“133. In my judgment all this set the context for a sudden loss of control resulting in an injury to A inflicted or caused by an anxious, stressed mother. Alternatively, and there is some evidence for this from M herself in her police interview and in the children’s reported conversations in the car [that] she left A unattended and was downstairs at the time.”
“Consequently, I am unable to reach a clear finding as to what caused the right-hand fracture and it remains unexplained.”
“132. In my judgment all this set the context for a sudden loss of control resulting in an injury to A inflicted or caused by an anxious, stressed mother, such as an intemperate throw or a drop rather than a cruelly inflicted injury. Alternatively, and there is some evidence for this from M herself in her police interview and in the children’s reported conversation in the car, [that] she left A unattended and was downstairs at the time.” (My emphasis added) [that] she left A unattended and was downstairs at the time.”
“1. In Paragraph 137 of the judgment I summarised the findings I made by reference to the LA threshold document fully set out at paragraph 6A of the judgment. This includes finding vi, namely ‘The injuries are inflicted injuries. The injuries were caused by the mother, LH’. This finding applies to the right sided skull fracture. As is made clear in paragraph 137, by reference to paragraph 136, I made only a limited finding in respect of the left-sided fracture. 2. M’s case, as put to me in evidence, was that the right sided skull fracture had occurred whilst she was present in the bedroom and when A had fallen as described in Paragraphs 109-113 and 117. She denied to me in evidence that it had occurred when she was downstairs. She did not suggest anyone else had caused the injury. 3. On reflection, it might have been better to say ‘In fact’ then ‘Whatever happened’ at the beginning of Paragraph 134 when I referred to the mother’s lack of credibility as I had considered the ‘alternative scenario’ i.e. an accident unwitnessed by the mother but rejected that as an explanation for the injury for the reasons set out in Paragraph 134. When I said in Paragraph 134 that I was satisfied that M’s behaviour was not consistent with a simple accident or negligence and that what had happened was not ‘a minor accident’, I was referring to the possibility that the child had fallen off the bed whilst unattended i.e. in an event not witnessed by the mother. If that was the case, there is no reason why she would not have told me that or why she would not have immediately sought medical attention when she first saw a swelling to her 15 week old baby’s head. Bearing in mind how quickly M had previously sought medical attention for her children when they had sustained an accidental injury and she having failed to seek prompt medical attention, I concluded that what had happened was not a simple accident and that the M herself had been dishonest, knew what had happened and that it was her fault. 4. Having accepted the opinions of the medical experts I was driven, by the totality of the evidence presented, to conclude that the right-sided head injury had been inflicted by the mother. 5. Therefore, to clarify, Paragraph 133 must be read in the context of the whole judgment and, in particular, with paragraphs 135 onwards.”
“25. Accordingly, we recommend the following course. If an application for permission to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons is made to the trial Judge, the Judge should consider whether his judgment is defective for lack of reasons, adjourning for that purpose should he find this necessary. If he concludes that it is, he should set out to remedy the defect by the provision of additional reasons refusing permission to appeal on the basis that he has adopted that course. If he concludes that he has given adequate reasons, he will no doubt refuse permission to appeal. If an application for permission to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons is made to the appellate court and it appears to the appellate court that the application is well founded, it should consider adjourning the application and remitting the case to the trial Judge with an invitation to provide additional reasons for his decision or, where appropriate, his reasons for a specific finding or findings.”
“50. The purpose of the judge providing a draft of the judgment before hand down is to enable the parties to spot typographical, spelling and minor factual errors which have escaped the judge's eye…Circulation of the draft is not intended to provide counsel with an opportunity to re-argue the issues in the case. 51. Only in the most exceptional circumstances is it appropriate to ask the judge to reconsider a point of substance… Letters such as the one sent in this case, which sought to reopen the argument on a wide variety of points, should not be sent.”
“16. First, it is the responsibility of the advocate, whether or not invited to do so by the judge, to raise with the judge and draw to his attention any material omission in the judgment, any genuine query or ambiguity which arises on the judgment, and any perceived lack of reasons or other perceived deficiency in the judge's reasoning process. 17. Second, and whether or not the advocates have raised the point with the judge, where permission is sought from the trial judge to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons, the judge should consider whether his judgment is defective for lack of reasons and, if he concludes that it is, he should set out to remedy the defect by the provision of additional reasons.”
“5. The primary purpose of this practice is to enable any typographical or similar errors in the judgments to be notified to the court. The circulation of the draft judgment in this way is not intended to provide an opportunity to any party (and in particular the unsuccessful party) to reopen or reargue the case, or to repeat submissions made at the hearing, or to deploy fresh ones. However on rare occasions, and in exceptional circumstances, the court may properly be invited to reconsider part of the terms of its draft… As we emphasise, an invitation to go beyond the correction of typographical errors and the like, is always exceptional, and when such a course is proposed it is a fundamental requirement that the other party or parties should immediately be informed, so as to enable them to make objections to the proposal if there are any.”
“4.6 Where a party’s advocate considers that there is a material omission from a judgment of the lower court or, where the decision is made by a lay justice or justices, the written reasons for the decision of the lower court (including inadequate reasoning for the lower court’s decision), the advocate should before the drawing of the order give the lower court which made the decision the opportunity of considering whether there is an omission and should not immediately use the omissions as grounds for an application to appeal.”
“39. Finally, I would observe that the demands by [Counsel] for correction and amplification of the draft judgment went far beyond what is permissible, and amounted to blatant attempts to reargue points which I had already rejected. This practice is becoming commonplace and should be stopped in its tracks in the interests of efficiency and the conservation of the resources of the court. Suggested corrections should be confined to typographical or plain numerical errors, or to obvious mistakes of fact. Requests for amplification should be strictly confined to claimed "material omissions" within the terms ofFPR PD 30A para 4.6.”
“to raise with the judge and draw to his attention any material omission in the judgment, any genuine query or ambiguity which arises on the judgment, and any perceived lack of reasons or other perceived deficiency in the judge's reasoning process.”