“Serious Case Panel The Serious Case Panel (the Panel) is chaired by a non-executive director and met quarterly throughout 2022-23. The Panel’s purpose is to consider issues and themes arising from serious cases and other insight and agree recommendations to address these. The Panel is currently overseeing the development, impacting and implementation of changes in alignment with the Department’s wider strategic aims including: … • Commissioning improvement activity in relation to our service when a vulnerable customer requires us to call them back to resolve an issue and on reducing errors when a vulnerable customer changes address.” • Commissioning improvement activity in relation to our service when a vulnerable customer requires us to call them back to resolve an issue and on reducing errors when a vulnerable customer changes address.”
“25.There is a substantial body of case law which establishes that assertions of a “chilling effect” on provision of advice, exchange of views or effective conduct of public affairs are to be treated with some caution. In Department for Education and Skills v Information Commissioner and Evening Standard EA/2006/0006, the First-tier Tribunal commented at [75(vii)] as follows: “In judging the likely consequences of disclosure on officials’ future conduct, we are entitled to expect of them the courage and independence that has been the hallmark of our civil servants since the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. These are highly-educated and politically sophisticated public servants who well understand the importance of their impartial role as counsellors to ministers of conflicting convictions. The most senior officials are frequently identified before select committees, putting forward their department’s position, whether or not it is their own.” 26.Although not binding on us, this is an observation of obvious common sense with which we agree. A three judge panel of the Upper Tribunal expressed a similar view in DEFRA v Information Commissioner and Badger Trust[2014] UKUT 526 (AC) at [75], when concluding that it was not satisfied that disclosure would inhibit important discussions at a senior level: “75. We are not persuaded that persons of the calibre required to add value to decision making of the type involved in this case by having robust discussions would be inhibited by the prospect of disclosure when the public interest balance came down in favour of it... “In judging the likely consequences of disclosure on officials’ future conduct, we are entitled to expect of them the courage and independence that has been the hallmark of our civil servants since the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. These are highly-educated and politically sophisticated public servants who well understand the importance of their impartial role as counsellors to ministers of conflicting convictions. The most senior officials are frequently identified before select committees, putting forward their department’s position, whether or not it is their own.” “75. We are not persuaded that persons of the calibre required to add value to decision making of the type involved in this case by having robust discussions would be inhibited by the prospect of disclosure when the public interest balance came down in favour of it... 76. ...They and other organisations engage with, or must be assumed to have engaged with, public authorities in the full knowledge that Parliament has passed the FOIA and the Secretary of State has made the EIR. Participants in such boards cannot expect to be able to bend the rules.” 27. In Department of Health v Information Commissioner and Lewis[2015] UKUT 0159 (AAC) , [2017] AACR 30 Charles J discussed the correct approach where a government department asserts that disclosure of information would have a “chilling” effect or be detrimental to the “safe space” within which policy formulation takes place, as to which he said: “27. ...The lack of a right guaranteeing non-disclosure of information ...means that that information is at risk of disclosure in the overall public interest ... As soon as this qualification is factored into the candour argument (or the relevant parts of the safe space or chilling effect arguments), it is immediately apparent that it highlights a weakness in it. This is because the argument cannot be founded on an expectation that the relevant communications will not be so disclosed. It follows that ... a person taking part in the discussions will appreciate that the greater the public interest in the disclosure of confidential, candid and frank exchanges, the more likely it is that they will be disclosed... 28. ...any properly informed person will know that information held by a public authority is at risk of disclosure in the public interest. 29. ... In my view, evidence or reasoning in support of the safe space or chilling effect argument in respect of a FOIA request that does not address in a properly reasoned, balanced and objective way: (i) this weakness, (ii) the public interest in there being disclosure of information at an appropriate time that shows that the robust exchanges relied on as being important to good decision making have taken place, and (iii) why persons whose views and participation in the relevant discussions would be discouraged from expressing them in promoting good decision making and administration and thereby ensuring that this is demonstrated both internally and when appropriate externally, is flawed.”. 28.Charles J discussed the correct approach to addressing the competing public interests in disclosure of information where section 35 of FOIA (information relating to formulation of government policy, etc) is engaged. Applying the decision in APPGER at [74] – [76] and [146] – [152], when assessing the competing public interests under FOIA the correct approach includes identifying the actual harm or prejudice which weighs against disclosure. This requires an appropriately detailed identification, proof, explanation and examination of the likely harm or prejudice. 29.Section 35 of FOIA, with which the Lewis case was concerned, does not contain the threshold provision of the qualified person’s opinion, but these observations by Charles J are concerned with the approach to deciding whether disclosure is likely to have a chilling effect and we consider that they are also relevant to the approach to an assessment by the qualified person of a likely chilling effect under section 36(2) and so to the question whether that opinion is a reasonable one. 30.Charles J said at [69] that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision should include matters such as identification of the relevant facts, and consideration of “the adequacy of the evidence base for the arguments founding expressions of opinion”
“I, Viscount Younger of Leckie, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Department for Work and Pensions (in the Lords) have reviewed the attached submission and the proposed information to be withheld under Section 36 of the FOI Act. I agree with the arguments put forward in the attached submission and it is my opinion that if the information requested were disclosed, the prejudice / inhibitions specified in the sub section(s) of Section 36 would be engaged. I therefore approve the use of Section 36 of the FOI Act to exempt the withheld information.”
‘a narrow, informal snapshot of information relating to some errors which may impact on the experience of some of our customers, as well as case-specific information. Furthermore, the extrapolated figures quoted in relation to error rates were approximate calculations and have not undergone the usual analytical rigour to be expected before making such information public. The purpose of the paper was to stimulate a discussion at the Serious Case Panel, leading to specific actions for improvement.’