“It is averred that the breaches of duty set out above constituted an unlawful return of capital to shareholders at a time when [JVB5] had no distributable reserves and was accordingly ultra vires and incapable of ratification by Mr Burton.”
“Paragraph 10 is denied. There was no unlawful return of capital to its shareholders.”
“Both experts relied (unsurprisingly) on comparables. In broad terms, however, I have to say that I found the comparables used by Mr Alford to be more on point and I preferred his methodology and approach generally.”
“As a matter of general principle, the submissions of leading counsel for JVB5 are of course correct. In general terms, he is right to say that it is JVB5 who is the claimant and it is therefore only the duties owed to JVB5 and any breach of the same that should concern me without regard to who in fact owns the underlying shares in JVB5. Having said that, for the reasons set out below, it seems to me that in order to properly consider the question of breach, I do need to consider the question of the beneficial ownership of not only the shareholding in JVB5 but also the beneficial ownership from time to time in the Croydon Properties themselves.”
“This being the case, I accept the submission of counsel for Mr Burton that the Duomatic principle would be of application. If I am wrong in my primary finding that Mr V Sharma was at all material times the ultimate beneficial owner of the Croydon Properties themselves, it would follow that as from July 2012 the beneficial ownership in the Croydon Properties was held by JVB5 (as well as the legal title). If this were to be the case, I would accept JVB5’s submission that by simply transferring the Croydon Properties to JVB7 on terms which meant that it did not benefit from the expected gain, Mr Burton would have acted in breach of his various duties to JVB5 3. Importantly, however, in so acting it is clear that Mr Burton was acting on the instructions of Mr V Sharma for whom, as I have found, Mr Burton held the shareholding in JVB5. In short, therefore, the very acts of which JVB5 complain were expressly authorised and carried out at the direction of its sole beneficial shareholder, Mr V Sharma. In such circumstances, so it seems to me, Mr Burton would have a complete defence to any breach of duty to JVB5 which he would otherwise be deemed to have committed.”
“For the avoidance of doubt, I find the only breaches for which, in this scenario, Mr Burton would be liable are those relating to the transfer of the Croydon Properties from JVB5 to JVB7 without proper consideration. I do not find that Mr Burton would also be liable in respect of an unlawful return of capital in relation to which the Duomatic principle would not apply.”
“The purpose of the transfer of the Croydon Properties from JVB5 to JVB7 was simply to manufacture a transaction with an artificially inflated price which would enable monies to be (fraudulently) raised.”
“The TR1 was not in fact intended to effect or record a transfer of property in return for the payment of a sum of money; there was no intention that the beneficial interest in the Croydon Properties should pass (at all times the beneficial interest remained with Mr V Sharma and only the legal title changed); and there was certainly no intention that money should change hands. The TR1 was nothing more than an instrument of fraud.”
“In my view the judge was not entitled to find for the claimant on the basis of the third man theory. It is fundamental to our adversarial system of justice that the parties should clearly identify the issues that arise in the litigation, so that each has the opportunity of responding to the points made by the other. The function of the judge is to adjudicate on those issues alone. The parties may have their own reasons for limiting the issues or presenting them in a certain way. The judge can invite, and even encourage, the parties to recast or modify the issues. But if they refuse to do so, the judge must respect that decision. One consequence of this may be that the judge is compelled to reject a claim on the basis on which it is advanced, although he or she is of the opinion that it would have succeeded if it had been advanced on a different basis. Such an outcome may be unattractive, but any other approach leads to uncertainty and potentially real unfairness.”
“Where it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be.”
“…in some cases doubts have been expressed as to whether the principle applies where it is the beneficial owners, rather than the registered shareholders who consent… But the correct view is that, at least as here where the ultimate beneficial owner, and not the registered shareholder is taking all the decisions in the relevant transactions, the Duomatic principle applies as regards the consent of (and authority given by) the ultimate beneficial owner.”
“A limited company not in liquidation cannot lawfully return capital to its shareholders except by way of a reduction of capital approved by the court. Profits may be distributed to shareholders (normally by way of dividend) but only out of distributable profits computed in accordance with the complicated provisions of theCompanies Act 2006 (replacing similar provisions in theCompanies Act 1985 ). Whether a transaction amounts to an unlawful distribution of capital is not simply a matter of form. As Hoffmann J said in Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd[1989] BCLC 626 , 631: “Whether or not the transaction is a distribution to shareholders does not depend exclusively on what the parties choose to call it. The court looks at the substance rather than the outward appearance.”
“A company can only lawfully deal with its assets in furtherance of its objects. The corporators may take assets out of the company by way of dividend, or, with the leave of the court, by way of reduction of capital, or in a winding up. They may, of course, acquire them for full consideration. They cannot take assets out of the company by way of voluntary distribution, however described, and, if they attempt to do so, the distribution is ultra vires the company.” ” “A company can only lawfully deal with its assets in furtherance of its objects. The corporators may take assets out of the company by way of dividend, or, with the leave of the court, by way of reduction of capital, or in a winding up. They may, of course, acquire them for full consideration. They cannot take assets out of the company by way of voluntary distribution, however described, and, if they attempt to do so, the distribution is ultra vires the company.” ”
“That principle [ie the Duomatic principle] accepts that all shareholders may formally or informally assent to or approve an arrangement or a transaction so that it is binding on the company. But that principle as Mr Oliver pointed out only applies to acts or transactions which are intra vires the company… Thus … if a director of a company 100% owned by himself decided simply to take the assets of the company for himself, he would not be able to rely on the Duomatic principle, because such conduct could not be considered a bona fide distribution of profits and would be a reduction of capital and ultra vires the company without the sanction from the court.”
“If the conclusion is that it was a genuine arm’s length transaction then it will stand, even if it may, with hindsight, appear to have been a bad bargain. If it was an improper attempt to extract value by the pretence of an arm’s length sale, it will be held unlawful. But either conclusion will depend on a realistic assessment of all the relevant facts, not simply a retrospective valuation exercise in isolation from all other inquiries.”
“If I am wrong in my primary finding that Mr V Sharma was at all material times the ultimate beneficial owner of the Croydon Properties themselves, it would follow that as from July 2012 the beneficial ownership in the Croydon Properties was held by JVB5 (as well as the legal title). If this were to be the case, I would accept JVB5’s submission that by simply transferring the Croydon Properties to JVB7 on terms which meant that it did not benefit from the expected gain, Mr Burton would have acted in breach of his various duties to JVB5.”
“This was a sale at the true value of the Croydon Properties, and while no new valuation was obtained at the time as it was so soon after the purchase that there was no reason to believe that the prices had varied by any significant degree.”
“I do not find that Mr Burton would also be liable in respect of an unlawful return of capital in relation to which the Duomatic principle would not apply.”