“Blue Sail Docs, Image, P2C from Uni.”
“This case is linked to a number of other applications which are approved and they are all in a trading loop and cannot start until this account is operational” [EX3-326] . Mr Mallaburn wrote in a further email of17 May 2005 : “This case is extremely urgent and I would like to resolve this query ASAP so we can move forward and approve the account …, the situation is critical as this is one of a loop of trading accounts, which cannot start using our services until the trading chain is complete. I am under extreme pressure to complete this trading chain and have the account approved…” [EX3-334] . 193. Rezaco applied to open an FCIB account on an application form dated and signed5 April 2005 , the same date as the application of P2C [EX3-254-257 & 421-425] . The application form indicates that Mr Moazen, the director of Rezaco, is a British citizen. 194. Bleu Opale applied to open an FCIB account on an application form dated and signed30 November 2005 [EX4-278-282] . The form named Mr Tahir Amin as the company’s director and beneficial owner and gave his address in East London, UK. According to Bleu Opale’s business plan it was an IT support company [EX4-316-334] . The French authorities have informed HMRC that Bleu Opale is a one person limited company that had been registered as a wholesaler of household equipment and had never submitted any VAT returns [EX6-101] . 195. Goodluck applied to open an FCIB account on an application form, dated28 December 2005 and signed12 January 2006 [EX5-100-103] . In an e-mail dated25 January 2006 , Goodluck informed FCIB that it was “currently trading in the recruitment and employment services market and [was] expanding into the marketing, sales and promotions markets” [EX5-127] . 196. Bluesail applied to open an FCIB account on an application form, dated21 March 2005 and signed22 March 2005 [EX4-172-176] . The form named Stuart Bateman (who subsequently provided a reference as director of Pochard Sp z.o.o (“Pochard”) for Transpacific’s account application [EX4-66] and who had witnessed Transpacific’s lease [EX4-83-86] ) as Bluesail’s director, and gave his address as being in Swansea [EX4-175] . At the time of Bluesail’s application, Mr Bateman was 21 years of age [EX4-175] . Bluesail’s VAT certificate showed a trade classification of “Other software consultancy and supply” [EX4-199] . 197. IPL applied to open an FCIB account on an application form dated and signed19 August 2005 [EX4-226-230] . The form named Riaz Ahmed Ramzan as company director and primary contact. Mr Ramzan provided a letter from Stuart Bateman of Pochard in support of his application for IPL’s account [EX4-235] . Mr Awan of P2C also provided a letter of reference for IPL [EX4-236] . 198. Orient applied to open an FCIB account on an application form, dated 10 July and signed15 July 2005 [EX3-347-350] . Mr Najmi of Orient stated on the FCIB due diligence form that Orient was an importer and exporter of used cars [EX3-368] and in a manuscript addendum wrote: “Form completed and signed as going forward company may start trading telecoms and computers as well. Note – Mr Najmi is closely related to a number of existing FCIB customer in telecoms—(by family). These connections in his community are paramount” [EX3-372] . 199. Transpacific applied to open an FCIB account on an application form dated and signed25 February 2006 [EX4-47-50] . The form named Azeem Ibrahim (also the director of Ionis) as director and primary contact of Transpacific and stated that the company was based in Anjouan in the Comoros Islands. The form indicated that the address of Mr Ibrahim was in Watford and that the postal address of Transpacific was in Swansea. James Mallaburn and Stuart Bateman were named in the form as third party referees [EX4-59] . Transpacific’s auditor was named as Opinder Sawhney (Aleena’s accountant) at an address in Wembley, London [EX4-59] , which was purportedly Aleena’s address from20 July 2005 [EX3-200] . Mr Ibrahim provided a letter from Stuart Bateman of Pochard, a Polish company, in support of his application for Transpacific’s account [EX4-66] . Mr Azeem stated that Transpacific would be capitalised at$200,000 [EX4-70] , with its principal and registered offices in Comoros [EX4-72] . Mr Azeem also provided a lease between Transpacific and Mr Salman Shaikh of Habib Enterprises Ltd for a property in Swansea. The lease states that it was witnessed by Stuart Bateman and gives his address as being in Swansea [EX4-83-86] . James Mallaburn had referred Transpacific to FCIB [EX4-48] . 200. Ionis applied to open its FCIB account on an application form, dated8 December 2004 and signed on20 December 2004 [EX4-3-6] . The form named Azeem Ibrahim as the director of Ionis and stated that he was a British citizen with an address in Watford. 201. Zaagoug International Sarl (“Zaagoug”) applied to open an FCIB account on an application form, dated20 September 2005 and signed25 December 2005 [EX4-100-103] . The form stated that Zaagoug was based in Tanger, Morocco and that its director, Mr Ali Zaagoug, was resident in Hofheim, Germany. In support of his application for an FCIB account Zaagoug provided a letter from Azeem Ibrahim of Ionis [EX4-108] . James Mallaburn had referred Zaagoug to FCIB [EX4-101] . Findings in relation to circularity of funds 202. Appendix 6 to the HMRC skeleton contains a summary of evidence from the FCIB material that is said to show that the money associated with all six of the transactions to which this appeal relates effectively moved in a circle, completed on the same day that it commenced, which started and ended with a Moroccan company called Zaagoug. Each party to the money movements, based in various countries, made payments in pounds sterling. 203. Appendix 5 to the HMRC skeleton and the charts at [EX5-75 & 77] contain a summary of evidence from the FCIB material that is said to show that 2 of the 3 “loan” payments by Orient to Aleena also moved in a circle, also in the space of a day, through 5 FCIB accounts and back to Orient. 204. The evidence and analysis underlying these appendices is found particularly in the second and third witness statements of Mr Walton. 205. By way of example, in relation to Aleena’s invoice 100003 (which was for 5800 Nokia 8800 mobile phones), a chain of payments through FCIB accounts can be seen from V5 to Rezaco, then from Rezaco to Aleena, then from Aleena to P2C, then from P2C to Easiblaster, then from Easiblaster to Bleu Opale. Each link in this chain consists of two payments. The annotations to the payments from V5 to Rezaco indicate that they are for “3000 NK8800” and “2800 NK8800” respectively. The annotations to the payments from Rezaco to Aleena indicate that they are for “part payment inv 100003” and “final payment inv 100003” respectively. The annotations to the payments from Aleena to P2C indicate that they are for “pp [presumably “part payment”] nokia stock” and “2800 units of nok8800 sim free” respectively. The annotations to the payments from P2C to Easiblaster indicate that they are for “3000 nokia 8800” and “2800 x nokia 8800 gsm handsets” respectively. The annotations to the payments from Easiblaster to Bleu Opale indicate that they are for “payment for nokia stock” and “payment for stock” respectively. From the material before it, and considering the relevant amounts of the payments in question in each case, the Tribunal is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that these payments are the payments for the deal chain in respect of Aleena’s invoice 10003, one of the six transactions referred to in paragraphs 131-137 above. All of these payments occurred on27 April 2006 . 206. The evidence shows, however, that this chain of payments was part of a longer, circular chain of payments. Payments bearing similar annotations were then made from Bleu Opale to Ionis, then from Ionis to Zaagoug, then from Zaagoug to V5. All of these payments were also made on27 April 2006 . 207. Given that the chain is circular, and given that the time of day of each of the payments is not separately recorded, it is difficult to say exactly which of the companies was the beginning and end of the circle. However, the two payments from Zaagoug to V5 amounted to£2,830,168 . The amounts reduce slightly in each of the successive payments from V5 to Rezaco, Rezaco to Aleena, Aleena to P2C and P2C to Easiblaster, such that the payments from P2C to Easiblaster amounted to£ 2,826,401.80 . Thereafter, identical payments totalling£ 1,791,863 were made from Easiblaster to Bleu Opale, from Bleu Opale to Ionis, and from Ionis to Zaagoug. The amounts of the figures suggest that the payments began and ended with Zaagoug. 208. It is unnecessary to set out all of the details of all of the circular payments that have been identified. Having considered these appendices and the evidence on which they are based, the Tribunal is satisfied that the circularity of these payments has been established. 209. Furthermore, the evidence also shows chains of payments from Easiblaster to Questline, from Questline to Goodluck, from Goodluck to Redsea, and from Redsea to Zaagoug. This payment chain is consistent with the chain of trading in the alleged “dirty” chain. This suggests that in both the alleged “dirty” chain as well as in the alleged “clean” chain, the payments that went through the chain of trading began with and ended up with Zaagoug. The Tribunal’s conclusions General 210. The Tribunal accepts the HMRC submission that the questions to be addressed by the Tribunal in determining this appeal are: (1) whether there was a VAT loss; (2) if so, was it occasioned by fraud; (3) if so, whether the Appellant’s transactions were connected with such a fraudulent VAT loss; (4) if so, whether the Appellant knew, or should have known, of such a connection. 211. Before addressing each of these issues, the Tribunal makes two preliminary observations. 212. First, on behalf of the Appellant, a general submission was made that there is nothing unlawful about contra-trading as such, and that legitimate businesses engage in contra-trading for legitimate purposes, including with a view to managing their cash flow. 213. The Tribunal does not find it necessary to make any findings in respect of the extent to which contra-trading may in practice be engaged in by traders for legitimate reasons. For purposes of this appeal, the Tribunal is prepared to assume that there is nothing unlawful as such in the practice of deliberately making imports from and exports to other EU Member States in roughly equal value in a given VAT period, such that the input tax repayment claim on the latter effectively cancels out the output tax liability on the former. In this decision, the Tribunal will for convenience refer to this practice as contra-trading, and emphasises that use of this term by the Tribunal in its discussion below is not intended in and of itself to imply the existence of any fraud. 214. However, that does not mean that the existence of contra-trading is necessarily irrelevant to the question whether or not the existence of fraud has been established. In determining whether the existence of fraud has been established, the Tribunal can take into account the combination of circumstances in the case as a whole, which may include circumstances that of themselves may seem legitimate when viewed in isolation. For instance, there is nothing intrinsically unlawful or even unusual about a trader making a payment to a supplier or receiving a payment from a customer. However, the circumstances and pattern of payments between traders in a particular case may nonetheless be evidence of fraud. The Tribunal recalls what was said in Red 12 quoted at paragraph 112 above. Similarly, the circumstances of contra-trading, even if assumed not to be intrinsically unlawful, may in the particular circumstances of a case as a whole be a factor that contributes to a finding that the existence of fraud has been established. In its consideration of the circumstances as a whole the Tribunal can take into account background evidence of the kind referred to at paragraph 68 above (subject to the reservation at paragraph 64 above). 215. Secondly, the Tribunal notes that the HMRC case is that both the alleged “clean” chain and the alleged “dirty” chain were part of a single co-ordinated fraudulent scheme. This means that on the HMRC case, almost all of the significant evidence in this case is relevant to all four of the questions referred to in paragraph 210 above that the Tribunal is required to address. The Tribunal, when considering each of those issues, has accordingly done so having regard to all of the evidence in the case as a whole. However, in this decision it would serve little purpose to address the whole of the same body of evidence four times when addressing the four different issues in turn. The discussion below therefore identifies the main points in relation to each of the respective issues, but the Tribunal emphasises that its consideration of each issue was not limited to the points specifically identified. Whether there was a tax loss 216. Goodluck has been issued with assessments totalling£18.8 million for undeclared output VAT on£107.5 million of invoices known to HMRC issued by Goodluck between6 March 2005 and25 April 2006 . Absent a successful appeal by Goodluck against those assessments, Goodluck remained liable to pay the amounts assessed. Goodluck was wound up by order of the Companies Court on24 January 2007 , and has neither paid nor appealed against the assessments. The Tribunal is satisfied in the circumstances on a balance of probability that there has been a tax loss. Whether the tax loss was occasioned by fraud 217. The fact that Goodluck defaulted on a VAT liability does not in and of itself establish that Goodluck acted with intent to defraud the Revenue, or that the default was part of a larger fraudulent scheme or that others in the same or a different trading chain were involved in such a larger fraudulent scheme. 218. In determining whether Goodluck’s default was due to fraud, the Tribunal finds the following matters to be particularly pertinent. 219. The stated business of Goodluck was a labour provider. Its application for VAT registration, it gave no indication that did trade in, or had any intention of trading in, mobile phones or indeed in any other goods. On13 March 2006 , its director Mr Shahid in fact expressly told HMRC officers that he had no intention of trading mobile telephones, when the company was at the time doing just that [EX7-172-174] . 220. Goodluck did not declare the sales to which the VAT default related in any of its VAT returns, despite the fact that those sales totalled some£107.5 million on which VAT of some£18.8 million was due (paragraph 149 above). Rather, it was assessed by HMRC to output VAT on sales based on invoices that HMRC discovered had been issued by Goodluck. Goodluck disappeared without paying or appealing against these assessments. 221. The Tribunal agrees with the HMRC submission that these are not the actions of an honest business. On the basis of the above considerations alone, the Tribunal is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Goodluck’s default was due to fraud. 222. That conclusion is more than amply reinforced by the broader picture painted by the evidence in the case as a whole, as considered in further detail below. 223. Based on the evidence in the case as a whole, the Tribunal is satisfied in the circumstances on a balance of probability that the tax loss referred to in paragraph 216 above was occasioned by fraud. Whether the Appellant’s transactions were connected with the fraudulent tax loss 224. The Appellant’s transactions material to this issue are the six sales of mobile telephones to Rezaco that occurred in February 2006 that were the subject of an input tax repayment claim in the Appellant’s 02/06 VAT return. The HMRC case is that the deal chains of which these transactions formed part were part of a larger fraudulent scheme involving also the deal chains in which there was a VAT default by Goodluck. The HMRC case is that other traders involved in the deal chains of which the Appellant’s transactions formed part were also parties to that larger fraudulent scheme. 225. The UK trader involved in both of these sets of deal chains was Easiblaster. In the deal chains involving Goodluck, Easiblaster was the “broker” (that is to say, the last UK trader in the chain, which sold the goods zero rated to a trader in another EU Member State and made an input tax repayment claim in the UK). In the deal chains involving the Appellant, the Appellant was the “broker”, and Easiblaster was the “acquirer” (that is to say, the trader which first imported the goods into the UK from a trader in another EU Member State, thereby generating a tax liability in the UK). For this reason, the two chains are referred to below respectively as the “Easiblaster broker chains” and the “Easiblaster acquisition chains”. 226. In both the Easiblaster broker chains and Easiblaster acquisition chains, Easiblaster’s respective sales/acquisitions were transacted in Easiblaster’s 03/06 VAT period. As a result, its VAT return for that period both returned a VAT liability in respect of its purchases in the acquisition chains, and made a VAT repayment claim in respect of its sales in the broker chains. In that VAT return, the former and the latter virtually cancelled each other out (paragraphs 171 and 176 above): that is to say, Easiblaster in that VAT quarter was engaging in contra-trading (see paragraphs 213-214 above). However, VAT repayment claims were made by the Appellant, as well as Bluesail and IPL, who were brokers in the Easiblaster acquisition chains, and the total of these VAT repayment claims (paragraph 174 above) was very similar to the amount of VAT on which Goodluck defaulted in respect of its sales to Easiblaster (paragraph 150 above), and very similar to the amount of the VAT repayment claim made by Easiblaster in respect of Easiblaster’s broker chains (paragraph 172 above), and very similar to the output tax liabilities in respect of Easiblaster’s acquisition chains (paragraphs 171-176 above). 227. In determining whether Easiblaster’s broker chains and Easiblaster’s acquisition chains both formed part of a single fraudulent scheme, the Tribunal finds the following matters to be particularly pertinent. 228. Even assuming that contra-trading is not of itself unlawful (paragraph 213 above), the Tribunal can take into account (paragraph 214 above) that the circumstances of the two sets of deal chains as described above were typical of an MTIC fraud involving contra-trading: see paragraphs 68-69 above, and for instance Mobilx at [9] referring to Blue Sphere Global Ltd v HM Revenue & Customs[2009] EWHC 1150 (Ch) and Olympia Technology Limited v HMRC [2008] UKVAT V20570 . The contra-trading had the practical effect in this case that it was the Appellant which made the VAT repayment claim and in respect of goods which had not been supplied by a missing trader. Other features of these transaction chains that can be considered typical of an MTIC fraud are for instance that series of transactions took place back-to-back, with traders able virtually immediately to sell the exact quantity of goods that they had just purchased, and with none of the goods in either set of chains being traced to a manufacturer, authorised distributor or retailer selling to end users. Another feature to be taken into account is that neither Aleena, nor Goodluck nor Bleu Opale disclosed to the tax authorities that they were trading in mobile phones or electronic goods. 229. The circular pattern of the chains of payments referred to in paragraphs 202-209 above also undermines the plausibility of the suggestion that all of these transactions were bona fide transactions between arm’s length traders. The Tribunal accepts the HMRC submissions that the circularity of monies had no plausible commercial purpose to it and that this circularity suggests that the transaction chains and the “loan” were not genuine commercial arrangements but were contrived and orchestrated. 230. The Tribunal further takes into account that there were numerous connections between the traders in both Easiblaster’s broker chains and Easiblaster’s acquisition chains. For instance, in Easiblaster’s broker chains, Easiblaster’s customer was Bleu Opale, while in Easiblaster’s acquisition chains, Easiblaster’s supplier was Bleu Opale. Again, the Tribunal accepts that there is nothing inherently unlawful in a UK trader simultaneously purchasing goods from and selling goods to the same trader in another EU Member State. However, the Tribunal considers that the number and kind of connections between the various traders in both sets of chains undermine the plausibility of the suggestion that all of these transactions were bona fide transactions between arm’s length traders. 231. A case in point is the evidence relating to the FCIB bank accounts (paragraphs 191 to 201 above). All of the parties in Easiblaster’s acquisition chains held accounts at the FCIB. The other parties in Easiblaster’s broker chains also held accounts at FCIB (Questline and Goodluck). In other chains not involving the Appellant in which Easiblaster acted as acquirer, the brokers (P2C, Bluesail, and IPL) held accounts at FCIB. The company that apparently loaned monies to the Appellant, Orient, also held an account with FCIB as did the company that provided its insurance, Transpacific. Those behind Bluesail and Transpacific held further accounts in the names of Pochard and Ionis. Indeed, all of the companies involved in the circular chains of payments referred to in paragraphs 202-209 above had accounts at the FCIB. A man called James Mallaburn had referred a number of the companies to FCIB. Various of these traders provided letters of reference in support of one another’s applications to open FCIB accounts or were otherwise linked. 232. Details of the evidence of various other links between these various companies is provided in Appendix 3 to the HMRC skeleton argument. 233. Particularly significant in this respect is the evidence of the Cricklewood documents, which were recovered from the home address of one of the directors of P2C. The Tribunal is satisfied that some of the Cricklewood documents, when considered together with other evidence in the case, relate to companies and/or transactions in both Easiblaster’s broker chains (including Goodluck, Questline, Easiblaster (trading as Universal Supplies)) and Easiblaster’s acquisition chains (including Bleu Opale, Easiblaster (trading as Universal Supplies) and P2C), as well as to other companies that appear in the circular payment chain. 234. Mr Awan has sought in an e-mail to explain why documents in relation to other businesses were found at the address of a director of P2C. On its consideration of the material as a whole, the Tribunal finds that there is no plausible explanation why P2C would have in its possession documents relating to Easiblaster’s broker chains if these were unconnected to Easiblaster’s acquisition chains, given that P2C, on the face of the transaction chains, was only involved in Easiblaster’s acquisition chains. Those documents even include what appear to be manuscript notes as to specific tasks to be carried out by particular traders involved in Easiblaster’s broker chains (paragraph 182 above). The contents of these documents suggest that the transaction chains in both Easiblaster’s broker chains and Easiblaster’s acquisition chains were all part of a single plan, and the fact that these documents were recovered from the home address of one of the directors of P2C suggests that P2C was at least one of those at the centre of the plan. 235. The Tribunal also takes into account the evidence of the insurance arrangements with Transpacific (paragraphs185-190 above). (It is recalled that the Tribunal has not considered the evidence relating to Transpacific that was the subject of the application by HMRC that was refused by the Tribunal at the outset of the hearing: see paragraph 20 above.) The Tribunal notes that despite being purportedly based in the Comoros and Gibraltar, Transpacific purported to lease a property in Swansea and its director lived in Watford. Transpacific submitted to FCIB what it claimed was marketing material from its website [EX4-76-82] . The telephone number given on the website was ++123 456 789 and the email address was misspelled as “claims@transp e cificinsurance.com” [EX4-79] . The Cricklewood documents included what appears to be draft documentation of Transpacific, and the same misspelling in Transpacific’s e-mail address can be seen in that documentation [EX5-302] . This suggests that those behind the organisation of Easiblaster’s broker chains and Easiblaster’s acquisition chains were also behind Transpacific, a conclusion reinforced by various other connections that appear between Transpacific and various of the companies involved in both sets of chains (see especially paragraphs 184 and 199 above). 236. In relation to the insurance arrangements, the Tribunal further notes the following. In a letter dated31 August 2006 , HMRC pointed out the potential requirement for additional documents to be submitted by Aleena to Transpacific [EX1-185] . Mr Rab then provided a letter from Transpacific purportedly dated4 April 2006 , that exempted Aleena from those additional documentation requirements [EX2-3-4] . In that letter Transpacific claimed to have “undertaken a credit and background check on the directors of Aleena Electronics Limited and have ascertained their sound financial background”
“We are currently trading in air conditioning units and parts. We are also looking to trade/supply in computer parts” [EX3-149] . Contrary to what Mr Rab suggested in his witness statement, in that questionnaire Mr Rab did not indicate that Aleena intended to trade in mobile phones, and Mr Rab has not provided any other indication that Aleena was interested in trading in computer parts. However, the Tribunal accepts the HMRC submission that mobile telephones and computer parts had in common that they were the most common goods used in the commission of MTIC frauds. 258. As HMRC have put it: The Tribunal is entitled to question whether a business who intended to trade in air conditioning equipment on Registration for VAT, could so radically change its business plan within a month, and then trade in such high large quantities of mobile telephones for such a short period. 259. The Tribunal considers that the evidence in fact suggests that it was the Appellant’s intention at the very time that it applied for VAT registration to trade in computer parts and/or mobile phones. 260. On the FCIB “Form Regarding Expected Wire Transfer Activity” submitted with the other documents dated23 September 2005 , Mr Rab stated that at that time the most important countries of origin and destination for wire transfers to and from Aleena’s FCIB account would be the UK and Dubai [EX3-153] . This contradicts the claim in Mr Rab’s witness statement that he originally anticipated selling mobile phones into the Bangladesh market [WS1-281-283§§5-12] . The only wire transfers that Aleena received from Dubai were in fact the apparent loan payments from Orient. The loan agreement between Orient and Aleena is dated16 January 2006 , some 4 months after this form had been submitted to FCIB [EX1-114-116] . This suggests that Mr Rab must have known in September 2005 that he would be receiving funding from Dubai to fund the input tax deficit on the Aleena’s transactions. 261. The loan agreement with Orient is dated16 January 2006 [EX1-114-116] , some 5 weeks before the relevant transactions took place. HMRC point out that Mr Rab has not provided any documentary evidence of any correspondence or negotiation preceding the signing of the loan agreement, and that when asked to provide a correspondence address, date of birth and bank details for Mr Najmi, Mr Rab’s response was that the information was private and confidential, that he had contacted Mr Najmi’s brother as Mr Najmi was on holiday, and Mr Najmi’s response would be forwarded when received [EX1-200] . HMRC inform the Tribunal that no such response has been provided to HMRC. 262. HMRC have submitted that aspects of the Appellant’s own documentation suggest that they are not bona fide commercial documents. In particular, HMRC note that the Appellant’s documentation simply stated the model type and that the stock was “Euro Spec”