‘136. Amazon relies on Nokia’s worldwide campaign of litigation, commenced in October 2023. Those include proceedings in: Germany (where the earliest infringement trial is listed to be heard in September 2024, with others in the following months); the ITC (in the US, where it is anticipated that an exclusion order could be issued in April 2025, becoming enforceable in June 2025); Brazil (where an injunction was obtained in December 2023, lifted temporarily, but reinstated in January 2024); India (where there is a hearing in August 2024, although it is anticipated that there will be a number of further hearings over an uncertain time period before an injunction would be granted); and the Unified Patent Court (where a decision is anticipated in late 2024 or early 2025). 137. Amazon contends that it is accordingly at increasing risk of being excluded from a number of major markets over the course of the next year, and will suffer significant harm as a result. The only means of avoiding that damage would be to give in to the commercial pressure by agreeing to licences on the supra-RAND terms which Nokia demands.’
‘11. [Counsel for Lenovo] refers to the fact that there is as yet no mechanism devised by the courts for holding the ring pending determination of a FRAND licence. A patentee such as InterDigital is therefore free to take action in other jurisdictions to try and prevent an implementer from selling its products, with the aim or at least consequence of encouraging it to enter into licences at rates demanded by the patentee – which the implementer contends are “supra” FRAND rates. 12. He submitted that while the UK Courts – which have taken on the task of setting global FRAND terms – have not so far identified an effective way of holding the ring pending trial, what they can do is to minimise the period during which an implementer is suffering damage, by expediting the trial. 13. He further submitted that InterDigital is participating in classic “hold-up” behaviour: it has already obtained an injunction in Germany precluding Lenovo from selling its products there, and is pursuing proceedings in the USA which, if successful, are likely to have the effect of excluding Lenovo from using five of its patents there, from about July 2025. This is a case, accordingly, where Lenovo can point to actual as well as threatened harm as a result of the delay between now and obtaining judgment in the FRAND trial.’
‘16. The very fact that InterDigital is insistent on maintaining its injunction, and refuses to stay enforcement pending trial, is compelling support for the conclusion that damage is caused by it. InterDigital accepts that it has sought the injunction because of a perceived benefit to it in doing so. That is likely to be, it seems to me, because the injunction causes harm to Lenovo.’
‘It is the third appeal on this issue to come before this Court in quick succession following Panasonic Holdings Corp v Xiaomi Technology UK Ltd[2024] EWCA Civ 1143 , in which the Court declared that a willing licensor in Panasonic’s position would grant Xiaomi an interim licence, and Alcatel Lucent SAS v Amazon Digital UK Ltd[2025] EWCA Civ 43 , in which the Court held that Amazon had a real prospect of success on their claim for a declaration that a willing licensor in Nokia’s position would grant Amazon an interim licence, and therefore Amazon should be permitted to amend their statements of case to advance that claim.’
‘…Xiaomi has done what it is that the UK court has expressed that an implementer in its position ought to do, which is commit to FRAND terms and move efficiently towards their determination.’
‘139. Both parties are major commercial concerns. Provided they are acting within their legal rights, they are free to exert whatever commercial pressure they consider appropriate in order to improve their negotiating position. On the other hand, (F)RAND is a process within which a patentee is required to behave consistently with its obligation to grant a licence on (F)RAND terms and an implementer is required to behave consistently with its need to take such a licence: InterDigital Technology Corp v Lenovo Group Ltd[2024] EWCA Civ 743 , per Arnold LJ at §39. Faced with an implementer prepared to undertake to enter into a licence on terms which this court (assuming it has jurisdiction to do so) declares to be RAND, it hardly lies in the mouth of a patentee, whose actions in taking enforcement action against the implementer in multiple jurisdictions is at least prima facie in conflict with its RAND obligations, to object to this court taking the view that such enforcement action provides a reason for seeking to resolve the RAND dispute as soon as practicable. 140. That view has been taken in at least two other cases: Panasonic Holdings Corp v Xiaomi Technology UK Ltd[2024] EWHC 1733 (Pat) and Lenovo Group Ltd v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson[2024] EWHC 1734 (Pat) . 141. In my judgment, the continuing and increasing risk of harm by reason of Nokia’s campaign of enforcement action in other jurisdictions does demonstrate a sufficient need for urgency to justify a measure of expedition. In the absence, so far, of a mechanism for holding the ring between patentees and implementers pending resolution of the terms of a RAND licence, the only available tool to address the problems that arise prior to that point is to try to ensure speedier resolution of those terms. 142. Miss Davies [Counsel for Amazon] suggested that an order for expedition would in some way be considered a criticism of the courts in other jurisdictions. I do not accept this. Different courts may well take different views as to the maintenance of the appropriate balance between the risk of hold-up (by patentees) and hold-out (by implementers). The purpose of expedition is simply to ensure that the moment at which a licence is in fact implemented – so that it is no longer relevant to maintain any such balance – is reached sooner rather than later.’
‘If ZTE gives a reciprocal undertaking to the English Court not to seek or enforce any injunctive relief in respect of patent infringement anywhere in the world pending the final UK FRAND determination (i.e., after exhaustion of all appeals), Samsung will give an undertaking to the English Court not to seek or enforce any injunctive relief in respect of patent infringement anywhere in the world pending the final UK FRAND determination. For the avoidance of doubt, the above proposal relates to injunctive relief for patent infringement in the relevant proceedings and so would not impact the Chongqing, Frankfurt or NDCA proceedings (and is entirely without prejudice to the parties’ respective positions in those proceedings).’
‘1. Samsung’s position on injunctive relief is as set out in its letter of13 March 2025 , … Samsung awaits ZTE’s response to that letter. 2. If ZTE rejects the proposal set out in the 13 March letter or fails to respond to it by21 March 2025 , Samsung’s position is: a) If Samsung obtains injunctive relief in any parallel patent infringement proceedings, Samsung would not enforce injunctive relief against ZTE in those proceedings pending the UK FRAND Trial subject to paragraph 2(b) below. b) If ZTE obtains and threatens to enforce (or enforces) any injunctive relief against Samsung in any parallel patent infringement proceedings prior to the UK FRAND Trial that prevents Samsung from continuing to sell products in any jurisdiction, then Samsung reserves the right to enforce any injunctive relief in any parallel patent infringement proceedings against ZTE.’
‘57 In the present case it was common ground between the experts who gave evidence as to Chinese law before the judge that the Chongqing court will apply Chinese law when determining the terms of a global FRAND licence. Indeed, the Guangdong Higher People's Court expressly rejected an argument that the Shenzhen first instance court should have applied French law in Huawei Technology Co Ltd v InterDigital Communications Inc (2013) Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No.305. Moreover, Ms Liao questioned why French law or the ETSI obligation were relevant to calculation of the applicable royalty rate at all. 58 The significance of this point is that, while the Supreme Court rejected a "hard-edged" approach to non-discrimination in Unwired Planet, it is common ground that that is the approach that has been adopted by the Chinese courts to date in cases involving PRC-only licences. Although there is no precedent in which a Chinese court has addressed this issue in a case involving a global licence, there is no evidence that this is likely to make a difference. As a result, Henry Carr J found in Conversant at [62(i)] and [63] that proceedings in China "would result in a lower rate for the entire portfolio than would be granted in other parts of the world". This is of particular concern for Nokia in circumstances where Oppo may seek to point to the 2018 licence as the appropriate comparator when adopting a hard-edged approach. 59 As Meade J observed in Optis Cellular Technology LLC v Apple Retail UK Ltd[2021] EWHC 2564 (Pat) at [187], "[t]he decision by an implementer to accept or reject the UK Court's FRAND rate is driven not by whether the FRAND rate is truly FRAND but only by whether it matches the implementer's expectations of what it might get from another Court in another jurisdiction." For the reason explained above, if the Chongqing court is found to be the appropriate forum, it is likely that that court will apply a different law and a different approach to FRAND to the English court, probably resulting in lower licence fees payable by OPPO. Nokia argue that this is a compelling reason why the English court is the appropriate forum for the trial of this dispute.’
“[g]ood administration of justice involves really two aspects. The first is consideration of the interests of the various parties before me, and the efficient disposal of their various competing claims. The second aspect involves those parties who are not before the court, that is to say other litigants who would be prejudiced if these claims are given expedited treatment in preference to theirs.”