“i) The governing principle is reasonableness. ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or nondefamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task. v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties. vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any 'bane and antidote' taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic "rogues' gallery" case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases). ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership. xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant's pleaded meaning).”
“(1) The court should give to the material complained of the natural and ordinary meaning which it would have conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer watching the programme once in [the year in which it was broadcast]. … (3) While limiting its attention to what the defendant has actually said or written, the court should be cautious of an overelaborate analysis of the material in issue. … In the present case we must remind ourselves that this was a factual programme, likely to appeal primarily to a seriously minded section of television viewers, but it was a programme which, even if watched continuously, would have been seen only once by viewers many of whom may have switched on for entertainment. Its audience would not have given it the analytical attention of a lawyer to the meaning of a document, an auditor to the interpretation of accounts, or an academic to the content of a learned article. In deciding what impression the material complained of would have been likely to have on the hypothetical reasonable viewer we are entitled (if not bound) to have regard to the impression it made on us.”
“It is important to acknowledge that assessing the meaning(s) of an hour long television programme is to a large extent a matter of impression. Yet it is also necessary to remember that the test is objective, so that one must always have in mind how the reasonable viewer would interpret it. Nonetheless it is recognised in the authorities that the judge can take into account his or her own subjective reason as part of the process. Beyond that, one must not be over-analytical, in the sense of subjecting the text to a leisurely or legalistic breakdown: ordinary viewers will not have had that opportunity. The overall flavour of a programme may contribute to an interpretation which would not necessarily be found when subjecting the text to piecemeal analysis. There is a risk that such an exercise will focus on the trees and miss the wood.”
“37. The task with which the Court is faced in this case in substantial and unusual and has to be approached with particular care. The Court is asked to determine the meaning of words spoken in the course of 25 TV programmes. However, because the TV programmes were entirely in Urdu, the Court cannot glean the meaning from simply watching recordings of the broadcasts. The Court is necessarily reliant on studying translations of the transcripts of the broadcasts. To this extent, the Court is having to approach the task twice-removed, i.e. through the filter of the transcript and the translation. The Court does not have the benefit of gaining the immediate impression which the words spoken would have had on the hypothetical viewer in the original broadcast. Further, the problem is compounded by the fact that much of the broadcasts amount to a ‘stream of consciousness’ by the presenter, Mr Luqman, in language which is not always syntactically correct or easily comprehensible. 38. In order to address these problems, and guard against literalism and over-reliance on textual analysis at the expense of the immediate impact of the spoken word, the approach I have adopted is as follows: (1) First, I played the DVD of the broadcasts with the transcripts in hand. I did not, of course, watch all 12 hours, because I do not speak Urdu; but I watched enough of each broadcast to get a flavour of the tone and structure of each programme and the style and approach of the presenter, Mr Luqman, and his various guests. (2) Second, I read the full English translations of the entire transcripts of each broadcast and formed my own impression of the meaning of the particular words complained of in each broadcast highlighted in yellow. (3) Third, I considered counsels’ written and oral submissions in relation to each broadcast. (4) Fourth, I replayed the DVD with the transcript and my notes to hand in order to confirm or adjust the impression I had formed as to meaning in relation to each broadcast.” (1) First, I played the DVD of the broadcasts with the transcripts in hand. I did not, of course, watch all 12 hours, because I do not speak Urdu; but I watched enough of each broadcast to get a flavour of the tone and structure of each programme and the style and approach of the presenter, Mr Luqman, and his various guests. (2) Second, I read the full English translations of the entire transcripts of each broadcast and formed my own impression of the meaning of the particular words complained of in each broadcast highlighted in yellow. (3) Third, I considered counsels’ written and oral submissions in relation to each broadcast. (4) Fourth, I replayed the DVD with the transcript and my notes to hand in order to confirm or adjust the impression I had formed as to meaning in relation to each broadcast.”
“10. I saw from his paragraph 38 how Haddon-Cave J dealt with the challenge of viewing foreign-language video. It is a real challenge. On the one hand it is important, as discussed below, not to over-labour what is essentially an impressionistic exercise. On the other hand, there is an irreducible minimum of effort involved in the basic task of accessing content. Unlike Haddon-Cave J, I was considering a few minutes’ footage only, so I adopted a variant of his technique. I watched the item once through, to get an impression of genre and tone, and a clear view of the video images. With that in mind, I next read the transcript and translations. I then watched the video again, along with the English texts, to get an overall impression of meaning. I formed and noted some provisional views. 11. I then read the preliminary issues trial bundle and the skeleton arguments lodged for both parties. I heard oral submissions at trial and reserved judgment. Finally, I replayed the item with the transcript and my notes to hand to confirm or adjust the impression I had formed as to meaning.”
“At common law, “A meaning or imputation, whether it be one of fact or opinion, is defamatory only if it would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that right- thinking members of society generally would treat the claimant”
“b) was venal, mercenary and a hypocrite. Whilst purporting to support Khalistan independence in reality he was an agent in the pay of Lord Nazir Ahmed promoting the interests of Pakistan against India where previously he had been in the pay of Indian nationalists.”
“fomented division, hatred and violence between Sikhs and Indians, and between Indians and Pakistanis.”
“was a member of a family which had been ordering the Guru Granth Sahib from India through their business.”