“(1) A person is entitled to vote as an elector at a parliamentary election in any constituency if on the date of the poll he- (a) is registered in the register of parliamentary electors for that constituency; (b) is not subject to any legal incapacity to vote (age apart); (c) is either a Commonwealth citizen or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland; and (d) is of voting age (that is, 18 years or over)….”
“Disfranchisement of offenders in prison etc (1) A convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution in pursuance of his sentence or unlawfully at large when he would otherwise be so detained is legally incapable of voting at any parliamentary or local government election. (2) For this purpose-- (a) ‘convicted person’ means any person found guilty of an offence (whether under the law of the United Kingdom or not), ….., but not including a person dealt with by committal or other summary process for contempt of court; … (c) a person detained for default in complying with his sentence shall not be treated as detained in pursuance of the sentence…”
“(2) …if on the day of the poll he would be entitled to vote as an elector at a parliamentary election in a parliamentary constituency wholly or partly comprised in the electoral region, and— (a) the address in respect of which he is registered in the relevant register of parliamentary electors is within the electoral region, or (b) his registration in the relevant register of parliamentary electors results from an overseas elector's declaration which specifies an address within the electoral region.”
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”
“The Scottish Parliament takes its place under our constitutional arrangements as a self-standing democratically elected legislature. Its democratic mandate to make laws for the people of Scotland is beyond question. Acts that the Scottish Parliament enacts which are within its legislative competence enjoy, in that respect, the highest legal authority. The United Kingdom Parliament has vested in the Scottish Parliament the authority to make laws that are within its devolved competence.”
“COMMON PROVISIONS ….. 6.1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of7 December 2000 , as adapted at Strasbourg, on12 December 2007 , which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII [Articles 51–54] of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.” …. 6.3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law. …. PROVISIONS ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES …. 10.1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. 10.2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens. 10.3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and asclosely as possible to the citizen. 10.4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union. …. PROVISIONS ON THE INSTITUTIONS …. 14.3. The members of the European Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.”
“190.1 The representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community shall be elected by direct universal suffrage. …. 4 The European Parliament shall draw up a proposal for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States or in accordance with principles common to all Member States.”
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, the electoral procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions. These national provisions, which may if appropriate take account of the specific situation in the Member States, shall not affect the essentially proportional nature of the voting system.”
“1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 2. Rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. 3. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection. 4. In so far as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions. 5. The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality. 6. Full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter. 7. The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States.”
“Article 39 - Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament 1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. 2. Members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Article 40 - Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he or she resides under the same conditions as nationals of that State.”
“applies under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, in accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter. Article 39(1) corresponds to the right guaranteed in Article 20(2) [TFEU] (cf. also the legal base in Article 22 [TFEU] for the adoption of detailed arrangements for the exercise of that right) and Article 39(2) corresponds to Article 14(3) [TEU]. Article 39(2) takes over the basic principles of the electoral system in a democratic state.”
“…corresponds to the right guaranteed by Article 20(2) [TFEU] (cf. also the legal base in Article 22 [TFEU] for the adoption of detailed arrangements for the exercise of that right). In accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, it applies under the conditions defined in these Articles in the Treaties.”
“53. First, article 3 of the First Protocol enshrines a characteristic principle of an effective democracy. …. 54. Second, although article 3 is phrased in terms of the obligation of the contracting states to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of individual rights, article 3 guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election …. 55. Third, there is room for ‘implied limitations’ on the rights enshrined in article 3, and contracting states must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere: Mathieu-Mohin v Belgium(1987) 10 EHRR 1 , para 52; Yumak v Turkey(2008) 48 EHRR 61 , para 109(ii). 56. Fourth, the content of the obligation under article 3 varies in accordance with the historical and political factors specific to each state; ….. 57. Fifth, article 3 is not (by contrast with some other Convention rights, such as those enumerated in articles 8 to 11) subject to a specific list of legitimate limitations, and the contracting states are therefore free to rely in general in justifying a limitation on aims which are proved to be compatible with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention: Yumak, para 109 (iii); Tanase v Moldova (Application No 7/08) (unreported) given18 November 2008 , para 105. 58. Sixth, limitations on the exercise of the right to vote or stand for election must be imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim, must not be arbitrary or disproportionate, and must not interfere with the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature: Yumak, para 109(iii) to (iv). 59. Seventh, such limitations must not curtail the rights under article 3 to such an extent as to impair their very essence, and deprive them of their effectiveness. They must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage. Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature and the laws which it promulgates: Mathieu-Mohin, para 52; Yumak, para 109(iv).”
“While the intervention of a judge is in principle likely to guarantee the proportionality of restrictions on prisoners' voting rights, such restrictions will not necessarily be automatic, general and indiscriminate simply because they were not ordered by a judge. Indeed, the circumstances in which the right to vote is forfeited may be detailed in the law, making its application conditional on such factors as the nature or the gravity of the offence committed.”
“This court is not bound to follow every decision of the European court. Not only would it be impractical to do so: it would sometimes be inappropriate, as it would destroy the ability of the court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the European court which is of value to the development of Convention law: see e g R v Horncastle[2010] 2 AC 373 . Of course, we should usually follow a clear and constant line of decisions by the European court: R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator[2004] 2 AC 323 . But we are not actually bound to do so or (in theory, at least) to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber. As Lord Mance pointed out in Doherty v Birmingham City Council[2009] AC 367 , para 126, section 2 of the 1998 Act requires our courts to ‘take into account’ European court decisions, not necessarily to follow them. Where, however, there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it would be wrong for this court not to follow that line.”
“It may perhaps be said that, by voting the way they did to exempt unconvicted prisoners from the restriction on voting, Parliament implicitly affirmed the need for continued restrictions on the voting rights of convicted prisoners. Nonetheless it cannot be said that there was any substantive debate by members of the legislature on the continued justification in light of modern day penal policy and of current human rights standards for maintaining such a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote.”
“The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [Human Rights] Convention and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.”
“65 …. Articles 189 EC and 190 EC do not expressly and precisely state who are to be entitled to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for the European Parliament. 66 … [Article 19 EC] is confined to applying the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality to the exercise of that right, by providing that every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national is to have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. …. 76 …. Article 19(2) EC …. is confined, as pointed out in paragraph 66 above, to stating a rule of equal treatment between citizens of the Union residing in a Member State so far as concerns that right to vote and stand for election. While that provision, like Article 19(1) EC relating to the right of Union citizens to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections, implies that nationals of a Member State have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in their own country and requires the Member States to accord those rights to citizens of the Union residing in their territory, it does not follow that a Member State in a position such as that of the United Kingdom is prevented from granting the right to vote and to stand for election to certain persons who have a close link with it without however being nationals of that State or another Member State.”
“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”
“Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council …. may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”
“41 Accordingly, the existence of direct discrimination, within the meaning of the Directive, presupposes, first, that the situations being weighed up are comparable. 42 In that regard, it should be pointed out that, as is apparent from the judgment in Maruko … at [67]—[73], first, it is required not that the situations be identical, but only that they be comparable and, secondly, the assessment of that comparability must be carried out not in a global and abstract manner, but in a specific and concrete manner in the light of the benefit concerned.”
“75 …. it must be observed that, although de facto unions and legally recognised unions, such as marriage, may display similarities in certain respects, those similarities do not necessarily mean that those two types of union must be treated in the same way. 76 In those circumstances, the decision to apply the criterion of matrimonial legal status appears neither arbitrary nor manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective of reducing the allowances paid to SNEs [national experts seconded to the Commission] when they are in a situation in which it can be assumed that they bear fewer costs and disadvantages on account of their matrimonial status.”
“45. First, even where the legality of measures is subject to judicial review, exercise of the legislative function must not be hindered by the prospect of actions for damages whenever the general interest of the Community requires legislative measures to be adopted which may adversely affect individual interests. Secondly, in a legislative context characterized by the exercise of a wide discretion, which is essential for implementing a Community policy, the Community cannot incur liability unless the institution concerned has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers…”
“51. In such circumstances, Community law confers a right to reparation where three conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious, and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties. 52. First, those conditions satisfy the requirements of the full effectiveness of the rules of Community law and of the effective protection of the rights which those rules confer. 53. Secondly, those conditions correspond in substance to those defined by the Court in relation to Article 215 in its case-law on liability of the Community for damage caused to individuals by unlawful legislative measures adopted by its institutions. …. 55. As to the second condition, as regards both Community liability under Article 215 and Member State liability for breaches of Community law, the decisive test for finding that a breach of Community law is sufficiently serious is whether the Member State or the Community institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion. 56. The factors which the competent court may take into consideration include the clarity and precision of the rule breached; the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or Community authorities; whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary; whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable; the fact that the position taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards the omission, and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to Community law. 57. On any view, a breach of Community law will clearly be sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the infringement in question to be established, or a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of the Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question constituted an infringement.”
“I do not . . . accept the distinction which he drew between democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course true that the judges in this country are not elected and are not answerable to Parliament. . . . But the function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some way undemocratic.”
“The Court has consistently held in its case law that its task is not normally to review the relevant law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in which they were applied to, or affected, the applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention. It is, in our opinion, difficult to see in what circumstances restrictions on voting rights would be acceptable, if not in the case of persons sentenced to life imprisonment. Generally speaking, the Court's judgment concentrates above all on finding the British legislation incompatible with the Convention in abstracto. We regret that despite this focus it gives the states little or no guidance as to what would be solutions compatible with the Convention. Since restrictions on the right to vote continue to be compatible, it would seem obvious that the deprivation of the right to vote for the most serious offences such as murder or manslaughter, is not excluded in the future. Either the majority are of the view that deprivations for the post-tariff period are excluded, or else they think that a judge has to order such deprivations in each individual case. We think that it would have been desirable to indicate the correct answer.”
“the right to vote is not a privilege; in the twenty-first century, the presumption in a democratic State must be in favour of inclusion and universal suffrage has become the basic principle. In the light of modern-day penal policy and of current human rights standards, valid and convincing reasons should be put forward for the continued justification of maintaining such a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote as that provided for in Article 32(3) of the Russian Constitution (ibid, para 79).”
“The requirement to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence will normally result in the domestic court applying principles that are clearly established by the Strasbourg court. There will, however, be rare occasions where the domestic court has concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to the domestic court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course. This is likely to give the Strasbourg court the opportunity to reconsider the particular aspect of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes place what may prove to be a valuable dialogue between the domestic court and the Strasbourg court.”
“This court is not bound to follow every decision of the European court. Not only would it be impractical to do so: it would sometimes be inappropriate, as it would destroy the ability of the court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the European court which is of value to the development of Convention law: see e.g. R v Horncastle[2010] 2 AC 373 . Of course, we should usually follow a clear and constant line of decisions by the European court: R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator[2004] 2 AC 323 . But we are not actually bound to do so or (in theory, at least) to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber. As Lord Mance pointed out in Doherty v Birmingham City Council[2009] AC 367 , para 126, section 2 of the 1998 Act requires our courts to ‘take into account’ European court decisions, not necessarily to follow them. Where, however, there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it would be wrong for this court not to follow that line.”
“Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have regard to the following purposes of sentencing— (a) the punishment of offenders, (b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence), (c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, (d) the protection of the public, and (e) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.”
“(2) The court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.”
“Therefore, while the court reiterates that the margin of appreciation is wide, it is not all-embracing. Further, although the situation was somewhat improved by the Act of 2000 which for the first time granted the vote to persons detained on remand, section 3 of the 1983 Act remains a blunt instrument. It strips of their Convention right to vote a significant category of persons and it does so in a way which is indiscriminate. The provision imposes a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison. It applies automatically to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin might be, and as being incompatible with article 3 of Protocol No 1.”