“56. This means that there is sufficient room for doubt about the safety of traceable descendants, no matter how small that may be. In view of this the majority sees no justification for imperilling their safety, however remote that possibility. In our view, in the absence of certainty it is far better to err on the side of caution than to give rise to such a risk through disclosure.”
“67. The Tribunal majority endorses the Commissioner's findings with regard to the public interest. We too acknowledge the importance of historic research and the Appellant's laudable efforts to cast light onto a once dim area of history. However, it is our view that the ability of the United Kingdom to maintain its national security and the safety of descendents [sic], who may be at risk of exposure to harm, to whatever degree, and the consequences this would have on current and future informants, must prevail.”
“26. The Home Office also sought to rely on the ‘late claimed’ exemption under s.38(1) of FOIA in the event that the Tribunal did not find that the exemption in s.24(1) was engaged or if the Tribunal found that the PIBT in relation to s.24(1) favoured disclosure. The Home Office contended that the persons likely to be ‘endangered’ (as referred to in s.38(1)) by disclosure of the information would be the descendants of informants. The Home Office accepted that the risk of such endangerment was small but submitted that the nature of the harm that might flow from disclosure was potentially very serious. In relation to the late claimed exemption under s.38(1) FOIA Mr Keane submitted that again this was not engaged as the risk of harm to descendants was speculative and unsupported by any evidence.”
“47. The Home Office contends there is a real risk that upon disclosure of the identities of the informants, their descendants will be able to be traced. They go on to say that groups or communities within which those informants operated are likely to seek retribution against descendants. They claim that this is particularly the case in Ireland and Northern Ireland where there remain threats to individuals from paramilitary dissident groups. Whilst the risk is acknowledged to be a small one, the nature of the harm that could result (serious injury or death) is so serious that identification should be avoided.”
“It is not the function of an appellate court to strive by tortuous mental gymnastics to find error in the decision under review when in truth there has been none. The concern of the court ought to be substance not semantics. To adopt Lord Hoffmann’s phrase, the court must be wary of becoming embroiled in ‘narrow textual analysis’.”
“Given such expertise in a Tribunal, it is entirely understandable that a reviewing court or Tribunal will be slow to interfere with its findings and evaluation of facts in areas where that expertise has a bearing. This may be regarded not so much as requiring that a different, enhanced standard must be met as an acknowledgement of the reality that an expert Tribunal can normally be expected to apply its expertise in the course of its analysis of facts.”
“(i) to consider to what extent the public interest factors potentially underlying the relevant exemption are in play in the particular case and then (ii) to consider what weight attaches to those factors, on the particular facts.”
“42. The difference arises from the significance to be given to the age of the information. All agree that there must come a time when the disclosure of the identity of an informant who operated in the distant past would not have an effect on the confidence of a current day informant. Or at least one whose inherent paranoia was not so great as to make him or her totally unsuitable to perform the role in any event. To take an extreme example, if a potential informant were to be discouraged from co-operating by the fear that his or her activities would be disclosed after, say, three hundred and fifty years (the equivalent of the disclosure today of those who may have acted as spies during the English Civil War), then one might conclude that his or her paranoia was so intense and irrational that it would not be safe for the police to pursue the recruitment process. Conversely, as the MI5 policy referred to above suggests (supported by the conclusions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in the Frank-Steiner case) it would certainly be premature to disclose today information about those acting as informants or agents during the Second World War. But, as one extends further back in time than that, those seeking to retain confidentiality must shoulder a greater burden of demonstrating that the risk of real danger, or of a rational perception of danger, has not diluted to such an extent that the public interest in maintaining secrecy loses much of its weight. In that context it is not just the seniority and experience of those giving evidence that must be considered. The Tribunal must assess the reasoning of an expert witness, no matter how eminent, experienced and knowledgeable he or she may be.”
“38. We say further, in relation to the Appellant's point about the age of the disputed information that there is a defining difference between a revelation of this nature (i.e. about informants in Irish history from the late 19th and early 20th centuries) and similar historical matters from say the 17th century (i.e. the time of the English Civil War). It is that totally different systems were in place. Informants in the Irish conflict were operated by agencies still in existence today and still in full operation. Furthermore, there are lingering embers from this conflict, however tangential they may be. Revelations about informants in 17th century affairs cannot be held the responsibility of anyone or any organisation still existing, whereas a revelation about Ireland could easily be linked to the MPS or MI5. As long as the MPS is operating in this way, anything they did in the past retains strong protection because it would be exactly they and no one else that would be responsible for redeeming the promise of perpetual secrecy.”