“the scale and duration of the policing operation has been one of the most significant that I have experienced in my career. Large numbers of officers, drawn from right across the force, have been deployed to Kingsbury day and night since the 1st of April. This has meant that we have had to scale down some non-emergency policing services, including those that serve North Warwickshire. Although core policing services have been effectively maintained across the county during this, the protests have undoubtedly impacted on the quality and level of the policing services that we are able to deliver. Officers who may have ordinarily been policing the communities of North Warwickshire, the road networks of North Warwickshire, or supporting victims of crime in North Warwickshire have had to be redeployed to support the policing operation linked to Kingsbury. It has also meant that we have had to bring in additional officers from other regional forces, in addition to more specialist teams such as working at heights teams and protestor removal teams. All of these will come at significant additional costs to the force and ultimately the public of Warwickshire. The impact on the local community has been substantial. There have been almost daily road closures of the roads around the oil terminal which has created disruption and inconvenience. The M42 has also been disrupted on occasions as a result of the protest activity. There has been a significant policing presence since the 1st of April which I am sure has created a level of fear and anxiety for the local community. The policing operation has also extended into unsociable hours, with regular essential use of the police helicopter overnight disrupting sleep. The reckless actions of the protesters has also created increased risk of potential fire or explosion at the site which would likely have catastrophic implications for the local community including the risk of widespread pollution of both the ground, waterways and air. Finally, the actions of the protesters has impacted the supply of fuel to petrol forecourts in the region leading to some shortages, impacting upon not only local residents but the broader West Midlands region.”
“I have grave concerns for public safety should the behaviour of the protesters continue in its current form. The Kingsbury site is an extremely hazardous site where the very presence of certain items and clothing on site is restricted because of the potential dangers of explosion or fire. The protesters have had no regard for their own or others safety with actions including the use of mobile phones on site (strictly prohibited), the scaling and locking on to very volatile fuel storage tanks, the tunnelling activity in close proximity to high pressure fuel pipes, and the forced stopping, and then scaling, of fuel tankers on the public highway. Not only does this cause unacceptable levels of risk to themselves and the public, it also puts my officers in significant danger as they have to attempt to remove them from the places they have decided to put themselves.”
“I don't think they have any understanding of the level of risk they are posing to themselves or others through their actions.”
“to use its powers to seek an injunction with a power of arrest to seek to control the locations in which and the manner in which the current protests at the terminal are conducted.”
“14. In reaching this conclusion, I have sought to strike a balance between the rights of the protesters and the rights of the community within the North Warwickshire area to be kept safe from the risk of a major emergency at the terminal and to be protected from nuisance, criminality and anti-social behaviour that has characterised these protests. 15. My reference to the community within North Warwickshire is a reference to all the people within the borough who are affected in different ways, including staff at the terminal, workers from other companies who attend there for their jobs, local residents, and businesses, all of whom are affected by the disruption. I also include other road users who have been affected by protestors on motorway slip roads and other highways causing blockages by their dangerous activities, members of the emergency services who are required to attend the Terminal on a daily basis and who would be forced to deal with the consequences of fire or explosion there, the protestors themselves whose safety is at risk and all those other members of the public and the borough who are affected by the disruption and whose safety would be compromised by an emergency at the Terminal.”
“This seems to me in principle to be a legitimate approach. It is one which has been taken regularly over several years in cases concerned with striking a balance between the protest rights of animal rights campaigners and those of research organisations and their staff. Such an order sets no limit on the kinds of speech that may be used by those involved in a protest. It defines where protest may take place. It is possible to frame an order of this kind which sets clear boundaries, without destroying the essence of the right to protest, which does not depend on location, and without interfering disproportionately with Article 10 and 11 rights: see Appleby v United Kingdom(2003) 37 EHRR 38 [47], Manchester Ship Canal Developments Ltd v Persons Unknown[2014] EWHC 645 (Ch) [37], where the court was concerned with a protest camp in the vicinity of a fracking site. I am prepared in principle to grant such an order.”
“the extent to which the continuation of the protest would breach domestic law, the importance of the precise location to the protesters, the duration of the protest, the degree to which the protesters occupy the land, and the extent of the actual interference the protest causes to the rights of others, including the property rights of the owners of the land, and the rights of any members of the public.”
“After a period of continuing unlawful and dangerous behaviour by protestors, there has more recently been a marked decline in kinds of unlawful behaviour that formed the basis for the claim. In particular, the events of 22-23 April 2022 ...were the last occasion on which the boundaries of the Terminal were breached. The last time the entrances to the terminal were obstructed was on26 April 2022 . The Claimant is not aware of tunnelling activity or other conduct breaching para.1(b) of the Injunction since that date.”
“The chronology of events at Kingsbury Oil Terminal have moved from unlawful actions, then the granting of the Order and then a move to lawful and legitimate forms of protest. In my opinion the evidence shows that the move to lawful and legitimate forms of protest would not have come about but for the granting of the Order...”
“1. The Defendants SHALL NOT (whether by themselves or by instructing, encouraging or allowing any other person): (a) organise or participate in (whether by themselves or with any other person), or encourage, invite or arrange for any other person to participate in any protest against the production or use of fossil fuels, at Kingsbury Oil Terminal (the “Terminal”), taking place within the areas the boundaries of which are edged in red on the Map attached to this Order at Schedule 1. (b) in connection with any such protest anywhere in the locality of the Terminal perform any of the following acts: (i) entering or attempting to enter the Terminal (ii) congregating or encouraging or arranging for another person to congregate at any entrance to the Terminal (iii) obstructing any entrance to the Terminal (iv) climbing on to or otherwise damaging or interfering with any vehicle, or any object on land (including buildings, structures, caravans, trees and rocks) (v) damaging any land including (but not limited to) roads, buildings, structures or trees on that land, or any pipes or equipment serving the Terminal on or beneath that land (vi) affixing themselves to any other person or object or land (including roads, structures, buildings, caravans, trees or rocks) (vii) erecting any structure (viii) abandoning any vehicle which blocks any road or impedes the passage of any other vehicle on a road or access to the Terminal (ix) digging any holes in or tunnelling under (or using or occupying existing tunnels under) land, including roads; (x) abseiling from bridges or from any other building, structure or tree on land or (xi) instructing, assisting, or encouraging any other person to do any act prohibited by paragraphs (b)(i)-(x) of this Order.”
“1. The Defendants SHALL NOT (whether by themselves or by instructing, encouraging or allowing any other person): (a) organise or participate in (whether by themselves or with any other person), or encourage, invite or arrange for any other person to participate in any protest against the production or use of fossil fuels, at Kingsbury Oil Terminal (the “Terminal”), taking place within the areas the boundaries of which are edged in red on the Map attached to this Order at Schedule 1, or within 5 metres of those boundaries (edged in red) (the “buffer zone”). For the avoidance of doubt, this prohibition does not prevent the Defendants from using any public highway within the buffer zone for the purpose of travelling to or from a protest held, or to be held, outside the buffer zone.”
“1. Service of the Claim Form and this Order shall be effected by (i) placing signs informing people of (a) this Claim, (b) this Order and power of arrest, and the area in which they have effect and (c) where they can obtain copies of the Claim Form. Order and power of arrest, and the supporting documents used to obtain this Order in prominent locations along the boundary of the buffer zone referred to at para.1 of this Order and particularly outside the Terminal and at the junctions of roads leading into the zone, (ii) placing a copy prominently at the entrances to the Terminal; (iii) posting a copy of the documents referred to at para.1(i)(c) above Order on its website, and publicising it using the Claimant’s Facebook page and twitter account, and posting on other relevant social media sites including local police social media accounts, and/or. (iv) any other like manner as the Claimant may decide to use in order to bring the Claim Form and this Order and power of arrest to the attention of the Defendants and other persons likely to be affected. 2. If the Claimant intends to take enforcement proceedings against any person in respect of this Order, the Claimant shall, no later than the time of issuing such proceedings, serve on that person, (i) a copy of the Claim Form and all supporting documents relied on to obtain this Order; and (ii) a copy of this Order and power of arrest. 3. The Court will consider whether to join the person served to the proceedings as a named Defendant and whether to make any further Order.”
“(1) Where a local authority consider it expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area— (a) they may prosecute or defend or appear in any legal proceedings and, in the case of civil proceedings, may institute them in their own name...”
“In proceedings instituted to promote or protect the interests of inhabitants generally, special damages are irrelevant and were therefore not mentioned in section 222.”
"130. - Protection of public rights. (1) It is the duty of the highway authority to assert and protect the rights of the public to the use and enjoyment of any highway for which they are the highway authority, including any roadside waste which forms part of it. (2) Any Council may assert and protect the rights of the public to the use and enjoyment of any highway in their area for which they are not the highway authority, including any roadside waste which forms part of it. (3) Without prejudice to subsections (1) and (2) above, it is the duty of a Council who are a highway authority to prevent, as far as possible, the stopping up or obstruction of— (a) the highways for which they are the highway authority, and (b) any highway for which they are not the highway authority, if, in their opinion, the stopping up or obstruction of that highway would be prejudicial to the interests of their area. (4) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this section, it is the duty of a local highway authority to prevent any unlawful encroachment on any roadside waste comprised in a highway for which they are the highway authority. (5) Without prejudice to their powers undersection 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 , a Council may, in the performance of their functions under the foregoing provisions of this section, institute legal proceedings in their own name, defend any legal proceedings and generally take such steps as they deem expedient."
“9. Not everyone however is entitled to sue in respect of a public nuisance. Private individuals can only do so if they have been caused special damage. Traditionally the action has been brought by the Attorney General, either of his own motion, or, as was the situation in the PYA case, on the relation of someone else such as a local authority. In Solihull Council v Maxfern Ltd [1977] 127, Oliver J. considered the history of the legislative predecessors of s.222 and concluded that the effect of section 222 is to enable a local authority, if it thinks it expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area, to do that which previously it could not do, namely, to sue in its own name without invoking the assistance of the Attorney General, to prevent a public nuisance. I recognise that in that case the Local Authority was not suing in nuisance but rather was enforcing the criminal law in an area for which it had been given express responsibility, namely the enforcement of the Sunday trading provisions of theShops Act 1950 . Nonetheless I respectfully agree with Oliver J.'s conclusion in relation to suing in nuisance. 10. Mr Wise who appeared for the respondent rightly submitted that in cases such as the present there was another principle engaged. This was that a local authority, being a creature of statute, could only do that which it was expressly or impliedly empowered to do. However, this principle thus stated is of no assistance when the question at issue is whether s.222 enables a local authority to sue for public nuisance. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative then the principle is satisfied. 11. There is no doubt that at common law it is a tort to create a public nuisance...”
“...a public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large.”
“If an injunction may only properly be granted to restrain conduct which is in itself tortious or otherwise unlawful, that would be a conclusive objection to term (c) of the28 January 1994 injunction... I do not, however, think that the court's power is so limited. A Mareva injunction granted in the familiar form restrains a defendant from acting in a way which is not, in itself, tortious or otherwise unlawful. The order is made to try and ensure that the procedures of the court are in practice effective to achieve their ends. The court recognises a need to protect the legitimate interests of those who have invoked its jurisdiction.”
“I accept that the court must be careful not to impose an injunction in wider terms than are necessary to do justice in the particular case; but I reject the argument that the court is not entitled, when satisfied that justice requires it, to impose an injunction which may for a limited time prevent the defendant from doing that which he would otherwise be at liberty to do.”
“While it is undoubtedly desirable that the terms of an injunction should correspond to the threatened tort and not be so wide that they prohibit lawful conduct, this cannot be regarded as an absolute rule. The decisions of the Court of Appeal in Hubbard v Pitt[1976] QB 142 and Burris v Azadani[1995] 1 WLR 1372 demonstrate that, although the court must be careful not to impose an injunction in wider terms than are necessary to do justice, the court is entitled to restrain conduct that is not in itself tortious or otherwise unlawful if it is satisfied that such a restriction is necessary in order to afford effective protection to the rights of the claimant in the particular case”
“We consider that, since an interim injunction can be granted in appropriate circumstances against “persons unknown” who are Newcomers and wish to join an ongoing protest, it is in principle open to the court in appropriate circumstances to limit even lawful activity.”
“A person is guilty of a public nuisance (also known as common nuisance), who (a) does an act not warranted by law, or (b) omits to discharge a legal duty, if the effect of the act or omission is to endanger the life, health, property, morals, or comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects.”
“78. Intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance (1) A person commits an offence if— (a) the person— (i) does an act, or (ii) omits to do an act that they are required to do by any enactment or rule of law, (b) the person's act or omission— (i) creates a risk of, or causes, serious harm to the public or a section of the public, or (ii) obstructs the public or a section of the public in the exercise or enjoyment of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large, and (c) the person intends that their act or omission will have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (b) or is reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence. (2) In subsection (1)(b)(i) “serious harm” means— (a) death, personal injury or disease, (b) loss of, or damage to, property, or (c) serious distress, serious annoyance, serious inconvenience or serious loss of amenity. […] (6) The common law offence of public nuisance is abolished. (7) Subsections (1) to (6) do not apply in relation to- (a) any act or omission which occurred before the coming into force of those subsections, or (b) any act or omission which began before the coming into force of those subsections and continues after their coming into force. (8) This section does not affect— (a) the liability of any person for an offence other than the common law offence of public nuisance, (b) the civil liability of any person for the tort of public nuisance, or (c) the ability to take any action under any enactment against a person for any act or omission within subsection (1).” (a) the person— (i) does an act, or (ii) omits to do an act that they are required to do by any enactment or rule of law, (b) the person's act or omission— (i) creates a risk of, or causes, serious harm to the public or a section of the public, or (ii) obstructs the public or a section of the public in the exercise or enjoyment of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large, and (c) the person intends that their act or omission will have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (b) or is reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence. (a) death, personal injury or disease, (b) loss of, or damage to, property, or (c) serious distress, serious annoyance, serious inconvenience or serious loss of amenity. (a) any act or omission which occurred before the coming into force of those subsections, or (b) any act or omission which began before the coming into force of those subsections and continues after their coming into force. (a) the liability of any person for an offence other than the common law offence of public nuisance, (b) the civil liability of any person for the tort of public nuisance, or (c) the ability to take any action under any enactment against a person for any act or omission within subsection (1).”
“The position therefore is that where a local authority seeks an injunction in its own name to restrain a use or activity which is a breach of the criminal law but not a public nuisance, it may have to demonstrate that it has some particular responsibility for enforcement of that branch of the law. But where it seeks by injunction to restrain a public nuisance, it may do so in its own name so long as it “considers it expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants” of its area (section 222(1)). That is so even though it is seeking to prevent a breach of the criminal law, public nuisance being a criminal offence.”
“It seems to me strongly arguable that by early November 1987 Bovis would have been amenable to action in any one of a number of ways. An individual resident of Petticoat Square could have sued in private nuisance. The Attorney General could have sued in public nuisance either ex officio or on the relation of the local authority or a resident of Petticoat Square. The local authority could have sued in their own name for public nuisance by virtue ofsection 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 if they considered it expedient for the protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area. One cannot at this interlocutory stage assert that those claims would necessarily have succeeded, but on the evidence they would appear to have had a very fair prospect of success. As it was, none of these procedures was invoked. Instead, the local authority decided in late October to issue summonses under section 60(8) alleging contraventions of the section 60 notice. The first summonses were issued on the 3rd November. Then, on the 12th November, in the light of further complaints, the Lord Mayor having ruled that the matter was by its very nature urgent, authority was given to launch the present proceedings. The local authority considered proceedings to be expedient for the protection of the inhabitants of the area, and the authority given was to prosecute proceedings undersection 222 of the 1972 Act .”
“It is made plain by the highest authority that the jurisdiction to grant an injunction in support of the criminal law is exceptional and one of great delicacy to be exercised with caution (Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435 at 481, 491, 500, 521). Where, as in the present case, Parliament has shown a clear intention that the criminal law shall be the means of enforcing compliance with a statute, the reasons for such caution are plain and were fully explained by their Lordships in Gouriet . The criminal law should ordinarily be pursued as the primary means of enforcement. The case law shows that the archetypal case in which this jurisdiction is exercised is one in which a criminal penalty has in practice proved hopelessly inadequate to enforce compliance: see, for example, Attorney General v. Sharp[1931] 1 Ch. 121 , Attorney General v. Premier Line Ltd.[1932] 1 Ch. 303 , Attorney General v. Barstow [1957] 1 Q.B. 514, and Attorney General v. Harris [1961] 1 Q.B. 74. I do not, however, think that all the decided cases can be brought within that category. In Attorney General v. Chaudry [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1614 there had been no criminal conviction (and no hearing, because an early hearing date could not be obtained) but the defendants were held to be deliberately flouting the law and the risk of grave and irreparable harm was held to justify the grant of an injunction. In Kent County Council v. Batchelor (No. 2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 213 an injunction was granted to restrain breaches of tree preservation orders even though such breaches were an offence and there had been no convictions. In Runnymede Borough Council v. Ball [1986] 1 W.L.R. 353 there had been no resort to the criminal law but an injunction was granted because of the risk of irreversible damage.”
“The guiding principles must, I think, be – (1) that the jurisdiction is to be invoked and exercised exceptionally and with great caution: [..]; (2) that there must certainly be something more than mere infringement of the criminal law before the assistance of civil proceedings can be invoked and accorded for the protection or promotion of the interests of the inhabitants of the area: see the Stoke-on-Trent case at 767B, 776C, and Wychavon District Council v. Midland Enterprises (Special Events) Ltd. [1987] 86 L.G.R. 83 at 87; (3) that the essential foundation for the exercise of the court's discretion to grant an injunction is not that the offender is deliberately and flagrantly flouting the law but the need to draw the inference that the defendant's unlawful operations will continue unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing short of an injunction will be effective to restrain them: see the Wychavon case at page 89.”
“It is accepted here that if the preliminary condition of section 222 is met the local authority stands in the same position as the Attorney General. It is not, I think, challenged that the preliminary condition of section 222 is met here. So the question is whether the local authority can show anything more (and, I would interpolate, substantially more) than an alleged and unproven contravention of the criminal law, and whether the inference can be drawn that noise prohibited by the notice will continue unless Bovis are effectively restrained by law and that nothing short of an injunction will effectively restrain them. I am in no doubt that these questions must be answered in favour of the local authority. The conduct which the local authority seek to restrain is conduct which would have been actionable (if not at the suit of the local authority) in the absence of any statute. Even if the conduct were not criminal, it would probably be unlawful. The contrast with the planning and Sunday trading cases is obvious. I see no reason for the court pedantically to insist on proof of deliberate and flagrant breaches of the criminal law when, as here, there is clear evidence of persistent and serious conduct which may well amount to contravention of the criminal law and which may, at this interlocutory stage, be regarded as showing a public and private nuisance. It is quite plain that the service of the notice and the threat of prosecution have proved quite ineffective to protect the residents. The local authority have issued 18 summonses but, even if convictions are obtained, the delay before the hearing will deprive the residents of Petticoat Square of any but (at best) minimal benefit. The local authority are charged with a power – and perhaps a corresponding duty – to protect their interests. It would be lamentable if their interests in the present case were left without protection. In my view the deputy judge was entitled to grant an injunction and was right to do so.”
“The noise resulting from the works constituted not merely a breach of the criminal law but also a nuisance gravely affecting the local inhabitants. Every disturbed night or weekend they suffer involves irreversible damage. The issue of criminal proceedings did not end the breaches. Time would inevitably pass before those proceedings could be heard. Should they be contested (as we have been told they are to be) and should the proceedings succeed, there would still remain the prospect of an appeal by way of re-hearing causing further delay. In those circumstances, it is clear that criminal proceedings were likely to be ineffective to protect the inhabitants, and I am satisfied that the grant of an injunction was therefore appropriate.”
“Although large numbers of arrests have been made, the offences for which they can be arrested (obstruction of the highway etc) are generally low level and summary only offences which means the criminal justice options can be limited. We have also utilised bail conditions to try and prevent protesters returning to the site but these have largely proved to be unsuccessful with many of the protesters already being arrested multiple times from the Kingsbury site. Even when protestors breached their bail conditions, unless further arrested for a further substantive offence, they are merely dealt with for the original offence for which they were arrested prior to the bail conditions being set. As stated, these are low level summary offences and therefore charge and remand in custody is not an option open to us.”
“41...Even assuming (without deciding) that a CBO is an appropriate order to be made on conviction for a motoring offence such as dangerous driving or racing on the highway, it could only be made against an individual who had been prosecuted and convicted of an offence, a process which might well take several months. The purpose of the injunction was to prevent future nuisances, not to impose penalties for past ones. 42. Judge Worster and Judge McKenna were well entitled to conclude, in the words of Bingham LJ’s third criterion in Bovis, that car cruising in the Birmingham area would continue unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing short of an injunction would be effective to restrain them. I regard this as a classic case for the grant of an injunction.”
“In Birmingham City Council v James[2014] 1 WLR 23 ;[2013] EWCA Civ 552 Jackson LJ observed that there are many situations in which, on the facts, two different pre-emptive orders are available and that there is no “closest fit” principle which cuts down the court’s statutory powers to make pre-emptive orders. He advised at [31] that “in future cases the Court of Appeal should not be invited to trawl through the legislation in some quest for the closest fit”
“Essentially, Mr Maxton [sic] is, as [sic] no more than an officer in a small local authority, asking the Court to over- ride what Parliament has decided should be the pre-conditions before prohibitions on the use of public spaces are imposed, or the sanctions that Parliament considers appropriate for breach. That is far from sufficient.”
“Different considerations arise in relation to law enforcement action, where a public authority is seeking to enforce the law in the interests of the public generally, often in pursuance of a public duty to do so, and enjoys only the resources which have been assigned to it for its functions. Other than in cases of misfeasance in public office, which require malice, and cases of breach of the Convention rights withinsection 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 , it remains the case that English law does not confer a general remedy for loss suffered by administrative law action. That is so, even though it involves breach of a public law duty. In the present context, the fact that an injunction is discharged, or that the court concludes after hearing extended argument that it ought not in the first place to have been granted, by no means signifies that there was any breach of duty on the public authority’s part in seeking it.”
“(2) If the person against whom the application for relief is made (“the respondent”) is neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is satisfied— (a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or (b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.” respondent; or not be notified.”
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. … 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of…public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others…”
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others… 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of… public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others…”
“The situation which the police faced at Fairford was difficult and delicate. Incursions into the base had taken place in the recent past and it was clear that extreme protesters were ready to commit further damage, quite possibly extending to acts of serious sabotage. With the commencement of the war with Iraq, the risk of damage to the operation of the base and the concomitant likelihood that the US military forces at the base might react strongly to attempts at trespass, there was a real prospect that unless matters were handled with great care very serious consequences could result. The Gloucestershire police very creditably formed an elaborate plan designed to allow considerable opportunity to peaceful protesters to exercise liberty of speech and assembly, while putting in place plans to prevent disruptive and potentially damaging behaviour carrying a threat to the safety of the base.”
“At [62]-[88] in Canada Goose, the court discussed in entirely orthodox terms the decisions in Cameron, Gammell, Ineos, and Cuadrilla, in which Leggatt LJ had referred to Hubbard v. Pitt[1976] 1 QB 142 and Burris v. Azadani[1995] 1 WLR 1372 . At [82], the court built on the Cameron and Ineos requirements to set out refined procedural guidelines applicable to proceedings for interim relief against persons unknown in protester cases like the one before that court. The court at [83]-[88] applied those guidelines to the appeal to conclude that the judge had been right to dismiss the claim for summary judgment and to discharge the interim injunction.”
“The fact that the Court of Appeal, in Barking, did not specifically identify para.[82] in Canada Goose as erroneous does not mean that that passage escapes the overall rulings or logic of the Barking decision.”
“The High Court or a county court may, on an application by a local authority, grant an injunction prohibiting a person from (a) engaging in or threatening to engage in conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance or annoyance to a person residing in, visiting or otherwise engaging in a lawful activity in residential premises to which this section applies or in the locality of such premises […] (c) entering residential premises to which this section applies or being found in the locality of any such premises.”
“it is unnecessary to repeat the terms of s 152 in this judgement, but a rapid glance at the section demonstrates that the word “locality” recurs. It was plainly used deliberately. Moreover section 152(7) provides for the grant of an injunction “under” that is, in the terms of the section. Although wide the statutory language is not imprecise. In this context “locality” is an ordinary, readily understood English word without specialised or refined meaning. The operation of the section is flexibly linked to a geographical place.”