Flat 1, 140 York Road, Southend-on-Sea SS1 2EA CAM/00KF/LSC/2022/0074

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case No CAM/00KF/LSC/2022/0074

Between

Ivana Baltic UnrepresentedApplicant

Long Term Reversions (Harrogate) LimitedRespondent

Before

Judge K. Saward

Miss M. Krisko BSc (EST MAN) FRICS

Paul Fuller, of Counsel for the Applicant

Date 5 June 2023

Hearing 2023-06-05

Property: SS1 2EA

Type of application: reasonableness of and the liability to pay service charges Judge K. Saward

DECISION

Description of hearing This has been a remote hearing which was consented to by the parties. The form of remote hearing was to be CVP Video. However, having initially connected to the video by mobile phone, the Applicant subsequently decided to participate by telephone. The hearing proceeded as a hybrid of CVP/telephone. A face-to-face hearing was not held because it was not practicable, and no-one requested the same. 2 DECISIONS(1) The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make a determination on the service charges levied in respect of buildings insurance and management fees for 2020/21, the matter having already been the subject of determination by the County Court. This part of the claim is struck out under rule 9(2) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2013.

(2) The Applicant’s case made in reference to the Building Safety Act 2022 has no reasonable prospects of success and is struck out under rule 9(3) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2013.

(3) The Tribunal determines that the sums of £595.11, £342.92, £350.00 and £350.00 for buildings insurance were reasonably incurred and reasonable in respect of the service charge years 2017/18, 2018/19, 2019/20 and 2021/22, respectively.

(4) The Tribunal determines that the sums of £95.94 for the service charge year 2017/18 and £115.00 in each of the service charge years 2018/19, 2019/20 and 2021/22, were reasonably incurred and reasonable.

(5) The Tribunal makes an order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 so that the landlord’s costs of the Tribunal proceedings that may be passed to the lessees through any service charge are limited to no more than 50% of the costs incurred.

REASONS

[1]By application dated 12 December 2022, the Applicant seeks a determination pursuant to section 27A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (“the 1985 Act”) as to the service charges levied in respect of buildings insurance and management fees in respect of the property for the service charge years 2017/18 to 2021/22. The service charge years run from 1 April until 31 March in the following year.

[2]The sums in dispute are: Service charge year Buildings insurance Management fees 2017/18 £595.11 £95.94 2018/19 £342.92 £115.00 3 2019/20 £350.00 £115.00 2020/21 £350.00 £115.00 2021/22 £350.00 £115.00 The background

[3]The property which is the subject of this application is described by the Applicant as a ground floor, 1 bedroom flat within a Victorian house situate at 140 York Road. The house has been converted into three flats with communal areas. The Applicant is the leaseholder of the flat held under a lease dated 18 May 1984 for a term of 99 years from the date thereof. The Respondent is the freeholder on whose behalf the property is managed by Pier Management Ltd.

[4]Neither party requested an inspection, and the Tribunal did not consider one was necessary or proportionate to the issues in dispute.

[5]The lease of the property requires the landlord to provide services and the leaseholder to contribute towards their costs by way of a variable service charge. The specific provisions of the lease are referred to below. Documents before the hearing

[6]The Tribunal received a single bundle of documents composed of some 210 pages. In summary, the bundle contains: title documents, the application, Applicant’s case (including witness statements from Ivana Baltic and Ian Taylor), Respondent’s case (including witness statement of Sarah Willis), Applicant’s reply, Tribunal directions and orders, and additional correspondence.

[7]The Applicant submitted a late supplemental bundle of 11 pages including a second witness statement from Ian Taylor and documents said to be extracted from previous County Court proceedings. At the hearing, the Respondent’s advocate initially disputed inclusion of all these documents. He later revised this position and raised no objection to their inclusion in the interests of expediency. This was on the basis that submissions would be made in closing.

[8]Prior to the hearing, the Respondent’s advocate produced a skeleton argument and copies of the legal authorities referred to therein. The Applicant sent an email in response along with a document described as an “open letter” and copies of photographs of the electricity cover. 4

[9]The Tribunal has noted the content of all these documents. Preliminary matters

[10]The Applicant experienced technical problems at various stages during the hearing when her telephone connection was lost. On each occasion, the Tribunal paused proceedings until the Applicant re-joined the hearing. The Tribunal was careful to ensure that the Applicant did not miss any part of the proceedings by checking the last thing she had heard and requiring anything said thereafter to be repeated.

[11]At the start of the hearing there were some preliminary matters that the Tribunal needed to address. These included applications made by the Respondent to strike out the proceedings on various grounds.

[12]The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (“the 2013 Rules”) are relevant. Under rule 9(2) the Tribunal must [my emphasis] strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings or case if the Tribunal(a) does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or case or that part of them; and

(b) does not exercise any power under rule 6(3)(n)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal). The Tribunal resolved to hear arguments over its jurisdiction first. Whether the 2020/21 charges have been determined by a court

[13]The first point arising is whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the service charges for buildings insurance and management fees for the year 2020/21 given previous litigation on these matters.

[14]Under section 27A(4)(c) of the 1985 Act, no application may be made under sub-section (1) or (3) which has been the subject of determination of a court. Sub-section (1) concerns the determination of payability of a service charge. Subsection (3) concerns a determination of whether a service charge would be payable for costs incurred, such as those for insurance or management.

[15]Proceedings were issued by the Respondent against the Applicant in the Southend County Court under claim no. G40YY502 on 26 November 2020 for non-payment of service charges and administration charges of £757.00. At the final hearing on 3 May 2022, the Applicant was ordered to pay the buildings insurance for the year 2020/21, a reminder charge, interest and costs. The Court did not make an award against the Applicant for the 2020/21 management fee, costs for guttering repairs and other administration charges.

[16]Thus, the management fee for 2020/21 has already been disallowed by the County Court and judgment entered against the Applicant for the amount of the 2020/21 buildings insurance premium. It follows that an 5 application could not be made to the Tribunal for these matters under section 27A because they have been the subject of a determination by a court. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the 2020/21 claim now made under section 27A.

[17]As there is no jurisdiction, the Tribunal cannot determine the 2020/21 management fee. This part of the claim must be struck out under rule 9(2). Whether the charges have been agreed or admitted

[18]The next issue concerns whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the disputed charges for the three preceding service charge years between 2017/18, 2018/19 and 2019/20.

[19]The Respondent states that the charges were settled on demand without challenge. As such, it is argued that the 2017-2020 charges were admitted, and the Applicant is debarred from challenging the same.

[20]Under section 27A(4)(a), no application under subsection (1) or (3) may be made in respect of a matter which has been admitted or agreed by a tenant. But, by virtue of section 27A(5), the tenant is not to be taken to have agreed or admitted any matter by reason only of having made any payment.

[21]In this regard, the Tribunal’s attention is drawn by the Respondent to the legal authorities in Cain v London Borough of Islington

[2015] UKUT 117 (LC)

; and Shersby v Greenhurst Park Residents Company Limited

[2009] UKUT 241 (LC)

[22]In Cain, HHJ Gerald referred to section 27A(4) and (5) and made plain that whether or not agreement or admission can be implied or inferred from payment made will always be a question of fact and degree in every case. Then, at paragraph 18: “Looking at the reasoning behind this provision, no doubt the reason why the making of a single payment on its own, or without more, would never suffice is that such will often be insufficiently clear but also, in the peculiar area of landlord and tenant, it is common enough for tenants to pay (even expressly disputed) service charges so as to avoid the risk of forfeiture and preserve their home and the value of their lease. But the reason why a series of unqualified payments may, depending on the circumstances, suffice is because the natural implication or inference from a series of unqualified payments of demanded service charges is that the tenant agrees or admits that which is being demanded … Self-evidently, the longer the period over which payments have been made the more readily the court or 6 tribunal will be to hold that the tenant has agreed or admitted that which has been demanded and paid. It is the absence of protest or qualification which provides the additional evidence from which agreement or admission can be implied or inferred.”

[23]In Shersby, agreement or admission was found to be established from a combination of a series of payments over a period of time coupled with(a) substantial delay before challenge, and

(b) other proceedings in which the applicant tenant had the opportunity to and could have challenged those elements. The tenant was found to have not only made the payments for 1997-2004 (inc) but waited until the 2007 application before seeking to challenge them. In the meantime, the tenant had made a separate application to the tribunal raising various other matters. It was the combination of repeated payments without complaint or reservation coupled with the lapse of time and express challenging of certain other matters (but not the disputed payment) that led the tribunal to conclude that the charges must have been agreed or admitted.

[24]As emphasised in Cain [at paragraph 20], Shersby was a particularly strong case because there was a finding akin to an abuse of process, it being established that all issues in dispute should be raised when the matter comes before the court. It, however, should not be treated as authority that there must be something additional to a series of unchallenged payments over a period of time. Whether that will suffice depends upon the circumstances.

[25]The Respondent also relies upon the doctrine of estoppel to contend that the Applicant should be estopped from challenging the service charges as being contrary to the implied act of acceptance when payments were made without objection. The Respondent further raised the principle in Henderson v Henderson [1843] to the effect that the Applicant should not be permitted to raise a claim for charges paid prior to the County Court litigation which ought properly to have been raised in that previous action.

[26]In this instance, it was not until the Tribunal application was made in December 2022 that issues were raised by the Applicant over buildings insurance premiums and management fees levied as service charges going back to 2017/18. Over 5 years had elapsed since the earliest payment. However, it was not an excessively long period of time. Whilst the Applicant initially told the Tribunal that she thought she had raised concerns in the County Court proceedings in respect of the preceding 3 service charge years, this was strongly refuted by the Respondent’s advocate. The Applicant then explained that she thought only the 2020/21 service charges were before the County Court and pointed out that she had not initiated the proceedings but was defending herself. 7

[27]It occurs to the Tribunal that the Applicant was clearly not conversant with legal proceedings or their scope. The County Court proceedings concerned only one service charge year. As a litigant in person the Applicant cannot be expected to realise that a counterclaim or claim by way of set-off for earlier service charge years was an option available to her. Unlike the tenant in Shersby, the Applicant did not institute her own separate and earlier proceedings while omitting the currently disputed service charges. Rather, the Applicant was an unrepresented defendant in County Court litigation without the benefit of legal advice.

[28]In all the circumstances, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the combination of the Applicant’s failure to raise a counterclaim in the earlier County Court action, the payments and delay in raising a dispute, suffice in this case for the Applicant to be taken to have agreed or admitted the 2017/18 – 2019/20 charges for the purposes of section 27A(4)(a) of the 1985 Act or to be estopped in her claim. The application for strike out of the proceedings on this ground fails. Application to strike out on other grounds

[29]The Respondent argued that the claims for all service charge years should be struck out on the basis that the Applicant had provided little to no evidence in support of her assertions, which in any event, do not go to the issues in the application (namely, whether the disputed charges were reasonable and/or reasonably incurred). According to the Respondent, the application singularly fails to disclose grounds in fact or law for challenging the disputed charges.

[30]As such, the Respondent submits that the application should be struck out pursuant to rule 9(3)(d) and/or rule 9(3)(e) as being frivolous or an abuse or process or otherwise disclosing no reasonable prospect of success. In addition, the Respondent referred to noncompliance with Tribunal directions under rule 9(3)(a).

[31]Pursuant to rule 9(3) the Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings or case if- (a) the applicant has failed to comply with a direction which stated that failure by the applicant to comply with the direction could lead to the striking out of the proceedings or case or part of it; (d) the Tribunal considers the proceedings or case (or a part of them), or the manner in which they are being conducted, to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse or process of the Tribunal; (e) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant’s proceedings or case, or part of it, succeeding. 8

[32]On 30 January 2023, the Tribunal directed the Applicant by 17 February 2023 to complete a schedule (in the form provided) of the items and amounts in dispute with reasons, and the amount of any amount (if any) the Applicant considered reasonable to pay for that item. By the same date, the Applicant was further required to provide a witness statement setting out the provisions in the lease, any legal submissions and any other matters relied upon along with copy documents relied upon. The directions contained a warning that failure to comply may result in the Tribunal striking out all or part of the Applicant’s case under rule 9(3)(a) of the 2013 Rules.

[33]When the Applicant failed to adhere to the timescales within the directions, further directions were issued by the Tribunal on 28 February 2023 extending the timescales for the submission of statements and documents to 16 March 2023.

[34]The Applicant’s witness statement of 15 March 2023 describes disputes with the Respondent’s managing agents from 2016 after challenging high insurance and administration charges. The Applicant expresses grievance that the managing agents have not addressed her complaints, including those arising from disputes with neighbouring tenants. Dissatisfaction is expressed with what the Applicant considers to be general reluctance on the Respondent’s part to undertake routine maintenance. These are quite generic comments.

[35]However, amongst these complaints, reference is made to the management agents having done little work to justify the managements costs. The Applicant goes on to identify two sources of specific complaint relating to the fireproof cover for electrical equipment in the shared hallway installed in 2017 which “has proven to be inadequate” and “seriously obstructive” and the unauthorised replacement of the carpet in the communal hallway by neighbouring tenants.

[36]These same points were identified in the Applicant’s completed Scott Schedule (Annex 1 document) in which three comments are made. Firstly, that the electric cover was installed incorrectly. Secondly, that the carpet/linoleum in the communal hallway was installed “unlawfully”. Thirdly, that both aforementioned issues remain uncorrected.

[37]The Applicant produced a ‘statement’ dated 14 April 2023, which she confirmed at the hearing to be her statement of case. This was produced some time after the deadline. It refers to the freeholder’s reluctance to do any repairs to the building, described as “historic neglect”, with no repairs to the façade since the Applicant’s acquisition in 2007. The Applicant asserts that she was not consulted, and proper procedures not followed when flooring was replaced by a neighbouring tenant. 9

[38]The Applicant is critical of the standard of work when installing the electric cover which she says obstructs access to the fuse box for her property. She also describes the fitting of a carpet in a communal area as a trip hazard.

[39]It was not until 12 May 2023, that the Applicant produced a supplemental bundle with a selection of additional documents.

[40]The Tribunal notes that the Applicant has failed to comply with directions in a timely manner and has sought to add to her case piecemeal. This alone does not justify a strike out of the claims in this case. Ultimately, it was possible for the Respondent to glean the matters in dispute from the information taken as a whole. The Respondent may consider these matters to be without merit, but issues are raised concerning the management of the building, and thus the associated fees, along with the insurance.

[41]The case is not altogether cogent and contains various irrelevancies, including details of neighbour disputes. Nevertheless, account must be taken of the Applicant being a litigant in person who cannot be expected to articulate her case as well as a party paying for professional representation. It does not mean that the application is frivolous, an abuse of process or without reasonable prospects. Enough information is given to disclose a possible basis of claim.

[42]Having regard to the overriding objective within rule 3 of the 2013 Rules to deal with cases fairly and justly, the Tribunal considers that the threshold has not been reached to warrant a strike out of the proceedings on the grounds pleaded and it would be unjust to do so. Building Safety Act 2022

[43]As part of the Applicant’s claim, it is suggested that the case involves issues under Schedule 8 to the Building Safety Act 2002, but the application discloses no defects with the building falling within section 117 of that Act.

[44]Case management directions issued by the Tribunal on 30 January 2023 required the Applicant to provide an explanation to both the Tribunal and Respondent (by 8 February 2023) of matters raised under the Building Safety Act 2022 and confirming the height from ground level and number of storeys of the building.

[45]By email on 6 March 2023, the Applicant confirmed the height of the building above ground is between 9-10 metres and has 3 storeys above ground. That being so, the property does not fall within the definition of a “relevant building” for the purposes of the 2022 Act as it is neither at least 11 metres high, nor is it at least 5 storeys (section 117(2)). 10

[46]At the hearing, the Applicant continued to maintain that the 2022 Act is relevant. However, the Act does not apply because the property is not a “relevant building”. Accordingly, there is no reasonable prospect of the case succeeding on this ground, which is struck out under rule 9(3)(e). The issues

[47]The recoverability of the charges under the terms of the lease are not in dispute. Save for identifying the relevant provisions, the Tribunal does not consider payability further. Having dealt with preliminary matters, the Tribunal identified the relevant issues for determination as follows:(i) whether the relevant service charges were reasonably incurred/reasonable for the service charge years 2017/18, 2018/19, 2019/20 and 2021/22;

(ii) whether an order under section 20C of the 1985 Act and/or paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 to the 2002 Act should be made; and

(iii) whether an order for reimbursement of Tribunal fees should be made. The lease

[48]The lease includes the following provisions of particular relevance to the issues before the Tribunal.

[49]Clause 2 contains the lessee’s covenants. They include, at clause 2(2), the duty to pay and discharge and keep the lessor indemnified from and against all existing and future rates taxes duties charges assessment and outgoings. At clause 3.(d) the lessee further covenants to pay to the lessor from time to time on demand as a contribution towards the costs charges expenses and management fees incurred by the lessor in carrying out his obligations under the Fifth Schedule. At clause 7, the lessor covenants to perform and observe the obligations in the Fifth Schedule.

[50]The Fifth Schedule provides that, subject to the due performance by the lessee of his obligations to contribute to the maintenance charges, the lessor will fulfil the obligations that follow. They include at paragraph (1)(C) a duty whenever reasonably necessary to maintain, repair, redecorate and renew the communal areas. At paragraph (4), the lessor must keep the building insured, which may be through such agents (if any) as the lessor shall nominate. Then, at paragraph (10) the lessor will employ managing agents to manage the building if and during such times as the lessor thinks fit and pay all 11 proper fees charges and expenses payable to such agents in connection therewith.

[51]Paragraph 5(B) of the First Schedule specifies that the lessee’s per centage of the maintenance charge is 20%. Evidence heard

[52]The Applicant, Ms Baltic, gave oral evidence. She was supported by her husband Mr Taylor who also reinforced her account on issues regarding the fuse box and communal hallway carpet. Both were cross-examined by the Respondent’s advocate.

[53]Mrs Willis, the Head of Portfolio Management at Pier Management Ltd and managing agent for the period in the application, was called to give evidence by the Respondent and answered questions put by Ms Baltic.

[54]Both parties took the opportunity to make a closing submission.

[55]Details of the evidence heard are encompassed within the analysis below. Buildings insurance - £595.11 (2017/18); £342.92 (2018/19); £350.00 (2019/20) and (2021/22)

[56]As set out above, the buildings insurance premium for service charge year 2020/21 does not fall for consideration. The Tribunal must focus on the charges in the preceding three years dating back to 2017/18 and the subsequent year of 2021/22.

[57]It is conjecture on the Applicant’s part that the buildings insurance would have been invalidated due to fire risk posed by the faulty installation of the electrical cover/damage to fuse box or from a trip hazard created by a buckling carpet in the communal hallway. Reference is also made to front door keys being handed out, but this is similarly unsubstantiated in terms of any effect upon the insurance.

[58]The Respondent had a contractual duty under the lease to effect insurance. Copies of certificates of insurance effected with AXA Insurance covering the periods from 1 July 2017 through to 30 June 2022 are produced. Insurance brokers were utilised whose letter of 5 April 2023 summarises how an extensive market exercise was undertaken at the policy renewal in 2018. Of the ten insurers 12 approached, the most competitive and lowest premium was accepted. A market exercise was repeated upon renewal in 2019. The brokers state that real estate market conditions changed significantly in 2020 and positive terms were negotiated for renewal in 2020 and 2021.

[59]Whilst the contributions may seem high for a 1-bedroom flat, the Applicant has not produced any alternative quotes or evidence to indicate that the amount of the premiums was unreasonable.

[60]It follows that the Tribunal finds that the buildings insurance charges for the disputed years were reasonably incurred and reasonable. Management fees - £95.94 (2017/18) & £115.00 (2018/19),(2019/20) & (2021/22)

[61]No consideration will be given to the management fees for 2020/21 which have already been disallowed by the County Court and credited to the Applicant’s service charge account.

[62]The first main limb of the Applicant’s case concerns access to her electricity meter, which she says could not be replaced because it is obstructed by the electricity cover fitted in March 2017. She attributes this to poor management.

[63]The second main limb of the Applicant’s case concerns the unauthorised replacement and condition of the communal hall carpet. The Applicant describes it of inferior quality to the one replaced, and it proceeded to “buckle” presenting a trip hazard.

[64]Photographs are supplied of both the carpet and electricity cover.

[65]The Respondent’s advocate argued that at its very highest, the Applicant’s remedy is for alleged breach of contract and disrepair to be pursued as a separate claim/counterclaim. Whilst the Applicant did refer to a breach of the landlord’s covenants, the key point emerging and which she emphasised orally, was that the claim is for unreasonable charges. In essence, the Applicant’s case is that the management fees were unreasonable due to a lack of management. This arises principally from what the Applicant says is an ongoing failure to resolve a safety issue with the electricity cover and delay in replacing the hall carpet.

[66]The Tribunal dismisses the Respondent’s argument that section 19(1)(b) is not engaged. The management fees are not “works” but section 19(1)(b) is not limited to works. It refers to the “provisions of services or the carrying out of works”. The agents are providing a 13 management service on behalf of the landlord for which a management fee is charged. Under section 19(1), the issue for the Tribunal is whether the management fees were reasonably incurred, and the management service was of a reasonable standard. The electric cover

[67]The Applicant’s supplemental bundle contains a communication from Pierpoint, the managing agents, of 20 January 2020 which refers to the leaseholder erecting a cupboard. It is not clear on its face if this is the same cupboard that houses the electrical equipment. In any event, Mrs Willis confirmed that the electric cover works were undertaken by Pier Management following a health and safety assessment. She has not personally been to the property but denied that any repair was needed.

[68]The Respondent’s position in this regard is set out in its statement of case. It states that the Applicant has offered no evidence of damage to the fuse box or that access is obstructed. The Respondent claims to be unaware of any essential services put to jeopardy by the electrical cover. It says the electric panels have been boxed in with fire resistant materials to prevent the risk of fire spread in line with the recommendation of a heath and safety survey, a copy of which is supplied, dated 25 May 2015.

[69]The Applicant’s supplemental bundle contains an “Important safety notice” from npower dated 17 December 2020. It records that a prepayment meter could not be installed above 1.8m as there was no means to install it at a lower point due to “cupboard obstruction”. It adds: “Will need to re-site meter + meter board”. No mention is made of the Applicant’s existing meter being obstructed or damaged.

[70]Moreover, there is a lack of supporting evidence that the Respondent was alerted to any issue with the electric cover prior to 2020. There would be no basis to make a deduction from the management fee between 2017/18 to 2019/20 for a management failure if the concerns had not yet been recorded. Even if the Applicant has complained since 2017, the Tribunal cannot establish if there is in fact an obstruction requiring remedial action in the absence of supporting evidence when the Respondent denies categorically that a problem exists. The position cannot be gleaned from the photographs.

[71]A fairly comprehensive ‘asset site inspection & general risk assessment’ was conducted for the Respondent on 18 October 2022 by ‘centrick’, the new managing agents since August 2022. Various items of concern are flagged, but nothing is identified with regard to the electric cover. 14

[72]There is simply insufficient evidence to indicate that the management service was not provided to a reasonable standard due to matters pertaining to the electric cover. The carpet

[73]Issues over the hall carpet did not arise until December 2020 onwards and so this could not justify the claim going back to previous service charge years. The management fees have already been disallowed and credited for service charge year 2020/21. That leaves the claim for 2021/22.

[74]It is undisputed that the carpet in the communal hallway was replaced by neighbouring tenants in December 2020 and this was likely to be a breach of the lease. Mrs Willis confirmed that Pier Management had contact with the lessees, not their tenants, and were made aware that the hall carpet had been replaced without the Respondent’s permission.

[75]The Applicant complains of the lack of action by the managing agents in addressing the unauthorised works. It is the Respondent’s position that it took the view not to take enforcement proceedings and to maintain/replace the carpet as and when needed. It noted that no loss had occurred to others with the relevant leaseholder having met the costs of the replacement carpet. This was a reasonable position to take. The Respondent was not compelled to initiate enforcement action.

[76]In her application, the Applicant states that the carpet is "now buckling" indicating it had not occurred immediately. Quite when the Respondent was alerted to the carpet having become a trip hazard is unclear, but it is recorded in the Respondent’s own ‘asset site inspection and risk assessment’ dated October 2022. The Applicant confirms that the carpet was replaced in April 2023 and suggests that this has only occurred due to the Tribunal proceedings. Whether or not that is so, there is no application before the Tribunal in respect of the 2022/23 service charge.

[77]Once the carpet was flagged ‘red’ as an internal trip hazard within the general health and safety risk assessment of October 2022, the Respondent was clearly on notice that action was required. There is no substantive evidence of a failure to reasonably manage in terms of the carpet, prior to this time.

[78]Even if there were failings before 31 March 2022, it is appropriate to look at the level of fees charged when considering whether the management fees were reasonable. The Tribunal considers that the management fees were much lower than the usual market rate. 15 Furthermore, throughout the disputed period, clearly the managing agents were providing services by arranging insurance, undertaking some repairs, invoicing, and providing other services, such as dealing with leaseholder communications. Whilst the managing agents did not provide all services as required by the lease (e.g., no budgets, accounts or reserve fund), the fees correspond with the level of service provided.

[79]The Applicant is aggrieved that she was not consulted before the works to replace the carpet were undertaken. The fact remains that the Respondent was not obliged to notify the Applicant in advance of the works in the communal area for which it is responsible. If a contribution exceeding £250 per leaseholder was to be sought for qualifying works, then the consultation requirements under section 20 of the 1985 Act would have been triggered, but no issues are raised in this regard.

[80]Various points are taken by the Applicant over anti-social behaviour by neighbouring tenants between 2018 and ongoing into 2021. Importantly, matters raised late in the supplemental bundle were before the County Court whereupon the 2020/21 management fee was disallowed. They cannot be relied upon again. It is further noted that a counterclaim by the Applicant for damages for deprivation of the right to enjoy the property and being placed at personal risk was struck out by the County Court on 7 December 2021. Permission to appeal was refused on 3 February 2022. The same matters cannot be re-litigated through these proceedings.

[81]The Tribunal does have concerns over the standard of maintenance including a series of areas identified as in poor condition within the Respondent’s site inspection report of October 2022. Notwithstanding those concerns, the Tribunal finds on the evidence presented that the management fees for the disputed years were reasonably incurred and reasonable. Conclusion

[82]The Tribunal concludes that the relevant service charges for buildings insurance and management fees were payable under the lease and reasonably incurred/reasonable.

[83]Although the Tribunal has not been satisfied there was basis for this claim to succeed, it is noted from the photographs supplied that the building looks to be in a very poor and neglected condition with various signs of disrepair. Numerous risk assessment improvements are identified within the October 2022 report. Without imputing liability in any future claims, these proceedings should have highlighted wider concerns over the condition of the building and the Respondent is alerted to the need for the building to be actively managed. 16 Applications under s.20C and paragraph 5A.

[84]There is no provision within the lease for the Respondent to recover its costs in this application from the Applicant as an administration fee. Accordingly, no order is made under paragraph 5A of the 2002 Act.

[85]Potentially, costs of the proceedings could be recoverable by the Respondent as a maintenance charge pursuant to paragraph 1(9)(a) to Schedule 5 of the lease. The Respondent resists the making of an Order under section 20C of the 1985 Act preventing the recovery of the cost of these proceedings through the service charge. The Respondent maintains that the Applicant has sought to re-litigate matters decided by the County Court and ought to have been raised in those proceedings. The Respondent describes the Applicant’s case as vague and incoherent and points to her failure to comply with case management directions, with documents submitted in piecemeal fashion including a substantial bundle on 15 May 2023, less than 1 month before trial.

[86]The Applicant responded to complain about the Respondent’s submission of a skeleton argument on the last working day before the hearing with numerous attachments, giving little opportunity for them to be considered. The Applicant posed the question of who would deal with her grievances if not the Tribunal.

[87]The skeleton argument provided early notice of how the Respondent intended to argue the case and did not raise new matters. However, the legal authorities should have been submitted earlier.

[88]Although the application has failed (and struck out in part), the Respondent advanced lengthy arguments taking up hearing time in an attempt to strike out the entire proceedings, which did not succeed. In all the circumstances, the Tribunal considers it just and equitable to limit recovery of the Respondent’s costs through the service charge to 50%.

[89]Fees normally follow the event. Given that the Applicant has not succeeded in her application, no award is made in respect of the Tribunal application/hearing fees. Name: Judge K. Saward Date: 16 June 2023 Rights of appeal 17 By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the Tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber). 18 Appendix of relevant legislation Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (as amended) Section 18(1) In the following provisions of this Act "service charge" means an amount payable by a tenant of a dwelling as part of or in addition to the rent - (a) which is payable, directly or indirectly, for services, repairs, maintenance, improvements or insurance or the landlord's costs of management, and (b) the whole or part of which varies or may vary according to the relevant costs.

(2) The relevant costs are the costs or estimated costs incurred or to be incurred by or on behalf of the landlord, or a superior landlord, in connection with the matters for which the service charge is payable.

(3) For this purpose - (a) "costs" includes overheads, and (b) costs are relevant costs in relation to a service charge whether they are incurred, or to be incurred, in the period for which the service charge is payable or in an earlier or later period. Section 19 (1) Relevant costs shall be taken into account in determining the amount of a service charge payable for a period - (a) only to the extent that they are reasonably incurred, and (b) where they are incurred on the provisions of services or the carrying out of works, only if the services or works are of a reasonable standard; and the amount payable shall be limited accordingly. (2) Where a service charge is payable before the relevant costs are incurred, no greater amount than is reasonable is so payable, and after the relevant costs have been incurred any necessary adjustment shall be made by repayment, reduction or subsequent charges or otherwise. Section 20 (1) Where this section applies to any qualifying works or qualifying long term agreement, the relevant contributions of tenants are limited in accordance with subsection (6) or (7) (or both) unless the consultation requirements have been either— (a) complied with in relation to the works or agreement, or 19 (b) dispensed with in relation to the works or agreement by (or on appeal from) the appropriate tribunal . (2) In this section “relevant contribution”, in relation to a tenant and any works or agreement, is the amount which he may be required under the terms of his lease to contribute (by the payment of service charges) to relevant costs incurred on carrying out the works or under the agreement. (3) This section applies to qualifying works if relevant costs incurred on carrying out the works exceed an appropriate amount.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that this section applies to a qualifying long term agreement— (a) if relevant costs incurred under the agreement exceed an appropriate amount, or (b) if relevant costs incurred under the agreement during a period prescribed by the regulations exceed an appropriate amount.

(5) An appropriate amount is an amount set by regulations made by the Secretary of State; and the regulations may make provision for either or both of the following to be an appropriate amount— (a) an amount prescribed by, or determined in accordance with, the regulations, and (b) an amount which results in the relevant contribution of any one or more tenants being an amount prescribed by, or determined in accordance with, the regulations.

(6) Where an appropriate amount is set by virtue of paragraph (a) of subsection (5), the amount of the relevant costs incurred on carrying out the works or under the agreement which may be taken into account in determining the relevant contributions of tenants is limited to the appropriate amount.

(7) Where an appropriate amount is set by virtue of paragraph (b) of that subsection, the amount of the relevant contribution of the tenant, or each of the tenants, whose relevant contribution would otherwise exceed the amount prescribed by, or determined in accordance with, the regulations is limited to the amount so prescribed or determined.] Section 20C (1) A tenant may make an application for an order that all or any of the costs incurred, or to be incurred, by the landlord in connection with proceedings before a court, residential property tribunal or the Upper Tribunal…… are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge 20 payable by the tenant or any other person or persons specified in the application. (2) …….. (3) The court or tribunal to which the application is made may make such order on the application as it considers just and equitable in the circumstances. Section 27A (1) An application may be made to the appropriate tribunal for a determination whether a service charge is payable and, if it is, as to- (a) the person by whom it is payable, (b) the person to whom it is payable, (c) the amount which is payable, (d) the date at or by which it is payable, and (e) the manner in which it is payable. (2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not any payment has been made. (3) An application may also be made to [the appropriate tribunal] for a determination whether, if costs were incurred for services, repairs, maintenance, improvements, insurance or management of any specified description, a service charge would be payable for the costs and, if it would, as to— (a) the person by whom it would be payable, (b) the person to whom it would be payable, (c) the amount which would be payable, (d) the date at or by which it would be payable, and (e) the manner in which it would be payable. (4) No application under subsection (1) or (3) may be made in respect of a matter which— (a) has been agreed or admitted by the tenant, (b) has been, or is to be, referred to arbitration pursuant to a post- dispute arbitration agreement to which the tenant is a party, (c) has been the subject of determination by a court, or (d) has been the subject of determination by an arbitral tribunal pursuant to a post-dispute arbitration agreement. (5) But the tenant is not to be taken to have agreed or admitted any matter by reason only of having made any payment. (6) An agreement by the tenant of a dwelling (other than a post-dispute arbitration agreement) is void in so far as it purports to provide for a determination— (a) in a particular manner, or (b) on particular evidence, 21 of any question which may be the subject of an application under subsection (1) or (3). (7) The jurisdiction conferred on [the appropriate tribunal] in respect of any matter by virtue of this section is in addition to any jurisdiction of a court in respect of the matter. Building Safety Act 2022 Section 116 (1) Sections 117 to 125 and Schedule 8 make provision in connection with the remediation of relevant defects in relevant buildings. (2) In those sections— (a) sections 117 to 121 define “relevant building”, “qualifying lease”, “the qualifying time”, “relevant defect” and “associate”; (b) section 122 and Schedule 8 contain protections for tenants in respect of costs connected with relevant defects, and impose liabilities on certain landlords; (c)… (d)… (e)… Section 117 (1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 119 to 125 and Schedule

[8](2) “Relevant building” means a self-contained building, or self-contained part of a building, in England that contains at least two dwellings and—(a) is at least 11 metres high, or (b)has at least 5 storeys. This is subject to subsection (3). Section 118 (1) This section applies for the purpose of section 117. (2) The height of a building is to be measured from ground level to the finished surface of the floor of the top storey of the building (ignoring 22 any storey which is a roof-top machinery or plant area or consists exclusively of machinery or plant rooms). (3) When determining the number of storeys in a building— (a) any storey below ground level is to be disregarded;

(b) any mezzanine floor is to be regarded as a storey if its internal floor area is at least half of the internal floor area of the largest storey in the building which is not below ground level. (4) In subsection (2) “ground level”, in relation to a building, means— (a) the level of the surface of the ground immediately adjacent to the building, or (b) where the level of the surface of the ground on which the building is situated is not uniform, the level of the lowest part of the surface of the ground immediately adjacent to it. (5) For the purposes of subsection (3) a storey is “below ground level” if any part of the finished surface of the ceiling of the storey is below the level of the surface of the ground immediately adjacent to that part of the building. --- decision_2.pdf --- © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2023 FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY) Case reference : CAM/00KF/LSC/2022/0074 Property : Flat 1, 140 York Road, Southend-on-Sea SS1 2EA Applicant : Ivana Baltic Unrepresented Respondent : Long Term Reversions (Harrogate) Limited Representative : Paul Fuller, of Counsel Type of application : For the determination of the reasonableness of and the liability to pay service charges Tribunal members : Judge K. Saward Miss M. Krisko BSc (EST MAN) FRICS Date of hearing : 5 June 2023 Date of decision : 1 August 2023 DECISION AND REASONS Description of hearing This has been a remote hearing which was consented to by the parties. The form of remote hearing was to be CVP Video. However, having initially connected to the video by mobile phone, the Applicant subsequently decided to participate by telephone. The hearing proceeded as a hybrid of CVP/telephone. A face-to- face hearing was not held because it was not practicable, and no-one requested the same. 2 Corrected decision The original Decision was issued on 16 June 2023. This is a corrected Decision issued under the Tribunal’s powers within Rule 50 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013. Corrected text to Decision (5) below is under-lined. DECISIONS (1) The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make a determination on the service charges levied in respect of buildings insurance and management fees for 2020/21, the matter having already been the subject of determination by the County Court. This part of the claim is struck out under rule 9(2) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2013. (2) The Applicant’s case made in reference to the Building Safety Act 2022 has no reasonable prospects of success and is struck out under rule 9(3) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2013. (3) The Tribunal determines that the sums of £595.11, £342.92, £350.00 and £350.00 for buildings insurance were reasonably incurred and reasonable in respect of the service charge years 2017/18, 2018/19, 2019/20 and 2021/22, respectively. (4) The Tribunal determines that the sums of £95.94 for the service charge year 2017/18 and £115.00 in each of the service charge years 2018/19, 2019/20 and 2021/22, were reasonably incurred and reasonable. (5) The Tribunal makes an order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 so that the landlord’s costs of the Tribunal proceedings that may be passed to the lessee_(Ms Baltic) through any service charge are limited to no more than 50% of the costs incurred. REASONS The application

[2]The sums in dispute are: 3 Service charge year Buildings insurance Management fees 2017/18 £595.11 £95.94 2018/19 £342.92 £115.00 2019/20 £350.00 £115.00 2020/21 £350.00 £115.00 2021/22 £350.00 £115.00 The background

[4]Neither party requested an inspection, and the Tribunal did not consider one was necessary or proportionate to the issues in dispute.

[9]The Tribunal has noted the content of all these documents. Preliminary matters

[15]Proceedings were issued by the Respondent against the Applicant in the Southend County Court under claim no. G40YY502 on 26 November 2020 for non-payment of service charges and administration charges of £757.00. At the final hearing on 3 May 2022, the Applicant was ordered to pay the buildings insurance for the year 2020/21, a reminder charge, interest and costs. The Court did not make 5 an award against the Applicant for the 2020/21 management fee, costs for guttering repairs and other administration charges.

[16]Thus, the management fee for 2020/21 has already been disallowed by the County Court and judgment entered against the Applicant for the amount of the 2020/21 buildings insurance premium. It follows that an application could not be made to the Tribunal for these matters under section 27A because they have been the subject of a determination by a court. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the 2020/21 claim now made under section 27A.

[17]As there is no jurisdiction, the Tribunal cannot determine the 2020/21 management fee. This part of the claim must be struck out under rule 9(2). Whether the charges have been agreed or admitted

[18]The next issue concerns whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the disputed charges for the three preceding service charge years between 2017/18, 2018/19 and 2019/20.

[21]In this regard, the Tribunal’s attention is drawn by the Respondent to the legal authorities in Cain v London Borough of Islington

[2015] UKUT 117 (LC)

; and Shersby v Greenhurst Park Residents Company Limited

[2009] UKUT 241 (LC)

[22]In Cain, HHJ Gerald referred to section 27A(4) and (5) and made plain that whether or not agreement or admission can be implied or inferred from payment made will always be a question of fact and degree in every case. Then, at paragraph 18: “Looking at the reasoning behind this provision, no doubt the reason why the making of a single payment on its own, or without more, would never suffice is that such will often be insufficiently clear but also, in the peculiar area of landlord and tenant, it is common enough for tenants to pay (even expressly disputed) service charges so as to avoid the risk of forfeiture and preserve their home and the value of their lease. But the reason why a series of unqualified payments may, depending on the 6 circumstances, suffice is because the natural implication or inference from a series of unqualified payments of demanded service charges is that the tenant agrees or admits that which is being demanded … Self- evidently, the longer the period over which payments have been made the more readily the court or tribunal will be to hold that the tenant has agreed or admitted that which has been demanded and paid. It is the absence of protest or qualification which provides the additional evidence from which agreement or admission can be implied or inferred.”

[23]In Shersby, agreement or admission was found to be established from a combination of a series of payments over a period of time coupled with(a) substantial delay before challenge, and

[26]In this instance, it was not until the Tribunal application was made in December 2022 that issues were raised by the Applicant over buildings insurance premiums and management fees levied as service charges going back to 2017/18. Over 5 years had elapsed since the earliest payment. However, it was not an excessively long period of time. Whilst the Applicant initially told the Tribunal that she thought she had raised concerns in the County Court proceedings in respect of the preceding 3 service charge years, this was strongly refuted by the Respondent’s advocate. The Applicant then explained that she thought only the 7 2020/21 service charges were before the County Court and pointed out that she had not initiated the proceedings but was defending herself.

[30]As such, the Respondent submits that the application should be struck out pursuant to rule 9(3)(d) and/or rule 9(3)(e) as being frivolous or an abuse or process or otherwise disclosing no reasonable prospect of success. In addition, the Respondent referred to non-compliance with Tribunal directions under rule 9(3)(a).

[31]Pursuant to rule 9(3) the Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings or case if- (a) the applicant has failed to comply with a direction which stated that failure by the applicant to comply with the direction could lead to the striking out of the proceedings or case or part of it; (d) the Tribunal considers the proceedings or case (or a part of them), or the manner in which they are being conducted, to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse or process of the Tribunal; 8 (e) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant’s proceedings or case, or part of it, succeeding.

[39]It was not until 12 May 2023, that the Applicant produced a supplemental bundle with a selection of additional documents.

(ii) whether an order under section 20C of the 1985 Act and/or paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 to the 2002 Act should be made; and

(iii) whether an order for reimbursement of Tribunal fees should be made. The lease

[48]The lease includes the following provisions of particular relevance to the issues before the Tribunal.

[50]The Fifth Schedule provides that, subject to the due performance by the lessee of his obligations to contribute to the maintenance charges, the lessor will fulfil the obligations that follow. They include at paragraph (1)(C) a duty whenever reasonably necessary to maintain, repair, redecorate and renew the communal areas. At paragraph (4), the lessor must keep the building insured, which may be through such agents (if any) as the lessor shall nominate. Then, at paragraph (10) the lessor will employ managing agents to manage the building if and during such times as the lessor thinks fit and pay all proper fees charges and expenses payable to such agents in connection therewith. 11

[51]Paragraph 5(B) of the First Schedule specifies that the lessee’s per centage of the maintenance charge is 20%. Evidence heard

[54]Both parties took the opportunity to make a closing submission.

[55]Details of the evidence heard are encompassed within the analysis below. Buildings insurance - £595.11 (2017/18); £342.92 (2018/19); £350.00 (2019/20) and (2021/22)

[58]The Respondent had a contractual duty under the lease to effect insurance. Copies of certificates of insurance effected with AXA Insurance covering the periods from 1 July 2017 through to 30 June 2022 are produced. Insurance brokers were utilised whose letter of 5 April 2023 summarises how an extensive market exercise was undertaken at the policy renewal in 2018. Of the ten insurers approached, the most competitive and lowest premium was accepted. A market exercise was repeated upon renewal in 2019. The brokers state that real estate market conditions changed significantly in 2020 and positive terms were negotiated for renewal in 2020 and 2021. 12

[59]Whilst the contributions may seem high for a 1-bedroom flat, the Applicant has not produced any alternative quotes or evidence to indicate that the amount of the premiums was unreasonable.

[61]No consideration will be given to the management fees for 2020/21 which have already been disallowed by the County Court and credited to the Applicant’s service charge account.

[64]Photographs are supplied of both the carpet and electricity cover.

[66]The Tribunal dismisses the Respondent’s argument that section 19(1)(b) is not engaged. The management fees are not “works” but section 19(1)(b) is not limited to works. It refers to the “provisions of services or the carrying out of works”. The agents are providing a management service on behalf of the landlord for which a management fee is charged. Under section 19(1), the issue for the Tribunal is whether the management fees were reasonably incurred, and the management service was of a reasonable standard. The electric cover 13

[72]There is simply insufficient evidence to indicate that the management service was not provided to a reasonable standard due to matters pertaining to the electric cover. The carpet

[73]Issues over the hall carpet did not arise until December 2020 onwards and so this could not justify the claim going back to previous service charge years. The management fees have already been disallowed and 14 credited for service charge year 2020/21. That leaves the claim for 2021/22.

[78]Even if there were failings before 31 March 2022, it is appropriate to look at the level of fees charged when considering whether the management fees were reasonable. The Tribunal considers that the management fees were much lower than the usual market rate. Furthermore, throughout the disputed period, clearly the managing agents were providing services by arranging insurance, undertaking some repairs, invoicing, and providing other services, such as dealing with leaseholder communications. Whilst the managing agents did not provide all services as required by the lease (e.g., no budgets, accounts or reserve fund), the fees correspond with the level of service provided.

[79]The Applicant is aggrieved that she was not consulted before the works to replace the carpet were undertaken. The fact remains that the Respondent was not obliged to notify the Applicant in advance of the works in the communal area for which it is responsible. If a contribution exceeding £250 per leaseholder was to be sought for qualifying works, 15 then the consultation requirements under section 20 of the 1985 Act would have been triggered, but no issues are raised in this regard.

[82]The Tribunal concludes that the relevant service charges for buildings insurance and management fees were payable under the lease and reasonably incurred/reasonable.

[85]Potentially, costs of the proceedings could be recoverable by the Respondent as a maintenance charge pursuant to paragraph 1(9)(a) to Schedule 5 of the lease. The Respondent resists the making of an Order under section 20C of the 1985 Act preventing the recovery of the cost of these proceedings through the service charge. The Respondent maintains that the Applicant has sought to re-litigate matters decided by 16 the County Court and ought to have been raised in those proceedings. The Respondent describes the Applicant’s case as vague and incoherent and points to her failure to comply with case management directions, with documents submitted in piecemeal fashion including a substantial bundle on 15 May 2023, less than 1 month before trial.

[87]The skeleton argument provided early notice of how the Respondent intended to argue the case and did not raise new matters. However, the legal authorities should have been submitted earlier.

[89]Fees normally follow the event. Given that the Applicant has not succeeded in her application, no award is made in respect of the Tribunal application/hearing fees. Name: Judge K. Saward Date: 1 August 2023 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the Tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First- tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such 17 reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber). 18 Appendix of relevant legislation Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (as amended) Section 18(1) In the following provisions of this Act "service charge" means an amount payable by a tenant of a dwelling as part of or in addition to the rent - (a) which is payable, directly or indirectly, for services, repairs, maintenance, improvements or insurance or the landlord's costs of management, and (b) the whole or part of which varies or may vary according to the relevant costs.

[1]Having considered Ms Baltic’s request for permission to appeal submitted on 14 July 2023, the Tribunal determines that it will not review its decision on the Applicant’s stated grounds of appeal and permission be refused. 2

[2]The Tribunal has considered the request by Long Term Reversions (Harrogate) Ltd for a review of the Tribunal’s decision dated 16 June 2023 (and, if it is not granted, for permission to appeal).

[3]Having done so, the Tribunal determines to correct a typographical error in the wording of the section 20C order in exercise of its powers of correction under rule 50 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013. A copy of the corrected decision is attached.

[4]The Tribunal determines that it will not review its decision on the Respondent’s grounds of appeal, and permission to appeal be refused.

[5]In accordance with section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and rule 21 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010, the further application for permission to appeal may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber). Such application must be made in writing and received by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) no later than 14 days after the date on which the First-tier Tribunal sent notice of this refusal to the party applying for permission to appeal.

[6]Where possible, you should send your further application for permission to appeal by email to Lands@justice.gov.uk, as this will enable the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) to deal with it more efficiently.

[7]Alternatively, the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) may be contacted at: 5th Floor, Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1NL (tel: 0207 612 9710). REASONS FOR THE DECISIONS The Applicant’s application

[8]The Applicant considers that the Tribunal has not protected the leaseholder against arbitrary and unlawful behaviour of the freeholder. The Applicant also seeks the removal of the threat of all the fees. The Tribunal takes this to mean that the Applicant considers an order should have been made under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 in respect of all the landlord’s costs of the proceedings.

[9]There is a misunderstanding over the function of the Tribunal. Its role was to determine the reasonableness of and liability to pay service charges for the disputed service charge years under section 27A of the 1985 Act. In its decision dated 16 June 2023, the Tribunal found the disputed charges to be reasonable and reasonably incurred. Notwithstanding this determination, the Tribunal made an order under section 20C to limit recovery of the landlord’s costs of the proceedings to no more than 50% of the costs incurred for the reasons given in its decision.

[10]Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the decision simply record documents before the Tribunal, which fell for consideration. The Applicant disputes that any documents were late. They were considered by the Tribunal regardless. 3

[11]There was no evidence before the Tribunal that the buildings insurance had been invalidated by reason of defects with the property or how it was managed, hence the comments at paragraph 57. That position is unaltered by the extracts from various websites quoted by the Applicant.

[12]The Applicant’s concerns over the electric cover and hallway carpet were addressed at length in paragraphs 67 to 79 (inclusive) of the decision. The points now made are essentially a repeat of arguments raised and considered as part of the substantive application challenging the disputed service charges and management fees.

[13]Taking into account the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly, the Tribunal will not review its decision on the grounds given by the Applicant.

[14]In the circumstances, the Tribunal does not consider that any of the Applicant’s grounds of appeal have a realistic prospect of success. The Respondent’s application

[15]The Respondent’s application dated 14 July 2023 is made on two grounds. Ground 1

[16]Ground 1 concerns the wording of the Tribunal’s decision of 16 June 2023 to make an order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 limiting the landlord’s costs of the Tribunal proceedings that may be passed “to the lessees” through any service charge. The Respondent says that the Tribunal erred in law by extending the order to other leaseholders who were neither applicants nor consented to the application.

[17]Plainly, there is a minor typographical error in the wording of the order which should have said “lessee” in reference to Ms Baltic and not “lessees”, plural. As set out in section 20C, the application was for an order that any costs incurred by the landlord “are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the tenant or any other person or persons specified in the application [emphasis added].” The application was made solely by Ms Baltic. The word “lessees” will be corrected accordingly. Ground 2

[18]The Respondent considers that the Tribunal erred in making the section 20C order at all. It is submitted that in deciding it just and equitable to make the order, the Tribunal failed to balance the factors fairly. In particular, the Respondent says it was entitled to pursue a case for strike out of the whole of the Applicant’s claim. Plus, legal submissions had to be made in any event during the hearing in respect of the Applicant’s attempts to re-litigate matters already determined by the County Court. The Respondent points to its success in defending all the challenges. It is further submitted that, if it is correct on ground 1, then it would be 4 fundamentally unfair for other leaseholders of 140 York Road to be required to contribute to the Respondent’s costs.

[19]The Tribunal recognises that the purpose of section 20C is not to punish a landlord or management company or to award damages through the backdoor. That is neither the purpose nor effect of the order made by the Tribunal in limiting recovery of the landlord’s costs to no more than 50% of those incurred.

[20]In arriving at its decision, the Tribunal took into account all the relevant factors. Part of the application was struck out in relation to arguments concerning the Building Safety Act 2022 and service charges for 2020/21 already determined in the County Court. However, there remained a dispute over service charges for four other years. The Respondent advanced protracted arguments in an unsuccessful attempt to strike out the claim in its entirety. Indeed, the Tribunal noted that there were issues raised by the Applicant capable of disclosing a possible basis of claim.

[21]The Tribunal did not find that there was “no basis for this claim to succeed”. It said that there would be no basis to make a deduction from the management fee between 2017/18 to 2019/20 for a management failure if the concerns had not yet been recorded. That is entirely different.

[22]It is somewhat remiss of the Respondent to claim wholescale success. It succeeded in defending the application, but not without the Tribunal expressing its concerns over the very poor and neglected appearance of the building. The application was not struck out entirely and the Respondent’s argument that section 19(1)(b) was not engaged was dismissed.

[23]Of course, the Respondent was entitled to defend itself, but it could have done so far more succinctly. By the same token, the Applicant was entitled to pursue an application before the Tribunal on the grounds not struck out. There were issues that warranted consideration. As it was, the Tribunal was satisfied as to the reasonableness of the disputed service charges. This conclusion was reached on the basis that the Applicant had not produced alternative buildings insurance quotes and the Tribunal took into account the low level of management fees.

[24]The Tribunal exercised its discretion in accordance with section 20C(3) to find it just and equitable in the circumstances to make an order limiting recovery of the Respondent’s costs in the proceedings through the service charge to no more than 50%. In doing so there was recognition that the Respondent had succeeded in striking out part of the claim and that determinations were made in its favour. However, the Tribunal reasonably and properly weighed up the time (and thus costs) taken by the Respondent in pursuing lengthy arguments against a litigant in person which did not wholly succeed and who had raised some issues worthy of consideration by the Tribunal, albeit not made out.

[25]The Applicant was not awarded her Tribunal fees because her claim did not ultimately succeed. It has no bearing on whether the recovery of the Respondent’s costs should be limited through an order under section 20C. 5

[26]The effect of the correction to the section 20C order is that no other person is entitled to the benefit of the order besides Ms Baltic. In this eventuality, the Respondent argues that it would be fundamentally unfair as the other leaseholders would be required to contribute to the Respondent’s costs in dealing with an application to which they were not a party. In this regard, the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Conway v Jam Factory Freehold Limited

[2013] UKUT 0592 (LC)

is cited.

[27]The Jam Factory was a complex case concerning blocks of multiple flats where the management arrangements had proved controversial and there were a series of disputes. It was fact sensitive. The circumstances are not comparable to this case which involves a semi-detached house converted into 3 flats and straight-forward arrangements. Each and every case must be considered on its individual merits.

[28]The section 20C order does not ‘require’ any other leaseholder to contribute towards the Respondent’s costs. I am mindful that the corrected order opens up the possibility of the Respondent seeking recovery of more of its costs through the service charge from the other leaseholders than the Applicant herself. Of course, those other leaseholders played no part in the proceedings and might well feel aggrieved if the Respondent chooses to recoup its expenses from them.

[29]I shall not prejudice the outcome of any application, but if the Respondent were to seek recovery of its costs from the other leaseholders, then they could make their own application to the Tribunal for an order under section 20C. The option would also be available for them to challenge the reasonableness of such charges under section 27A of the 1985 Act. There would be a potential remedy available to them.

[30]It would not have been just and equitable in the circumstances of this case to refuse Ms Baltic any order under section 20C. To do so would enable the full recovery of the Respondent’s costs of the proceedings from her and other leaseholders when the Tribunal has found that not to be justified. It imposed a 50% limit for a reason.

[31]Taking into account the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly, the Tribunal will not review its decision.

[32]In the circumstances, the Tribunal does not consider that an appeal has a realistic prospect of success. Name: Judge K Saward Date: 1 August 2023 --- decision_4.pdf --- © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2023 FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY) Case reference : CAM/00KF/LSC/2022/0074 Property : Flat 1, 140 York Road, Southend-on- Sea SS1 2EA Applicant : Ivana Baltic Unrepresented Respondent : Long Term Reversions (Harrogate) Ltd Representative : J B Leitch Limited Type of application : Rule 13 costs application Tribunal members : Judge K Saward Miss M. Krisko BSc (EST MAN) FRICS Date of decision : 1 August 2023 DECISION AND REASONS Description of determination This has been a determination by the Tribunal on the papers. A face-to-face hearing was not held because all issues could be determined on paper and no hearing was requested. The application for costs was made by the Respondent on 14 July 2023. The Applicant submitted a response on 31 July 2023. DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL The application for an order that the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs pursuant to rule 13(1) of The Tribunal Procedure (First Tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 is dismissed. 2 REASONS The application

[1]The application for costs is made by the Respondent landlord of the Applicant. It follows the decision of the Tribunal on 16 June 2023 concerning the reasonableness of and the liability to pay service charges in respect of management fees and insurance premiums for the service charge years 2017/18 to 2021/22.

[2]In its decision, the Tribunal determined to strike out the Applicant’s claim for service charges levied in respect of buildings insurance and management fees for 2020/21 having already been the subject of a County Court judgment. The Applicant’s case made in reference to the Building Safety Act 2022 was also struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success. The Tribunal further determined that the sums charged for buildings insurance over the 4 service charge years 2017/18 to 2021/22 (excluding 2020/21) were reasonably incurred and reasonable as were the management fees for the same periods.

[3]The Respondent seeks costs totalling £5,100 (inc VAT) made up of £3,000 legal costs and £2,100 for Counsel’s fees. In addition, the sum of £1,085 (inc VAT) is sought for costs of this costs application. The Law

[4]Except to the limited extent provided by rule 13, the Tribunal is normally a “no costs” jurisdiction. The basic power of the Tribunal to award costs is found in section 29 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. This provides that costs shall be in the discretion of the Tribunal subject to (in the case of this Tribunal), The Tribunal Procedure (First Tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (“the 2013 Rules”).

[5]The limited powers of the Tribunal to award costs are contained within Rule 13 of the 2013 Rules. As the Respondent’s application was made on 14 July 2023, it fell within the requisite 28-day period of dispatch of the Tribunal decision to be made within time under rule 13(5).

[6]The actual wording of rule 13(1)(b) is important. It specifies that the Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only “if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings”. Under the 2013 Rules, the word “proceedings” means acts undertaken in connection with the application itself and steps taken thereafter (rule 26).

[7]Thus, unreasonable conduct is a prerequisite of the power to award costs. The exercise of such power, once established, is then within the discretion of the Tribunal.

[8]In making the application, the Respondent cites the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) decision of Willow Court Management Company (1985) Ltd v Alexander

[2016] UKUT 290 (LC)

); Sinclair v 231 Sussex Gardens Right to Manage 3 Limited LRX/99/2015; and Stone v 54 Hogarth Road, London SW5 Management Ltd LRX/88/2015 (“the UT Decision”). The Tribunal is invited to note that the parties to these proceedings were the second case in the UT Decision.

[9]The UT Decision gave clear guidance on the principles to be applied in respect of rule 13(1)(b). The UT suggested a sequential three-stage approach. It is not of rigid application as each case will be fact sensitive but provides a helpful framework. It may be summarised as:-(1) applying an objective standard, has the person acted unreasonably?

(2) if so, should the Tribunal exercise its discretion to make an order for costs?

(3) if so, what should the terms of the order be?

[10]Stage 1 is essentially a gateway to stages 2 and 3. In deciding what is meant by acting “unreasonably”, the UT followed the approach set out in Ridehalgh v Horsfield [1994] EWCA 23 Civ 40,

[1994] Ch 205

, and stated (at paragraph 24) that “unreasonable conduct includes conduct which is vexatious and designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case. It is not enough that the conduct leads in the event to an unsuccessful outcome. The test may be expressed in different ways. Would a reasonable person in the position of the party have conducted themselves in the manner complained of? Or Sir Thomas Bingham’s “acid test” [in Ridehalgh]: is there a reasonable explanation for the conduct complained of?”.

[11]The UT Decision (at paragraph 23) also expressly rejected the submission that “unreasonableness should not be interpreted as encompassing only behaviour which is also capable of being described as vexatious, abusive or frivolous”, i.e. it rejected the contention that ‘unreasonableness’ should be given a wider meaning. The UT did not go so far as to state that rule 13(1)(b) costs should only be awarded in the most exceptional of cases. However, it is made plain that orders under rule 13(1)(b) are to be reserved for the clearest cases and the bar is a high one.

[12]The burden is on the party claiming costs to demonstrate that the other party’s conduct has been unreasonable. Findings of fact

[13]The Respondent asserts that the Applicant acted unreasonably in bringing the proceedings to meet stage 1. To support this stance, the Respondent relies upon its attempts to negotiate settlement of the claim.

[14]The Respondent’s first offer to settle was made on 30 March 2023 in a letter marked ‘without prejudice save as to costs’ sent by its solicitors to the Applicant. The letter pointed out that the insurance and management fees for 2020/21 had already been determined by the County Court. As such, 4 they were “not eligible to be challenged again as part of the application and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the same”. The letter expresses confidence that the Respondent will be wholly successful in responding to the application but is mindful of the obligations on parties to try to resolve their disputes and of the ongoing landlord and tenant relationship. In light of this, the letter proceeds “on a purely commercial basis” to offer settlement of the Applicant’s claim in its entirety. If the Applicant admitted the payability and reasonableness of the insurance fees (excluding 2020/21), the Respondent would credit the Applicant’s service charge account with £440.94 for 4 years of management fees. Each party was to bear their own costs. A deadline of 3 April 2023 was given.

[15]There followed a series of emails between the Applicant and Respondent’s solicitors on 31 March 2023. The first email from the Appellant said: “We are happy to discuss your offer further but would need more time”. The Respondent’s solicitors replied explained that the deadline was set to avoid expense being incurred in drafting their Statement of Case to comply with the Tribunal deadlines and they considered 4 days sufficed. The Applicant offered to raise no objection to the Respondent seeking an extension of time. The solicitors responded on 3 April 2023 to say that the Tribunal had been clear that further extensions were unlikely to be given.

[16]The Applicant’s email to the solicitors on 3 April 2023 did not respond to the Respondent’s offer but asked for the carpet/linoleum in the common area to be replaced and the electrical box to be remedied. In reply the same day, the solicitors stated that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an order of specific performance and no sums for these items had been demanded.

[17]The Respondent’s solicitors alerted the Applicant on 4 April 2023 that it would draw the Tribunal’s attention to the correspondence upon consideration of costs. The Applicant replied: “We are not refusing settlement just the opposite” and requested funds to order and oversee a professionally fitted carpet as a “right step in future negotiations”. The solicitors’ response reiterated previous points and suggested the Applicant may wish to seek independent legal advice.

[18]Subsequently, the Applicant emailed the solicitors on 12 April 2023 to say that the buckling carpet had been removed so that “one matter appears to be resolved” and enquired if the previous offer still stands. It was confirmed on 25 April 2023 that the offer was no longer available, but a second offer was made to credit the £440.94 on different terms.

[19]The revised terms required an admission of the reasonableness and payablity of the insurance fees over the 5 disputed years (including 2020/21), and an acceptance that the lease contains requirements to pay yearly rents and maintenance charges. In addition, the offer required the Applicant to agree that there would no longer be a limit from 2023/24 on the previously agreed insurance contribution of £350. Instead, her contribution would be a 20% pursuant to the First Schedule of the lease. 5

[20]By way of clarification, the Respondent advises the Applicant’s insurance contribution had been agreed as £350.00 as part of a settlement of previous Tribunal proceedings in 2018.

[21]On 25 April 2023, the Applicant indicated willingness to accept the sum of £440.94 but no increase in service charges “when the management and service up to date have been deplorable.” Exchanges then took place between the parties. These included a comment from the Applicant on 30 April 2023 that it would be unreasonable to change the £350.oo cap previously agreed on settlement for her building insurance contribution.

[22]The solicitors responded to clarify that the insurance charge had not been capped indefinitely but for specific years up to year end 2021/22 and the Respondent had continued to bill “only £350” as a gesture of goodwill.

[23]This culminated in a revised third offer on 19 May 2023 to settle on the same terms as the second offer but without the clause providing for future building insurance charges. Owing to the proximity of the hearing listed for 5 June 2023, a deadline of 24 May 2023 was imposed for acceptance.

[24]When the Applicant responded on 23 May 2023, after being chased up by the Respondent’s solicitors, she appeared to misunderstand the terms of offer believing that the Respondent wished “to retreat from the letter of the lease” and removing provision “referring to the possible acceptance of attending to the matter of electric cover”. She comments that “it would take a qualified accountant to decipher this offer”.

[25]The solicitors sought to provide clarification in 2-pages of email text on 24 May 2023. When settlement was not reached, the Respondent’s solicitors sent a 5-page letter to the Applicant on 31 May 2023 setting out the background and re-asserting points made before. The letter responds to issues raised over the carpet and electrical cupboard and then makes an “open offer of settlement”. The offer was in essentially the same terms as the first offer, waiving the management fees of £440.94 without any acceptance of liability on the Respondent’s part. It is emphasised that the offer does not release the Applicant from any other obligation under the Lease. It suggests again that if the Applicant does not understand the offer or terms then she may wish to obtain independent legal advice.

[26]The Respondent says that the Applicant’s response of 1 June 2023 was received at 16.46 hours, being after the Respondent’s 1pm deadline. The last sentence says: “I feel unable to sign any agreement without independent financial advice.”

[27]The Respondent maintains that the Applicant behaved unreasonably by failing to productively engage with the Respondent’s solicitors to resolve issue once the application was issued or throughout the proceedings. At the same time, the Applicant was unreasonable in her requests. In particular, seeking resolution of matters previously determined in the County Court. 6 Analysis

[28]As set out in the UT Decision (paragraph 28), the first stage does not involve an exercise of discretion but rather the application of an objective standard of conduct to the facts of the case. If there is no reasonable explanation for the conduct complained of, the behaviour will properly be adjudged to be unreasonable, and the threshold for the making of an order will have been crossed.

[29]The Respondent considers the Applicant acted unreasonably in pursuing charges in respect of buildings insurance and management fees for 2020/21. These charges had already been the subject of determination by the County Court. Judgment had been entered against the Applicant for the building insurance charges but no award was made for the management fee for that year. As this matter had been finally disposed of, with the Applicant already succeeding for the management fee for 2020/21, this part of the claim could not succeed. It had to be struck out. When the Applicant was invited during the hearing to respond to the application to strike out her claim she was fixated on her grievances. No clear explanation was given for pursuing an application in the Tribunal for a matter already resolved in the County Court.

[30]The fact that a party acts without legal advice is relevant at stage 1, as per paragraph 32 of the UT Decision. The question is whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have acted in the same way as the Applicant. In making that assessment the UT considered that it would be wrong to assume a greater degree of legal knowledge or familiarity with Tribunal procedures and the conduct of proceedings before it, than is in fact possessed by the party whose conduct is under consideration.

[31]Applying the objective standard as the Tribunal must, it is difficult to see how a reasonable person in the Applicant’s position (i.e., without legal knowledge or advice) would still not realise that the same charges for 2020/21 had already been litigated and resolved. It was unreasonable to persist in this part of the application once alerted to the duplication. The stage 1 test is met on this point, but it was only one part of the application with which the Tribunal had to deal. Consideration is required to other aspects of the application.

[32]The Tribunal also struck out the Applicant’s case in reference to the Building Safety Act 2022. Although raised by the Applicant late in proceedings, a reasonable person in her position would not have appreciated the lack of prospects on this point or the procedural implications. No unreasonable behaviour is found in this regard.

[33]The Respondent engaged solicitors to deal with the Tribunal application and authorised offers to be made in an attempt to resolve the proceedings. However, the glaring omission is that the Applicant repeatedly referred to the carpet hallway and electric cover and yet no-one for the Respondent appears to have positively engaged with her on these matters to see if a resolution might be found. Instead, the Respondent entrenched its 7 position of denying liability. There was no indication that anyone had gone to the premises to better understand the issue with the electric cover, for instance. Even at the Tribunal proceedings the managing agent’s representative acknowledged not having personally visited the property. The hall carpet was rectified shortly before the hearing and with better communication on this issue, the Applicant could have been appeased.

[34]A failure to deal with both the hall carpet and electric box had formed part of the Applicant’s reasoning as to why service charges were disputed in respect of management fees. None of the offers provided any resolution to these complaints and so it was hardly surprising that the Applicant declined to accept.

[35]From the Applicant’s perspective, she clearly felt that she had a legitimate grievance. She was no doubt fuelled in those beliefs because the ‘asset site inspection & general risk assessment’ conducted by the new managing agents on 18 October 2022 identified numerous areas in which the property is in poor condition. In the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Applicant as a litigant in person to raise concerns through application to the Tribunal.

[36]Having done so, the Applicant did attempt to engage with the solicitors albeit after some prompting. It is abundantly clear from her responses that she was struggling to understand the terms in which the offers of settlement were being made and was wary of committing herself without the benefit of advice. An unrepresented party cannot be criticised for treating offers of settlement made by their opponent’s lawyers with some caution. That is particularly so when the Applicant was being asked to make admissions. The way that the offers were communicated would not be easily understood by the everyday person without legal training.

[37]Indeed, it is unclear to the Tribunal why the terms of the second and third offers required an admission of the reasonableness and payablity of the insurance fees for 2020/21 when the Respondent itself raised this as a matter concluded by the County Court and outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal proceedings.

[38]Ultimately, the application (that was not struck out) failed because the Applicant did not produce evidence to support her claim. She had not understood what was required and that is very typical for litigants in person. It does not make it unreasonable.

[39]The Tribunal considers that it was not unreasonable for the Applicant to pursue her claim on matters not already litigated.

[40]The issue turns to whether the Tribunal will exercise its discretion and make an award of costs in relation to the unreasonableness of persisting in pursuing the part of her claim already determined by the County Court.

[41]Plainly, there would be no justification for a full award when unreasonableness has only been shown with respect to this one element of a far wider application. Even then, this is by no means a clear case 8 warranting an award of costs. Stepping back and looking at the conduct of the parties as a whole, it would be unduly harsh to make an award of costs against the Applicant. She clearly believed there was a legitimate claim and had found the Respondent’s approach to her to be bullish. As described above, communications with the Applicant could have been better.

[42]There was a wide imbalance in the position of the parties. The Applicant cannot be criticised for not taking professional legal advice. The Respondent could afford to engage solicitors, but their involvement did not aid early resolution. It was the Respondent’s choice to incur legal costs and to instruct Counsel in what was a straightforward dispute. The length of the Respondent’s submissions throughout (including the costs application) have been extraordinary. The resultant amount of costs incurred has been disproportionate to the issues involved.

[43]Moreover, it was not a resounding win for the Respondent whose wider management of the property prompted the Tribunal to express concern over its condition and to issue a warning.

[44]The Tribunal has decided not to exercise its discretion to award costs in all the circumstances of this case. The application will be dismissed. Name: Judge K. Saward Date: 1 August 2023 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).