Edward Williams v Information Commissioner & Anor [2026] UKFTT 568 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 00568 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/EA/2025/0313

First-tier Tribunal

General Regulatory Chamber

Hearing Heard on: 27 March 2026

Date 15 April 2026

Information Rights

Heard by: Cloud Video Platform

Before

JUDGE HAZEL OLIVER

MEMBER SUZANNE COSGRAVE

MEMBER EMMA YATES

Between

edward williamsAppellant

INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondent

THE HOME OFFICERespondent

In person for Appellant

Did not attend for Respondent

for Second Respondent: Mr Tom Tabori, counsel

Decision: The appeal is allowed in part.

Substituted Decision Notice:

The exemptions relied on by the Home Office are not engaged by the titles of the 26 reports prepared by the Extremism Analysis Unit that were disclosed to the Appellant on 11 March 2019. No further action is required by the Home Office as the titles of these reports have already been disclosed.

The Home Office was entitled to withhold the remainder of the requested information under the exemption in section 24 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

REASONS

Mode of hearing

[1]The proceedings were held by video (CVP). All parties joined remotely, with the Appellant attending by audio only. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.

Background to Appeal

[2]This appeal is against a decision of the Information Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) dated 18 August 2025 (IC-360110-J0P6, the “Decision Notice”). The appeal relates to the application of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). It concerns information about the report titles and actual reports by the Extremism Analysis Unit (“EAU”) requested from the Home Office.

[3]On 27 June 2024, the Appellant wrote to the Home Office and requested the following information (the “Request”):

“1.Disclose the official TITLE of all the reports of The Extremism Analysis Unit. Please provide list in date order, oldest first, with the relevant publication/finalisation date shown if possible. 2.Disclose all of the REPORTS of the EAU. The request does not include personal data where there is no legitimate interest in it being disclosed. If you claim an exemption, please state which report(s) it relates and why. Do not use phrases like 'chilling effect' and 'safe space', please. They are infantile.”

[4]The Home Office responded on 18 July 2024. They confirmed that the requested information was held, but refused to provide any of the information. They said that this information is exempt from disclosure under sections 24, 27, 31, 35, 38 and 40 FOIA.

[5]The Appellant requested an internal review on 18 July 2024. The Home Office responded late, on 30 January 2025, and maintained their position, including the refusal to disclose the titles of the reports.

[6]The Appellant complained to the Commissioner on 30 January 2025. The Commissioner decided that the exemption in section 24(1) (national security) was engaged, as he was satisfied that the Home Office’s arguments show that withholding the requested information is necessary for the purposes of safeguarding national security. The Commissioner also decided that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

The Appeal and Responses

[7]The Appellant appealed on 18 August 2025. His grounds of appeal are:a. Section 24 does not apply to the requested information.

b. There is no explanation why parts of the information cannot be redacted.

c. Titles of some of the reports are already in the public domain, as they were included in an amended response from the Home Office in appeal number EA/2020/0154.

[8]The Commissioner’s response maintains that the Decision Notice was correct, except in relation to the titles of reports that had already been disclosed:a. The Commissioner concedes that the names of 26 listed reports (and the names only) are not exempt from disclosure, based on a previous disclosure by the Home Office on 11 March 2019 in response to a request from the Appellant. He consents to a substituted Decision Notice recording that the cited exemptions are not engaged in respect of the names (and the names only) of the above reports.

b. The Commissioner maintains that the titles of all other reports, and the content of all reports, are exempt under section 24(1).

c. Only some report titles were previously disclosed, no actual reports were disclosed, and the Home Office has said it is the policy of the EAU not to routinely release the titles of its reports.

d. The Commissioner remains satisfied with the Home Office’s submissions, and can “clearly see the risk to national security if such information were to be disclosed given that it would reveal the full extent and capability of the unit’s analysis and in turn any gaps within the Home Office’s intelligence function”. Redaction would not be appropriate.

e. The Tribunal has previously upheld the refusal to provide the contents of the reports, under section 35(1)(a) FOIA (formulation and development of government policy).

[9]The Appellant submitted a reply which makes the following points:a. Section 24(1) is not engaged because neither the Home Office nor the Commissioner has made the statutory “admission” that withholding is required to safeguard national security.

b. The Commissioner failed to require any explanation of why withholding is required in relation to this specific information.

c. The public-interest balance is flawed because the Commissioner failed to take any account of the age of the information.

d. The Commissioner failed to consider less restrictive measures (partial or redacted disclosure).

[10]The Home Office was joined as a party to the proceedings. Their amended response does not oppose the Commissioner’s concession relating to the report titles that had previously been disclosed to the Appellant, but otherwise resists the appeal:a. The Home Office relies on the Commissioner’s response, and in the alternative on the other exemptions previously relied on.

b. The harmful consequence of disclosure is not cured by redacting portions of each report. In addition, any redaction would produce information of no meaningful utility nor weight, and would make the request vexatious due to the length of time involved.

[11]The Appellant provided a detailed reply to the Home Office’s response, and his points are dealt with in the discussion below.

Applicable law

[12]The relevant provisions of FOIA are as follows. 1 General right of access to information held by public authorities. (1). Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b). if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. ……

[2]Effect of the exemptions in Part II. ……. (2) In respect of any information which is exempt information by virtue of any provision of Part II, section 1(1)(b) does not apply if or to the extent that—(a) the information is exempt information by virtue of a provision conferring absolute exemption, or

(b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. …….. 24 National security (1) Information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt information if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. ……. 58 Determination of appeals (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a). that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based.

[13]The exemption for national security in section 24 does not require prejudice, but it is a qualified exemption that is subject to the public interest test.

[14]The principles and key caselaw regarding national security and the section 24 exemption were set out by the Upper Tribunal in FCDO v Information Commissioner, Williams and Others

[2021] UKUT 248 (AAC)

, at paragraph 31:(1) The term national security has been interpreted broadly and encompasses the security of the United Kingdom and its people, the protection of democracy and the legal and constitutional systems of the state: Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman

[2001] UKHL 47

[2003] 1 AC 153

, paras 15-16 per Lord Steyn, para 50 per Lord Hoffmann and para 64 per Lord Hutton.

(2) A threat to national security may be direct (the threat of action against the United Kingdom) or indirect (arising from the threat of action directed against other states): Rehman, paras 16 and 64.

(3) Section 24 is not engaged, unlike the majority of the qualified exemptions, by a consideration of prejudice. Its engagement is deliberately differently worded.

(4) The term “required” means “reasonably necessary”: Kalman v Information Commissioner & Department for Transport [2011] 1 Info LR 664, para 33.

(5) National security is a matter of vital national importance in which the Tribunal should pause and reflect very carefully before overriding the sincerely held views of relevant public authorities: APPGER v InformationCommissioner & Ministry of Defence

[2011] UKUT 153 (AAC)

, [2011] 2 Info LR 75, para 56 (citing Rehman).

(6) Even where the chance of a particular harm occurring is relatively low, the seriousness of the consequences (the nature of the risk) can nonetheless mean that the public interest in avoiding that risk is very strong: Kalman, para 47. As the Upper Tribunal put it: “the reality is that the public interest in maintaining the qualified national security exemption in section 24(1) is likely to be substantial and to require a compelling competing public interest to equal or outweigh it”: Keane v Information Commissioner, Home Office and Metropolitan Police Service

[2016] UKUT 461 (AAC)

, para 58 (approving Kalman). That does not mean that the section 24 exemption carries “inherent weight”, but is rather a reflection of what is likely to be a fair recognition of the public interests involved in the particular circumstances of a case in which section 24 is properly engaged.

Issues and evidence

[15]The issues are:a. Is section 24(1) engaged by the withheld information? This requires the Tribunal to decide whether the exemption from disclosure is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

b. If so, does the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweigh the public interest in disclosing the information?

[16]By way of evidence and submissions we had the following, all of which we have taken into account in making our decision:a. An agreed bundle of open documents.

b. A closed bundle of documents containing a full list of the requested titles, and full samples of some of the reports.

c. Open and closed witness statements for the Second Respondent.

d. Skeleton argument from the Second Respondent, and oral submissions from both parties.

Open Evidence

[17]We had a detailed witness statement from Dr Anuj Mathew, Deputy Director and head of Homeland Security Analysis and Insight Unit. He is a Senior Civil Servant. Key factual points from his witness statement are:a. The EAU was established in December 2014 to provide analysis of extremism which has a direct impact on the UK and the UK’s interests. The EAU was rebranded as the Homeland Security Analysis and Insight Unit (“HSAI”) in 2021. Responsibility for counter-extremism policy work moved to the Home Office in 2024. The general methodology and approach in producing intelligence assessments has remained consistent, and HSAI maintains a library of all EAU and HSAI assessments.

b. Much of HSAI’s work is for the Prevent Directorate. The core mission of Prevent is stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

c. The purpose of the counter-extremism work in HSAI is to provide government with an understanding of extremism and the way extremists work, their ideologies and the harm they cause or potentially cause. HSAI may rely on a variety of sources when preparing its reports, including open-source material, academic research, and input from partners. HSAI work has a particular focus on national security harms from extremism because that is the key area of interest for the Homeland Security Group and Prevent.

d. The range of extremist beliefs and ideologies individuals subscribe to is becoming more diverse. Extremist ideology can be spread both online via the internet and offline through direct interaction between individuals, meaning anyone can engage with it anywhere, and there is also the risk of geographical community “hot spots” of extremism. This diversity is reflected in HSAI’s very large catalogue of assessments.

e. The work of HSAI informs policy and operational activity undertaken by multiple government departments, and most reports are distributed to a wide cross-government customer base of individuals working in counter-extremism. Distribution is strictly managed by a set distribution list that can only be joined via a specific minimum level of security clearance and an agreement to adherence of handling instructions.

f. HSAI reports comment on the risks and threats from actors who seek to draw others into extremism and ideological violence, and the work and reports of the HSAI can also be linked to counter-terrorism operations and policy response in some cases. The reports of HSAI provide a detailed analysis of activity in areas of extremism and radicalisation towards terrorism.

g. Dr Mathew says that the areas covered in the reports and the content of those reports is of great sensitivity. He says that disclosure of the entire history of extremism reporting, including dates and titles of reports, would likely reveal the full capability and gaps within the Home Office’s extremism intelligence function. His concern is that this information would be used by extremist actors to gain an advantage, by understanding and exploiting capability and subject matter expertise to tackle extremist threat.

h. In relation to the list of report titles that was disclosed in 2019, Dr Mathew says that the personnel involved in making this decision are no longer working at the Home Office, and he does not agree that their decision to provide a redacted list of reports was in the correct interest of safeguarding national security.

[18]The Appellant had made a written application to exclude parts of Dr Mathew’s evidence as it was advocacy rather than facts based on his own knowledge (this application was refused but he had the opportunity to make submissions at the hearing). He also questioned a sentence in Dr Mathew’s statement which says it was written with assistance of legal representatives. We accept Dr Mathew’s position that the statement is his own and we have made the factual findings above on the basis they are from Dr Mathew’s own knowledge.

[19]Dr Mathew gave his oral evidence under oath. He was questioned by the Appellant. Some of this questioning was challenging and repetitive. The Tribunal’s view of Dr Mathew’s evidence is that he was an honest and consistent witness, who was endeavouring to help the Tribunal as much as possible while being mindful not to disclose any information that might breach national security.

[20]During this oral evidence, Dr Mathew explained that the sample set of reports provided to the Information Commissioner were chosen at random, but ensuring they covered all the different types of risk. He confirmed that the total number of titles was 216, and he had read all reports from 2023 onwards when he started his current job. He explained that all the reports are of the same nature and cover the same range of risks. He also said that older reports do not involve less risk to national security, as the nature of the risk carries on and the same ideologies may be carried on. He was not aware of any harm caused by the list of titles provided in 2019, but also said he did not have access to information on this.

Closed Evidence

[21]We had a short closed statement from Dr Mathew. We have also seen a full list of the report titles, and a sample of ten of the reports (the same sample of reports that was provided to the Information Commissioner during his investigation).

Discussion and Conclusions

[22]We held a closed session during the hearing in order to ask Dr Mathew additional questions on a closed basis, including questions on behalf of the Appellant. The following is the gist of the closed session that was agreed with the Second Respondent and read out to the Appellant when the open session resumed: 1. Dr Anuj Mathew (M) described the size of his team, the process of review of draft reports, and the nature of his review involvement. 2. Through review of the titles of the reports, M identified that he had reviewed approximately 20 reports since he started in his role in January 2023. More reports will have been published since the list of titles was provided to the Tribunal. 3. M described the circulation list for the reports and the reasons why recipients request and receive these reports. 4. As to circulation to the public, M did not think a member of the public could receive these reports, as a matter of vetting and also of “need to know”. M did not think that the reports have been shared with the public. M is not responsible for vetting and does not know the details required. 5. M described the marking of the security class of reports. 6. On the nature of the selection of samples, M further explained that he and his team sectored the areas of reports, then chose randomly within those sectors, whilst then making some updates to ensure they gave reflective coverage. The Tribunal looked at the titles of the reports as part of this discussion. 7. M gave more detail on the reasons why the passage of time does not diminish the risk of disclosure of reports or their titles, including because it reveals capability of the unit, with reference to specific report titles and also what is not included in the report titles. 8. M addressed further why he disagreed with the 2019 disclosure, referring to the advent of social media. Discussion and Conclusions In accordance with section 58 of FOIA, our role is to consider whether the Commissioner’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law. As set out in section 58(2), we may review any finding of fact on which the Decision Notice was based. This means that we can review all of the evidence provided to us and make our own decision. We deal in turn with the issues.

[23]Both the Information Commissioner and the Home Office have conceded that the 26 report titles that were disclosed to the Appellant in March 2019 should not have been withheld. We agree. The appeal succeeds in part on this basis, as set out in the substituted decision notice.

[24]We have considered the application of the exemption in section 24 to the remainder of the withheld information.

[25]Is section 24(1) engaged by the withheld information? This requires the Tribunal to decide whether the exemption from disclosure is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. Having considered the evidence and the submissions from the parties, we find that this exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. This applies to both the report titles and the content of the reports.

[26]In relation to the report titles, the Tribunal has seen a list of all 216 titles. We agree with the evidence from Dr Mathew that these reports appear to cover the same types of risk, with the titles of the reports showing how they are connected to counter-terrorism and the precise subject matter. We accept the position of the Home Office that disclosure of a full list of report titles reveals the full capability and gaps within the Home Office’s extremism intelligence function over time – by showing what had been and was currently being focussed on, as well as areas of limited or no focus. We can see how this information could be used by extremist actors to gain an advantage, based on detailed knowledge about the Home Office’s focus and capabilities. This in turn would make communities, individuals and institutions in the UK less safe, by making it more difficult to detect extremism, and so increasing the risk of extremist or terrorist activities.

[27]In making this assessment, we have given weight to the sincerely held views of the Home Office, as they are experts in this matter and in accordance with the guidance in the caselaw. We also find that this risk is clear from looking at the full list of titles and the descriptive nature of those titles, including the date of each report.

[28]We have considered the Appellant’s arguments in relation to the report titles. In his reply to the Home Office response, he says that EAU is a research and policy unit rather than a security/intelligence body, and there is no evidence of classified intelligence collection, covert operations or direct threat disruption comparable to security services. He therefore says that the mosaic risk is overstated and there is no evidence of harm from title disclosure. We disagree. The reporting work of the EAU and HSAI is based on research rather than front-line security operations, but this does not prevent disclosure of report titles from being a risk to national security. For the reasons explained above, we accept that disclosure of all report titles would present a genuine risk to national security by revealing areas of focus and gaps.

[29]We note the Appellant’s point that a list of 26 report titles was disclosed in 2019, and no evidence has been provided of direct harm. However, we note that this was a redacted list. That is very different from a full list of all 216 reports. In addition, we accept Dr Mathew’s evidence that he disagrees with this past disclosure. He is of the view that the risk from disclosure is higher now, partly due to social media. The Appellant also says that disclosure of further titles will only reveal thematic focus areas. We do not agree that this means disclosure would not be a risk to national security. The titles of the reports are very clear as to each area of focus and, as explained above, it is this information about Home Office focus that could be exploited by extremist actors.

[30]We therefore find that the report titles engage section 24.

[31]We have also considered the report contents. Having found that the titles engage section 24, it is clear that the content of the reports also engages the exemption for the same reason. The titles alone give information about capability and gaps. The content of the reports would give even more information about this, and so pose a greater risk to national security.

[32]The Appellant has suggested that redacted versions of the reports could be provided. We disagree. As we have found the report titles engage section 24, this would require removal of all information that could reveal what the report was about. We agree with the submission of the Home Office that this level of redaction would produce information with no meaning, and would not further the transparency and accountability interests in disclosure. Having viewed a sample of 10 of the full reports, it is difficult to see how any coherent information at all could be provided without revealing the subject matter of the report.

[33]The Appellant made oral submissions at the hearing that the Commissioner’s decision was based on a sample of only 10 reports out of 216 (the Appellant incorrectly referring to 261). He questioned how this could fit with the FOIA regime and how this could be an adequate sample. He sent an email after the hearing making the point that this was approximately 3.8% of the total reports held. The correct calculation is actually 4.6% (10/216). However, this issue about samples is not relevant to our decision. We have found that the titles of the reports engage the exemption, which means the full reports must do so as well. It was not necessary for us to review the content of the sample reports in any detail in order to reach this decision. It is self-evident that the content of each report will reveal what it is about, and that is enough to engage the exemption.

[34]We have also considered the point made in the Appellant’s first reply that section 24(1) is not engaged because neither the Home Office nor the Commissioner has made the statutory “admission” that withholding is required to safeguard national security. The Appellant is correct that section 24 is based on whether the exemption is “required”. However, the Home Office has been clear in its view that the exemption is required, and we do not agree that some form of “statutory admission” is necessary.

[35]If so, does the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweigh the public interest in disclosing the information? We deal in turn with the public interest for and against disclosure.

[36]Public interest in favour of disclosure. There is a general public interest in openness and transparency in government. We can see that there may be a particular interest in the work of the Home Office and HSAI in relation to counter-extremism, given the serious effects on society of acts of extremism and terrorism. The Appellant argues that the public interest has strengthened since the previous appeal, and gives various examples in his second reply – extremism threats have evolved, there is intense public debate on counter-extremism policy, and transparency in taxpayer funded research informing Prevent and counter-extremism strategy promotes accountability and informed debate. We agree that this is a significant area of public interest and debate.

[37]Public interest in maintaining the exemption. There is always a strong public interest in safeguarding national security. As referred to in FCDO v Information Commissioner, Williams and Others, national security is a matter of vital national importance, and the seriousness of the consequences can mean that the public interest in avoiding that risk is very strong, even where the chance of a particular harm is relatively low. The information in this case relates to extremism. This can cause significant physical and psychological harm to individuals and communities, as well as undermining democracy and the operation of the state. The Appellant relies on the way that extremism threats have evolved as a factor in favour of disclosure, but this is also something that increases the risks of extremism and so a reason for withholding the information. We agree with the Commissioner that the benefit that would flow from disclosure would not justify the potential harm to the UK’s national security.

[38]The Appellant says that much of the information is now historical in nature, and suggests this tips the balance towards disclosure for older information, promoting accountability for historical counter-extremism efforts while the risk of harm fades. We have considered this argument in the light of the evidence from Dr Mathew. It is correct that some of the reports are up to 10 years old. However, we accept the evidence from Dr Mathew that older reports do not by virtue of their age involve less risk to national security, as the nature of the risk carries on and the same ideologies may be carried on. We explored this further in the closed session with reference to specific report titles, as set out in the gist above. We find that the age of some of the information does not significantly reduce the risk of harm from disclosure and so does not tip the balance in favour of disclosure for the older reports.

[39]We therefore find that the public interest in maintaining the exemption does outweigh the public interest in disclosing the information.

[40]The Home Office was entitled to withhold the requested information under the section 24 exemption for national security, with the exception of the list of titles of reports that had been disclosed in 2019.

[41]We uphold the appeal in part and issue the Substituted Decision Notice set out at the start of this decision. Signed: Judge Hazel Oliver Date:10 April 2026