“8.2 Operating Committee Meetings and Data Beginning five (5) Business Days from the date of the Default Notice, and thereafter while the Defaulting Party remains in default, the Defaulting Party shall not be entitled to attend Operating Committee or subcommittee meetings or to vote on any matter coming before the Operating Committee or any sub-committee until all of its defaults have been remedied (including payment of accrued interest). Unless agreed otherwise by the non-defaulting Parties, the Voting Interest of each non-defaulting Party during this period shall be its proportionate share, expressed as a percentage, of the total applicable Cost Bearing Participations of the non-defaulting Parties. Any matters requiring a unanimous vote of the Parties shall not require the vote of the Defaulting Party. …”
“Remedies 8.4.1 During the continuance of a default, the Defaulting Party shall not have a right to its Entitlement [defined as "that quantity of Hydrocarbons which a Party has the right and obligation to take delivery pursuant to the Lease, Article 9 of this Agreement, and any applicable offtake agreement"] which shall vest in and be the property of the non-defaulting Parties. The Technical Adviser (or the notifying Party if the Technical Adviser is a Defaulting Party) shall be authorized to sell such Entitlement in an arm's-length sale on terms that are commercially reasonable under the circumstances and, after deducting all costs, charges and expenses incurred in connection with such sale, pay the net proceeds to the non-defaulting Parties in proportion to the amounts they are owed by the Defaulting Party hereunder (and apply such net proceeds toward the establishment of the fund under Article 8.4.3, if applicable) until all such amounts are recovered and the fund is established. Any surplus remaining shall be paid to the Defaulting Party, and any deficiency shall remain a debt due from the Defaulting Party to the non-defaulting Parties. When making sales under this Article 8.4.1, the non-defaulting Parties shall have no obligation to share any existing market or obtain a price equal to the price at which their own production is sold. … 8.4.4 Notwithstanding that the amount of the default has been satisfied pursuant to Article 8.4.1, if the Defaulting Party fails to pay when due its applicable Cost Bearing Participation share of Joint Account expenses, including cash advances and interest by the forty-fifth (45th) Day following the date of the Default Notice, then, without prejudice to any other rights available to the non-defaulting Parties to recover amounts owing to them under this Agreement, two or more of the non-defaulting Parties having a majority of the interests of the non-defaulting Parties (after excluding Affiliates of the Defaulting Party) shall have the option, exercisable at anytime thereafter until the Defaulting Party has completely cured its default, to require that the Defaulting Party completely withdraws from this Agreement and the Lease. Such option shall be exercised by notice to the Defaulting Party and each non-defaulting Party. If such option is exercised, the Defaulting Party shall be deemed to have transferred, pursuant to Article 13, effective on the date of the non-defaulting Party's notice, all of its rights, obligation, title and beneficial interest in and under this Agreement, the Lease, and the Technical Assistance Agreement to the non-defaulting Parties. …”
“It is therefore imperative that Pan Petroleumremains involved in all Operating Committee decisions and technical decisions made by the joint venture partners.”
“C could never by an award of damages be put in the same position it would have enjoyed if an injunction had been granted. In particular C will lose its ability to attend, discuss, influence decision-making, be properly informed, object to further decisions that require unanimity, and protect its substantial investments in the project to date…What is more, by excluding C from these decision-making processes, D are likely to impose increased operational, financial and environmental risks on C towards third parties (or its interest in the JOA) that C is not aware of and has no opportunity to mitigate and all which will be very hard if not impossible to assess in terms of damages.”
“…the cash calls 30 and 31 do not relate to Aje-6 and 7. Hence the change of the wording we are proposing; in other words, the wording narrowing it down to Aje-6 and 7. So, the injunction, as we are seeking today, would not affect the defendants’ rights in relation to cash calls 30 and 31. Under the default notices, which have been issued on those cash calls, the parties have got until 23 February to pay before any question arises under 8.4.4 in relation to those cash calls.”
“Pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”) And upon Folawiyo Aje Services Limited (“FASL”), duly giving notice to all parties (including those in default) of a meeting to be held in London pursuant to Article 5.5.1, And upon Pan Petroleum Aje Limited (“PPA”) being in default of Cash Calls 30 and 31, and upon EER (Colobus) Limited (“EER”) and PR Oil and Gas Nigeria Limited (“PROG”) also being in default, And upon all relevant parties agreeing pursuant to Article 5.5.3 to waive the notice period and hold the meeting on23 January 2017 , And upon the parties attending the meeting noting that there had arisen a challenge to the validity of resolutions previously passed and to the validity of certain Cash Calls, and noting that, without making any admission or comment relating to the challenges raised or in relation to any other grounds for alleging invalidity, the passing of further resolutions would be useful in clarifying the situation., And upon the following Resolutions were put before the Operating Committee at the meeting, IT WAS RESOLVED with the unanimous consent of all parties entitled to attend the Operating Committee and to vote, and not being excluded from attending or voting pursuant to Article 8.2; 1. That the notice period for holding this meeting be waived; 2. That the meeting could consider and vote upon all the matters noted below which were not included in the agenda for the meeting. 3. That the approval of the Operating Committee be given to Cash Call immediately for$2.8 mm for long lead items for D&C of Aje 6 and$1.65 mm for Aje 5 intervention; 4. That the approval of the Operating Committee be given to Cash Call immediately for£1.6 mm for long lead items for hook up of Aje 6; 5. That in respect of the Cash Call to be issued subsequent to this resolution relating to the items outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and to the extent that sums have already been paid in respect of Cash Call 29 or the purported Cash Call 29, relating to those items, then those sums be applied in connection with the further Cash Call and further sums requested from each party in further Cash Call be adjusted accordingly. … 11. That the approval of the Operating Committee be given to establish a Development Budget for 2016 and 2017, to include$40.4 MM and D&C of Aje 6: 12. That the approval of the Operating Committee be given to establish a Development Budget for 2016 and 2017, to include$14.2 MM for hookup of Aje6; … 14. That the approval of the Operating Committee be given, to Cash Call immediately$13.1 MM for long lead items for D&C of Aje-7; 15. That the approval of the Operating Committee be given, to Cash Call immediately$2.0 MM for long lead items for hook up of Aje-7; 16. That the approval of the Operating Committee be given to establish a Development Budget for 2017, in the amount of$47.5 MM for D&C of AJE 7; 17. That the approval of the Operating Committee be given to establish a Development Budget for 2017, to include$16.5 MM for hookup of Aje7; 18. That Cash Call 28 be retrospectively approved, and/or that the sums claimed n Cash Call 28 be approved, and/or that FASL be duly authorised to issue a further Cash Call in respect of the sums claimed in Cash Call 28, and to apply the sums received in payment of Cash Call 28 against the sums requested in further Cash Call.”
“Up to and including the date specified in paragraph 1 above, the Defendants must not exercise or purport to exercise (by written notice or otherwise) in respect of any non-payment by the Claimant of cash calls relating to Aje-6 or Aje-7 development wells: … 2.2. any of the rights and/or remedies in Article 8.2 of the Joint Operating Agreement to exclude the Claimant from participating in, or voting at, meetings of the Operating Committee.”
“On the question of the terms of the order that I made on the 20 January with the benefit of the claimant’s wording in front of me, my conclusion is that the terms are to be in that form. I gave an opportunity for dialogue between the parties to see whether the terms could be better expressed but am of the view that the terms are best expressed as per the claimant’s draft. So, that is to confirm the position at 20 January and the form in which the sealed order will be made.”
“11. It is in my view plain beyond argument that what I have just described amounted to the exercise or purported exercise of "rights and/or remedies in Article 8.2 of the Joint Operating Agreement to exclude the Claimant from participating in, or voting at, meetings of the Operating Committee". 12. Was that exercise or purported exercise "in respect of the Aje-6 or Aje-7 development wells"? The resolutions concern approval of financial calls and budgets for work on or with those wells, rather than approval of the work itself. But on the plain and natural meaning of the words "in respect of", excluding the Claimant from participating in a meeting approving a financial call or a budget for work on or with a well is exercising or purporting to exercise that right "in respect of the" well. The words "in respect of" are wide words, as Mr David Joseph QC (appearing for the Claimant) submits. 13. Mr Rhodri Davies QC (appearing for the Defendants) argues that, when used in connection with Article 8.4 (and specifically Article 8.4.4) in paragraph 2.1 of the injunction, the words "in respect of the Aje-6 or Aje-7 development wells" must refer to failure to pay in respect of those wells (rather than other wells). They should mean the same, the argument continues, when applied in connection with Article 8.2 in paragraph 2.2 of the injunction. This is material because in exercising Article 8.2 rights the Relevant Defendants were relying on a failure to pay in respects other than in respect of those wells. 14. As to this argument, I do not consider that it follows, either necessarily or otherwise as a matter of interpretation, from the fact that the words "in respect of the Aje-6 or Aje-7 development wells" may have narrower application in the context of Article 8.4 that they have a narrower application in the context of Article 8.2. The Article in question will inform their meaning, and breadth of application, when used in relation to that Article. 15. Mr Davies QC argues that the injunction does not say that the Defendants were restrained from acting "even if the Claimant was in default in respect of undisputed cash calls which did not concern the Aje-6 or Aje-7 wells". He is, with respect, correct only in the technical or narrow sense that those are not the words that are used. The words that are used ("in respect of the Aje-6 or Aje-7 development wells") are wide enough to restrain acting that was in respect of the Aje-6 or Aje-7 development wells even though that acting was undertaken in reliance on undisputed cash calls which did not concern the Aje-6 or Aje-7 wells. 16. Mr Davies QC argues that it is material to the interpretation of the injunction that the Claimant had not and could not put forward a case for protection from the consequences under Article 8.2 where its default was in respect of undisputed cash calls which did not concern the Aje-6 or Aje-7 wells. It is, rightly, acknowledged in this argument that it is the terms of the injunction that matter. If it is wider than the Claimant is entitled to then that would be for an application to vary or discharge the injunction, or for an appeal against its grant or against a refusal to vary or discharge. 17. But in any event Mr Davies QC's argument meets the obstacle that the parties were in dispute in relation to the Aje-6 well and that dispute might cause the transaction (unless restrained) of different business by the Operating Committee concerning the Aje-6 well than would be the case if the Claimant was right in that dispute. 18. Mr Davies QC is correct in saying that the dominant concern in ordering the injunction was to prevent the use of Article 8.4 of the Joint Operating Agreement to cause irreversible loss to the Claimant of its entire commercial interest. However Article 8.2 had its place in the injunction too. 19. Mr Davies QC argues that the standard of certainty required before reaching a conclusion on meaning is very high in the context of contempt proceedings. Thus, he argues, if there is a reasonable argument for a construction that would not put the Relevant Defendants in breach of the injunction, then the application should fail. I do not disagree but the present case is plain.”
“…the construction of a judicial order, like that of any other legal instrument, is a single coherent process. It depends on what the language of the order would convey, in the circumstances in which the Court made it, so far as these circumstances were before the Court and patent to the parties. The reasons for making the order which are given by the Court in its judgment are an overt and authoritative statement of the circumstances which it regarded as relevant. They are therefore always admissible to construe the order. In particular, the interpretation of an order may be critically affected by knowing what the Court considered to be the issue which its order was supposed to resolve.”
“In my judgment the power of the court to ensure obedience to its orders for the benefit of those in whose favour they are made would be inappropriately curtailed if, in addition to having to show that a defendant had breached the order, it was also necessary to establish, and to the criminal standard, that he had done so in the belief that what he did was a breach of the order – particularly when a belief that it was not a breach may have rested on the slenderest of foundations or on convenient advice which was plainly wrong.”
“... the Defendants must not exercise ... 2.2 any of the rights and/or remedies in Article 8.2 of the Joint Operating Agreement to exclude the Claimant from participating in, or voting at, meetings of the Operating Committee in respect of the Aje-6 or Aje-7 development wells ...”
“restrains the Defendants from exercising rights against the Claimant in respect of any default by the Claimant, whether or not this has anything to do with Aje-6.” In order to address this objection, Pan Petroleum circulated a revised draft Order on19 January 2017 , the day before the hearing, the relevant paragraph of which provided: “2. Up to and including the date specified in paragraph 1 above, the Defendants must not exercise or purport to exercise (by written notice or otherwise) in respect of the Aje-6 or Aje-7 development wells: 2.1 any of the rights and/or remedies in Article 8.4 of the Joint Operating Agreement to vest, deem to vest, transfer, or deem to transfer for its own benefit or otherwise the Claimant’s Entitlement and/or Participating Interest in the Joint Operating Agreement or Oil Mining Lease 113; 2.2 any of the rights and/or remedies in Article 8.2 of the Joint Operating Agreement to exclude the Claimant from participating in, or voting at, meetings of the Operating Committee; 2.3 any right of termination at law or other remedy which would deprive the Claimant of its Entitlement and/or Participating Interests in the Joint Operating Agreement or Oil Mining Lease 113.” The underlined words were added by Pan Petroleum to address the defendants’ concern about the width of the injunction. 2.1 any of the rights and/or remedies in Article 8.4 of the Joint Operating Agreement to vest, deem to vest, transfer, or deem to transfer for its own benefit or otherwise the Claimant’s Entitlement and/or Participating Interest in the Joint Operating Agreement or Oil Mining Lease 113; 2.2 any of the rights and/or remedies in Article 8.2 of the Joint Operating Agreement to exclude the Claimant from participating in, or voting at, meetings of the Operating Committee; 2.3 any right of termination at law or other remedy which would deprive the Claimant of its Entitlement and/or Participating Interests in the Joint Operating Agreement or Oil Mining Lease 113.”