“…it has been clear law binding on this court for sixty years that an inspector of taxes has only to raise an assessment to impose on the taxpayer the burden of proving that it is wrong: Haythornthwaite & Sons Ltd v Kelly (Inspector of Taxes) (1927) 11 TC 657. The taxpayer companies do not dispute this principle but maintain that they have done everything which it requires by tendering senior officials and the auditors of the taxpayer companies to give evidence and producing the taxpayer companies' accounts and records to show that there is nothing in them to justify the raising of an assessment in respect of the sums which the inspector has asserted were wrongfully diverted from the taxpayer companies' funds. They go on to say that the burden of displacing this evidence rested on the Revenue, given that the case against them was fundamentally one of fraud, a case which the party asserting it must always be under a heavy burden to prove. I believe that when analysed this proposition has two quite different aspects. The first is based on the way in which the Revenue approached the matter in correspondence. In a letter of14 December 1983 the inspector notified the taxpayer companies that a number of assessments would be made and went on to say that he had decided to make them 'on the basis that there has been fraud, wilful default or neglect' on the part of the taxpayer companies. It would, I believe, have been natural to read this letter as an intimation that the Revenue were proposing, either to claim lost tax out of time unders 36 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 by proving fraud or wilful default, or to use an in-time assessment based on fraud, wilful default or neglect as a springboard for subsequent out of time assessment under s 39. If this had indeed been the basis on which the hearing had been conducted before the commissioners, it would indeed have been perfectly clear on general principle, without the need for recourse to specialist revenue law, that the burden of proof would rest on the Crown; and, if authority were needed on this particular field, Hudson v Humbles (Inspector of Taxes) (1965) 42 TC 380 at 384 is only one example of cases which could be called up in support. We have, however, had the benefit of an explanation of the way in which the dispute was actually conducted before the commissioners. We are told that, whatever the letter may have said, the Revenue was concerned only to protect its right to interest under s 88, and that, when it came to the hearing before the commissioners, no attempt was made to advance a case under ss 36 and 39. Rather, the matter was approached, so far as the Revenue were concerned, on an ordinary Haythornthwaite basis. If this is so, and the contrary has not, as we understand it, been asserted, the formal burden of proof was not assumed by the Revenue. The commissioners had no ground for approaching their fact-finding functions on any other basis than that it was for the taxpayer companies to make the running.”
“…It is a commonplace that, if there is a disputed question of fact admitting of only two possible solutions, X and Y, with party A having the burden of proving X in order to establish his case, if A produces credible evidence in favour of X and B produces none in favour of Y, it is very likely that A will win. B must therefore exert himself if he wishes to avoid defeat. But this does not mean that B ever has the burden of proof. So also here. It may well be that, if the taxpayer companies' version does not correspond with the true facts, it must follow that someone was guilty of fraud. This does not mean that, by traversing the taxpayer companies' case, the Revenue have taken on the burden of proving fraud. Naturally, if they produce no cogent evidence or argument to cast doubt on the taxpayer companies' case, the taxpayer companies will have a greater prospect of success. But this has nothing to do with the burden of proof, which remains on the taxpayer companies because it is they who, on the law as it has stood for many years, are charged with the task of falsifying the assessment. The contention that, by traversing the taxpayer companies' version, the Revenue are implicitly setting out to prove a loss by fraud, overlooks the fact that, in order to make good their case, the Revenue need only produce a situation where the commissioners are left in doubt. In the world of fact there may be only two possibilities: innocence or fraud. In the world of proof there are three: proof of one or other possibility, and a verdict of not proven. The latter will suffice, so far as the Revenue are concerned. ”
“[69] There is no problem so far as concerns the appeal against the VAT assessment. The position on an appeal against a 'best of judgment' assessment is well-established. The burden lies on the taxpayer to establish the correct amount of tax due: 'The element of guess-work and the almost unavoidable inaccuracy in a properly made best of judgment assessment, as the cases have established, do not serve to displace the validity of the assessments, which are prima facie right and remain right until the taxpayer shows that they are wrong and also shows positively what corrections should be made in order to make the assessments right or more nearly right.' (See Bi-Flex Caribbean Ltd v The Board of Inland Revenue (1990) 63 TC 515 at 522–523 per Lord Lowry.) That was confirmed by this court, after a detailed review of the authorities, in Customs and Excise Comrs v Pegasus Birds Ltd[2004] EWCA Civ 1015 ,[2004] STC 1509 . We also cautioned (see[2004] STC 1509 at [38]) against allowing such an appeal routinely to become an investigation of the bona fides or rationality of the 'best of judgment' assessment made by Customs: ' Evidence to the tribunal [38] … (i) The tribunal should remember that its primary task is to find the correct amount of tax, so far as possible on the material properly available to it, the burden resting on the taxpayer. In all but very exceptional cases, that should be the focus of the hearing, and the tribunal should not allow it to be diverted into an attack on the Commissioners' exercise of judgment at the time of the assessment …' It should be noted that this burden of proof does not change merely because allegations of fraud may be involved (see eg Brady (Inspector of Taxes) v Group Lotus Car Companies plc[1987] STC 635 at 642,[1987] 3 All ER 1050 at 1057–1058 per Mustill LJ).”
“[15]…As the decision in Brady shows, this is so even if the circumstances of the case are such that there either must, or may, have been some fraudulent conduct on the part of the taxpayer which is relevant to the tax liability. As Mustill LJ said at 644g: ‘The fact that the possibility of fraud is on one side of the case will of course require the tribunal to take particular care when weighing the evidence, given the seriousness of any finding which puts in question the honesty of a party to a civil suit (see Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd[1957] 1 QB 247 ). At the same time, I cannot accept that this bears on the burden of proof.’”
“1. The commissioners' opinion referred to in s 73(6)(b) is an opinion as to whether they have evidence of facts sufficient to justify making the assessment. Evidence is the means by which the facts are proved. 2. The evidence in question must be sufficient to justify the making of the assessment in question (see Customs and Excise Comrs v Post Office[1995] STC 749 at 754 per Potts J). 3. The knowledge referred to in s 73(6)(b) is actual, and not constructive knowledge (see Customs and Excise Comrs v Post Office[1995] STC 749 at 755). In this context, I understand constructive knowledge to mean knowledge of evidence which the commissioners do not in fact have, but which they could and would have if they had taken the necessary steps to acquire it. 4. The correct approach for a tribunal to adopt is (i) to decide what were the facts which, in the opinion of the officer making the assessment on behalf of the commissioners, justified the making of the assessment, and (ii) to determine when the last piece of evidence of these facts of sufficient weight to justify making the assessment was communicated to the commissioners. The period of one year runs from the date in (ii) (see Heyfordian Travel Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs [1979] VATTR 139 at 151, and Classicmoor Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs [1995] V&DR 1 at 10). 5. An officer's decision that the evidence of which he has knowledge is insufficient to justify making an assessment, and accordingly, his failure to make an earlier assessment, can only be challenged on Wednesbury principles, or principles analogous to Wednesbury (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp[1948] 1 KB 223 ) (see Classicmoor Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs [1995] V&DR 1 at 10–11, and more generally John Dee Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs[1995] STC 941 at 952 per Neill LJ). 6. The burden is on the taxpayer to show that the assessment was made outside the time limit specified in s 73(6)(b) of the 1994 Act.”
“I believe that you have not declared or we have not assessed the correct amount of VAT due for the periods shown below. This is because monies have been deposited in the UK for the sale of goods said to be made in non-UK bonded warehouses, and the money is said to be transported into the UK by cash couriers. However, subsequent HMRC checks reveal this scenario is not credible and the monies must have had a UK origin. Therefore the goods [are] subject to UK VAT at the standard rate.”
“I do not challenge the transactional documents under which the Appellant contends its supplies were made other than to the extent of saying that I do not accept that the documents provide any evidence that the Appellant’s alleged French customers paid for the supplies. As previously explained, all the evidence suggests that these alleged customers were not genuine wholesalers or cash and carries, had not means of even storing the alcohol, never mind the means to make a further supply to any customer in France (never mind the fact that given their location there was no possibility that they were selling to UK travelling consumers). Therefore, I want to make clear that I do not accept that the transactional documents are proof that the Appellant ever received payment of the goods from the French customers, that were said to be supplied, or that the alleged French customers ever took physical receipt of those goods. Given the other factors (detailed in my first statement), I was (and remain) of the view that it is far more probable that the cash deposits were consideration for supplies that were made by or on behalf of the Appellant in the UK and which, to that extent, gives rise to an under-declaration of output tax in the UK.”