“The Defendant applies for an Order to strike out pursuant to CPR Parts 3.4(2)(a) and/or for summary judgment pursuant toCPR Part 24 in respect of those parts of the Claimants’ Particulars of Claim and Claim Forms insofar as they seek to challenge, quash and/or seek declaratory/injunctive relief and/or damages in respect of: (i) the design and requirements of the franchise competition, as specified in the invitation to tender (ITT) documents; (ii) the introduction of the Pensions Requirements as part of the Revised Bid instructions and their legality; and (iii) the existence and scope of the Defendant’s reserved discretion to evaluate and disqualify bids as part of the tender process for non-compliance with the above requirements, (together, the “tender process complaints”) on the basis that those parts of the Claims are out of time and have not brought with the required rapidity pursuant to Regulation 1370/2007, namely within 3 months of the date when the Claimants knew, or ought to have known the grounds giving rise to their claim, within the meaning ofCPR Rule 54.5 and applicable EU and UK law. In the alternative, the Claimants have no real prospect of succeeding on these issues because the Claimants knew, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, prior to the 3 month deadline, the relevant facts to constitute the cause of action and thus necessary to commence proceedings in respect of the claim, namely that the matters of which they complain caused or risked causing them loss.”
“If the Applications are successful, there will be no basis for declaratory or other relief in respect of the ITT or the Re-Bid Instructions and/or the Pensions Requirements set out therein (in the case of [C] including but not limited to its noncompliances concerning the Pension Requirements). Accordingly those remedial aspects of the Claims should be struck out or summary judgment granted in the Defendant’s favour in that regard. The Claimants should be directed to amend their pleadings to reflect the ongoing scope of the matters in dispute.”
“The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court – (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing …the claim; (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.”
“The court may give summary judgment against a claimant … on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if – (a) it considers that – (i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or (ii) …; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”
“67. In his conduct of the Procurement, the Secretary of State was required to comply with the terms of the Railway Regulation (which was expressly referred to as the basis for the Procurement). The Railway Regulation gives rise to directly effective rights and is a concrete expression of obligations flowing from EU Treaty principles, in particular those of equal treatment, transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, good administration, non-arbitrariness, protection of legitimate expectations and the requirement to act without manifest error (the “EU Treaty principles”). The Secretary of State was required expressly (but without limitation) to comply with: a. Article 3, concerning public service contracts and general rules. b. Article 4, concerning the mandatory content of public service contracts and general rules. c. Article 5, concerning the award of public service contracts which requires that the procedure adopted “shall be fair and observe the principles of transparency and nondiscrimination”. (emphasis original) d. Article 6, concerning public service compensation. e. Article 9, concerning compatibility with the Treaty. 68. Further or alternatively, the Secretary of State was required to comply with those same obligations flowing from the EU Treaty principles as they arise out of the EU Treaties themselves and which give rise to directly effective EU law rights and the general principles of EU law. 69. Further or alternatively, the Secretary of State was required to comply with obligations arising under Articles 49 and/or Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) on freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. 70. The Secretary of State’s breaches of the terms of the Railway Regulation and/or Articles 49 and/or Article 56 TFEU and/or obligations flowing from EU Treaty principle which give rise to directly effective EU law rights constitute breaches of the terms ofsection 2(1) European Communities Act 1972 and are actionable in domestic law by way of a claim for breach of statutory duty.”
“91. In its conduct of the Procurement, the Defendant is required to comply with: (i) the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road (“the Railway Regulation”), including: (a) Article 4(1), by which the Franchise Agreement must clearly define the franchisee’s public service obligations and must establish in advance, in an objective and transparent manner (inter alia), the nature and extent of any exclusive rights granted, the arrangements for the allocation of costs connected with the provision of services and the parameters on the basis of which the franchisee’s compensation is to be calculated; (b) Article 5(3), by which the procedure for competitive tendering of the Franchise Agreement must be fair and must observe the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, as well as (by implication) the principle of equal treatment, and (by implication) by which assessment of bids must be free from manifest error; (ii) Articles 49 and/or 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), on, respectively, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services; (iii) general principles under the TFEU, including the principles of non-discrimination, proportionality, transparency, equal treatment, the protection of legitimate expectations, the requirement to act without manifest error and good administration. 92. Any breach by the Defendant of the obligations referred to in paragraph 91 above constitutes a breach ofsection 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 and is actionable in domestic law by way of a claim for breach of statutory duty. …”
“Without prejudice to its contention that breaches of the duties described in sub-paragraphs 9(i), 9(ii) and 9(iii) above are actionable by way of private law claims for breach of statutory duty undersection 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 , the Claimant avers that the Defendant’s breaches of such duties are also amenable to judicial review.” iv) [96]-[101] of Arriva’s Particulars of Claim in the Part 7 proceedings pleads as follows: “96. In his design and conduct of the Procurement, the Defendant owed the Claimant a duty to comply with the following (collectively, “the Defendant’s obligations”): a. the Regulation and/or; b. enforceable general principles of EU law arising the EU Treaties and/or the ECA72, including (without limitation) those of equal treatment, transparency, non-discrimination, nonarbitrariness, proportionality, good administration, procedural fairness, and the protection of legitimate expectations; and/or c. Ars. 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the “TFEU”); and/or d. theRailways Act 1993 as amended by theRailways Act 2005 (together “the Acts”); and/or e. the Implied Tender Contract; and/or f. enforceable general public law duties owed as a public authority, namely to take decisions in a procedurally proper fashion that are lawful, reasonable, proportionate, procedurally fair, substantively fair and respect legitimate expectations. 97. The Defendant was further required to conduct a process for the selection of tenderers and award of the Contract that was free from manifest error and/or irrationality. 98. In particular, the Defendant was required to treat the Claimant equally, transparently and in a proportionate way. It was required to conduct the Procurement in accordance with the procedure set out in the ITT and other tender documents, and to assess each bid solely by reference to the award criteria and scoring criteria set out therein. The Defendant was further required to conduct a fair and objective assessment of the tender responses to the Procurement that was free of manifest error. 99. Further or alternatively, by their respective conduct relating to the Procurement, the Claimant and the Defendant established an implied tender contract that comprised express and/or implied terms that the Defendant would conduct the Procurement in accordance with the aforementioned general EU Treaty principles (“the Implied Tender Contract”). A. The Regulation 100. Without prejudice to the generality of the obligations identified above, insofar as the Regulation is concerned, the Defendant (as a competent authority and/or public service operator, as defined in the Regulation) owed the Claimant (as a public service operator, as defined in the Regulation) a duty to comply (without limitation) with the following Articles: a. Article 2a(1): “When laying down those specifications and the scope of their application, the competent authority shall duly respect the principle of proportionality, in accordance with Union law” and “The specifications shall be consistent with the policy objectives stated in public transport policy documents in the Member States”; and/or b. Article 2a(2): “The specifications of the public service obligations and the related compensation of the net financial effect of public service obligations shall: (a) achieve the objectives of the public transport policy in a cost-effective manner; and (b) financially sustain the provision of public passenger transport, in accordance with the requirements laid down in the public transport policy in the long term”; and/or c. Article 4(1): “Public service contracts and general rules shall: (a) clearly set out the public service obligations, defined in this Regulation and specified in accordance with Article 2a thereof, with which the public service operator is to comply, and the geographical areas concerned; [and] (b) establish in advance, in an objective and transparent manner: (i) the parameters on the basis of which the compensation payment, if any, is to be calculated; and (ii) the nature and extent of any exclusive rights granted, in a way that preventsovercompensation”; and/or d. Article 5: “(1) Public service contracts shall be awarded in accordance with the rules laid down in this Regulation” and/or “(3)The procedure adopted for competitive tendering shall be open to all operators, shall be fair and shall observe the principles of transparency and non-discrimination” and/or “(7) Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that decisions taken in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6 may be reviewed effectively and rapidly, at the request of any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement, on the grounds that such decisions have infringed Community law or national rules implementing that law”; and/or e. Article 6(1): “All compensation connected with a general rule or a public service contract shall comply with the provisions laid down in Article 4, irrespective of how the contract was awarded”
“(c) to promote efficiency and economy on the part of persons providing railway services”; and/or “(d) to promote competition in the provision of railway services for the benefit of users of railway services”; and/or “(g) to enable persons providing railway services to plan the future of their businesses with a reasonable degree of assurance”; and/or b. Section 4(2): The Defendant has a duty to exercise functions in the manner which are “best calculated to protect”: “(b) the interests of persons providing services for the carriage of passengers or goods by railway in their use of any railway facilities which are for the time being vested in a private sector operator, in respect of—(i) the prices charged for such use; and (ii) the quality of the service provided”; and/or c. Section 26(3):“The appropriate franchising authority shall not issue an invitation to tender under this section to (or entertain such a tender from) any person unless it is of the opinion that the person has, or is likely by the commencement of the franchise term to have, an appropriate financial position and managerial competence, and is otherwise a suitable person, to be the franchisee.””
“(i) a declaration that the Defendant has acted unlawfully in: (a) its design of the Procurement in the ways described in paragraphs 94 to 106 above; and/or (b) in allowing MTR to continue to participate in the Procurement despite adding RENFE as a key subcontractor; and/or (c) in taking the Disqualification Decision; and/or (d) in its treatment of MTR’s and FTWC’s bids; (ii) an injunction requiring the Defendant: (a) to desist from conducting the Procurement on the basis of a Procurement design which is unlawful, as described in paragraphs 94 to 106 above; and/or (b) to exclude MTR from the Procurement; and/or (c) to restart the Procurement on a lawful basis; and/or (d) to revoke the Disqualification Decision; (iii) damages for the losses described in paragraph 120 above, and in this regard the Claimants aver that the breaches particularised above are sufficiently serious to warrant an award of damages; (iv) interest; (v) such further relief as may be just and appropriate; and/or (vi) costs.”
“1. A declaration or declarations that the Secretary of State acted unlawfully and in breach of statutory duty in (a) disqualifying [SEMTL/SSETL] from the [EM/SE] Franchise Competition [and (b) awarding the EM Rail Franchise to Abellio and/or not awarding the EM Rail Franchise to SEMTL]; 2. An injunction requiring the Secretary of State to revoke the Disqualification Decision and/or restart the Procurement on a lawful basis; 3. Damages for loss of profit and/or contribution to overheads and/or wasted tender costs; 4. Damages for loss of reputation, goodwill and the ability to win and earn profits on other similar contracts; 5. Damages for the loss of the chance of being awarded the EM Rail Franchise;] 6. Interest pursuant tosection 35A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 or the equitable jurisdiction of the Court on the amount found to be due to the Claimant at such rate and for such period as the Court sees fit; and/or 7. Such further or other relief as the Court may determine. 8. Costs.”
“29.— Mandatory, prohibiting and quashing orders. (1) The orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari shall be known instead as mandatory, prohibiting and quashing orders respectively. (1A) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to make mandatory, prohibiting and quashing orders in those classes of case in which, immediately before1st May 2004 , it had jurisdiction to make orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari respectively. … 30.— Injunctions to restrain persons from acting in offices in which they are not entitled to act. (1) Where a person not entitled to do so acts in an office to which this section applies, the High Court may— (a) grant an injunction restraining him from so acting; and (b) if the case so requires, declare the office to be vacant. (2) This section applies to any substantive office of a public nature and permanent character which is held under the Crown or which has been created by any statutory provision or royal charter. 31.— Application for judicial review. (1) An application to the High Court for one or more of the following forms of relief, namely— (a) a mandatory, prohibiting or quashing order; (b) a declaration or injunction under subsection (2); or (c) an injunction under section 30restraining a person not entitled to do so from acting in an office to which that section applies, shall be made in accordance with rules of court by a procedure to be known as an application for judicial review. (2) A declaration may be made or an injunction granted under this subsection in any case where an application for judicial review, seeking that relief, has been made and the High Court considers that, having regard to— (a) the nature of the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by mandatory, prohibiting or quashing orders ; (b) the nature of the persons and bodies against whom relief may be granted by such orders; and (c) all the circumstances of the case, it would be just and convenient for the declaration to be made or the injunction to be granted, as the case may be. … (3) No application for judicial review shall be made unless the leave of the High Court has been obtained in accordance with rules of court; and the court shall not grant leave to make such an application unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. … (4) On an application for judicial review the High Court may award to the applicant damages, restitution or the recovery of a sum due if– (a) the application includes a claim for such an award arising from any matter to which the application relates; and (b) the court is satisfied that such an award would have been made if the claim had been made in an action begun by the applicant at the time of making the application. (5) If, on an application for judicial review, the High Court quashes the decision to which the application relates, it may in addition– (a) remit the matter to the court, tribunal or authority which made the decision, with a direction to reconsider the matter and reach a decision in accordance with the findings of the High Court, or (b) substitute its own decision for the decision in question. … (6) Where the High Court considers that there has been undue delay in making an application for judicial review, the court may refuse to grant— (a) leave for the making of the application; or (b) any relief sought on the application, if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration. (7) Subsection (6) is without prejudice to any enactment or rule of court which has the effect of limiting the time within which an application for judicial review may be made. …”
“5.3 Any competent authority which has recourse to a third party other than an internal operator, shall award public service contracts on the basis of a competitive tendering procedure, except in the cases specified in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6. The procedure adopted for competitive tendering shall be open to all operators, shall be fair and shall observe the principles of transparency and non-discrimination. Following the submission of tenders and any preselection, the procedure may involve negotiations in accordance with these principles in order to determine how best to meet specific or complex requirements. … 5.7 Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that decisions taken in accordance with paragraph 2 to 6 may be reviewed effectively and rapidly, at the request of any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement, on the grounds that such decisions have infringed Community law or national rules implementing that law. … 8.2 … [T]he award of public service contracts by rail and by road shall comply with Article 5 as from3 December 2019 . During this transitional period Member States shall take measures to gradually comply with Article 5 in order to avoid serious structural problems in particular relating to transport capacity.”
“The point we are making is if the initial phase ofproving breach is precluded as a matter of public law, then the reservoir of rights in the EU doesn't contain a right to damages and so nothing flows down the conduit pipe. That's the basic point.”
“What we are saying is that in these circumstances a successful public law challenge is a pre-condition for a successful private law claim for Francovich damages.”
“We say that it's a basic principle of administrative law that a public law measure is valid if it is not challenged within the relevant time period and as such it cannot form the basis for an action for damages under EU law if it is in fact valid.”
“Regulation 32(4) specifies a short limitation period. That is no doubt for the good policy reason that it is in the public interest that challenges to the tender process of a public service contract should be made promptly so as to cause as little disruption and delay as possible. It is not merely because the interests of all those who have participated in the tender process have to be taken into account. It is also because there is a wider public interest in ensuring that tenders which public authorities have invited for a public project should be proceeded as quickly as possible. A balance has to be struck between two competing interests: the need to allow challenges to be made to an unlawful tender process, and the need to ensure that any such challenges are made expeditiously.”
“17-112 Although damages are a private law remedy, a claim may be attached to a claim for public law remedy in a claim for Judicial review. In practice, the court will first determine whether there has been any breach of EU law and whether the claimant is entitled to any remedies in public law, such as quashing order to quash an unlawful decision or a declaration. Then the court will deal with the question of damages.”
“32. Counsel for the Crown accepts that the claim of PPL may be brought by ordinary action. But, he submits, the cause of action is sui generis and based on a core allegation that that the UK should have amended the 1988 Act so as to repeal ss.67 and 72. He contends that such a claim is inherently a public law claim which ought to be pursued in proceedings for judicial review. To require such a procedure will enable the court to exercise control over the claims and the periods for which they may be pursued. In those circumstances, he submits the Court has jurisdiction to strike out the action as an abuse of process of its process. 33. This is disputed by Counsel for PPL. He accepts that the complaint of PPL could have been brought by judicial review. But, he contends, this is a private law claim which PPL is entitled to bring by ordinary action commenced within the limitation period.”
“47. I start with a consideration of the nature of the proceedings. The decision of the Divisional Court in Factortame V … was considered by the Court of Appeal ([1998] Eu.L.R. 456)and the House of Lords ([2000] 1 AC 524 )… . In both those courts there was clear recognition that the effect of Francovich and subsequent cases was to subject Member States to an obligation under Community Law to compensate individuals who have sustained consequential loss if they satisfy the conditions identified by the ECJ in those cases. Such an obligation gives rise to a correlative right in one who has suffered such damage. Such a right is not discretionary. 48. Nor in my view can such a right be categorised as a public law right even though the Crown's obligations under Community Law and how to discharge them fall to be considered. As in the context of the Limitation Act, the remedy is for damages for breach of a statutory duty arising under Article 8.2 of the Rental Directive and s. 2(2) European Communities Act. This is recognised by the relief sought in the form of a declaration and damages. Counsel for PPL accepted that a declaration was a discretionary remedy but offered to abandon it if that mattered. 49. Neither party referred me to the provisions ofCPR Part 54 . Nevertheless it appears to me that though the nature of the proceedings might fall within the definition of a claim for judicial review in Rule 54.1(2)(a)if the claim for a declaration is abandoned it would be excluded by Rule 54.3(2). I do not suggest that the form of the proceedings can govern their substance but, to my mind, this confirms the view that the proceedings are essentially private law proceedings which can and prima facie should be brought by an ordinary claim. 50. I see nothing in the features on which the Crown relied to suggest that the court should regard the continuation of the claims as ordinary actions as an abuse of the process. So to do would be to subject the rights of an individual to a discretion and a time limit much more restrictive than those normally appropriate to a private law claim for breach of statutory duty and would itself constitute a breach of community law.”
“all the obligations on which the claimants rely, apart from the implied contract, are in substance binding on the Secretary of State as a public body performing the role that that public body is required to perform under Regulation 1370.”
“69. …The argument is that the refusal to supply the fully executable version was the subject of a clear decision by NICE which was capable of being challenged at the time; yet Eisai waited some 18 months, until the end of the appraisal process, before mounting its challenge. There was a failure to apply within the time limit laid down inCPR 54.5 (1)(“promptly and in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose”), and there was therefore “undue delay” within the meaning of the statute. Had a prompt challenge been made, the court would have entertained it at that time, rather than allowing the appraisal process to continue for over a year in circumstances of doubt as to its lawfulness. 70. I do not accept that the court would have viewed an early challenge in that way. It is more likely that such a challenge would have been considered premature and inappropriate. At the time when NICE refused to release the fully executable version, it was uncertain what the outcome of the appraisal process would be. The Final Appraisal Determination might have proved to be acceptable to Eisai, in which case the issue concerning release of the fully executable version would have been academic. Further, and very importantly, Eisai had a right of appeal to the Appeal Panel against that determination, and the grounds on which such an appeal lay included procedural unfairness. That might well have been viewed as providing an appropriate alternative remedy, rendering a judicial review challenge inappropriate at that stage. 71. Even if there had been undue delay in applying for judicial review, it would only be a factor to be taken into account in the exercise of the court's discretion as to the grant of relief; and in the light of the matters set out below it would in my view be of no materiality. 72. Mr Pannick made clear that Eisai does not seek to have the existing guidance quashed if that can be avoided. It simply wants the fully executable version to be released to it and to have an opportunity to make representations on it, with a view to NICE making a further determination in the light of any such representations and with a right of appeal to the Appeal Panel if the further determination is adverse to Eisai. If that course can be achieved, as may well be possible through the provision of an appropriate undertaking by NICE, then it seems to me to be an eminently sensible one. 73. Mr Pannick also indicated that Eisai would want the court to make a declaration. For my part, I doubt whether a formal declaration would be appropriate. The judgment will speak for itself.”
“The exclusivity principle 20. The main issue in the present case turns on the effect of the so-called exclusivity” principle, established in O'Reilly v Mackman[1983] 2 AC 237 : that is, that in general it is an abuse of process to challenge the validity of public law actions or decisions other than by judicial review. Among the factors leading to this conclusion was the streamlined procedure by then available for judicial review, the requirement for leave, and the short time-limit (normally three months) for commencing proceedings. Lord Diplock said: “The public interest in administration requires that public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision-making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected by the decision.”
“What matters under the CPRregime is not the mode of commencement of proceedings but whether the choice of procedure may have a material effect on the outcome.”
“Distinction between public and private law”). 23. The problems described in those passages arose principally from cases in which private and public law principles overlapped (see De Smith para 3-102). I do not read them as seeking to undermine the principles that purely public acts should be challenged by judicial review, and that it is in the public interest that the legality of the formal acts of a public authority should be established without delay. The latter is confirmed by the retention inCPR 54 of the requirement that an application to bring judicial review proceedings must be made promptly, and in any event within three months. This principle is not undermined by the fact that it is subject to the general power to extend time-limits (CPR 3.1 (2)(a)), the exercise of which is itself governed by well-established principles (see 2010 White Book para 3.1.2, 54.5.1). 24. Nor do I find in the textbooks support for the suggestion that the existence of factual disputes is a reason for an exception to the exclusivity principle. The need to resolve such disputes does not often arise, because of the nature of most judicial review proceedings. But, when it does arise, it does not create any particular conceptual or procedural problems. The permission stage gives the court full control of the proceedings. It may give any necessary directions for the attendance of witnesses and cross-examination (CPR 8.6 (2)-(3) , not disapplied byCPR 54.16 : see White Book para 54.16.1-2, R (G) v Ealing LBC(No 2)[2002] EWHC 250 (Admin) para 20). 25. … 26. The exclusivity principle is in my view directly applicable in the present case. The service of a breach of condition notice is a purely public law act. There is strong public interest in its validity, if in issue, being established promptly, both because of its significance to the planning of the area, and because it turns what was merely unlawful into criminal conduct. It is an archetypal example of the public action which Lord Diplock would have had in mind. It does not come within any other categories identified in Wade and Forsyth or De Smith as requiring a more flexible approach.”
“The judicial review procedure has special provisions designated to protect public bodies, most notably, a short time limit and the need to obtain permission. Declarations and injunctions remain available by way of an ordinary Pt 7 or Pt 8 claim where these restrictions do not apply. The courts have had to consider the extent to which a declaration or injunction may be sought by way of an ordinary claim where the claim raises public law issues that could have been brought by way of a claim for judicial review.”