“(1) In this section a reference to a person's “citizenship status” is a reference to his status as— (a) a British citizen, (b) a British overseas territories citizen, (c) a British Overseas citizen, (d) a British National (Overseas), (e) a British protected person, or (f) a British subject. (2) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good. … (4) The Secretary of State may not make an order under subsection (2) if he is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless. … (4A) But that does not prevent the Secretary of State from making an order under subsection (2) to deprive a person of a citizenship status if— (a) the citizenship status results from the person's naturalisation, (b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is conducive to the public good because the person, while having that citizenship status, has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, any of the Islands, or any British overseas territory, and (c) the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, to become a national of such a country or territory. (5) Before making an order under this section in respect of a person the Secretary of State must give the person written notice specifying – (a). that the Secretary of State has decided to make an order, (b). the reasons for the order, and (c). the person’s right of appeal under section 40A (1) or undersection 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 . (6) Where a person acquired a citizenship status by the operation of a law which applied to him because of his registration or naturalisation under an enactment having effect before commencement, the Secretary of State may by order deprive the person of the citizenship status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of— (a) fraud, (b false representation, or (c) concealment of a material fact.”
“In accordance withsection 40(5) of the British Nationality Act 1981 , the Secretary of State gives notice of her decision to make an order to deprive you [name] of British citizenship under section 40(2) …. This is because the Secretary of State is satisfied that it would be conducive to the public good to do so…. Having considered all relevant circumstances, the Secretary of State considers deprivation of your British citizenship to be reasonable and proportionate …. In accord [sic] with section 40(4) …. the Secretary of State is satisfied that such an order will not make you stateless. You still hold Pakistani nationality as Pakistan Nationality law allows for a person to hold dual nationality.”
“You may appeal to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal against the decision to deprive you of your citizenship, under section 40A (1) …. In the eventuality that you are deprived of your British citizenship, the Secretary of State will also give consideration to pursuing your removal or deportation from the United Kingdom. You will be receiving a separate notification if such a decision is made …. Should any appeal in respect of the notice to deprive you of your British citizenship be dismissed, the deprivation order under section 40(2) … depriving you of your British citizenship will be served on you.”
“Deprivation of your citizenship (as distinct from deportation) will not, in itself, have a significant effect on the best interests of your children. It will neither impact on their or your wife’s status in the United Kingdom, nor is there any evidence that it will impact on their education, housing, financial support or contact with you. The Secretary of State acknowledges that deprivation may have an emotional impact on your children. However, having taken into account the best interests of your children as a primary consideration in discharge of her section 55 duty, the Secretary of State considers that the public interest in depriving you of citizenship clearly outweighs any interest your children might have in your remaining a British citizen. British citizenship is a privilege that confers particular entitlements and benefits, including the right to a British passport and the right to vote in general elections. It is not in the public interest that individuals who engage in serious and/or organised crime, which constitutes a flagrant abuse of British values, enjoy those entitlements and benefits … Having considered all relevant circumstances, the Secretary of State considers deprivation of your British citizenship to be reasonable and proportionate.”
“At least three days before the CMR all parties shall file and serve a skeleton argument addressing the relevance of section 55 of the 2009 Act to each case …”
“…. The Secretary of State, following submission made by the legal representatives for the above named [the three Appellants concerned], has decided to reconsider the decisions in accordance with the Secretary of State’s obligations under section 55 …. Therefore the Secretary of State has decided to withdraw the decisions ….”
“Judge Baird asked the Appellant some questions to ascertain the circumstances of him and his family. The Appellant confirmed that he is still on licence, the terms of which prohibit him from going to Rochdale. He lives in Swinton, Manchester. He is working part time in a carpet shop. His wife is still living in Rochdale. He has one son aged 7 who is living with his mother in a council property. He does not see his child. He explained that this was because the social worker will not allow it. He has no telephone contact either. He has cousins, nephews and his wife’s family in the UK and he is in contact with them. His wife is a British citizen as is his son … He did see his son when he was in prison. He was asked whether his wife had said how his absence is affecting his son and he responded that the child is very upset and it is affecting his education. His wife lives on state benefits and is struggling financially so their son does not get the things that he needs.” (b). The third Appellant, Mr Rauf, who was legally represented, made a relatively detailed witness statement which was submitted to the FtT. The Secretary of State’s decision had noted that this Appellant has five British citizen children, aged between 8 and 15 years. In his statement, this Appellant makes a bare, unparticularised reference to “my wife and children”
“He told us that he has five children between the ages of 9 and 16. They went to Pakistan to see relations in April 2015. He said that none of them have any medical problems but are upset. When asked how he thought that deprivation of his British citizenship would affect them, he said that it would be a very hard life for them without him. They would be very upset. He said that this was because he looks after them financially and takes them to and from school. His wife cannot drive and she is not educated and there are no other relatives in the UK who can look after the children … he told us that all his children were in education and doing well at school.”
“In subsequent re-examination it came out that in fact the Appellant is not living with his wife and children currently. He said it was a condition of his licence that he cannot go to Rochdale which is where they live. He sees them on Saturdays during the day. He confirmed therefore that he is not currently taking or collecting them from school nor is he in employment and providing for them financially … he has not worked since he was released from prison in November 2014. His licence will expire in November 2017 and he is on the Sex Offenders Register for an indefinite period.” (c). In the case of the fourth Appellant, Mr Aziz, the Secretary of State’s decision noted that he had three British citizen children aged 5, 14 and 17 years. This Appellant was represented before the FtT. The presentation of his case included a written statement. This recounted that prior to his incarceration he was the family’s sole bread winner, working as a taxi driver. His children were in full time education. The family was now wholly dependent upon state benefits. His wife and children had visited him during his imprisonment. Following his release from prison in December 2015 any contact with his children had been supervised, involving an appointed Social Services supervisor. His childrens’ maternal grandparents lived in the United Kingdom. He had a strong bond with his wife and children. In his evidence to the Tribunal this Appellant elaborated on his written statements and explained that (by reason of the licence conditions) he was living apart from his family, in Manchester. In evidence to the Tribunal, this Appellant’s spouse testified that all three children were “bright in their education”
“He is currently not having contact with his child. His wife has looked after the child all the time he has been in prison. She has also been deprived of her husband and his income for that period of time …. There was no evidence of the effect his separation from the child may have had on the child … Given the seriousness of the crimes committed by the Appellant, very considerable weight must be given to the public interest in his removal. The family circumstances of this Appellant, even put at their highest, which would include him being able to resume living with his wife and child, do not render his removal, in all the circumstances, disproportionate.”
“The second alleged impropriety is that the Secretary of State did not make adequate or any enquiries as to where the best interests of the children lie and the Appellant is thus unable to answer that. However, the Secretary of State has clearly taken the best interests of the children at their highest and said at paragraph 7 of the Notice that the public interest outweighed the best interests of the children. In other words, even if the best interests of the children required the Appellant to remain a British citizen and thereafter in the UK, those interests are outweighed by the public interest because of the gravity of his offending behaviour …. We find that being the case the Secretary of State has adequately dealt with the best interests of the children and fulfilled her obligations under section 55 …. Conversely, the Appellant has adduced no evidence whatsoever about the children’s best interests. We have been provided with no evidence from their GP, school or even their mother that they will suffer by either the Appellant losing his British citizenship or being removed from the UK.”
“It would not prevent the Appellant from being with and caring for his children if permitted to do so. It would be open to him to seek leave to remain in the UK on the basis of his family life. Furthermore, given the grave nature of the offending and the fact that it was an organized crime perpetrated with others over a sustained period, we find the decision to deprive the Appellant of his British citizenship entirely appropriate. The consequences of him no longer being a British citizen on either himself or his family members is not such as to outweigh the public interest in the deprivation.”
“The Appellant claims that his wife cannot look after the children without him. However, the fact is she has done so for the three years since his arrest and since his release. Again apart from the Appellant’s bare assertion, there was not a shred of evidence to support this and most strikingly nothing from his wife … The Appellant claims that his children have been badly affected by their separation from the Appellant, again not a shred of evidence to that effect …. We have been provided with no evidence that the Appellant even has a genuine and subsisting relationship with either his wife or his children.”
“We accept that he has a family life with his wife and children although this is at the moment severely restricted with only supervised contact with his children being allowed …. We take into account that under the terms of his licence, the Appellant cannot go to Rochdale. His wife and children had to live without him when he was in prison though we do accept and take into account that they did have some contact with him by visiting him. We have considered the best interests of his children as we are required to do. Clearly the children have suffered some unpleasantness at the hands of other people due to the crimes committed by their father … Despite that, they do not want their father to have to go to Pakistan. His absence has created financial difficulties for the whole family … We do not accept the evidence of the Appellant’s wife about the problems her youngest child had when his father went to prison. He was just a baby and at one year old would be unlikely to be affected as she claims. We would also say that we find it highly unlikely that it is the case that the Appellant’s wife is the only person who can look after her parents. She has siblings in the UK and there is in any event no evidence of the level of care required.”
“Having considered all the evidence in the round, we find that there are no compelling circumstances over and above those described in paragraphs 399 and 399A of the Immigration Rules that would outweigh the public interest in deportation. Indeed, we would go so far as to say that the crime being an organised and sustained series of sexual assaults on children is so serious that the family circumstances of this Appellant come nowhere close to outweighing the public interest in deportation.” [Emphasis supplied.]
“We accept that the best interests of children in general lie in being with both parents but in all the circumstances of this case ….. those interests are outweighed by the public interest and would not render any decision to remove the Appellant disproportionate. We make this finding having considered the family circumstances at their highest, which would include the Appellant being able to resume living with his wife and children. We have no hesitation in finding that the deprivation of citizenship itself does not breach his right to a family and private life as protected by Article 8.”
“No enquiries were made in these appeals. In light of the publicity, notoriety and nature of the crimes committed by the Appellants, there would plainly have been a grave impact upon the children … despite the obvious need for full and proper information with respect to the impact upon the children, the Respondent did not make any enquiries ….”
“The question of whether the duties imposed by Section 55 have been duly performed in any given case will inevitably be an intensely fact sensitive and contextual one. In the real world of litigation, the tools available to the court or tribunal considering this question will frequently, as in the present case, be confined to the application or submission made to the Secretary of State and the ultimate letter of decision ….”
“In this appeal Counsel for the appellant placed considerable emphasis on the need for the Tribunal to satisfy itself as to the interests of the child in such a way as suggested an inquisitorial procedure. I agree with Laws LJ that the circumstances in which the Tribunal will require further enquiries to be made, or evidence to be obtained, are likely to be extremely rare. In the vast majority of cases, the Tribunal will expect the relevant interests of the child to be drawn to the attention of the decision maker by the individual concerned. The decision maker would then make such additional enquiries as might appear to him or her to be appropriate. The scope for the Tribunal to require, much less indulge in, further enquiries of its own seems to me to be extremely limited, almost to the extent that I find it hard to imagine when, or how, it could do so.”
“Depriving the Appellant of his British citizenship will also deprive him of citizenship of the European Union. However the case of Pham relied upon does not find that the Government does not have the power to do this. The UK Government is sovereign in this respect, with the proviso that the decision must accord with the principles of proportionality and must not render a person stateless. As we have found the Appellant will not be stateless and the decision is proportionate. In any event this Appellant has never exercised any rights conferred by his EU citizenship.”
“’Conduciveness to the public good’ means depriving in the public interest on the grounds of involvement in terrorism, espionage, serious organised crime, war crimes or unacceptable behaviours.”
“There is no legal definition of organized crime in England and Wales. For the purposes of this strategy, organized crime is serious crime planned, co - ordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain.”
“Organized crime is characterized by violence or the threat of violence and by the use of bribery and corruption: organized criminals very often depend on the assistance of corrupt, complicit or negligent professionals, notably lawyers, accountants and bankers. Organized crime also uses sophisticated technology to conduct operations, maintain security and evade justice.”
“We make a distinction between organized crime groups and urban street gangs …. The differences are primarily about the level of criminality, organization, planning and control. But there are connections between gangs and organized crime: urban gang members may engage in street drug dealing on behalf of organized criminals and some gangs aspire to and may become organized crime groups in their own right.”
“This section of our strategy provides a short introductory overview of the main organised criminal activities in the UK …. Over half of the organized crime groups operating against the UK are involved in drug-related crime; a significant proportion are also involved in violent crime ….” [Our emphasis] Paragraph 2.43: “Child sexual abuse and exploitation remains a largely solitary crime and, where group offending occurs, it shares few of the characteristics traditionally associated with organised crime. The offending is, however, often extremely serious and complex. The majority of child sexual exploitation and abuse offenders are motivated by sexual gratification with a much smaller number motivated by financial or other gain.”
“The formulation of policies is a perfectly proper course for the provision of guidance in the exercise of an administrative discretion. Indeed policies are an essential element in securing the coherent and consistent performance of administrative functions. There are advantages both to the public and the administrators in having such policies. Of course there are limits to be observed in the way policies are applied. Blanket decisions which leave no room for particular circumstances may be unreasonable. What is crucial is that the policy must not fetter the exercise of the discretion. The particular circumstances always require to be considered. Provided that the policy is not regarded as binding and the authority still retains a free exercise of discretion the policy may serve the useful purpose of giving a reasonable guidance both to applicants and decision-makers.”
“This Part applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts - (a). breaches a person’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and (b). as a result would be unlawful undersection 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 .”
“This error is not immaterial. It shows that the FtT’s approach to the appeals was confused. This confusion led it into error in assessing whether the deprivation decisions were inconsistent with Article 8 rights; and in exercising discretion generally as to whether the deprivation decisions should have been made.”
“… The FtT made clear that it was considering the hypothetical situation in which there was an appeal against a decision to deport. The FtT may well have found such a hypothetical consideration a useful check on its decision under Article 8 about the decision to deprive of citizenship …. The Respondent accepts that the provisions did not apply to the decision to deprive of citizenship. The FtT did not suggest that they did. The Respondent did not apply them when making her decisions. The Respondent submits that hypothetical consideration of the deportation issue by the FtT has no effect on its properly reached conclusions in respect of the deprivation of citizenship.”
“Having had sight of the skeleton argument prepared for the other Appellants, the first Appellant wishes to adopt that skeleton without repetition herein … Any submissions made in this skeleton are in addition to the points therein.”