"(1) Where a local planning authority consider it necessary or expedient for any actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by injunction, they may apply to the court for an injunction, whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise any of their other powers on this Part. (2) On an application under subsection (1) the court may grant such an injunction as the court thinks appropriate for the purpose of restraining the breach. (3) Rules of court may provide for such an injunction to be issued against a person whose identity is unknown. (4) In this section 'the court' means the High Court or the county court."
"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."
"41. True it is, as Mr McCracken points out, that, once the planning decision is taken as final, the legitimate aim of preserving the environment is only achievable by removing the gipsies from site. That is not to say, however, that the achievement of that aim must always be accepted by the court to outweigh whatever countervailing rights the gypsies may have, still less that the court is bound to grant injunctive (least was all immediate injunctive) relief. Rather I prefer the approach suggested by the 1991 Circular: the court's discretion is absolute and injunctive relief is unlikely unless properly thought to be 'commensurate' - in today's language, proportionate. ... Proportionality requires not only that the injunction be appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the public interest objective sought - here the safeguarding of the environment - but also that it does not impose an excessive burden on the individual whose private interests - here the gipsy's private life and home and the retention of his ethnic identity - are at stake. 42. I do not pretend that it will always be easy in any particular case to strike the necessary balance between these competing interests, interests of so different a character that weighing one against the other must inevitably be problematic. This, however, is the task to be undertaken by the court and, provided it is undertaken in a structured and articulated way, the appropriate conclusion should emerge."
"The effect of the various speeches - set out most comprehensively in the leading speech of Lord Bingham of Cornhill, was as follows: 1) section 187B confers on the courts an original and discretionary, not a supervisory, jurisdiction, so that a defendant seeking to resist injunctive relief is not restricted to judicial review grounds; 2) it is questionable whether Article 8 adds anything to the existing equitable duty of a court in the exercise of its discretion under section 187B; 3) the jurisdiction is to be exercised with due regard to the purpose for which was conferred, namely to restrain breaches of planning control, and flagrant and prolonged defiance by a defendant of the relevant planning controls and procedures may weigh heavily in favour of injunctive relief; 4) however, it is inherent in the injunctive remedy that its grant depends on a court's judgment of all the circumstances of the case; 5) although a court would not examine matters of planning policy and judgment, since those lay within the exclusive purview of the responsible local planning authority, it will consider whether, and the extent to which, the local planning authority has taken account of the personal circumstances of the defendant and any hardship that injunctive relief might cause, and it is not obliged to grant relief simply because a planning authority considered it necessary or expedient to restrain a planning breach; 6) having had regard to all the circumstances of the case, the court will only grant an injunction where it is just and proportionate to do so, taking account, inter alia, of the rights of the person or persons against whom injunctive relief is sought, and of whether it is relief with which that person or persons can and reasonably ought to comply."
"The Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that the unmet needs of gypsies generally in the area and the lack of suitable alternative sites, together with the appellant's limited financial means and some of the children's special education needs cumulatively amount to very special circumstances that outweigh the harm to the purposes of the green belt if the development were to be allowed. The Secretary of State agrees also that, so long as these circumstances exist, they justify the grant of temporary planning permission. The Secretary of State agrees that, although the special needs of some children do not apply to all residents, the lack of alternative site applies to them all."
"The Council has proposed to advertise a limited tender for consultants to carry out a quantitative assessment of need for gypsy sites. However, the Council in this case had not, at the time of the inquiry, carried out such an assessment, as required by Government policy and its own policy. ..."
"The Secretary of State considers that a temporary permission of two years is a sufficient period for the Council to carry out a quantitative assessment of the need for gypsy sites. This would then provide an opportunity to bring forward the identification and availability of alternative sites."
"The Owners are forbidden (whether by himself or by instructing or encouraging any other person) from: 1) Stationing or causing to be stationed any caravans on any part of Waldens Farm... other than those which are in position on the 1st of July 2004 or which may be placed on the land pursuant to a planning permission granted by the Claimant or by the First Secretary of State. 2) That the Claimants have permission to effect alternative service of the claim form by placing a copy of the claim form on a conspicuous part of the entrances to the site and by placing a copy of the claim form next to each of the caravans currently on site. 3) That the Defendants be identified for the purpose of this claim by reference to their ownership of the plots comprising Waldens Farm... 4) This order shall remain in force until further order. 5) The Defendants may apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge this order but if they wish to do so they must first inform the Claimant's solicitor in writing at least 48 hours beforehand. 6) Costs in the case. This order shall remain in force until further order of the court."
"PERSONS UNKNOWN (being persons other than those listed in the Schedule to the Claim Form dated14 July 2004 therein) causing or permitting Hardcore to be deposited other than for agricultural purposes on land known as plots 1-11, Victoria View ... Caravans, mobile homes or other forms of residential accommodation to be stationed other than for agricultural purposes on the said land; or Existing caravans, mobile homes or other forms of residential accommodation on the said land to be occupied other than for agricultural purposes."
"The Respondents shall be restrained until trial or further order from causing or permitting - 1. Hardcore to be deposited other than for agricultural purposes on land known as plots 1-11..."
"5. Having read Porter, Searle & Berry, Mr Paget, it seems to me that it is a step even further to say that once an injunction has been granted, if someone comes to the injunction as it were, their personal circumstances ought to be taken into the balance, before deciding whether the injunction applies to them. It is another matter whether their circumstances should be taken into account when deciding, having decided as a matter of fact that they are in breach, whether and what sanctions should be applied."
"12. It seems to me that it is not open to me at this stage to reopen the injunction, because it would in effect, as their Lordships said, be contemplating that those who are prepared to commit an unlawful act could, even though they knew it to be unlawful, come and ask, as it were, to be relieved from sanction, when the court has already considered it appropriate, having undertaken the more general balancing exercise to grant an injunction. When I say 'the more general balancing exercise,' it is absolutely clear that the Court of Appeal were acutely aware of the tensions in South Cambridgeshire, that there are a number of people of gypsy traveller origin who wish to set up homes, that there is land on which they wish to set up homes but which the Local Authority has determined is not appropriate in planning terms for that purpose, and this is one of those areas where that stand-off has been evident for many years. But so far as this person is concerned, Mrs Gammell, she is not a party to that long-standing dispute, but simply someone who has come on to the site after the Court of Appeal has determined that it is appropriate that further incursions on the site should be restrained by an injunction. 13. In my opinion, the court has jurisdiction to attach her, whether or not she is joined as a respondent. The question then is to whether I should join her as a respondent. If Mr Padjet seeks that I do, I will, because it is appropriate that she should have opportunity to argue her case as to whether being in breach she should be the subject of sanction, what sanction and when. The factors that I may take into account then are her personal position, the position of someone who needs a plot if she is to remove from that site, and therefore local site availability, and more broadly East Anglian site availability, and also the question of the likelihood of there being any change in the planning status of the site as a result of the inspector's inquiry which is commencing this week."
"The first defendant, a gipsy, bought a parcel of land adjacent to a village where he planned to settle with other members of his extended family, who included several children. The land was designated agricultural land in an area of great landscape beauty within the green belt. Alerted to the fact that unauthorised works were being carried out on the land, the claimant council obtained an interim injunction undersection 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to restrain its use for residential purposes. In breach of that injunction the defendants moved their caravans onto the land. They subsequently submitted an application for planning permission for a change of use to a gipsy residential site. The council applied for a final injunction prohibiting the change of use in breach of planning control. The judge granted a final prohibitory order but suspended it pending the determination of the planning application on the ground that the interests of the safety and stability of the young children on the site overrode the objective of safeguarding the environment."
"The balancing act 23. In his careful judgment the judge cited the relevant authorities and he considered the evidence in detail, including the fact that the defendants had acted in flagrant breach of the planning control and of the injunction by bringing caravans on to the land and living there, which it was accepted counted against the defendants. He said that it could not be disputed that the council's decision to make the application was 'entirely appropriate'. As the council pointed out, the violations were deliberate, no attempt had been made to discuss the matter with the council and 'the breaches of the law had been persistent and serious, albeit only over a few days'. 24. On the issue of the justice and proportionality of granting an immediate injunction the judge considered the countervailing factors, which, applying the principles laid down in South BucksDistrict Council v Porter[2003] 2 AC 558 , he thought were against the grant of an immediate injunction: although the council had indicated that the permission was unlikely to be granted, the judge placed little weight on a view which he thought had been expressed without detailed consideration, and there was a possibility that the council would make a different planning decision, the time for making a decision expiring on27 October 2004 ; although the judge found that there would be some environmental damage caused by the breach of planning control, it would not be serious and the injunction would not remove it; there were no alternative local official or private sites to which the defendants could move; and there would be hardship if the defendants were required to move, as that would affect the safety and stability of the defendants small children. He thought that an injunction would not bring the defendant's unlawful activities to an end. Conclusion 25. In our judgment, the judge's decision to suspend the injunction pending the determination of the planning application did not take proper account of the vital role of the court upholding the important principle that the orders of the court are meant to be obeyed and not to be ignored with impunity. The order itself indicated to the defendants the correct way in which to challenge the injunction. It contained an express provision giving the defendants liberty to apply, on prior notice, to discharge or modify the order. The proper course for the defendants to take, if they wished to challenge the order, was to apply to the court to discharge or vary it. If that failed, the proper course was to seek to appeal. Instead of even attempting to follow the correct procedure, the defendants decided to press on as originally planned and as if no court order had ever been made. They cocked a snook at the court. They did so in order to steal a march on the council and to achieve the very state of affairs which the order was designed to prevent. No explanation or apology for the breaches of the court order was offered to the judge or to this court. 26. The practical effect of suspending the injunction has been to allow the defendants to change the use of the land and to retain the benefit of occupation of the land with caravans for residential purposes. This was in defiance of a court order properly served on them and correctly explained to them. If those circumstances there is a real risk that the suspension of the injunction would be perceived as condoning the breach. This would send out the wrong signal, both to others tempted to do the same and to law-abiding members of the public. The message would be that the court is prepared to tolerate contempt of its orders and to permit those who break them to profit from their contempt. 27. The effect of that message would be to diminish respect for court orders, to undermine the authority of the court and to subvert the rule of law. In our judgment, those overarching public interest considerations far outweigh the factors which favour the essential suspension of the injunction so as to allow the defendants to keep their caravans on the land and to continue to reside there in breach of planning control. 28. We would add that the defendants would have attracted more sympathy from the court for their plight, if they had embarked on their plans to purchase and establish a caravan site, so that they could integrate with the community, by taking steps to obtain a site which had a reasonable prospect of being granted planning permission, by following the proper procedures for obtaining the necessary permission and by awaiting the outcome of the planning application, instead of taking the law into their own hands, flouting orders of the court and asking the court to suspend the injunction in order to relieve them of the consequences of their unlawful conduct."