"11. The Court's task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, which is the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the words bear. It is well recognised that there is an artificiality in this process because individual readers may understand words in different ways: Slim -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd[1968] 2 QB 157 , 173D–E, per Lord Diplock. 12. The following key principles can be distilled from the authorities: see e.g. Slim -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd 175F; Charleston -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd[1995] 2 AC 65 , 70; Gillick -v- Brook Advisory Centres[2002] EWCA Civ 1263 [7]; Charman -v- Orion Publishing Co Ltd[2005] EWHC 2187 (QB) [8]-[13]; Jeynes -v- News Magazines Ltd & Anor[2008] EWCA Civ 130 [14]; Doyle -v- Smith[2018] EWHC 2935 [54]-[56]; Lord McAlpine of West Green -v- Bercow[2013] EWHC 1342 (QB) [66]; Simpson -v- MGN Ltd [2016] EMLR 26 [15]; Bukovsky -v- Crown Prosecution Service[2017] EWCA 1529 [2018] 1 WLR 18 ; Brown -v- Bower[2017] 4 WLR 197 [10]-[16] and Sube -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd[2018] EWHC 1234 (QB) [20]: i) The governing principle is reasonableness. ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task. v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties. vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any 'bane and antidote' taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic "rogues' gallery" case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases). ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership. xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant's pleaded meaning). 13. As to the Chase levels of meaning, see Brown -v- Bower [17]: "
"If one repeats a rumour one adds one's own authority to it and implies that it is well founded, that is to say, that it is true. It is otherwise when one says or implies that a person is under suspicion of guilt. This does not imply that he is in fact guilty but only that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion, which is a di?erent matter."
"…you cannot escape liability for defamation by putting the libel behind a pre?x such as 'I have been told that …' or 'It is rumoured that …' and then asserting that it was true that you had been told or that it was in fact being rumoured. You have … to prove that the subject matter of the rumour was true … A rumour that a man is suspected of fraud is di?erent from one that he is guilty of it. For the purpose of the law of libel a hearsay statement is the same as a direct statement, and that is all there is to it."
"It is not therefore, correct to say as a matter of law that a statement of suspicion imputes guilt. It can be said as a matter of practice that it very often does so, because although suspicion of guilt is something di?erent from proof of guilt, it is the broad impression conveyed by the libel that has to be considered and not the meaning of each word under analysis. A man who wants to talk at large about smoke may have to pick his words very carefully if he wants to exclude the suggestion that there is also a ?re; but it can be done. One always gets back to the fundamental question: what is the meaning that the words convey to the ordinary man: you cannot make a rule about that."
"In my judgment, to produce a Chase level 1 meaning, the e?ect of the publication (taken as a whole) has to be the adoption or endorsing of the allegation. That adoption or endorsement may come from "bald" repetition (as May LJ observed in Shah ) or it may come from other context which signals to the reader that the allegation is being adopted when it is repeated. The converse is also true. The context may signal to the reader that the allegation is not being adopted or endorsed. Sometimes allegations are repeated to criticise the person who made them. When doing so, prudent publishers often expressly state that the allegations were "baseless", but whilst no doubt su?cient (in most cases) to prevent the publisher being found to have adopted the allegation by repetition it is not necessary in all cases for this to be stated expressly. It all depends upon the context."
"Taking responsibility for its further dissemination means, in this context, liability for republication of the allegation, but it does not mean that the court is bound to ?nd that the defamatory meaning that attached to the repetition is, in all cases, the same level as the original allegation. When the authorities speak of rejecting submissions that words repeating the allegations of others bear a lower meaning than the original publication that is a rejection of the premise that the statement is less defamatory (or not defamatory at all) simply because it is a report of what someone else has said. That kind of reasoning is what the repetition rule prohibits when applied to meaning. The meaning to be attached to the repetition of the allegation has still to be judged, applying the rules of interpretation I have set out above, looking at the publication as a whole."
"In some unusual circumstances, articles published at different times may be so interlinked that they can be considered in conjunction for some purposes, such as meaning, or reference (see, for instance, Hayward v Thompson[1982] 1 QB 47 ). But in general, for the purposes of assessing defamatory impact, a published article must be considered individually; it will not normally be appropriate or even possible to treat a number of articles as a single "statement" for the purpose of s 1, any more than it was at common law. It may, depending on the circumstances, be appropriate to take account of one or more previous articles as part of the context in which a given statement was published. But it is hard to see how the defamatory impact of one publication could be affected by the defamatory impact of a separate, later publication."
"Again, there is no dispute as to the principles to be applied. Drawn from Grech -v- Odhams Press[1958] 2 QB 75 ; Branson -v- Bower [2001] EMLR 32 ; Lowe -v- Associated Newspapers Ltd[2007] QB 580 ; Joseph -v- Spiller[2011] 1 AC 852 ; British Chiropractic Association -v- Singh[2011] 1 WLR 133 ; Yeo -v- Times Newspapers Limited[2015] 1 WLR 971 [88]-[89]; Wasserman -v- Freilich[2016] EWHC 312 (QB) ; Morgan -v- Associated Newspapers Limited[2018] EWHC 1850 (QB) [13]; and Zarb-Cousin -v- Association of British Bookmakers[2018] EWHC 2240 (QB) , when determining whether the words complained of contain allegations of fact or opinion, the Court will be guided by the following points: i) The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact. ii) Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc. iii) The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion. iv) Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, i.e. the statement is a bare comment. v) Whether an allegation that someone has acted "dishonestly" or "criminally" is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact."
"At common law, a meaning is defamatory and therefore actionable if it satisfies two requirements. The first, known as "the consensus requirement", is that the meaning must be one that "tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally."
"?Esther Baker's crowdsourcing page has been taken down after Simpson Millar solicitors (whose name was placed on the page without authorisation) asked for their name to be removed."
"At this point Baker has been dropped by four lawyers and three crowdfunding firms. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) has also declined to investigate her claims. Those organisations must have had good reasons – readers can draw their own conclusions.?"
"Unsubstantiated rape accuser Esther Baker, who accused former MP John Hemming and a number of other VIPs, has had her crowdfunding campaigned banned from yet another website – this time GoGetFunding.com. Esther Baker has now been dropped by four lawyers and three crowdfunding firms. This is the third site that has booted Baker and there is no point repeating all the problems with the campaign nor the evidence. My article about the many misrepresentations is ?here from the first time she got booted. My video about her dropping her Defence of Truth whilst telling potential donors they were going to help reveal the 'Truth' is? ?here?. At this point Baker has been dropped by four lawyers and three crowdfunding firms. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) has also declined to investigate her claims. Those organisations must have had good reasons – readers can draw their own conclusions. At this point it is barely worth a stub of an article."
"Recently, I reported some of her Twitter posts as harassment directed at myself and (indirectly) former MP John Hemming."
"I am far from the only complainant, with far more serious allegations outstanding."
"I put a draft of this article to police, with four questions –"
"It is now a court finding that former MP John Hemming did not rape Esther Baker and when she publicly accused him of doing so on Twitter, she libelled him."
"Mrs Justice Steyn ruled that Baker libelled Hemming by accusing him of rape on Twitter. Some aspects of the case remain live, the court has yet to rule on Baker's claim Hemming libelled her by calling her a liar and criminal but Baker has been prohibited from saying John Hemming raped her…"
"This was dishonest"
"And it's wrong. That defence is not blocked/dropped. My fundraising link is on my profile or pinned tweet [Smiley face emoticon]."
"Although the evidence against Baker seems strong, it is important to note that the case is indeed going to trial. Whether she is a liar, mad or just mistaken is yet to be proven. However, Ms Baker has taken the very unusual course of formally declining to file evidence."
"On17th December 2019 Esther Baker filed her Re-Amended Reply to Defence in the claim ? Baker v Hemming ?. By way of brief explanation, Esther Baker was an abuse accuser who alleged that a group of VIPs and others ritually abused her. No charges have been brought. She has attempted to sue one of the VIPs, former MP John Hemming for libel for calling her a liar. He counter-sued for libel over her rape allegations. Much of Baker's claim was struck out last year and she lost the counter-claim entirely, with ?Mrs Justice Steyn ruling her allegations of VIP ritual abuse, ?"untrue"?. Baker is now supposedly under police investigation."