“7. The Buyers will obtain planning permission for a single new dwelling on the property and thereafter market the property for sale. In the event that the new property is sold for a sum in excess of£1m , the Buyers will pay to the Sellers 50% of the amount in excess of£1m for which the property is sold subject only to the deduction therefrom of one half of the legal and estate agency fees incurred in connection with such sale. 8. In the event that the Buyers wish to retain the new property, the parties hereto shall appoint an independent valuer…to value the property and if such valuation is in excess of£1m the Buyers shall pay to the Sellers 50% of such amount of the valuation in excess of£1m . 9. In the event that the property has not been sold by the28th February 2003 the Sellers require the Buyers to place the property on the market forthwith and to sell the property.”
“The Bank’s lawyers have come back indicating that the Bank is probably likely to agree a provision that clauses 7, 8 and 9 should apply but only after any monies due to the Bank under its security have been discharged in full. I assume that you do not have any major problems with this suggestion, although perhaps you would be so good as to confirm.”
“Provided that any money in excess of£1m repaid to Bank of Ireland from the proceeds of sale of [the property] shall first be taken from the share of the buyers.”
“THE PARTIES hereto wish to vary the terms of special conditions 7, 8 and 9 of the Contract to the extent that special conditions 7,8 and 9 should only take effect provided that the legal charge in favour of the Bank of Ireland to be registered against both titles has been repaid in full and the entries in the Charges Register to both titles in respect of the legal charge have been cancelled and that the provisions of clauses 7,8 and 9 only apply to net proceeds of sale after the said charge has been discharged.”
“The Buyers will obtain planning permission for one or more new dwellinghouses (not exceeding three) on the Property…and thereafter construct such new dwellings as soon as reasonably practicable and thereafter market them for sale. In the event that the new dwellings are sold for a combined sum in excess of£1m , the Buyers shall pay to [the Sellers] 50% of the amount in excess of£1m subject only to the deduction therefrom of one half of the legal and estate agency fees incurred in connection with such sale.”
“In the first place it is clear that this is the true construction of the original contract of5th December 2000 which makes no reference to construction costs at all. This is equally true of the deed of covenant. The correspondence which led up to the supplemental agreement shows that this was purely a requirement of the bank and there is nothing in my view which indicates that there was to be any variation of the original agreement under which the [buyers] took the risk of development costs exceeding the difference between the price they paid, that is to say£600,000 , and the figure of£1m , that is to say overall costs of£400,000 . In giving evidence [the male buyer] accepted that he had originally taken the risk in respect of the amount of the construction costs…However he says that he instructed his solicitor to re-draft the contract so as to exclude the overage provisions and that it was this which led to the supplemental agreement. However, I do not accept his evidence on this…In my view [he] has persuaded himself of this supposed variation subsequently…upon realisation that the development costs would by far and away exceed the amount which he had estimated.” 23. For the following reasons I have no doubt that the master was correct in reaching the above conclusion: (a) The mode of calculation of the overage threshold could not have been more clearly expressed under Condition 7. Clear language would be necessary in order that a clause in a supplemental agreement, reached less than three months later, should dramatically alter the effect of the condition. Yet the second limb of the clause is thoroughly ambiguous. (b) The correspondence which led to the making of the supplemental agreement showed that the need for it was driven only by a demand by the Bank of Ireland that, prior to making a loan to the buyers, clear provision should be in place for its security to take precedence over the right of the sellers to overage. When the sellers pressed for the inclusion of a proviso which would have made it totally clear that the provision for the calculation of overage under Condition 7 was to be unaffected, objection came not from the buyers but from the bank. (c) Had the Supplemental Agreement made the dramatic alteration in the calculation of the overage threshold for which the buyers contend, one would expect to see the change reflected in the way in which the provision for overage was recast in paragraph 1 of the schedule to the Deed of Covenant dated16 March 2001 . Yet in that regard the wording of the deed is identical to the wording of Condition No.7. (d) Mr Holland on behalf of the buyers argues that it would make no commercial sense for their borrowings from the bank not to be the subject of initial deduction from the price prior to the division of profit. I disagree. It is clear that the thinking of the buyers in entering into Condition No.7 was that they could fund the construction of the dwelling for£400,000 and that their total outlay on the property, above which the price obtained for it would be all profit, would be about£1,000,000 ; and the master records the concession of the male buyer in evidence that he had originally taken the risk that his estimate of£400,000 might prove too low. In my view it is the buyers’ suggested construction of the overage condition, as varied by the Supplemental Agreement, which makes no commercial sense: for, were their construction right, the buyers would be motivated to borrow every penny of the sum required for purchase and construction from the bank upon charge, rather than to fund any part of it out of their own resources, in order to eliminate or reduce the overage. I have no doubt that the two limbs of the variation effected by clause 2 of the Supplemental Agreement were belt and braces: both should be construed as providing that, as between the bank and the sellers, the former were to have priority, in respect of whatever was owed under charge, over the latter in respect of whatever was owed by way of overage. Neither limb altered the calculation of overage payable to the sellers in any way. 24. I turn to the ground of the sellers’ appeal, namely that the master was wrong to adopt Mr Harvey’s figure of£1,500,000 as the likely sale price. The appeal centres around the fact that the master adopted Mr Harvey’s figure by reference to the burden of proof, namely by reference to the fact that it was for the sellers to establish a higher figure and that in his judgment they had failed to do so. 25. In his final written submissions to the master, Mr Holland on behalf of the buyers had presciently adverted to the difficulty in which the master might find himself in weighing the evidence of Mr Smart against that of Mr Harvey: “It is always invidious for a court to have to choose between the views of two apparently honest and competent experts especially when their valuations are so far apart and there appears to be little material with which the court can bridge the gap.” 26. In his judgment the master stated that he would address compendiously the questions as to when the property would have been sold and as to the price at which it would have been sold. He went on: “This aspect of the case is also by far the most difficult since I am confronted with expert evidence of two professional surveyors who are unable to agree upon a price range and who both present valuation ranges which are some way apart.” 27. The master began by summarising Mr Smart’s report in two paragraphs. He noted the dimensions of the hypothetical dwelling, as suggested by Mr Smart, and the fact that it would have had a view over a pond. He referred to the price achieved for the comparable property, namely Sherbourne House, mainly relied on by Mr Smart and to the fact that, as Mr Smart accepted, the latter had more land than the hypothetical property but, on the other hand, lacked a view over water and suffered from traffic noise. The master then referred to Mr Smart’s evidence as to the value of three other allegedly comparable properties. 28. Then the master devoted a paragraph to Mr Harvey’s report. He recorded that Mr Harvey considered that the postal address of the buyers’ property, the quality of the surrounding properties and the propinquity of a landfill site detracted from its value. The master said that Mr Harvey had referred to Mr Smart’s four comparable properties and had added two others which he had conceded were not very helpful. And the master referred to a letter obtained by Mr Harvey from Messrs Hamptons suggesting a guide price of£1,600,000 for the hypothetical property. 29. Thereupon, no doubt by reference to his notes, the master devoted two paragraphs to the evidence given by the experts in cross-examination. He recorded Mr Smart’s concession that his valuation of£2,200,000 as at April 2002 had been bold and that£2,000,000 would have been more appropriate. He recorded that Mr Harvey had been pressed with the fact that in 2001 he had valued the property in its existing condition at£950,000 and with the suggestion that it exposed his valuation of the hypothetical property as too low. 30. Then the master referred to the fact that the two valuers had together produced a schedule identifying, in terms of percentages of value and under six headings (namely location, quality, layout, size, date of sale and other), the rival degrees of weight which they sought to place upon such features of the four comparable properties relied on by Mr Smart as were allegedly different from those of the hypothetical property. 31. Thereupon the master said as follows: “21. I have to say that at the end of the day I found it very difficult to satisfactorily resolve this conflict of evidence which is based upon a difference of professional opinion, reflecting a number of matters of appreciation which are to some extent subjective in relation to the comparable properties. In particular I should mention that I do not think it is possible for me to enter into my own subjective view of the application of the particular factors, since that would be for me to set myself up as an expert and to usurp the role of the experts. It is necessary for me to choose between the views which are expressed on both sides, if it is possible to do so. 22. However, the conclusion which I have reluctantly reached is that I am unable to decide that I prefer one view over the other, and in those circumstances the case falls to be decided on the basis of the burden of proof. As the claimants bear the burden of proof to satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that their view is correct, and as they have failed to do this, I shall adopt the view put forward by the defendants. Accordingly I will proceed upon the basis of Mr Harvey’s evidence, which is that the property would have sold for …£1.5m .” 32. In his unreserved judgment on costs the master summarised his approach to the issue as to price by saying: “because of the burden of proof, I felt constrained to accept the defendants’ evidence”. 33. The gravamen of the sellers’ appeal is that the master abdicated his judicial responsibility by failing to reach a conclusion, in the light of the evidence of the two experts, as to the price which would have been achieved upon sale. The sellers seek a rehearing of that issue by a High Court judge of the Chancery Division. 34. I deal initially with one of Mr Holland’s responses to the appeal. He contends that the point made by the sellers is misconceived in that the master did in the end accept the evidence of Mr Harvey. Mr Holland points to the statement of the master in his substantive judgment that he would “adopt the view put forward by the defendants” and in his judgment on costs that he “felt constrained to accept the defendants’ evidence”
“[It is] of great importance… that the judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the other with regard to the facts averred by the parties. He has open to him the third alternative of saying that the party on whom the burden of proof lies in relation to any averment made by him has failed to discharge that burden. No judge likes to decide cases on burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are cases, however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course for him to take.” 40. The second is the decision of this court in Morris v London Iron and Steel Co. Ltd[1988] QB 493 . An applicant claimed before an industrial tribunal that he had been unfairly dismissed. The respondent, his former employer, alleged that, instead of being dismissed, he had resigned. The tribunal rehearsed the rival evidence of dismissal and resignation, found that the probabilities were equally balanced and so dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant had not discharged the burden of proof. This court held that the tribunal had been entitled to do so. May L.J. said at 504C-D that “in the exceptional case” a judge confronted with an issue of fact might be in breach of his judicial duty to do other than to resort to the burden of proof. Then, at 505E, he addressed a submission on behalf of the applicant that the tribunal “should have set out in much greater detail than it did its findings on other facts, its reasoning, its analysis of those facts, where that analysis had led it, and why in the end it found that it was unable to reach a conclusion one way or the other.”