“5.8.1 The IFP2 Information Memorandum … is a very important document in this case. Mr Milne QC put this document front and centre of his case in opening. The reason is that if the document is accurate it goes to prove that IFP2 was acting with a view to profit. However the document is inaccurate and it contains inaccurate assumptions of which Mr McKenna, Mr Reid and Mr Clayton were or should have been fully aware. … 5.8.26 The Information Memorandum, together with LS202, is an important document in the case, as it shows that on any realistic view IFP2 would be loss making. It is not credible to believe that Ingenious believed its own propaganda. The Information Memorandum in and of itself should cause the Tribunal to be sceptical indeed as to the credibility of the persons who stood behind it and sold it to the public.”
“this may change and HMRC reserves the right to make amendments. In any event the burden of proof is on IFP2 to establish the facts and that the tax treatment claimed by it was correct. Nothing in this [statement of case] should be construed as an admission either as to the facts or the consequences alleged by IFP2, as to which IFP2 is put to proof.”
“The fact that the possibility of fraud is on one side of the case will of course require the tribunal to take particular care when weighing the evidence, given the seriousness of any finding 8 which puts in question the honesty of a party to a civil suit (see Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd[1957] 1 QB 247 ). At the same time, I cannot accept that this bears on the burden of proof.”
“each party must send or deliver to the Tribunal and to each other party a list of documents – (a) of which the party providing the list has possession, the right to possession, or the right to take copies; and (b) which the party providing the list intends to rely upon or produce in the proceedings.”
“This default rule makes considerable sense in the usual type of case, where HMRC will have used their extensive statutory powers of investigation at the stage of enquiry into a taxpayer’s affairs and thus will have seen all relevant documents in the taxpayer’s possession by the time an appeal is launched. In such a case, it would be disproportionate and unnecessary to require either the taxpayer or HMRC to list out and then allow 9 inspection of all documents in their possession which are relevant to the appeal. The adoption of this type of formula in the Directions in the present appeals, however, created a problem. That is because, by reason of the agreed, limited approach to disclosure at the investigation stage, HMRC had not already seen or had a chance to inspect all the documents which might be relevant to determination of the issues arising on the appeal.”
“62. In my view, the judge proceeded on an unfairly narrow view of the facts in para [15] of the decision, when he said that HMRC had the opportunity and the powers to require [the Appellants] to produce the documents “but decided not to do so”
“all documents not previously disclosed relating to the profits/losses, income, and estimates of and projections of income and profit/loss for every film said to have been produced by IFP2 and every non-production project with which IFP2 was involved.”
“5.8.23 True figures for P & A would have shown that Ingenious’ assumptions put them in a loss making position. As was demonstrated in the cross-examination of Mr Reid, if only one sensible assumption is made about the proper P & A costs and put into LS202, upon which the Information Memorandum is based, it shows that IFP2 would be loss making. The costs of DVD sales is put in at 23% of DVD revenue … in the film income tab cells C27 and C54. That is far too low. The correct figure is 35% of DVD revenue and, as far as HMRC has been able to determine, this is the percentage used for all other purposes [two examples are then given]. Mr Reid readily agreed that he would expect the DVD costs to be in the region of 35% of DVD revenue … When one changes the figures from 23% to 35% the figures produced on the Film Production tab alter to show a loss … Mr Reid was unable to explain the fact that the DVD costs were far too low in the model. 5.8.24 The assumptions relating to non-production are even more egregious … Mr Reid agreed that Ingenious was proposing that it could make 72% of its profits on nonproduction activities, which were supposed to be low risk …, as opposed to 28% from production. The Financials Tab of LS202 indicated that Ingenious were expecting to obtain profit from its low risk activities in excess of the profit it was expecting on its high risk film production activities. If Ingenious could obtain high rates of return on low risk investments it is difficult to see why Ingenious would have 13 bothered with the high risk activities at all. Mr Reid was wholly unable to explain this extreme oddity … 5.8.25 Even when one uses Ingenious’ assumptions with one proper P & A assumption (of which Ingenious, in particular, Mr McKenna, Mr Reid and Mr Clayton would or certainly should have been aware) it shows that IFP2 would be loss making, as it indeed it has turned out to be. Indeed, the non-production forecasts … fail to withstand the most basic scrutiny.”
“No, I am not asserting dishonesty.”
“Are you now telling us that you didn’t bother to find out whether or not the information was correct and satisfy yourself that the figures being put forward to you were right or wrong?”
“No, sir, I can’t do that because Mr McKenna was unable to answer my questions on it, so I may need to ask a later witness as to how the cost of sales figure is arrived at.”
“As I am trying to demonstrate, the Information Memorandum were merely pretexts for what was really going on.”
“MR GAMMIE: Indeed, we will see how they might be carrying on some of their – we have already been into the games Information Memorandum and illustrated how that – you can reflect on Mr Reid’s evidence as to what consideration they gave to that. MR MILNE: It’s an allegation of dishonesty that my learned friend expressly disavowed in the first week. MR GAMMIE: No, no. Sham has nothing to do with dishonesty and – MR MILNE: It certainly does. 15 MR GAMMIE: Well, it may be that – sir, we are just wasting time.”
“On that particular point, sir, that was not the express disavowal of any allegation of dishonesty that one might have liked. This isn’t time wasting, it is very important that we know whether or not we are faced with any unpleaded allegations of fraud, sham, deliberate misrepresentation or any other similar form of dishonesty against the Appellants. It should be easy to give that information. Nothing is pleaded, no application has been made to amend the pleadings and my learned friends are well aware of their obligations in this respect so I would ask them now to give that confirmation. Right now.”
“I would also say that the evidence hasn’t closed so how one characterises that evidence is still an open question. And moreover, I would say – and this is particular to the Tribunal in a way which is slightly different from litigation in the High Court. In the end this Tribunal has a duty to take an unblinkered view of what it sees before it, even in fact if a party doesn’t plead a point. They have to decide in the end what they think is right.”
“THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I’ve not heard that sort of allegation and I assume I haven’t misheard as far as you know. MR DAVEY: I don’t think you have, sir. THE CHAIRMAN: Right. So therefore I think that is the answer to your question, Mr Vallat. I haven’t heard an allegation of dishonesty of the nature you describe. MR VALLAT: Sir, if we are being told that we have to take Mr Davey’s answers as an assurance that no allegation of dishonesty is going to be made, then we are happy with that. THE CHAIRMAN: If they turn around later and make an allegation of dishonesty then there is the question of whether we can find dishonesty and that brings Okolo back into it – MR VALLAT: Yes, and then we’re into all sorts of things. THE CHAIRMAN: All sorts of things, yes, and we know the answer to that.”
“(2) The Upper Tribunal – (a) may (but need not) set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and (b) if it does, must either – 23 (i) remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration, or (ii) re-make the decision. … (4) In acting under sub-section (2)(b)(ii), the Upper Tribunal – (a) may make any decision which the First-tier Tribunal could make if the First-tier Tribunal were re-making the decision, and (b) may make such findings of fact as it considers appropriate.”
“The Upper Tribunal should not interfere with case management decisions of the FTT when it has applied the correct principles and has taken into account matters which should be taken into account and left out of account matters which are irrelevant, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that the decision is so plainly wrong that it must be regarded as outside the generous ambit of discretion entrusted to the FTT: Fattal v Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Ltd[2008] EWCA Civ 427 at [33],[2008] All ER (D) 109 (May) at [33]; Revenue and Customs Comrs v Atlantic Electronics Ltd[2013] EWCA Civ 651 at [18],[2013] STC 1632 at [18]. The Upper Tribunal should exercise extreme caution before allowing appeals from the FTT on case management decisions: Goldman Sachs International v Revenue and Customs Comrs …[2009] UKUT 290 (TCC) at [23] – [24],[2010] STC 763 at [23] – [24].”