“The working group also considered the extent to which operational housing services including homelessness and housing advice should be included within any proposed trust. The group were of the view that there were significant benefits to continuing to provide these currently interlinked services within the trust, although based on a separate service level agreement”
“With regard to the delegation of aspects of homelessness, housing advice and Housing Needs Service, the Council’s legal advisors, Trowers and Hamlin, have been able to confirm that the proposed detail of delegation is fully compliant with theLocal Authorities (Contracting Out of Allocations and Housing and Homelessness Function) Order 1996 . As a result the council can be confident that it is able to meet its statutory duties in those respects under current legislation.”
“(1) If an Applicant who has requested a review under s. 202 – (a) is dissatisfied with the decision on the review, or (b) is not notified of the decision on the review within the time prescribed under s. 203, he may appeal to the county court on any point of law arising from the decision or, as the case may be the original decision.”
“The Council may contract out to another body or organisation non-executive functions provided that there is no delegation of the Council’s discretionary decision making. The Cabinet may contract out executive functions on the same basis.”
“Councils may wish to make clear those functions to which this section currently or potentially applies. These [Council under alternative arrangements and for functions which are not executive functions] [executive for executive functions] may contract out to another body or organisation functions which may be exercised by an officer and which are subject to an order unders. 70 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 , or under contracting arrangements where the contractor acts as the council’s agent under usual contacting principles (sic), provided there is no delegation of the Council’s discretionary decision making.”
“11.4 The Council may contract out to another body or organisation non-executive functions which may be exercised by an officer and which are subject to an Order undersection 70 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 , or under contracting arrangements where the contractor acts as the Council’s agent under usual contacting principles (sic), provided in the latter case that there is no delegation of the Council’s discretionary decision making. The Cabinet may contract out executive functions on the same basis.”
“(1) this section applies to any function of the local authority – (a) which is conferred by or under any enactment; … (1A) this section also applies to any function of the local authority – (a) if, and to the extent that, it is the responsibility of an executive of that local authority under executive arrangements, within the meaning ofPart II of the Local Government Act 2000 ; … (4) subsections (4) and (5) of section 69 above shall apply for the purposes of this section as they apply for the purposes of that section and in subsection (5) of that section as so applied any reference to the Minister or office-holder by whom the authorisation is given shall be construed as a reference to the local authority by which the authorisation is given.” … (a) if, and to the extent that, it is the responsibility of an executive of that local authority under executive arrangements, within the meaning ofPart II of the Local Government Act 2000 ; … The effect of s. 70(4) is that the authorisation “shall be for such period, not exceeding 10 years, as is specified in the authorisation” (see s. 69 (5)). Plainly, s. 70 (1) is wide enough to cover the entirety of the Respondent’s homelessness functions, whether or not the latter comprise “discretionary decision making”. (2)The Local Authorities (Contracting Out of Allocation of Housing and Homelessness Functions) Order 1996 , (1996 SI No 3205) Article 3 provides: “Contracting Out of Homelessness Functions Any function of an authority which is conferred by or under Part VII of the Act (homelessness) except one which is listed in Schedule 2 to this Order, may be exercised by, or by employees of, such person (if any) as may be authorised on their behalf by the authority whose function it is.”
“the functions that it may be appropriate for a local authority to retain that relate to housing include: …homelessness responsibilities (see paragraph 3.8 below).” …homelessness responsibilities (see paragraph 3.8 below).”
“in order to set the scene for an examination of these issues I must say a bit more about the statutory background. This is important, as the questions that arose for decision in this case must be seen in that context. They were, as I have said, pure questions of fact. But they were, in each case, only one of a number of questions that had to be addressed in order to decide whether the Defendant’s duty under s. 193 had come to an end. Their resolution was a stepping stone to a consideration of a much broader question as to whether the accommodation that had been declined was suitable. This called for the exercise of expertise and judgment on a variety of factual issues. The scheme of the statute is that a decision on all these questions is entrusted, in the event of a review, to the reviewing officer and is subject to appeal on a point of law only.”
“RESOLVED: that the management fee of£9,397,420.00 be agreed from within the overall approved housing revenue account, general fund and capital budget for 2010/11”
“In that regard, in accordance with Article 1(a) of Directive 93/36, it is, in principle, sufficient if the contract was concluded between, on the one hand, a local authority and, on the other hand, a person legally distinct from that local authority. The position can be otherwise only in the case where the local authority exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities”
“So long as no private interests are involved, they are acting solely in the public interest in the carrying out of their public service tasks and they are not contriving to circumvent the rules on public procurement, the conditions are likely to be satisfied.” and “I would sum up my conclusions on the control test, in the light of the guidance offered by these authorities, as follows. Individual control is not necessary. No injury will be caused to the policy objective of the Directive if public authorities are allowed to participate in the collective procurement of goods and services, so long as no private interests are involved and they are acting solely in the public interests in the carrying out of their public service tasks.”
“The question to be considered is whether as a matter of construction ofs. 101 of the 1972 Act the statutory powers with which this appeal is concerned, can be exercised with retrospective effect. I do not find it necessary, nor indeed desirable, to consider this question as a matter of general application. Indeed I do not think that a comprehensive answer could probably be given. Quite obviously each exercise of delegation must be considered in its own statutory context. In the present case, which involves the exercise of draconian powers affecting the rights of individual property owners, the court will be slow to adopt a construction ofs. 101 of the 1972 Act which will detract from or negative the protection given to the property owner unders. 379(1) of the 1985 Act . If the requirement that certain qualifying conditions must appear to exist to the council is not fulfilled either by resolution of the council or of the sub-committees or delegate properly appointed, then this omission should not be capable of ratification by a retrospective delegation of authority to an officer who has wrongly assumed such authority. That this is so is supported by the fact that Parliament has seen fit to import a special relief provision ins. 384 of the 1985 Act . If Parliament had envisaged thats. 101 of the Local Government Act 1972 should have retroactive effect for the purpose of delegating powers to be exercised unders. 379 of the Housing Act 1985 then it would have been necessary to include in s. 384 this provision: “insofar as an appeal is based on the ground that the control order is invalid, the court shall confirm the order unless satisfied that the interests of the Appellant have been substantially prejudiced by the facts relied upon by him.”
“If by virtue of the date by which a decision must be taken Rule 13 (general exception) cannot be followed, then the decision can only be taken if the decision taker in this case either the Cabinet or individual member of the Cabinet making the decision, obtains the agreement of the Chairman of the appropriate Overview and Scrutiny committee that the taking of the decision cannot be reasonably deferred…”
“You moved to 99 Belvedere Avenue, Carmarthen in July 2009. At this time you were in a relationship with Mr Tachie and he moved into the accommodation with you during this period. During the period of living at this address in June 2010 Mr Tachie found work with Eurest Services in Hatfield. He decided to stay with friends during the week and travel back to be with you and the family at weekends and during his holiday period. Indeed whilst working for Eurest Services, the home address on Mr Tachie’s payslips was 99 Belvedere Avenue, Carmarthen. You later married in December whilst living at this address. It is therefore clear that the accommodation was available for the whole family. In terms of whether it was reasonable given the location of Mr Tachie’s work. This appears to have been a lifestyle choice, you were both living at this address before Mr Tachie took up work in Hatfield, if you wish to be living and working in the same area, it would therefore have been up to you to identify accommodation closer to Mr Tachie’s place of work.”
“We have been asked to move out by the family that we have been staying with since arriving from Southampton August 15th 2011. They say cannot continue to live with us after saying the house and arrangement is not working out.”
“The family lived in Southampton since 2001 where they were privately renting. Mr Terera worked for Hampshire District Council. Mr Terera gave up his job and home to move to this borough as he was given a place at our university to train to be a social worker. They have been living with friends of friends at 7 Newstead since August and claim to have been looking for their own accommodation. They are no longer getting on with the family they are staying with and have been told to leave today…”
“I’m not really quite sure either why I increased his priority or felt that he was vulnerable if homeless but, perhaps felt from the GP letter that his condition had in some way worsened. On overall review of all the information I feel that, in fact, “recognised” was the correct priority and that he should be able to fend for himself if homeless from the medical perspective”
“Naturally his depression is likely to worsen if he becomes homeless. This does not, however, mean that he will take his medication any less regularly nor that his depression would necessarily destabilise, although of course there is a risk that it might do so.”
“If you were homeless, it is natural in considering whether you are vulnerable when street homeless, that anyone in this position would suffer from some level of depression. With continued use of your medication, I do not see any reason to believe you would be at any greater harm or detriment than the ordinary street homeless person suffering related depressive symptoms.”
“(2) If the reviewer considers that there is a deficiency or irregularity in the original decision, or in the manner in which it was made, but is minded nonetheless to make a decision which is against the interest of the Applicant on one or more issues, the reviewer shall notify the Applicant: (a) that the reviewer is so minded and the reasons why; and (b) that the Applicant, or someone acting on his behalf, may make representations to the reviewer orally or in writing or both orally and in writing.” 89. Mr Vanhegan submitted that this regulation was triggered on the facts of this case. There was a “deficiency or irregularity in the original decision, or in the manner in which it was made”, namely the Respondent’s medical officer’s stark change of mind. There should therefore have been a “minded to refuse” letter inviting further representations, if necessary provided orally. In support of this submission Mr Vanhegan relied on Lambeth LBC v Johnstone[2009] HLR 10 where the Court of Appeal stated that there was a mandatory obligation in the local authority first to consider whether there has been a deficiency or irregularity in the decision or the manner in which it was made; and, secondly – if there was – to serve a “minded to refuse” notice. On the facts of that case the obligation was triggered because the local authority had failed to carry out appropriate inquiries: thus, there was “something lacking” of sufficient importance to the fairness of the procedure to justify the extra procedural safeguard. Furthermore, Mr Vanhegan submitted that the process was unfair because his client was given no opportunity to comment on the medical officer’s third expression of opinion. 90. This ground of appeal turns on what is meant by “deficiency or irregularity in the decision, or the manner in which it was made”
‘long term depression, on quite a high dose of anti-depressant medication used to treat the more severe levels of depression. He has a history of attempted suicide although this was in 2003. Does not appear to be under mental health team care. He also has some physical conditions outlined in GP Letter, these in my opinion would not significantly reduce his ability to fend if homeless. Overall in view of his severe depression and the risk of an acute relapse (with possible self harming if this happened) if homeless, in my opinion this makes him vulnerable. Priority high’ 3/317 16.12.11 Home visit to Appellant by Katie Burgess Asked about medical condition. Ms Burgess advised that he was not considered to be vulnerable and there was no duty to accommodate him 3/297-8 21.12.11 s.184 Decision Not vulnerable. Not in priority need. Katie Burgess, Housing Options Officer 3/66-69 23.1.12 Pre-action protocol letter for JR proceedings Alleged failure to make a decision on homelessness application (the point advanced being the Common Issues) and failure to respond to request for accommodation pending review 3/96-100 5.1.12 App’s solicitors request housing file 3/70 10.1.12 Request for review, detailed representations to follow 3/79 10.1.12 Request for accommodation pending review 3/80-1 10.1.12 Review request acknowledged 3/83-4 19.1.12 Temporary accommodation pending review refused 3/94-5 Pre-action protocol letter for JR proceedings 3/96-100 Respondent acknowledges receipt of letter dated 23.1.13. Agrees to accommodate pending review 3/101 31.1.12 App’s representations in support of review request. All but three paragraphs of the four page letter concentrate on the contracting out point 3/106-9 27.2.12 Respondent asks its medical advisor to re-assess the medical information 3/318 27.2.12 Dr Watson, Medical advisor’s opinion (2) Cover letter: ‘to follow my reassessment re Yucil Il. I am really not quite sure either why I increased his priority or felt that he was vulnerable if homeless, but, perhaps felt from the GP letter that his condition had in some way worsened. On overall review of all of the information I feel that in fact ‘recognised; was the correct priority and that he should be able to fend for himself if homeless from the medical perspective. I feel that the 2nd to last paragraph of your letter (beginning ‘whilst we acknowledge…) sums up the situation very well’ 3/319-20 Medical Advisor’s Recommendations: ‘…condition is well controlled…not under MHT care…’