“In this action, PEWC seeks to recover the legal and beneficial interest in the shares of the first four defendants herein, the defendants being companies incorporated in BVI and are subject to the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. In an action commenced in the Court of First Instance in the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, PEWC is seeking to recover the legal and beneficial interest in the PacMos shares and for accounts and inquiries …”
“Except where these rules provide otherwise, the court may … stay the whole or part of any proceedings either generally or until a specified event or date.”
“I think this action ought to be stayed as being a vexatious action within the meaning attached to that word by the Courts, because it can really lead to no possible good. It does not fall under the rule as the Lord Justice has said, but the rules, as we have pointed out more than once, do not, and that particular rule does not, deprive the Court in any way of the inherent power which every Court has to prevent the abuse of legal machinery which would occur, if for no possible benefit the defendants are to be dragged through litigation which must be long and expensive.”
“…it does not follow that the special power given by the Rules limits the inherent general jurisdiction in the Court to stay proceedings in proper cases.”
“The form of section 24(5) [of the 1925 Act] was evidently such as to secure that whatever special powers might be defined by rules of court, the inherent and general power of the High Court to stay proceedings should remain.”
“There was nothing in the Act of 1873, or in any of the rules made under it, to limit the Court’s powers of staying proceedings to cases in which such proceedings were oppressive or vexatious. Indeed, the rules made no reference to vexation or oppression. It was not until the Judicature Rules of 1883 were enacted that the word ‘vexatious’ or cases of vexation were referred to; and not until after theSupreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 that the rules referred to ‘cases of vexation or oppression,’ but they did not, in my view, curtail the court's inherent jurisdiction to stay by confining it to such cases. The courts would never stay an action lightly but only if convinced that justice required that it should be stayed. Justice would no doubt so require it but, in my view, not only if the action would properly be described as vexatious or oppressive.”
“In our judgment, the application by the appellant for a stay of proceedings was not an application under O. 12, r.8(1). Only where a party, on one of the grounds specified in that rule, seeks relief in which he disputes the jurisdiction of the Court can his application fall within the rule. Here there was no question of the appellant disputing the jurisdiction of the Court. Indeed, as he had been served personally with the writ in this country, it is difficult to see on what ground he could possibly dispute the Court's jurisdiction. His application was for a stay of proceedings which, indisputably, had been properly commenced against him. The effect of a stay, if granted, would not have been to set aside the proceedings; it would have been simply to stop the respondents from pursuing the action any further at that time. Moreover, it would have been open to the respondents to apply thereafter to have the stay lifted, and if such an application was granted they could continue to proceed with the action.”
“An order containing a declaration that the court has no jurisdiction or will not exercise its jurisdiction may also make further provision including – (a) setting aside the claim form; (b) setting aside service of the claim form; (c) discharging any order made before the claim was commenced or before the claim form was served; and (d) staying the proceedings.” (a) setting aside the claim form; (b) setting aside service of the claim form; (c) discharging any order made before the claim was commenced or before the claim form was served; and (d) staying the proceedings.”