“4. The Respondent must: (1) forthwith deliver to the Applicant’s solicitor each and every electronic device in his ownership possession or control containing or capable of containing digital vehicle engine tuning files including but not limited to computer(s), laptops, tablets, external discs or hard drives, handhelds, phones, memory cards, (individually and collectively “the Devices”);”
“… contemptuous breach of the Order backed by a Penal Notice for delivery up of his computer and electronic storage media made on17th May 2018 and thereby intentionally interfered with the administration of justice.” 17.It is alleged that: “The Defendant’s breach of the Order of17th May 2018 is constituted by: (i) His failure to deliver up the computer and electronic storage equipment he was required to deliver up under that order; (ii) His concealment and/or destruction of the computers and electronic storage media which he has failed to deliver up as required by the Order; and (iii) His attempt to mislead the Claimant and the court in relation both to his failure to deliver up and his concealment of computers and electronic storage media that were covered by the Order.”
“Where an application is made to commit a defendant for contempt of court, it is obviously important that great care is taken by the applicant to ensure that all of the procedural requirements in this Section of Pt 81 are met.”
“While the procedural requirements in relation to applications to commit and committal orders are there to be obeyed and to protect the contemnor, if there is non-compliance with the requirements which does not prejudice the contemnor, to set aside the order purely on the grounds of technicality is contrary to the interests of justice. As long as the order made by the judge was a valid order, the approach of this court will be to uphold the order in the absence of any prejudice or injustice to the contemnor as a consequence of doing so.”
“In all cases the Convention rights of those involved should particularly be borne in mind. It should be noted that the standard of proof, having regard to the possibility that a person may be sent to prison, is that the allegation be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” (3) For the purposes of an application to commit for contempt, any Order requiring a party to do or abstain from doing an act should be strictly construed, and any doubt as to its construction resolved in favour of the respondent. A respondent should not be found in contempt of an order which fails to make clear what it is that he or she must or must not do. This, again, is a long-established principle but illustrated (for instance) by Pan Petroleum AJE Ltd v Yinka Folawiyo Petroleum Co Ltd[2017] EWCA Civ 1525 [41-42]. (4) Where, as here, the applicant’s factual case is a circumstantial one depending upon inference, the Court should not make a finding of contempt if there is at least one realistic inference consistent with innocence. In this context Mr Carpenter-Leitch has referred me to JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (above) [8] and JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko[2013] EWCA Civ 829 [40]. Mr Ramsden has referred to the wellknown passage in the judgment of Christopher Clarke J in Masri at [146]. I regard all those cases as helpful. But neither party has dissented from the way that I put the matter in Liverpool Victoria Insurance v Yavuz[2017] EWHC 3088 (QB) [20]: “… I should apply the established approach of the criminal law. I should decide which of the strands of evidence relied on I accept as reliable, and which if any I do not. I must then decide what conclusions I can fairly and reasonably draw from any strands of evidence I do accept. I should not engage in any guesswork or speculation. The ultimate question is whether I have been made sure of the defendant’s guilt. To reach that point I must be persuaded that, on the view of the evidence that I take, I can reject all realistic possibilities consistent with innocence, and infer guilt: see, for instance, R v G & F[2012] EWCA Crim 1756 [2013] Crim LR 678 [36]-[37].”