“a) In cases concerned with fire, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher requires two things. First, the defendant must have brought onto his land things which were likely to cause and/or catch fire, and kept them in such a condition that, if they ignited, the fire would be likely to spread to the claimant's land. To put it another way, those things must represent a recognisable risk to the owners of the adjoining land. Secondly, the actions on the part of the defendant must arise from a non-natural user of the defendant's land: see Mason and Transco. b) This rule, although carefully restricted in recent years, has twice avoided complete abolition: see Cambridge Water and Transco. c) A non-natural user should be considered by reference to contemporary standards. The existence of statutory regulations relating to the storage of the dangerous thing(s) may preclude the operation of the rule in a particular case: that was Lord Hoffmann's first factor in Transco. The existence, or otherwise, of insurance may be a relevant factor, although, as set out above, this was a matter on which the House of Lords emphatically disagreed. d) In the two leading cases of the last decade or so, it has been held that a pipe containing water for domestic purposes was not a non-natural user of land (see Transco) but that the storage of chemicals for the purposes of industrial tanning was a non-natural user (see Cambridge Water). Respectfully, I do not regard either conclusion as exceptionable. In addition, it was held, in both Mason and Hobbs, that the storage of inflammable materials was sufficient to trigger the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. e) Fire is plainly dangerous. Therefore, if the escape of fire from A's land to B's land was the (foreseeable) result of the storage of dangerous things that comprised a non-natural user of land by A, then, subject to the qualifications set out above, A is prima facie liable to B under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.”