“(1) A prisoner … may be lawfully confined in any prison. (2) Prisoners shall be committed to such prisons as the Secretary of State may from time to time direct; and may by direction of the Secretary of State be removed during the term of their imprisonment from the prison in which they are confined to any other prison.”
“Where it appears desirable, for the maintenance of good order or discipline or in his own interests, that a prisoner should not associate with other prisoners, either generally or for particular purposes, the governor may arrange for the prisoner’s removal from association accordingly.”
“Protected Witness Units maintain the anonymity of, and provide secure and safe custody for Protected Witnesses, whose lives may be endangered were they to encounter other prisoners. Accommodating such prisoners in a PWU ensures that there is no contact between a PW and anyone else outside the unit, other than those with a legitimate reason, and proper authority, for access.”
“… This report will form the basis on which a decision is reached by Prison Service Headquarters about an informant’s eligibility to be treated as a protected witness and should include information about his criminal record, the present charges and details of the help which the police envisage that the informant will provide.”
“The senior officer responsible for the decision to regard a prisoner as a resident informant … or an officer of equivalent rank should periodically review the case (at least) once every 3 months) in consultation with the local Chief Crown Prosecutor to ensure that continued grant of resident informant status is justified.”
“1.15. … the PW will look to the handler for advice, assistance and support. This handler will be a central figure in the management of the prisoner. 1.16 It is likely that the handler from the police … will have had much to do with the PW when he was first arrested and charged, and will be one of the few people who know the case of the PW intimately. The handler may also have had frequent handler dealings with the PW during his lengthy de-briefing. This is more likely if the PW has spent any considerable time in police custody on production. As such, [prison] staff must be aware the PW will have learnt to rely on the handler, much as some prisoners rely on personal officers. PWs newly arrived in a PWU are likely to want to maintain close ties with their handlers.”
“If 61 is to be relocated and recategorized, how is the process to be handled? I would wish … [Mr Golds] to confirm how this is to be done, and that he is completely satisfied that relocation is feasible and safe for this man. My own view is that he will have difficulty in Prison, not only because he is a ‘first timer’ and very naïve in the ways of Prison, but that to account for the last 18 months will be almost impossible, and will potentially place him in danger. I am aware too that creating a new file may prove difficult. If this man was ‘an old lag’ he might just be able to carry a move off, however having discussed it with him, I fear he is a lamb to the slaughter.”
“… You are aware that the PW Operating Standards require the Prison Service to review the status of PWs annually. I took the opportunity to review the status of 61 when we received a report that he was not to be used in any criminal proceedings. Given the above and the current threat assessment received from the police it became clear that he no longer warranted PW status. I therefore commissioned a re-entry strategy back into the main prison system. This is now well advanced. I spoke with him on my visit … and outlined the proposals and will ensure that the necessary procedures are put in place before he is moved. I am uncertain as to your future role with ..[61], when he leaves custody he will not receive a change of identity and intends to settle with his family. I would therefore propose that any responsibility for his resettlement rest with the prison probation officer. … I am more than content to discuss this issue further and will add this to the agenda for our next meeting. Which will need to take place shortly to reflect that [Bloggs 61] is now part of the system. ”
“13. … This is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the claimant should remain in a Protected Witness Unit. But the defendant regards this factor as of little weight. It does not tip the balance in favour of keeping the claimant in a Protected Witness Unit. As I have stated …, places in Protected Witness Units are very expensive and demand exceeds supply. … And, in a clear reference to Mr. Ayers’ more general concerns, he said: 28. [15]. The defendant is satisfied that arrangements can be made for the claimant to be placed in the mainstream prison system in safety. The defendant intends to place the claimant in an establishment appropriate to his security category, taking into account his individual needs and offering him the opportunity to maintain contact with family and friends. He will be carefully prepared for his re-entry into the mainstream prison system and the Governor of the receiving prison will be briefed as to the claimant’s full prison history. Following his return to the mainstream prison system the claimant’s parole and all other sentence planning matters will progress normally. Disclosure of his previous location within a Protected Witness Unit will be limited to the Governor and a member of the prison’s security staff. His prison record will be amended so as not to show that he has been located within a Protected Witness Unit. An appropriate cover story will be provided, to explain the time spent in the Protected Witness Unit, indicating that the claimant has progressed normally through the prison system, to a lower category prison. While the defendant will make every effort to ensure that this cover story is maintained, considerable responsibility for the maintenance of this cover will of necessity rest with the claimant. … If the claim for judicial review is dismissed, the defendant will reassess the proposed arrangements, to ensure that they take account of any new information.”
“the ostensible authority is general in character, arising when the principal has placed the agent in a position which in the outside world is generally regarded as carrying authority to enter into transactions of the kind in question.”
“34. There is … an analogy between a private law estoppel and the public law concept of a legitimate expectation created by a public authority, the denial of which may amount to an abuse of power, Ex p. Coughlan[2001] QB 213 . But it is no more than an analogy because remedies against public authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public which the authority exists to promote. Public law can also take into account the hierarchy of individual rights which exist under theHuman Rights Act 1998 …. 35. … In the Western Fish case[1981] 2 All ER 204 the Court of Appeal tried its best to reconcile …. invocations of estoppel with the general principle that a public authority cannot be estopped from exercising a statutory discretion or performing a public duty. But … [i]t seems to me that in this area, public law has already absorbed whatever is useful from the moral values which underlie the private law concept of estoppel and the time has come for it to stand upon its own two feet.”
“We consider that the appropriate course is to consider first the nature of the subjective fears that that the soldier witnesses are likely to experience if called to give evidence in the Guildhall, to consider the extent to which those fears are objectively justified and then to consider the extent to which those fears, and the grounds giving rise to them, will be alleviated if the soldiers give their evidence somewhere in Great Britain rather than in Londonderry. That alleviation then has to be balanced against the adverse consequences to the inquiry of the move of venue, applying common sense and humanity. The result of the balancing exercise will determine the appropriate decision. This course will, we believe, accommodate both the requirements of article 2 and the common law requirement that the procedure should be fair.”
“… First, the requirement that the authorities knew or ought to have known of the risk will usually be satisfied much more readily in relation to a prisoner, particularly one who has assisted the authorities, than in relation to a member of the community in general. Secondly, the authorities are in position to take measures to avoid any risk to an extent much greater than are the police in relation to a member of the community. Thirdly, the authorities are likely to be less inhibited by restraints imposed on the scope of their actions by the need to respect the human rights of others, since providing a protective regime is unlikely to affect the rights of others.”
“In R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex p. Fernandez[1971] 1 WLR 987 , after adumbrating the various phrases which he considered expressed the same degree of likelihood of risk, Lord Diplock referred, at p. 994, to the alternative of ‘applying, untrammelled by semantics, principles of common sense and common humanity’. We believe that there is much to commend that approach in the present case. The search for a phrase which encapsulates a threshold of risk which engages article 2 is a search for a chimera. … Of one thing we are quite clear. The degree of risk described as ‘real and immediate’ in Osman …., as used in that case, was a very high degree of risk calling for positive action from the authorities to protect life. It was ‘a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party’ which was, or ought to have been, known to the authorities: p. 305, para. 116. Such a degree of risk is well above the threshold that will engage article 2 when the risk is attendant upon some action that an authority is contemplating putting into effect itself. It was not an appropriate one in the present context.”
“… the Court’s task is not to substitute its own view for that of the … [decision makers], but to review their decision with an intensity appropriate to all the circumstances of the case.”
“I add, from the claimant’s point of view, the decision of Mr. Golds is undoubtedly seen as a betrayal and on the assumption that the claimant is right about what was said to him, it can readily be seen to be unfair from his perspective. But that and any impact which that might have on the operation of the Bloggs system, including the disclosure of the identity of its inmates or the effectiveness of informants is not a matter for me. It is a matter for the police and Prison Service together. No challenge to Mr. Golds’ decision has been raised on that basis. I am only concerned insofar as those feelings of the claimant have any effect upon the risk to which he is subject. … I do not consider that the obligations of common sense and humanity, which are directly relevant to the assessment of the degree of risk and the protective measures required, can mean that the PWU should contain someone when that protection is not warranted. I say that even though it is impossible to avoid a strong sense that, on the factual assumptions which I make, the claimant has a justified sense of grievance which it would at least be desirable to assuage. But from a legal point of view such assuaging has to be set in a principled legal framework which here I cannot find.”