacate your temporary accommodation and return the keys to the council ….”
[13]As Mr Young did not vacate 15 Ganley Court, on 12 November 2020 the Council served on him a notice to quit requiring him to vacate the property by 14 December 2020. The present proceedings were issued on 18 May 2021. By them, the Council claimed possession of 15 Ganley Court.[14]The Official Solicitor was appointed as Mr Young’s litigation friend on 22 November 2021 and a defence was served on his behalf. This included the contention that the Council continued to owe Mr Young the main housing duty with the result that “an eviction from the property, without the provision of suitable alternative accommodation, would be a breach of that duty”.[15]The matter came before District Judge Daley, sitting in the County Court at Wandsworth, on 21 September 2023. Mr Daniel Grütters, who appeared for Mr Young at the hearing, argued that the main housing duty continued, first, because “there should have been notification to [Mr Young] pursuant to section 184 of the Housing Act, that the duty under section 193(2) was considered to have come to an end on the acceptance by him of an offer of accommodation and also, more particularly, pursuant to (5), that that notification had to include information to him as to his right to seek a review” (to quote from paragraph 25 of the District Judge’s judgment) and, secondly, because “Mr Young had not in fact accepted the offer, so that section 193(6)(c) does not apply” since he “did not have capacity” (see paragraph 34 of the judgment). However, the District Judge accepted neither contention and ordered Mr Young to give vacant possession. Among other things, the District Judge considered that the evidence of Dr Suleman was “insufficient to conclude that at the time he accepted the offer, Mr Young was incapable of doing so” (paragraph 37 of the judgment).[16]Mr Young appealed, but without success. The appeal was dismissed by His Honour Judge Saggerson, sitting in the County Court at Central London, on 27 January 2025.[17]Mr Young now challenges Judge Saggerson’s decision in this Court.

The statutory framework

[18]Part VII of the 1996 Act, comprising sections 175-216, is concerned with homelessness.[19]Sections 183 and 184 of the 1996 Act have the overall heading “Application for assistance in case of homelessness or threatened homelessness” and section 184 is itself headed “Inquiry into cases of homelessness or threatened homelessness”. So far as relevant, section 184 provides: “(1) If the local housing authority have reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, they shall make such inquiries as are necessary to satisfy themselves—(a) whether he is eligible for assistance, and(b) if so, whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed to him under the following provisions of this Part. (2) They may also make inquiries whether he has a local connection with the district of another local housing authority in England, Wales or Scotland. (3) On completing their inquiries the authority shall notify the applicant of their decision and, so far as any issue is decided against his interests, inform him of the reasons for their decision. … (4) If the authority have notified or intend to notify another local housing authority in England under section 198(A1) (referral of cases where section 189B applies), they shall at the same time notify the applicant of that decision and inform him of the reasons for it. (5) A notice under subsection (3) or (4) shall also inform the applicant of his right to request a review of the decision and of the time within which such a request must be made (see section 202).” (a) whether he is eligible for assistance, and (b) if so, whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed to him under the following provisions of this Part.[20]Section 188 of the 1996 Act, headed “Interim duty to accommodate in case of apparent priority need”, requires a local housing authority to secure that accommodation is available for the occupation of an applicant if it has reason to believe that the person may be homeless, be eligible for assistance and have a priority need.[21]Section 193 of the 1996 Act, which is to be found in a group of sections with the heading “Duties to persons found to be homeless or threatened with homelessness”, imposes the main housing duty, requiring the local housing authority “to secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant”: see section 193(2). This applies where the local housing authority concludes that the person is homeless, is eligible for assistance, did not become homeless intentionally and has a priority need.[22]Section 193(3) of the 1996 Act provides for a local housing authority to remain subject to the main housing duty until it ceases by virtue of any of the following provisions of the section. Those of relevance in the present context are subsections (5), (6), (7), (7AA) and (7AB). They provide:
“(5) The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if— (a) the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is suitable for the applicant, (b) that offer of accommodation is not an offer of accommodation under Part 6 or a private rented sector offer, and (c) the authority notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section. (6) The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant— (a) ceases to be eligible for assistance, (b) becomes homeless intentionally from the accommodation made available for his occupation, (c) accepts an offer of accommodation under Part VI (allocation of housing), or (cc) accepts an offer of an assured tenancy (other than an assured shorthold tenancy) from a private landlord, (d) otherwise voluntarily ceases to occupy as his only or principal home the accommodation made available for his occupation. (7) The local housing authority shall also cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant, having been informed of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of his right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses a final offer of accommodation under Part 6. … (7AA) The authority shall also cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant, having been informed in writing of the matters mentioned in subsection (7AB)— (a) accepts a private rented sector offer, or (b) refuses such an offer. (7AB) The matters are— (a) the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance of the offer, and (b) that the applicant has the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, and (c) in a case which is not a restricted case, the effect under section 195A of a further application to a local housing authority within two years of acceptance of the offer.” (a) the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is suitable for the applicant, (b) that offer of accommodation is not an offer of accommodation under Part 6 or a private rented sector offer, and (c) the authority notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section. (a) ceases to be eligible for assistance, (b) becomes homeless intentionally from the accommodation made available for his occupation, (c) accepts an offer of accommodation under Part VI (allocation of housing), or (cc) accepts an offer of an assured tenancy (other than an assured shorthold tenancy) from a private landlord, (d) otherwise voluntarily ceases to occupy as his only or principal home the accommodation made available for his occupation. (a) accepts a private rented sector offer, or (b) refuses such an offer. (a) the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance of the offer, and (b) that the applicant has the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, and (c) in a case which is not a restricted case, the effect under section 195A of a further application to a local housing authority within two years of acceptance of the offer.”
[23]Section 193 of the 1996 Act has been the subject of significant amendments since first enacted. In their original form, subsections (5) and (7) provided as follows:
“(5) The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is suitable for him and the authority notify him that they regard themselves as having discharged their duty under this section. … (7) The local housing authority shall also cease to be subject to the duty under this section if— (a) the applicant, having been informed of the possible consequence of refusal, refuses an offer of accommodation under Part VI, and (b) the authority are satisfied that the accommodation was suitable for him and that it was reasonable for him to accept it and notify him accordingly within 21 days of the refusal.”
The Homelessness Act 2002 inserted the words “and of his right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation” into subsection (5) and replaced the existing subsection (7) with a provision in its current terms except that it did not include “or acceptance”. Those words were added into subsection (7) by the Localism Act 2011, which also provided for the present form of subsection (5) to be substituted. In the meantime, subsections (7AA)-(7AD) had been inserted by the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, and those subsections were modified by the 2011 Act. (a) the applicant, having been informed of the possible consequence of refusal, refuses an offer of accommodation under Part VI, and (b) the authority are satisfied that the accommodation was suitable for him and that it was reasonable for him to accept it and notify him accordingly within 21 days of the refusal.”[24]The following observations can be made: i) Subsections (5), (7) and (7AB) all now require an applicant to have been informed of the right to request a review of suitability; ii) In their original form, subsection (5) required the local housing authority to “notify [the applicant] that they regard themselves as having discharged their duty under this section” and subsection (7) required the authority to “notify [the applicant] … within 21 days of the refusal” that it was “satisfied that the accommodation was suitable for him and that it was reasonable for him to accept it”. Nowadays, subsection (5) speaks of the authority “notify[ing] the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section”, while the notification obligation formerly in subsection (7)(b) has been dispensed with. Nor do subsections (7AA)-(7AD) say that the authority must notify the applicant of anything after an offer has been accepted or refused.[25]The explanatory notes in respect of section 7(3) of the Homelessness Act 2002, which was the provision which effected the substitution of a subsection (7) in substantially the present form (and, hence, the deletion of the notification requirement in what had been subsection (7)(b)), stated:
“Section 7(3) replaces section 193(7) of the 1996 Act and sets out further circumstances under which the main duty to secure accommodation ceases. The new provision clarifies the ending of the main homelessness duty where the applicant refuses an offer of suitable accommodation allocated under Part 6. The housing authority has to notify the applicant in writing that the offer is a final offer and that the duty will end if it is refused. It must also notify the applicant of his right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation.”
[26]Sections 202-204A of the 1996 Act make provision as regards reviews and appeals. Section 202 confers on an applicant a right to request a review of various decisions of a local housing authority. Such decisions include, by section 202(1)(a), (b) and (f) respectively, “any decision of a local housing authority as to his eligibility for assistance”, “any decision of a local housing authority as to what duty (if any) is owed to him under sections 189B to 193C and 195 ... (duties to persons found to be homeless or threatened with homelessness)” and “any decision of a local housing authority as to the suitability of accommodation offered to him in discharge of their duty under any of the provisions mentioned in paragraph (b) or (e) or as to the suitability of accommodation offered to him as mentioned in section 193(7)”. Section 202(2) states that there is “no right to request a review of the decision reached on an earlier review”. Section 202(3) provides:
“A request for review must be made before the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the day on which he is notified of the authority’s decision or such longer period as the authority may in writing allow.”
[27]By section 204 of the 1996 Act, a person dissatisfied with a review decision may appeal to the County Court on “any point of law arising from the decision or, as the case may be, the original decision”. “Although the county court’s jurisdiction is appellate, it is in substance the same as that of the High Court in judicial review” (Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 2 AC 430, at paragraph 7, per Lord Bingham). The grounds of challenge can include “procedural error, the extent of legal powers (vires), irrationality and inadequacy of reasons”: see James v Hertsmere BC [2020] EWCA Civ 489, [2020] 1 WLR 3606, at paragraph 31, per Peter Jackson LJ, and also Abdikadir v Ealing LBC [2022] EWCA Civ 979, [2022] PTSR 1455, at paragraph 8, per Lewison LJ.[28]The procedures for review and appeal for which sections 202 and 204 of the 1996 Act provide were an innovation. In this connection, De Smith’s Judicial Review, 9th ed., explains in paragraph 17-036:
“By the mid-1990s, a third of all judicial review applications to the High Court concerned homelessness decisions; often the dispute was essentially one of fact and primary judgment (was the person intentionally homeless? was the accommodation offered suitable?) rather than of law. … In Access to Justice, Lord Woolf recommended that the supervisory jurisdiction over the lawfulness of homelessness decision-making should be transferred to the county courts and this was swiftly implemented by Pt 7 of the Housing Act 1996. … The existence of a review procedure in the county courts has not taken away the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction to exercise its judicial review jurisdiction in the context of decisions relating to homelessness, but that jurisdiction will now be used only in exceptional circumstances.”

The issues

[29]The appeal gives rise to two main issues: i) Was Mr Young still owed the main housing duty by the time of the hearing before District Judge Daley? ii) Was Mr Young in any event precluded from raising the point in the possession proceedings rather than by way of review or appeal under the provisions of the 1996 Act?[30]I shall take these issues in turn. Was Mr Young still owed the main housing duty? Mr Young’s case

Was Mr Young still owed the main housing duty?

[31]Mr Justin Bates KC, who appeared for Mr Young with Mr Grütters, did not suggest that District Judge Daley’s finding that Mr Young had accepted the offer of accommodation at 25 Diprose Lodge is open to challenge. His argument (like that of Mr Grütters before Judge Saggerson) was rather that the main housing duty could not have come to an end without the Council having informed Mr Young both of that (with reasons) and of his right to request a review of such a decision. While the Council told Mr Young in its review decision that the main housing duty had been discharged, it did not inform him that he had the right to request a review. It follows, Mr Bates submitted, that the main housing duty was continuing when the matter was before the District Judge (and, in fact, has still not ceased).[32]As Mr Bates recognised, section 193(6)(c) of the 1996 Act states in unqualified terms that a local housing authority “shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant … accepts an offer of accommodation under Part VI”. He argued, however, that the combined effect of sections 184 and 202 is to require the applicant to be notified that the authority considers a condition specified in section 193(6) to have been satisfied (together with reasons for concluding that no duty is now owed) and that there is a right to request a review of such a decision.[33]Mr Bates stressed the central importance of section 202 of the 1996 Act in the statutory scheme. Section 202(3) stipulates that a request for review must be made “before the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the day on which [the applicant] is notified of the authority’s decision or such longer period as the authority may in writing allow”. The evident purpose, Mr Bates said, is to ensure that requests for reviews are made quickly and, since that depends on the applicant being “notified of the authority’s decision”, it must be incumbent on authorities to notify applicants of their decisions. Consistently with that, Mr Bates submitted, section 184 applies. That being so, as and when an authority decides that it no longer owes the main housing duty, it must “notify the applicant of their decision and … inform him of the reasons for their decision” (in compliance with section 184(3)) and “also inform the applicant of his right to request a review of the decision and of the time within which such a request must be made” (in compliance with section 184(5)).[34]In the present case, Mr Bates argued, there was incorporated in the letter containing the review decision a distinct decision that the main housing duty had been discharged. The letter thus needed to inform Mr Young both of his right to appeal to the County Court against the review decision (as it did) and of his right to request a review of the discharge of duty decision (which it did not). The main housing duty did not, therefore, end.

Authorities

[35]We were referred to three main authorities in this context: Warsame v Hounslow LBC [2000] 1 WLR 696 (“Warsame”), Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 755, [2011] PTSR 117 (“Ravichandran”) and R (Bano) v Waltham Forest LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 92, [2025] 1 WLR 2557 (“Bano”).[36]In Warsame, an attempt to appeal pursuant to section 204 of the 1996 Act was rejected in the County Court on the basis that section 202(1)(b) “had no application to a decision under section 193(7) whether accommodation offered under Part VI of the Act was suitable accommodation”: see 704. Allowing an appeal, Chadwick LJ, with whom Rattee J agreed, commented that the Circuit Judge’s approach “fails to give due weight to the width of section 202(1)(b)”: see 704. Chadwick LJ explained that the language of section 202(1)(b) was “apt … to apply to a decision that a duty, once owed, is owed no longer” and that “it was the intention of Parliament that decisions as to matters which, if they existed, would cause a duty to cease, are decisions which can be the subject of a request for review”: see 705-706.[37]Mr Bates focused on the following passage from Chadwick LJ’s judgment, at 704-705, in which I have added the emphasis:
“It is plain that section 202(1)(b) is directed, at least, to the question whether a duty arises. The phrase ‘any decision as to what duty (if any) is owed’ reflects the words in section 184(1)(b). That section requires the local authority to make enquiries to satisfy themselves ‘whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed’ under the provisions of the Act. But, although the paragraph plainly applies in that case, the language is apt, also, to apply to a decision that a duty, once owed, is owed no longer. A decision that a duty once owed is no longer owed is, to my mind, plainly a decision as to what duty, if any, is owed at the time when the decision is taken. I can see nothing in the language which restricts decisions within paragraph (b) to decisions whether a duty arises and excludes decisions whether a duty which has arisen has ceased.”
[38]Mr Bates argued that Chadwick LJ’s linking of section 202(1)(b) and section 184(1)(b) indicates that section 184 is applicable where section 202(1)(b) would be and, hence, that it is in point where a local housing authority decides that “a duty, once owed, is owed no longer”. However, Chadwick LJ drew the parallel with section 184(1)(b) when explaining that section 202(1)(b) applies to “the question whether a duty arises”, not as supporting his view that section 202(1)(b) extends to “decisions as to matters which, if they existed, would cause a duty to cease”. It is fair to say that, in the context of section 202(1)(b), Chadwick LJ considered that words reflective of those used in section 184(1)(b) extended to a “decision that a duty once owed is no longer owed”, but it need not follow that a similar conclusion is to be drawn in the context of section 184(1)(b): regard must be had to how section 184(1)(b) fits into section 184 and Part VII more generally.[39]In Ravichandran, applicants refused an offer of accommodation under Part VI of the 1996 Act, but, following a review, the local housing authority confirmed that it considered the property suitable. A few months later, the authority informed the applicants that it was “ending its duty to assist you with housing under section 193(7)”, adding that the applicants could request a review of the decision within 21 days. The applicants duly asked for such a review, but the authority’s position remained the same: it restated that it no longer owed a duty under section 193. The applicants appealed to the County Court without success, but the Court of Appeal decided in their favour, holding that the second review had been defective.[40]At the time (though not now), section 193(7F) provided:
“The local housing authority shall not— (a) make a final offer of accommodation under Part 6 for the purposes of subsection (7); (ab) approve a private accommodation offer; or (b) approve an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy for the purposes of subsection (7B), unless they are satisfied that the accommodation is suitable for the applicant and that it is reasonable for him to accept the offer.”
[41]Giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Stanley Burnton LJ explained in paragraph 35(5) that an applicant was “entitled to a review of the suitability requirement in section 193(7F) by virtue of section 202(1)(f) and of the reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F) by virtue of section 202(1)(b)”, observing that it was “both possible and desirable for both requirements to be reviewed at the same time”. Stanley Burnton LJ continued:
“(6) The applicant is also entitled to a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b). If the review takes place before refusal of the final offer of accommodation, it will strictly be a review of the intention that the offer will, on refusal, result in cessation of the authority’s duty. If the review takes place after the refusal of accommodation, it will be a review of the authority’s confirmation that its duty has ceased by virtue of satisfaction of the statutory preconditions for such cessation. The applicant should be informed of the right to such review. (7) It is desirable that such a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) takes place at the same time as the review of the suitability requirement and the reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F). If it is intended that it will take place at the same time, the applicant should be so informed.”
Earlier in the judgment, in paragraph 31, Stanley Burnton LJ had said:
“In the present case it is clear from the correspondence … that Lewisham came to a decision in January 2009 about whether or not its duty had ceased under section 193(7).

(b) ”

[42]Stanley Burnton LJ thus considered that decisions which are merely confirmatory can potentially be subject to review. It is also to be noted that he said that an applicant should be informed of the right to a review of “the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b)”.[43]In Bano, the applicant, Mrs Bano, had refused a “private rented sector offer”, but she maintained that the offer letter had been defective and so that she was still owed the main housing duty. She sought judicial review in respect of the local housing authority’s refusal to accept that the duty continued, but this Court dismissed the claim on the basis that she had had available to her, but had failed to invoke, the procedure (viz. review and appeal) which was meant to apply in relation to decisions as to whether a duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act was owed. In the Court’s view, Mrs Bano could have requested a review both in relation to the offer letter and in respect of the authority’s later conclusion that its duty to the applicant had ceased.[44]In the course of my judgment (with which Peter Jackson and Warby LJJ agreed), I expressed the view that refusal of a private rented sector offer of itself brings the main housing duty to an end. I said in paragraph 55:
“It is doubtless the case that, as Ms Davies [i.e. counsel for Mrs Bano] said, local housing authorities commonly tell applicants who have refused offers that they consider their duties to have come to an end. No doubt, authorities also sometimes (though I would guess less often) inform applicants who have accepted private rented sector offers that the authorities’ duties have ceased. However, the legislation does not specify that an applicant must be told that the authority’s duty has terminated, and I do not think that the decided cases establish that an authority is under an obligation to inform an applicant that it considers its duty to have ceased or even to make a decision to that effect. To the contrary, Ravichandran seems to me to lend support to the proposition that, as section 193(7) of the 1996 Act is now framed, there is ‘automatic discharge’ where an offer of accommodation under Part VI is refused and, if that is right, there must similarly be ‘automatic discharge’ under section 193 (7AA) where a private rented sector offer is refused or accepted provided that the applicant has been informed of the matters mentioned in section 193 (7AB).”
[45]Later in my judgment, when explaining why I considered that Mrs Bano had been entitled to request a review under section 202(1)(b) of the 1996 Act when she received the offer letter, I said this in paragraph 60:
“Ms Davies submitted that, while the offer letter of 11 June 2020 specifically informed Mrs Bano that she had a right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, it did not tell her that she could request a review on any other basis. However, (a) section 193(7AA) and (7AB)(b) of the 1996 Act impose a requirement to inform an applicant of the right to request a review of suitability but not on any other basis, (b) the offer letter included a reference to a right of review under section 202 which did not mention suitability … and (c) in any event, nothing in section 193, section 202 or elsewhere in the 1996 Act makes the right to request a review under section 202(1)(b) conditional on the applicant having been informed of the right.”
[46]I thus noted that “section 193(7AA) and (7AB)(b) of the 1996 Act impose a requirement to inform an applicant of the right to request a review of suitability but not on any other basis”. However, Mr Bates observed that(a) no one appears to have referred to section 184 in Bano,(b) Bano concerned the provisions relating to private rented sector offers, which, he said, constitute a self-contained scheme and(c) Bano is under appeal to the Supreme Court (although Mr Bates recognised that as matters stand this Court is bound by its decision in Bano).

Discussion

[47]It is crucial to Mr Young’s case that the Council was obliged to inform him that he had a right to request a review of the decision that the main housing duty had been discharged which, he says, was incorporated in the letter containing the review decision. It is not enough for Mr Young to show that the letter included a decision which was susceptible to a further review. For Mr Young to succeed, it must have been incumbent on the Council to tell him that he was entitled to request such a review.[48]As I have said, Mr Bates argued that such an obligation is to be derived from sections 184 and 202 of the 1996 Act. I have not, however, been persuaded.[49]Section 202(3) of the 1996 Act states that a request for review “must be made before the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the day on which [the applicant] is notified of the authority’s decision or such longer period as the authority may in writing allow”. This means that, once an applicant has been notified of a decision, he must request a review within 21 days unless the local housing authority agrees otherwise. Notification of a decision therefore plays an important role. Without it, the time limit for which section 202(3) provides will not apply. Section 202(3) does not, however, provide for an authority to be under an obligation to notify an applicant of a decision, let alone impose a requirement that an authority inform an applicant of a right to request a review. While section 202(3) refers to an applicant being “notified of the authority’s decision” (emphasis added), there is no reference to notification of a right to request a review.[50]Nor, in my view, does section 184 of the 1996 Act assist Mr Young. My reasons are as follows: i) Section 184 applies to the inquiries which a local housing authority is required to make by subsection (1) if it has “reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness”. It is significant that it is one of a pair of sections with the heading “Application for assistance in case of homelessness or threatened homelessness” and is itself headed “Inquiry into cases of homelessness or threatened homelessness”. The focus is on what must be done when a person first applies for accommodation or assistance, when the authority has “reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness” but has not already so concluded; ii) In contrast, as the heading to the group of which it is part indicates, section 193 is concerned with duties to persons “found to be homeless or threatened with homelessness” (emphasis added) and prescribes specific requirements in respect of the various ways in which the main housing duty can cease. By subsection (5), the applicant must have been “informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation” and notified by the authority that it regards itself as ceasing to be subject to the duty. Subsection (7) requires an applicant to have been “informed of the possible consequences of refusal or acceptance and of his right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation”. For subsection (7AA) to be applicable, the applicant must have been informed of “the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance of the offer” and “that the applicant has the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation”; iii) These requirements sit ill with those for which section 184 provides. For example, were Mr Bates’ submissions well-founded, an authority making an offer of accommodation under Part VI would presumably have to inform the person at the time not merely that he had a right to request a review of suitability (in accordance with section 193(7)) but that he could request a review of the authority’s decision to make the offer (to comply with section 184(5)). Further, if the offeree refused the offer, section 184 would oblige the authority to inform him both that it had decided that the main housing duty had come to an end (with reasons) and that he was entitled to request a review of that decision even though no suggestion of such requirements (even by cross-reference to section 184) is to be found in section 193. Again, it is hard to see why Parliament should have chosen to provide for an authority to “notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section” in section 193(5)(c) if it was anyway incumbent on it to notify the applicant of its decision (and with reasons) pursuant to section 184(3). The position would be all the odder when Parliament had elected to retain a notification requirement in section 193(5)(c) but not in relation to refusal of a Part VI offer, in respect of which section 193(7) formerly provided for notification that “the authority are satisfied that the accommodation was suitable for him and that it was reasonable for him to accept it”; iv) It is noteworthy, too, that the explanatory notes in respect of section 7(3) of the Homelessness Act 2002 spoke of the new section 193(7) for which it provided as “clarif[ying] the ending of the main homelessness duty where the applicant refuses an offer of suitable accommodation allocated under Part 6” while identifying an authority’s notification obligations by reference to the terms of section 193(7) without any reference to section 184; v) Although Stanley Burnton LJ said in Ravichandran, in paragraph 35(6),that an applicant should be informed of the right to a review of “the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b)”, I do not think he is to be understood as expressing the view that there was a legal obligation on an authority to do more than section 193 prescribed. In any event, the comment was obiter and Stanley Burnton LJ did not expand on it. In Bano, I rejected a complaint that the offer letter had not informed Mrs Bano that she could request a review on a basis other than suitability in part on the grounds that “section 193(7AA) and (7AB)(b) of the 1996 Act impose a requirement to inform an applicant of the right to request a review of suitability but not on any other basis” and “nothing in section 193, section 202 or elsewhere in the 1996 Act makes the right to request a review under section 202(1)(b) conditional on the applicant having been informed of the right”: see paragraph 60; vi) The upshot, I think, is that section 184 has no application in relation to cessation of the main housing duty. Parliament has laid down in section 193 the requirements which are to apply in such cases. Section 184 does not do so additionally.[51]I would add that if, contrary to my view, a local housing authority continued to owe the main housing duty where an applicant asked for review of suitability and the review officer(a) decided that the accommodation was suitable,(b) added that the main housing duty had ceased,(c) explained that there was a right of appeal but(d) did not refer to the possibility of any further review, that could give rise to considerable difficulty. I would guess that there have been many review decisions along these lines.[52]In short, it seems to me that, even supposing (which is far from clear) that the letter containing the review decision incorporated a distinct decision which was susceptible to a further review, the Council was not obliged to inform Mr Young that he was entitled to request such a review. That being so, the appeal must fail.

Was the point open to Mr Young in these proceedings?

[53]Supposing that I am wrong and that the Council had a duty to tell him that he was entitled to another review, was it open to him to rely on that as a defence before District Judge Daley?[54]It was common ground before us that there can be circumstances in which a “public law” defence can be advanced in possession proceedings. In this connection, we were referred to Wandsworth LBC v Winder (No. 1) [1985] AC 461, Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465, Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57, [2009] 1 AC 367 and Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. In the last of these cases, Lord Neuberger, giving the judgment of the Court, said in paragraph 81 that, “where a tenant contends that the decision of a local authority landlord to issue, or indeed to continue, possession proceedings can in some way be impugned, the tenant should be entitled to raise that contention in the possession proceedings themselves, even if they are in the county court”.[55]In the context, however, of Part VII of the 1996 Act, Parliament has established procedures for review and appeal. In general, accordingly, issues as to what duties are owed under Part VII are to be addressed through those procedures.[56]The cases to which we were taken in this connection included Tower Hamlets LBC v Rahanara Begum [2005] EWCA Civ 116, [2006] HLR 9 (“Rahanara Begum”), Godson v Enfield LBC [2019] EWCA Civ 486, [2020] HLR 1 (“Godson”) and Bano.[57]In Rahanara Begum, the defendant resisted possession proceedings on the ground that the claimant owed her the main housing duty. She won in the County Court, but the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the claimant. The Court considered that it had been open to the defendant to request a review under section 202 of the 1996 Act or to appeal under section 204, that the District Judge ought to have concluded that it was now too late for her to do so and that, as a result, he should have dealt with the claim on the basis that the claimant’s decision that it owed no further duty to house the defendant was correct.[58]Neuberger LJ, with whom Ward and Tuckey LJJ agreed, said this in paragraphs 32-33 of his judgment:
“32. Part 7 of the 1996 Act requires a housing authority to be the initial decision-maker on questions concerning a person’s homeless status and housing rights, and it includes a tolerably clear appeals procedure, with relatively short and fairly strict time limits, for the benefit of a person dissatisfied with any decision of the authority. Where, as here, possession proceedings are brought by the authority, and the defence involves impugning a decision of the authority under Pt 7 of the 1996 Act, which could have been, but was not, appealed, and the time for appeal has long since expired, it appears to me to be wrong in principle that the court hearing the possession action should be able freely to reconsider, and if necessary to reverse, the authority’s decision with regard to its duty. 33. Where a statute provides that the entitlement to a right is to be determined by a particular entity, and further provides for a specific appeals procedure, including time limits, in relation to any such determination, I consider that it would be wrong in principle, at least in the absence of exceptional circumstances, to permit the determination to be challenged by a different procedure much later. To hold otherwise would effectively enable a person such as the respondent to have the benefit of the statutory provisions, in this case s.193, without taking the concomitant burden, namely the procedure and time limits in ss.202–204.”
[59]In Godson, Lewison LJ (with whom I agreed) quoted paragraphs 32-33 of Neuberger LJ’s judgment in Rahanara Begum and said in paragraph 24 that they were “plainly right”. That being so, it was not open to the appellant to dispute a conclusion reached in a review decision which he had not appealed.[60]In Bano, I referred in paragraphs 32-35 of my judgment to the principle that judicial review should be refused where an alternative remedy exists. In paragraph 70, I said:
“In my view, it is not appropriate to allow Mrs Bano to claim judicial review. I do not think that there are ‘pressing’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances which would warrant permitting Mrs Bano to pursue her claim for judicial review notwithstanding the fact that she had available to her, but failed to invoke, the procedure (viz review and appeal) which was meant to apply in relation to decisions as to whether a duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act was owed. In Nipa Begum [2000] 1 WLR 306, Auld LJ said that, ‘save in the most exceptional circumstances, the residual jurisdiction of the High Court should not be regarded as a backstop for the appellate jurisdiction of the county court under section 204 where the applicant for housing assistance has failed to appeal a review decision within the 21 days’ time limit’. I do not consider such exceptional circumstances to exist in the present case ….”
[61]There may, of course, be circumstances in which it is appropriate for a District Judge hearing a possession claim to have regard to the possibility of a local housing authority’s decision being wrong. If, for example, there were a pending appeal against such a decision, or the defendant had avowed an intention to appeal and was in time to do so, the District Judge could be expected to adjourn. That is by no means, however, to say that a District Judge should decide an issue in respect of which the review and appeal procedures are or were available. To the contrary, where the defendant was informed of an authority’s decision and failed to request a review of it, or failed to appeal a review decision of which he had been notified, it would (as Neuberger LJ said in Rahanara Begum) be “wrong in principle, at least in the absence of exceptional circumstances, to permit the determination to be challenged by a different procedure much later”.[62]In the present case, Mr Young was told by the Council in the letter of 20 July 2020 containing the review decision that the main housing duty had been discharged. The letter of 12 November 2020 enclosing the notice to quit also referred to Mr Young’s temporary accommodation coming to an end as a result of his signing the tenancy agreement for 25 Diprose Lodge.[63]In the context of the issue I am now addressing, it is to be assumed that, contrary to the conclusions I have reached earlier in this judgment, the Council ought to have informed Mr Young that he had a right to request a review of its conclusion that the main housing duty had ceased. Mr Bates argued that the Council’s failure so to inform him means that there were “exceptional circumstances” making it appropriate to allow him to dispute the point in the present proceedings.[64]I do not agree. There is no suggestion that Mr Young was not made aware of the Council’s understanding that the main housing duty had come to an end. Section 202(3) required him to request any review of such a decision within 21 days of notification unless the Council allowed a longer period, but he neither requested a review within 21 days nor has ever asked the Council to agree to an extension of time. As Mr Bates stressed, Mr Young was not told of any right to review at the time, but the Council did not issue its claim until more than five months after it had served the notice to quit and, by the date the matter came before District Judge Daley, more than three years had elapsed since Mr Young had been told of the review decision. Even taking account of the fact that Mr Young was not alerted to the possibility of a review by the Council, he had had ample opportunity to request one and the circumstances were not such as could, exceptionally, make it permissible for him to pursue any challenge to the Council’s view in the possession proceedings rather than via the review and appeal procedures for which Parliament has provided.

The “so what?” point

[65]It follows from my conclusions earlier in this judgment that, in my view, this appeal should be dismissed. I am anyway doubtful as to whether acceptance of Mr Young’s case would have been likely to assist him. If, as was argued on his behalf, it was incumbent on the Council to notify him that he had a right to a further review and he could raise its failure to do so in the present proceedings, he could presumably ask for such a review now. If, however, he in fact accepted the Council’s offer of accommodation at 25 Diprose Lodge, as District Judge Daley found, the conclusion would once again be that the Council has ceased to owe him the main housing duty and that he had no right to continue to occupy 15 Ganley Court.

Conclusion

[66]I would dismiss the appeal.

Postscript

[67]District Judge Daley referred in his judgment to Mr Young’s good fortune in obtaining the assistance of Mr Flack. I would echo that, but add that he has also been fortunate in having the able representation of Mr Bates and Mr Grütters.[68]I agree.[69]I also agree.

Cited in 1 later judgment