“Her Majesty’s Government assesses that you • are involved in terrorism-related activities; • have links to a number of Islamic extremists.” • are involved in terrorism-related activities; • have links to a number of Islamic extremists.”
“The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.”
“The Secretary of State may not make an order under subsection (2) if he is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless.”
“Before making an order under this section in respect of a person the Secretary of State must give the person written notice specifying— (a) that the Secretary of State has decided to make an order, (b) the reasons for the order, and (c) the person’s right of appeal under section 40A(1) or undersection 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 .”
“An order under s.40 may not be made in respect of a person while an appeal under this section ors.2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 – (a) has been instituted and has not yet been finally determined, withdrawn or abandoned, or (b) could be brought (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission).”
“The following provisions of the [2002 Act] shall apply in relation to an appeal under this section as they apply in relation to an appeal under section 82, 83 or 83A of that Act— (a) section 87 (successful appeal: directions) (for which purpose a direction may, in particular, provide for an order under section 40 above to be treated as having had no effect).”
“Should any appeal in respect of the deprivation of your citizenship be successful, the order depriving you of your citizenship will be treated as never having had effect.”
“(1) A person may not appeal under section 82(1) while he is in the United Kingdom unless his appeal is of a kind to which this section applies.
“9. On that shaky foundation, Miss Weston submits that, on the facts, the Claimant will not have an adequate opportunity to present his appeal unless his return to the United Kingdom is facilitated. There is a good deal of evidence about this issue. The Defendant suggests that he can give instructions and evidence by Skype or television link, for which there are adequate facilities in Khartoum: see the letter from the British Embassy of1 July 2011 . The Claimant has obtained an opinion from an apparently well informed expert that to do so would put him at risk of becoming of adverse interest to the Sudanese security service, NISS, an occurrence which would put his safety at risk: see the reports of 21 May and8 July 2011 of Peter Verney. Further, the Claimant’s skilful and conscientious solicitors maintain that they cannot fulfil their professional duties to him adequately unless they are able to speak to him face to face and in confidence: see the witness statement of Smita Bajaria of11 February 2011 , prepared for the purposes of MK’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, C4/2010/2146. It is neither possible nor necessary for me to resolve these differences. They can be circumvented if the Claimant can travel to a safe third country, in or from which he can give instructions and from which he can give evidence by television link – a means of giving evidence which is not significantly less satisfactory than giving evidence when physically present in court, as I explained in paragraph 24 of my judgment in El v SSHD[2011] EWHC 1047 (Admin) .” 10. The live question is whether the Claimant can travel to a safe third country. For that, he will require a Sudanese identity document and passport. He already has a nationality certificate which his solicitors understand ‘absent other factors’ entitles him to obtain a Sudanese passport: see their letter of11 April 2011 to SIAC. Mr Verney states that his Sudanese sources confirm that it would not be possible ‘under normal circumstances’ to obtain a Sudanese passport without showing that national service had been completed. The June 2003 issue of the Sudanese Human Rights Quarterly stated that persons who refused to enter national service ‘may also be prevented from obtaining official identity documents, such as travel documents, identity papers and drivers licenses’: see paras 13 and 16 of Mr Verney’s letter of8 July 2011 . If there is a legal principle which requires that the Claimant can give evidence in a manner which permits SIAC to hear and observe him which, for the reasons expressed above, I doubt, it must, as a matter of principle, be for the Claimant to demonstrate that that course is not open to him. The material which he has deployed is, at best, equivocal. On balance, it seems to be more likely than not that he can obtain a Sudanese passport, just as he has obtained a nationality certificate. 11. Further, he would, in any event, require a Sudanese passport lawfully to leave Sudan. His British passport has been withdrawn. If, nevertheless, he would propose to depart Sudan by using it, he could also use it to visit a third country. Further, if he were to return to the United Kingdom, there is no guarantee – indeed, in my judgment, little likelihood – that he would return to Sudan if he were to lose his appeal. If he left without a Sudanese passport and, probably, exit visa, he would have no travel document which would secure his re-entry into Sudan. Emergency travel documents would have to be obtained from the Sudanese Embassy in London. If his concerns about NISS are justified, that would immediately alert the Sudanese authorities to the fact that he was unable to travel on his British passport. The most obvious of enquiries would reveal why – that it had been withdrawn on conducive grounds. It would then be open to him to claim that it would not be safe to return him to Sudan – a ground of challenge, which, given Sudan's notoriously poor human rights record, might well succeed. Accordingly, the step which the Claimant suggests is required of the Defendant would, if he were found to pose a threat to national security, frustrate a decision which would, by then, have been established to be lawful and justified. In my judgment, the Defendant cannot be criticised for refusing to take a step which would, in all probability, have the effect of frustrating a decision which, if upheld on appeal, would have been lawfully and properly taken in the interests of national security.”
“38 The German and Austrian Governments also argue that when the decision withdrawing the naturalisation of the applicant in the main proceedings was adopted, the latter was a German national, living in Germany, to whom an administrative act by a German authority was addressed. According to those governments, supported by the Commission, this is, therefore, a purely internal situation not in any way concerning European Union law, the latter not being applicable simply because a Member State has adopted a measure in respect of one of its nationals. The fact that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, the person concerned exercised his right to freedom of movement before his naturalisation cannot of itself constitute a cross-border element capable of playing a part with regard to the withdrawal of that naturalisation.”
“39 It is to be borne in mind here that, according to established case law, it is for each member state, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality: see Micheletti (Case C-369/90 )[1992] ECR I-4239 , para 10; Belgian State v Mesbah[1999] ECR I-7955 , para 29 and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Case C-200/02 ), para 37. ... 42 It is clear that the situation of a citizen of the Union who... is faced with a decision withdrawing his naturalisation, adopted by the authorities of one Member State, and placing him, after he has lost the nationality of another Member State that he originally possessed, in a position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 17 EC and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law. 43As the Court has several times stated, citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States (Grzelczyk[2001] ECR I-6193 , paragraph 31; Baumbast and R[2002] ECR I-7091 , paragraph 82). 44 Article 17(2) EC attaches to that status the rights and duties laid down by the Treaty, including the right to rely on Article 12 EC in all situations falling within the scope ratione materiae of Union law... 45 Thus, the Member States must, when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality, have due regard to European Union law (Micheletti and Others[1992] ECR I-4239 paragraph 10...). 46 In those circumstances, it is for the Court to rule on the questions referred by the national court which concern the conditions in which a citizen of the Union may, because he loses his nationality, lose his status of citizen of the Union and thereby be deprived of the rights attaching to that status. 47 In this regard, the national court essentially raises the question of the proviso formulated in the Court’s case-law cited in paragraph 45 above, to the effect that the Member States must, when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality, have due regard to European Union law... 48 The proviso that due regard must be had to European Union law does not compromise the principle of international law previously recognised by the Court... that the Member States have the power to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality, but rather enshrines the principle that, in respect of citizens of the Union, the exercise of that power, in so far as it affects the rights conferred and protected by the legal order of the Union, as is in particular the case of a decision withdrawing naturalisation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of European Union law.”
“56 Having regard to the importance which primary law attaches to the status of citizen of the Union, when examining a decision withdrawing naturalisation it is necessary, therefore, to take into account the consequences that the decision entails for the person concerned and, if relevant, for the members of his family with regard to the loss of the rights enjoyed by every citizen of the Union. In this respect it is necessary to establish, in particular, whether that loss is justified in relation to the gravity of the offence committed by that person, to the lapse of time between the naturalisation decision and the withdrawal decision and to whether it is possible for that person to recover his original nationality.”
“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”
“Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”
“This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.”
“Member States may exclude the individual concerned from their territory pending the redress procedure, but they may not prevent the individual from submitting his/her defence in person, except when his/her appearance may cause serious troubles to public policy or public security or when the appeal or judicial review concerns a denial of entry to the territory.”
“within the scope of application of the Treaties/Treaty”
“[W]hat the Charter does not and cannot do is to give birth to rights, freedoms and principles in areas in which the Treaties claim no rule-making competence but acknowledge the exclusive competence of Member States. This is spelt out in art 51(2) of the Charter...”
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”